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Croatia – Geographical and political profile 
Official name Republic of Croatia (Republika Hrvatska) 
Independence 25 June 1991 
Area 56,542 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (932 km), Hungary (329 km), Serbia (241 
km), Montenegro (25 km), Slovenia (670 km), coastline (5,835 km) 
Population 4.5 million (2007, est.) 
Density 78 inhabitants per km² 
Distribution 53.3% urban population, 46.7% rural population (2002) 
Population profile Croat (89.6%), Serb (4.5%), Bosniak (0.47%), Hungarian (0.37%), 
Czech (0.34%), Slovene (0.3%), Roma (0.21%) (2001 census) 
Languages Croatian (96.1%), Serbian (1%), other, including Italian, Hungarian, 
Czech, Slovak and German (2.9%) (2001 census) 
Religions Roman Catholic (87.8%), Orthodox (4.4%), Muslim (1.3%), 
Protestant (0.3%), others (6.2%) 
Life expectancy Average: 74.9 years, male: 71.3 years, female: 78.8 years (2007 est.) 
Main political parties 
in Parliament (152 
seats) 
HDZ - Croatian Democratic Union (63), SDP - Social Democratic 
Party (34), HNS - Croatian People’s Party (11), HSS - Croatian 
Peasants’ Party (9) 
President Stjepan (Stipe) MESIC (HNS, since 18 February 2000) 
Prime Minister Ivo SANADER (HDZ, since 9 December 2003) 
 
Croatia – Economic profile 
GDP Approx. €27.6 billion (2004) 
GDP per capita €6,200 in purchasing power standards (48.86% of EU-25 average) 
(2004) 
Economic growth 5.3% in 2003; 3.8% in 2004; 4.3% in 2005; 4.6% in 2006 
Inflation rate  3.4% (2006 est.) 




Currency  Kuna (HRK) 
Government budget 
balance  
-3.9% of GDP 
Current account 
balance 
-7.7% of GDP (second quarter of 2006, four quarter moving 
average) 
Foreign debt  82.5% of GDP (end 2005) 
FACTS AND FIGURES XXVIII 
Croatia – Economic profile (cont’d) 
Natural resources oil, some coal, bauxite, low-grade iron ore, calcium, gypsum, 
natural asphalt, silica, mica, clays, salt, hydropower 
Agricultural products wheat, sugar beets, sunflower seed, barley, alfalfa, clover, olives, 
citrus, grapes, soybeans, potatoes, livestock, dairy products 
Industries chemicals and plastics, machinery, fabricated metal, electronics, pig 
iron and rolled steel products, aluminium, paper, wood products, 
construction materials, textiles, shipbuilding, petroleum (refining), 
food and beverages, tourism 
Export products transport equipment, textiles, chemicals, foodstuffs, fuels 




Export: Italy 21.8%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 14.7%, Germany 
10.7%, Slovenia 8.1%, Austria 7.3% (2005) 
Import: Italy 15.9%, Germany 14.9%, Russia 9.1%, Slovenia 6.8%, 
Austria 5.8%, China 4.7%, France 4.2% (2005) 
Trade with the EU  Exports to the EU: 64% of total (€3.92 billion) (2005)  
Imports from the EU: 70% of total (€9.78 billion) (2005) 
Trade deficit = €5.86 billion 
 
Macedonia – Geographical and political profile 
Official name The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Independence 8 September 1991 
Area 25,333 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries 
Albania (151 km border), Serbia (221 km), Bulgaria (148 km), 
Greece (246 km), coastline (0 km) 
Population 2.06 million (2007 est.) 
Density 78.7 inhabitants per km² 
Population profile Macedonian (64.2%), Albanian (25.2%), Turkish (3.9%), Roma 
(2.7%), Serb (1.8%), Bosniak (0.8%), Vlach (0.5%), other (0.9%) 
(2002 census) 
Languages Macedonia (66.5%), Albania (25.1%), Turkish (3.5%), Serbia 
(1.2%), other (3.7%) 
Religions Orthodox (64.8%), Muslim (33.3%), other (1.9%) (2002 census) 
Life expectancy Average: 74.2 years, male: 71.7 years, female: 76.9 years (2007 est.) 
Main political parties 
in Parliament (120 
seats) 
VMRO-DPMNE (VMRO-Democratic Party for Macedonia 
National Unity) (45), SDSM (Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia) (32), BDI/DUI (Democratic Union of Integration) (17), 
PDSh-DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) (11) 
President Branko CRVENKOVSKI (SDSM, since 12 May 2004) 
Prime Minister Nikola GRUEVSKI (VMRO-DPMNE, since 26 August 2006) 
FACTS AND FIGURES XXIX 
Macedonia – Economic profile 
GDP Approx. €4.3 billion (2004) 
GDP per capita  €5,600 in purchasing power standards (25% of EU-25 average) 
(2004) 
Economic growth 4.0% in 2005; 3.1% in 2006 
Inflation rate 3% (2006 est.) 




Currency Macedonian Denar (MKD) 
Government budget 
balance 
2005 budget surplus: 0.3% of GDP (general government) 
Current account 
balance 
-1.4% of GDP ( 2005) 
Foreign debt 38% of GDP (natura, August 2006) 
Natural resources low-grade iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, chromite, manganese, nickel, 
tungsten, gold, silver, asbestos, gypsum, timber, arable land 
Agricultural products grapes, wine, tobacco, vegetables, milk, eggs 
Industries food processing, beverages, textiles, chemicals, iron, steel, cement, 
energy, pharmaceuticals 
Export products food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, miscellaneous manufactures, iron 
and steel 




Export: Serbia and Montenegro 22.5%, Germany 17.8%, Greece 
15.3%, Italy 8.3% (2005)  
Import: Russia 13.2%, Germany 10.4%, Greece 9.2%, Serbia and 
Montenegro 8.2%, Bulgaria 7.3%, Italy 6% (2005) 
Trade with the EU Exports to the EU: 52.3% of total (2004)  
Imports from the EU: 64.4% of total (2004) 
 
Albania – Geographical and political profile 
Official name Republic of Albania 
Independence 28 November 1912 
Area 28,748 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries 
Greece (282 km), FYROM (151 km), Montenegro (172 km), Serbia 
(115 km), coastline (362 km) 
Population 3.6 million (2007 est.) 
Density 109 inhabitants per km² 
Distribution 44% urban population, 56% in rural areas 
Population profile Albania (95%), Greek (3%), other (2%) (Vlach, Roma, Serb, Mace-
donian, Bulgarian) (1989 est.) 
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Albania – Geographical and political profile (cont’d) 
Languages Albanian, Greek, Vlach, Romani, Slavic dialects 
Religions Muslim (70%), Albanian Orthodox (20%), Roman Catholic (10%) 
(est.) 
Life expectancy Average: 77.6 years, male: 74.9 years, female: 80.5 years (2007 est.) 
Main political parties 
in Parliament 
(140 seats) 
Democratic Party (56), Socialist Party (42), Republican Party (11), 
Party of Social Democracy (7), Liberal Union Party (5), other (19)  
President Alfred MOISIU (DP, since 24 June 2002) 
Prime Minister Sali BERISHA (SP, since 10 September 2005) 
 
Albania – Economic profile 
GDP Approx. €5.4 billion (2004) 
GDP per capita €3,983 in purchasing power standards (8% of EU-25 average) 
(2003 est.) 
Economic growth  3.4% in 2002; 6.0% in 2003; 6.3% in 2004; 5% in 2006 
Inflation rate 2.4% in 2003; 3.4% in 2004; 2.5% in 2006 




Currency  Lek 
Government budget 
balance  
-4.9% of GDP (2004) 
Current account 
balance  
-6.0% of GDP (2004) 
Foreign debt  20.2% of GDP (2003) 
Natural resources petroleum, natural gas, coal, bauxite, chromite, copper, iron ore, 
nickel, salt, timber, hydropower 
Agricultural products wheat, corn, potatoes, vegetables, fruits, sugar beets, grapes, meat, 
dairy products 
Industries food processing, textiles and clothing, lumber, oil, cement, 
chemicals, mining, basic metals, hydropower 
Export products textiles and footwear, asphalt, metals and metallic ores, crude oil, 
vegetables, fruits, tobacco 
Import products machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, textiles, chemicals 
Most prominent 
trading partners 
Export: Italy 72.4%, Greece 10.5%, Serbia and Montenegro 5% 
(2005)  
Import: Italy 29.3%, Greece 16.4%, Turkey 7.5%, China 6.6%, 
Germany 5.4%, Russia 4% (2005) 
Trade with the EU  Exports to EU-25: €1.11 million (2003) 
Imports from EU-25: €368 million (90%) (2003) 
Trade deficit = €393 million 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina – Geographical and political profile 
Official name  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Independence 1 March 1992 
Entities Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska, Brcko district 
Area  51,129 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries  
Croatia (932 km), Montenegro (225 km), Serbia (302 km), coastline 
(20 km) 
Population  4.5 million (2007 est.) 
Density  71 inhabitants per km² (est.) 
Distribution  43% urban population, 57% rural population (est.) 
Population profile  Bosniak (48%), Serb (37.1%), Croat (14.3%), other 0.6% (2000 est.) 
Languages  Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian 
Religions Muslim (40%), Orthodox (31%), Catholic (15%), Protestant (4%), 
other (10%) (est.) 
Life expectancy  Average: 78.2 years, male: 74.6 years, female: 82.0 years (2007 est.) 
Main political parties 
in the House of 
Representatives 
(42 seats) 
Party for Democratic Action (SDA, Bosniak) (9), Party for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (SBiH, Bosniak) (8), Party of Independent Social 
Democrats (SNSD, Serb) (7), Social Democratic Party of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (SDP BiH, multi-ethnic) (5), Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ, Croat) (3), Serb Demo-
cratic Party (SDS, Serb) (3), Croat Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 
1990, Croat) (2) 
Presidency (rotating) Nebojsa RADMANOVIC (Serb), Haris SILAJDZIC (Bosniak) and 
Zeljko KOMSIC (Croat) (since November 2006) 
Prime Minister BiH Nikola SPIRIC (since 11 January 2007) 
Prime Minister RS Milorad DODIK (since November 2006) 
Prime Minister FBiH Nedzad BRANKOVIC (since March 2007) 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – Economic profile 
GDP Approx. €7.5 billion (2005) 
GDP per capita €933 (2005) 
Economic growth 6% (2006 est.) 
Inflation rate 8.2% (2006, following the introduction of VAT) 




Currency Convertible Mark (KM) 
Government budget 
balance 
+0.9% of GDP (2005) 
Current account 
balance 
-21.7% of GDP (2005) 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina – Economic profile (cont’d) 
Foreign debt 29% of GDP (2005) 
Natural resources coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, chromite, cobalt, 
manganese, nickel, clay, gypsum, salt, sand, forests, hydropower 
Agricultural products wheat, corn, fruits, vegetables, livestock 
Industries steel, coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, manganese, bauxite, vehicle 
assembly, textiles, tobacco products, wooden furniture, tank and 
aircraft assembly, domestic appliances, oil refining 
Export products metals, clothing, wood products 
Import products machinery and equipment, chemicals, fuels, foodstuffs 
Most prominent 
trading partners 
Exports: Croatia 18.4%, Italy 17.1%, Slovenia 14.7%, Germany 
12.8%, Austria 6.5%, Hungary 5.2%, China 4.2% (2005)  
Imports: Croatia 24.7%, Germany 13.6%, Slovenia 13%, Italy 11%, 
Austria 6.9%, Hungary 5.5% (2005) 
Trade with the EU Exports to EU-25: €1.3 billion (2005)  
Imports from the EU-25: €2.7 billion (2005) 
 
Montenegro – Geographical and political profile 
Official name Republic of Montenegro 
Independence 3 June 2006 
Area 14,026 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries 
Albania (172 km), Croatia (25 km), Bosnia-Herzegovina (225 km), 
Serbia (203 km), coastline (293.5 km) 
Population 684,736 (July 2007 est.) 
Density 44.9 inhabitants per km² (est.) 
Distribution 60% urban population, 40% rural population 
Population profile Montenegrin (43%), Serb (32%), Bosniak (8%), Albanian (5%), 
Muslim (4%), Croat (1.1%), other (4.3%) 
Languages Serbian (official; Ijekavian dialect), Bosnian, Albanian, Croatian 
Religions Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic 
Life expectancy Average: 72.5 years, male: 71 years, female: 74 years 
Main political parties 
in Parliament (81 
seats) 
Coalition for European Montenegro (DPS/SDP) (39), Serbian List 
(12), Coalition SNP/NS/DSS (11), Movement for Changes (PZP) 
(11), Liberals and Bosniaks (3), Albanian minority parties (5) 
President Filip VUJANOVIC (since 11 May 2003) 
Prime Minister Zeljko STURANOVIC (since 13 November 2006) 
 
Montenegro – Economic profile 
GDP €1.67 billion (2006 est.) 
GDP per capita €2,950 in purchasing power standards (2006 est.) 
Economic growth 6.5% in 2006 
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Montenegro – Economic profile (cont’d) 
Inflation rate 3.4% (2004) 







1.2% of GDP 
Current account 
balance 
-9.1% of GDP (2005) 
Foreign debt 27.6% of GDP (2005) 
Natural resources bauxite, hydroelectricity 
Agricultural products grains, tobacco, potatoes, citrus fruits, olives, grapes, sheepherding, 
commercial fishing negligible 
Industries steelmaking, aluminium, agricultural processing, consumer goods, 
tourism 
Export products aluminium and aluminium products (41%), beverages and tobacco 
(18%), wood and timber (8%) 




Export: Serbia 42.6%, Italy 24.2%, Greece 9.0%, Switzerland 5.5%, 
BiH 3.7% (2004)  
Import: Serbia 34.8%, Italy 8.6%, BiH 5.5%, Greece 5.0%, 
Slovenia 5.0%, Germany 4.2% (2004) 
Trade with the EU Exports to EU-27: €287.7 million (2006) 
Imports from EU-27: €501.8 million (2006) 
 
Serbia – Geographical and political profile 
Official name Republic of Serbia 
Independence 5 June 2006 
Area 88,361 km² (at the time of writing still including Kosovo) 
Neighbouring 
countries 
Bulgaria (318 km), Romania (476 km), Hungary (151 km), Croatia 
(241 km), Bosnia-Herzegovina (302 km), Albania (115 km), 
FYROM (221 km), Montenegro (203 km), coastline (0 km) 
Population 10.15 million (including Kosovo, July 2007 est.) 
Density 84 inhabitants per km² 
Population profile Serbian (66%), Albanian (17%), Hungarian (3.9%), Romany 
(Gypsy) (1.4%), Bosniak (1.8%), Montenegrin (0.9%), other 9.0% 
(2002 census) 
Languages Serbian (88.3%), Hungarian (3.8%), Bosniak (1.8%), Romany 
(Gypsy) (1.1%), other 5% (2002 census)  
Note: Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Croatian all 
official in Vojvodina; Albanian official in Kosovo 
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Serbia – Geographical and political profile (cont’d) 
Religions Serbian Orthodox (85%), Catholic (5.5%), Protestant (1.1%), 
Muslim (3.2%), other (5.2%) (2002 census) 
Life expectancy Average: 75.0 years, male: 72.5 years, female: 77.9 years (2007 est.)  
Main political parties 
Parliament (250 seats) 
SRS (81), DSS (64), DSS-NS (47), G17 Plus (19), SPS (16), LDP 
Coalition (15), other (8) 
President Boris TADIC (DS, since 11 July 2004) 
Prime Minister Vojislav KOSTUNICA (DSS, since 3 March 2004) 
 
Serbia – Economic profile 
GDP €32.97 billion (including Kosovo) (2006 est.) 
GDP per capita €2,506 in purchase power standards (2006 est.) 
Economic growth 5.9% in 2005; 6.3% in 2006 
Inflation rate 6.6% (2006) 




Note: data covers the former Serbia and Montenegro (1999 est.) 
Currency Serbian Dinar (RSD) 
Government budget 
balance 
0.6% of GDP (2006) 
Current account 
balance 
-10.2% of GDP (2006) 
Foreign debt 61% of GDP (2006) 
Natural resources oil, gas, coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, antimony, chromite, 
nickel, gold, silver, magnesium, pyrite, limestone, marble, salt, 
arable land 
Agricultural products wheat, maize, sugar beets, sunflower, beef, pork, milk 
Industries sugar, agricultural machinery, electrical and communication 
equipment, paper and pulp, lead, transportation equipment 
Export products manufactured goods, food (raspberries, frozen fruits) and live 
animals, machinery and transport equipment 
Import products oil, natural gas, transport vehicles, cars, machinery, food 
Most prominent 
trading partners 
Export: Italy 14.1%, BiH 11.7%, Montenegro 10.4%, Germany 
10.2%, FYROM 4.7% (2006)  
Import: Russia 14.5%, Germany 8.4%, Italy 7.3%, China 5%, 
Romania 3% (2006) 
Trade with the EU Exports to EU-25: 56% of total (2006)  
Imports from EU-25: 49% of total (2006) 
 
FACTS AND FIGURES XXXV 
Kosovo – Geographical and political profile 
Official name Kosovo (at the time of writing still part of Serbia but under the rule 
of the UNMIK pursuant to UNSC res. 1244) 
Area 10,887 km² 
Neighbouring 
countries 
FYROM (159 km), Albania (112 km), Montenegro (78.5 km), 
coastline (0 km) (Serbia: 351.5 km) 
Population 2.1 million (2006 est.) 
Density 193 inhabitants per km² (2006 est.) 
Distribution 60% rural population, 40% urban population (2006 est.) 
Population profile Albanian (90%), Serbian (5%), Bosniak (1.9%), Roma (1.7%), 
Turkish (1%), Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani (0.4%) (2006 est.) 
Languages Albanian, Serbian 
Religions Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic 
Life expectancy Average: 69 years, male: 67 years, female: 71 years (2003 est.) 
Main political parties 
in Parliament 
(120 seats) 
LDK (46), PDK (30), AAK (9), SLKM (8), Ora (7), Bosniak Vakat 
coalition (4), KDTP (3), other (13) 
President Fatmir SEJDIU (LDK, since 10 February 2006) 
Prime Minister Agim CEKU (since 10 March 2006) 
UN SRSG (UNMIK) Joachim RUCKER 
 
Kosovo – Economic profile 
GDP €2.326 million (2004) 
GDP per capita €964.4 (2004) 
Economic growth 1.2% (2002), 3.1% (2003), 3.2% (2004), 3.5% (2005) 
Inflation rate 3.6% (2002), 1.1% (2003), 1.5% (2004), -0.5% (2005) 




Currency Euro, Dinar 
Government budget 
balance 
6.2% of GDP (2002), 2.5% of GDP (2003), -3.8% of GDP (2004) 
Current account 
balance 
-11.6% of GDP (2002), -15.8% of GDP (2003), -18% of GDP 
(2004) 
Natural resources bauxite, coal, silver, nickel 
Agricultural products wheat, maize, livestock, dairy products 
Industries steel, mining  
Export products base metal and articles of base metal (58.2%), mineral products 
(18.8%), leather products (6.8%), prepared foodstuffs, beverages 
and tobacco (4.4%), machinery, appliances and electric materials 
(3.3%) (2006) 
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Kosovo – Economic profile (cont’d) 
Import products mineral products (19.6%), prepared foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco (13.4%), base metal and articles of base metal (10.3%), 
machinery, appliances and electric materials (9.0%) (2006) 
Main trading partners Export: Albania 20.0%, Macedonia 13.2%, Italy 8.4%, Greece 6.4% 
(2007) (Serbia 14.7%)  
Import: Macedonia 18.3%, Turkey 8.2%, Germany 7.0%, China 
5.7% (2007) (Serbia 14.4%) 
Trade with the EU Exports to the EU: 32.6% 
Imports from the EU: 33.3% (2007) 
 
Sources: WIIW Balkan Observatory, EUROSTAT, European Commission, DG 
ECFIN, CIA Word Factbook, IMF, UNMIK, Kosovo Statistical Office, OSCE, and 










The decomposition of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has 
been one of the most tragic events in Europe since the end of World War II. After 
almost fifty years of peace, war returned to the south-eastern corner of Europe, 
exactly at a time when twelve Western European countries redefined their 
organised cooperation with the establishment of the European Union, character-
ised by prosperity, democracy and ever closer integration. 
From the very beginning of the ‘Yugoslav’ crisis, after the outbreak of war in 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the European Communities (EC), and later the 
European Union (EU), were at the forefront of international efforts to stop the 
escalation of the armed conflict. But even if some heralded that ‘the hour of 
Europe ha[d] dawned’,1 the crisis arrived at the wrong moment for the European 
Communities.2 While the EC had developed itself into a powerful trading bloc, 
foreign affairs, let alone international security issues, still remained largely 
outside the ambit of its competences. Although the Single European Act, in 
Article 30, had established the first legal basis for cooperation in the field of 
foreign and (non-military) security policy, the legal foundations for a more 
comprehensive Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were still being 
negotiated in the framework of the pre-Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC). After Maastricht and throughout the rest of the 1990s, the European Union 
remained what it was once famously compared to by Belgian Minister of State 
Mark Eijskens: ‘an economic giant, political mouse and military worm’.3 The 
instruments through which the European Union could wield real influence were 
largely economic, and only to a much lesser extent diplomatic and political, but 
                                                                                                                                               
1 Declaration by J. Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, to the international press, 29 June 
1991. 
2 See T. de Wilde d’Estmael, La dimension politique des relations économiques extérieures de 
la Communauté européenne: sanctions et incitants économiques comme moyens de politique 
étrangère (Brussels, Émile Bruylant 1998) at pp. 282-283: ‘Si l’heure de l’Europe avait en apparence 
sonné, les Douze furent bien incapables d’assumer toutes les obligations du rendez-vous, tant en 
raison de la faiblesse des moyens de persuasion de la CPE/PESC que les divergences entre Etats 
membres sur la politique à mener. D’où l’émergence de ce syndrome d’autant plus aigu que la faillite 
européenne eut de tragiques conséquences à Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, […] Ce 
n’était toutefois pas faute d’avoir essayé.’ 
3 M. Eyskens, Bron en horizon. Het avondland uit de impasse (Leuven, Lannoo 1985) at p. 316. 
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by no means military in nature. The lack of a comprehensive set of instruments to 
address the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia may well explain why the 
autonomous efforts of the European Union were sometimes partially successful 
but failed miserably to attain their objectives. 
Then again, the disintegrative violence which seems so characteristic of the 
Western Balkans – captured in the generic terms ‘balkanisation’ or ‘balkanism’4 – 
is hard to contain in either time or space. Up till now, no single country or 
universal or regional organisation has been capable of preventing or solving a 
conflict in the Balkans by itself. So far, this has only been achieved through 
cooperation between several functionally specialised organisations. The United 
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European 
Union (WEU), the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE), to name just a few, have 
all made mutually reinforcing contributions towards creating a stable and secure 
environment in the Balkans. But, sadly, cooperation between these international 
organisations has not prevented the outbreak of two of Europe’s gravest conflicts 
since the end of World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.5 And while 
NATO’s single-handed armed intervention in Kosovo did bring a temporary 
conclusion to the ten-year ethnic-territorial decomposition of Yugoslavia, it did 
not eliminate any of the fundamental socio-economic and political threats to the 
stability of South-Eastern Europe. 
Whether or not they have been directly involved in conflict during the last 
fifteen years, the post-Communist societies of the Western Balkans still face 
widespread organised crime, high levels of unemployment and the displacement 
of tens of thousands of persons. While the worst affected areas are Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo, no part of the region is untouched by the social 
distortion that has accompanied the disintegrative violence of the Yugoslav wars 
of the 1990s. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo can be described as the epicentres. 
Their ‘gangster economies’ have radiated outwards through networks of refugees, 
arms smugglers, money launderers, black market traders and drug, organ and 
                                                                                                                                               
4 For a critique of the use of these generic terms, see M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 1997); J. Stilhoff Sörensen, ‘Balkanism and the New Radical 
Interventionism: A Structural Critique’, 9 International Peacekeeping (2002) pp. 1-22. For a nuanced 
analysis, see I. Kadare, ‘The Balkans: Truths and Untruths’, in D. Triantaphyllou, ed., ‘The Southern 
Balkans: Perspectives from the Region’, 46 Chaillot Papers (2001) pp. 5-16. 
5 For an analysis of the effectiveness of the European security architecture in these crises and 
proposals to improve the functioning of the system, see, e.g., J. Wouters and F. Naert, ‘How 
Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo’, 50 ICLQ (2001) 
pp. 540-576; and H. Neuhold, ‘Collective Security After “Operation Allied Force”’, in J. Frowein 
and R. Wolfrum, eds., Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000) pp. 73-106. More 
generally, see N.M. Blokker and H.G. Schermers, eds., Proliferation of International Organizations: 
Legal Issues (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2001). 
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people traffickers.6 Both territories are surrounded by (largely overlapping) 
concentric circles of more or less war-affected societies. Hence, there is an inner 
ring of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, which are similarly affected; 
then Slovenia, where after ‘only’ ten days of war transition by peaceful means 
and political consolidation has gone further; then Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, 
where the consequences of the wars only became visible later; and, finally, there 
is an outer ring consisting of Member States of the European Union (most notably 
Greece, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Germany) and Turkey, which have not been 
able to prevent the influx of refugees and the spread of organised crime. 
Fuelled by the above-mentioned socio-economic and political threats to stabil-
ity, the recurring ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo.7 and the repeated calls 
for independence by political leaders of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.8 are reminders that further changes to parts of the region’s composi-
tion should not be excluded. Any stable, long-term settlement in the Western 
Balkans will not be possible until all ethnic-territorial and constitutional disputes 
are resolved. In an attempt to reach agreement between Belgrade and Priština on 
the final status of Kosovo, the international community has opened what is 
potentially the most explosive of Pandora’s many Balkan boxes.9 If mismanaged, 
the outcome of the final status talks could spark Serbian irredentism, have a 
ruinous impact on the weak state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and push Albanian 
nationalists across the region to create a ‘Greater Albania’, thereby also threaten-
ing the precarious stability in Macedonia.10 In short, an imposed solution on the 
                                                                                                                                               
6 See M. Kaldor, V. Bojičić and I. Vejvoda, ‘Reconstruction in the Balkans: A Challenge for 
Europe?’, 2 EFA Rev. (1997) pp. 329-350 at pp. 330 and 333. See also V. Gligorov, M. Kaldor and 
L. Tsoukalis, ‘Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration’, WIIW Policy Paper (October 
1999); M. Emerson, ‘Perspectives for the Balkans and a Wider European Order’, paper presented at 
the WIIW/LSE Conference on ‘Reconstruction and Integration in South-Eastern Europe: Economic 
Aspects’, Vienna, 12-13 November 1999; and M. Pugh, ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace’, 8 Global Governance (2002) pp. 467-482. 
7 In March 2004, nineteen died in anti-Serb riots in Kosovo. Since then there have been several 
highly publicised security incidents that affected Kosovo Serbs but were ‘not necessarily’ of an inter-
ethnic nature, although they were denounced as such by some Kosovo Serb leaders and the Serbian 
authorities. See the briefing of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo to the 
Security Council, UN Doc. SC/8827, 13 September 2006, and the Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2006/906, 20 November 
2006. 
8 In the wake of the pro-independence referendum results in Montenegro of 21 May 2006, 
Bosnian Serb leaders renewed calls for the independence of Republika Srpska. They did so again in 
the run-up to the general elections of 1 October 2006 and in view of a possible declaration of 
independence by Kosovo. See ‘Fragmented Bosnia urged to restart pro-EU reforms’, BBC News, 24 
October 2006, and ‘Ivanic: independence of Kosovo could cause a chain reaction’, seeurope.net, 14 
November 2006. 
9 On the final status talks, see chapter 4, section 3.3. 
10  The notion of irredentism refers to cross-border nationalist agitation, based on historical, 
ethnic, and other reasons, for the incorporation of land. See, e.g., T. Musgrave, Self-Determination 
and National Minorities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) ch. 9. 
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status of Kosovo that is not supported by the main parties to the dispute could 
create a potentially violent domino effect in the whole region. Hence, the critical 
mass for security stabilisation in the Western Balkans lies at the junction of 
Serbian-Albanian interests.11 
To fill the relative ‘black hole’ on the map of South-Eastern Europe.12 with 
conflict-controlling and resolving mechanisms, and to create a belt of security, 
stability and prosperity stretching from Ireland in the west to Greece in the south-
east, the European Union has, for some years now, committed itself to a strategy 
designed to favour a progressive process of socio-economic stabilisation and 
association of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia (including Kosovo). Add to this the recent establishment of a real and 
credible Common Foreign and Security Policy towards the Western Balkans and 
the launching of the first-ever EU missions in the framework of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and every self-respecting Europhile would 
be tempted to conclude that what we are witnessing is nothing less than the 
emergence of the first international organisation that is able to adopt, all by itself, 
a comprehensive strategy for the stabilisation of the Western Balkans. If this were 
really the case, then this would of course be a welcome development in the 
improvement of the European security architecture, especially in cases where 
other international players, such as the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the 





Mismanagement of the remaining ethnic-territorial and constitutional issues in the 
Western Balkans could have severe and destabilising consequences, including a 
greater likelihood of political extremism, an increase in organised crime and other 
illegal economic activities, terrorism, armed conflict and further human displace-
ment. New headline-grabbing violence will bring home to the international 
community what has been common knowledge in the region for some time: the 
ethnic-territorial status quo is unsustainable in parts of the Western Balkans.13 
Another episode of war, however limited, would be devastating for the region and 
beyond. It would also amount to a policy failure with damaging implications for 
                                                                                                                                               
11  See M. Hadzić, ‘Kosovo and the Security Stabilization of South-East Europe’, 7 International 
Peacekeeping (2000) pp. 83-94; D. Triantaphyllou, ed., What Status for Kosovo? (Paris, ISS 2001); 
and P. Jureković, ed., Building Stability in Weak States: The Western Balkans (Vienna, National 
Defence Academy 2002). 
12  See the map on p. xxiii. 
13  See, inter alia, International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future 
(Sofia, Centre for Liberal Strategies 2005) at p. 10. 
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the international organisations active in the region, in particular the European 
Union. Relapsing into violence can be avoided when sustainable solutions are 
found for the remaining status and constitutional issues and the region as a whole 
is moved from the stage of international protectorates and weak states to the stage 
of accession to NATO and the European Union. This scenario not only presup-
poses a reinvigorated drive for reform by the countries concerned but also 
presumes a continued, albeit reconfigured and rebalanced, engagement by the 
Euro-Atlantic security organisations. 
The chief argument of this study is that, of all the international organisations 
that are active in the Western Balkans, the European Union possesses most of the 
mechanisms and the requisite political skills to face up to the challenges that the 
region will present over the next couple of years. The European Union does not 
only sport a unique combination of competences in the fields of policy, law, 
economics and security; it also has the money, interest and political will to 
stabilise the roughest of its neighbourhoods. Moreover, the European Union has 
the power of attraction. In the region, it is often criticised but never rejected, 
unlike other international organisations, as the countries of the Western Balkans 
all want to attain membership of this Union characterised by prosperity, democ-
racy and peace. The prospect of future EU membership offers them a strategic 
objective and acts as the most powerful incentive for reform. Because the Union 
is best placed and has the greatest moral obligation to stabilise the Western 
Balkans, it carries the heaviest responsibility to see the process of stabilisation, 
association and integration through. It is in its own interest. The European Union 
admitted as much in its European Security Strategy (ESS): ‘the credibility of our 
foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements [in the Western 
Balkans].’14 In other words, if the Union fails to ‘brusselise’ the Western Balkans, 
then ‘Brussels’ risks being ‘balkanised’. Hence, the Union should put its (wo)men 
and money where its mouth is, because success in the Western Balkans is not 
guaranteed. In the absence of a panacea, a policy of ‘tough love’ is probably best 
to secure a positive outcome of the process. As much as the European Union 
                                                                                                                                               
14  A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 
2003, at p. 8: ‘Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the European 
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative 
relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with 
the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer 
threatened by the outbreak of major conflict.’ The European Council adopted the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) on 12 December 2003. See Bull. EU 12-2003, point I.32.83. On the ESS in more 
general terms, see, e.g., R. Kissack, ‘The European Security Strategy: A First Appraisal’, 2 CFSP 
Forum (2004) pp. 19-20; S. Duke, ‘The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: 
Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?’, 9 EFA Rev. (2004) pp. 459-481; A. Bailes, 
The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History (Stockholm, SIPRI 2005); and S. Biscop, 
The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power (Aldershot, Ashgate 
Publishing 2005). 
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needs to enhance its presence in the Western Balkans, it ought to be firm but fair 
in monitoring the transition process in each country of the region. Consistency, as 
well as coherence, is crucial.15 The Union should make it clear that countries will 
gain rewards if they meet tough conditions and that rewards will be denied or 
withdrawn if they lapse back into bad habits. In fact, this is what the Union is 
doing in the Western Balkans: with a special brand of conditionality, it provides 
the ‘carrots and sticks’ to ensure that the countries of the region continue on the 
path of progress and reform. 
That is not to say that the European Union’s record is flawless or, even less, 
that the Union should go it alone in the Western Balkans. The European Union 
does not have the same level of expertise and experience in fields in which other 
international organisations have specialised. Moreover, it cannot afford to devote 
most of its resources to the Western Balkans, to the detriment of other foreign 
policy goals. And it cannot risk falling prey to the negative consequences of being 
the sole security institution in the region. The Western Balkans would be better 
helped if the European Union were to take the lead in a revamped international 
effort to stabilise the region, in particular in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
The Union should act under the authority of the United Nations and in harmony 
with NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international players to 
increase the effectiveness of its civilian and military presence on the ground. 
Also, the European Union should devise a bolder accession strategy that could 
encompass all Western Balkan countries as new members within the next 
decade.16 Failure to do so could result in a costlier and more dangerous interven-
tion down the line and act as an unnecessary irritant in international relations. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
15  Art. 3 TEU states: ‘The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activi-
ties as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. 
The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall 
cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance 
with its respective powers.’ More specifically, the ESS calls for a more coherent security policy 
regionally, especially when dealing with conflict. ESS, at p. 13. 
16  The third International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) has called on the European Union 
to demonstrate that a new European century will have arrived in Sarajevo on 28 June 2014, one 
hundred years to the day after Europe entered a century of madness and self-destruction. See ICB, op 
cit. n. 13, at p. 6. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sent a first international 
commission composed of six respected and influential individuals from different countries to the 
Balkans to report on the causes and conduct of the 1912 and 1913 wars. It was in much the same 
spirit that the second ICB was created in response to the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia 
and the ferocity of the wars. For the background, composition and objectives of the ICB, see ibid., at 
pp. 3-4. 
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3. AIMS, METHODOLOGY, STRUCTURE 
 
Legal and political issues arising out of any approach adopted to deal with the 
dissolution of states, the emergence of new ones and the stabilisation of relations 
within and between them require a thorough understanding of the relevant facts. 
While it is obvious that any academic discourse must proceed from firm factual 
foundations, it is necessary to emphasise the importance of the circumstantial 
dimensions of the issues at stake, given that the views on the pertinent facts 
usually diverge, especially during the policy-making stage. The assessment of 
facts is much easier from an historical distance.17 Nobody today questions the 
wisdom of recognising the dissolution of the Spanish colonial empire in Latin 
America, or the independence of Greece from Ottoman rule. These events belong 
to history and have a comfortable place in contemporary textbooks on interna-
tional relations. At the time, however, they were highly controversial political 
issues and contributed considerably to the collapse of the prevailing international 
system. Therefore, it seems necessary to recognise that the ‘facts’ and ‘policy 
matters’ concerning the dissolution and creation of states contain an important 
contextual – historical, geographical, religious, cultural, legal and even linguistic 
– dimension. Hence the importance of including maps (.pp. xxiii-xxvi), essential 
statistical data (.pp. xxvii-xxxvi), a chronology of crucial events (.pp. 337-366) 
and an attempt to define key terminology (sections 4 and 5 below). 
This study is an attempt to assess the role and impact of the international 
community’s legal and political instruments and actions in stabilising the Western 
Balkans. As such, it deals with a series of topics and countries which, more often 
than not, are discussed in isolation in both time and space. In doing so, the 
analysis takes a ‘tough love’ attitude towards conflict prevention, crisis manage-
ment and peacebuilding, paying particular attention to measures that strengthen 
those who pursue moderation and modernisation, while weakening those who 
espouse stagnation and extremism. The aim of this book is to craft realistic 
recommendations targeted at making the stabilisation efforts of the international 
community in the Western Balkans more effective. While trying not to resort to a 
series of moralising ‘musts’, the recommendations focus on a wise use of the 
resources in the interest of both the Western Balkans and the international 
community: preventing the region from becoming a vacuum in which organised 
crime and terrorism prevail and poverty and violence fuel migration to the 
                                                                                                                                               
17  Although, as Rebecca West (the British-Irish author who wrote an epic 1,181-page trave-
logue, largely pro-Serb in its point of view, giving an account of Balkan history and ethnography, 
and the significance of Nazism, structured around her trip through Yugoslavia in 1937) has pointed 
out: ‘[i]t is sometimes very hard to tell the difference between history and the smell of skunk.’ See R. 
West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia, 4th edn. (Edinburgh, Canongate 
Books 2001) at p. 127. 
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European Union and beyond. As such, this study aims to make a practical 
contribution to an assessment of the international community’s policies and 
actions in the Western Balkans rather than to provide new theoretical or concep-
tual constructs for understanding such policies and actions. Of course, this study 
builds upon such existing edifices and may offer new insights into them. 
To support the thesis that the European Union should take the leading role in 
the international effort geared towards bringing lasting peace and stability to the 
Western Balkans, and to answer the main question how the Union’s strategies and 
actions should be reinforced accordingly, a short description and evaluation of the 
roles and impact of the other external players in attaining that goal is required. 
Such an inductive, bottom-up and comprehensive approach to the subtle linkages 
between and existing overlaps in the actions and strategies of the international 
organisations that are active in the region will be instrumental in the formulation 
of a more coherent and effective strategy aimed at bringing lasting peace and 
stability to the Western Balkans. It should be pointed out that, with an abundance 
of international stakeholders, it is impossible within the scope of this study to 
review all of them. Therefore, the current research is restricted to the past and 
present strategies and activities of the main universal and regional organisations 
active in the Western Balkans, namely the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe (chapter 2). The activities of some of the other interna-
tional stakeholders (e.g., the WEU, the Contact Group, the G-8, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.) are only briefly mentioned along the way.18 
To support the central argument of this study, and reflecting the organisation’s 
front-row position in addressing the situation in the Western Balkans, most 
attention is devoted to the European Union. In three chapters, the Union’s love-
hate relationship with the Western Balkans is assessed from the moment the 
former Yugoslavia started falling apart: first through an overview of the European 
Union’s foreign policy actions (in particular its sanctions policies) towards the 
SFRY and (the leaders of.) its successor states in the period 1991-2001 (chapter 
3); then via an analysis of the Union’s emerging Common Foreign and Security 
Policy towards the region, roughly from 2001 onwards (chapter 4); and, finally, 
by means of an evaluation of the Union’s application of the conditionality 
principle towards the Western Balkans, which will be of increasing importance in 
the near future (chapter 5). On the basis of the conclusions drawn from each of 
these analyses, recommendations are made to reinforce the role and impact of the 
international community – the European Union in particular – towards the 
Western Balkans (chapter 6). 
                                                                                                                                               
18  On the WEU, see chapter 2, section 1, and chapter 4, section 1. On the Contact Group, see, 
inter alia, C. Schwegmann, ‘The Contact Group and its Impact on the European Institutional 
Structure’, 16 EUISS Occasional Papers (2000). 
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In search of the right policy mix for the stabilisation of the Western Balkans, 
and as a result of the aim to strike a balance between taking a broad view of 
international relations with the Western Balkans as a whole and examining certain 
events, actions and policies in greater detail, this study does not dwell on specific 
legal questions relating to the nature of the European Union and/or the interna-
tional legal order. Rather, its aim is primarily to assess the extent to which the 
international community, and in particular the European Union, is supplied with 
adequate legal instruments in the light of the policy objectives. The result of this 
approach is that the more specifically legal dimension of this study is rather 
dispersed. Two other points of caution should be raised. Firstly, measuring the 
success, failure and effectiveness of policy making and concrete actions targeted 
at creating lasting peace and stability in countries or regions is fraught with 
difficulties. It is near to impossible to determine to what extent single efforts and 
approaches have led to positive or negative results. Nevertheless, a number of 
activities and approaches may be ascribed a positive (or negative) influence on 
developments that have the potential to (de)stabilise a situation. It is on the basis 
of such general perceptions that general conclusions in this book are drawn and 
recommendations are formulated. Secondly, due to the fast-moving dynamics of 
both the European Union and the Western Balkans, any book, article or report on 
the relationship between the two is bound to be outdated before it is even pub-
lished. While this study tries to take a contextual approach to problem solving in 
the Western Balkans, its recommendations are best understood when viewed in 
combination with the snapshot picture of the regional and international state of play 
at the time of writing. Research for this book was concluded on 31 May 2007. 
 
 
4. THE BALKANS: CAUGHT BETWEEN HISTORY AND 
GEOGRAPHY 
 
Although geographically speaking the Western Balkans is unquestionably part of 
the European continent, its turbulent history has left a mark – in the form of deep 
ethnic, religious, cultural, economic and political divisions – and blurred its 
European credentials. The geographical name of the entire region, ‘the Balkan 
Peninsula’ (Balkan Halbinsel.), is a fictitious name introduced at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century by the German geographer August Zeune, in an attempt to 
avoid what were at the time politically incorrect names such as ‘the European part 
of Turkey’ or ‘Turkey in Europe’.19 Zeune made the erroneous assumption that 
                                                                                                                                               
19  See A. Zeune, Gäa: Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Erdbeschreibung (Berlin 1811), quoted 
in P. Simić, ‘Do the Balkans Exist?’, in D. Triantaphyllou, ed., The Southern Balkans: Perspectives 
from the Region (Paris, ISS 2001) at p. 20. 
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the Balkan Mountains in Bulgaria (Stara Planina) ran right across the peninsula 
of South-Eastern Europe and thereby formed the northern geographical border of 
the region, much as the Pyrenees demarcate the top of the Iberian Peninsula.20 
Nineteenth century sensitivities explain the fact that ‘the Balkans’, like 
‘Europe’, has always been more than a geographical concept.21 For the better part 
of the history of mankind, the Balkans formed the border between empires, 
religions and civilisations, while its peoples often clashed in their role as guardi-
ans of that border.22 Among the consequences of imperial wars in the Balkans 
were large population migrations, which left the ethnic patterns of the peninsula 
‘spotted like a leopard’s pelt’, while various religious and cultural influences 
resulted in the mixing of Catholic and Orthodox Christianity with Islam.23 Ethnic 
and religious animosities also belong to the consequences. The fiercest conflicts 
in the wars over Yugoslavia’s succession, from 1991 to 2001, took place pre-
cisely in the areas of former boundaries between empires, such as Krajina in 
Croatia, where the Habsburg Empire had settled Serbian refugees from the 
Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century to guard against Turkish incur-
sions.24 On the other side of the border, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was under 
military administration of the Ottoman Empire, played a similar role. The most 
problematic source of current ethnic-territorial conflict in the Western Balkans – 
Kosovo – is the consequence of differences between Albanians, who converted to 
Islam in the sixteenth century and became the instrument of Ottoman rule, and 
neighbouring Christian nations, in particular the Serbs.25 
                                                                                                                                               
20  See infra section 5.1. See also P. Liotta, ‘The Geopolitics of the Balkans: Outcomes and 
Possibilities’, 7/8 New Balkan Politics (2003). ‘Balkans’ means (forested) ‘mountains’ in Turkish. 
21  It is striking that, in the context of the European Union’s pre-accession process, there has not 
been any serious political debate about the question whether the Western Balkans are ‘European’ in 
the sense of Article 49 TEU. This observation reinforces the argument that, in terms of EU 
membership conditionality, geography is more important than identity. This conclusion shows the 
hypocrisy of the claim that Turkey should not be allowed to join the European Union because of its 
Muslim culture. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia all have substantial Muslim popula-
tions and the European Union has put them all on the integration track. On the idea and identity of 
Europe, see E. Bussière, M. Dumoulin and G. Trausch, eds., Europa: The European Idea and 
Identity from Greek Antiquity to the 21st Century (Antwerp, Yuste 2001). For more on EU member-
ship conditionality, see chapter 5. 
22  See W. Blockmans, A History of Power in Europe (Antwerp, Mercatorfonds 1997); and R. 
Detrez, De Balkan: van burenruzie tot burgeroorlog, 4th edn. (Antwerp, Hadewijch 1993). 
23  See Simić, loc. cit. n. 19. 
24  See A. Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the 
Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond (New York, Basic Books 2002). ‘Krajina’ means 
‘frontier’ in the language formerly known as Serbo-Croat and is derived from the original name 
‘Vojna krajina’, the ‘military frontier’ during the Habsburg Empire. 
25  See T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd edn. (New Haven, Yale University Press 2002). 
See also the references mentioned supra n. 11. 
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Wars of liberation and national revolutions in the Balkans at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century brought into conflict the national projects of the Balkan 
peoples, while interventions by great powers prevented any of them from estab-
lishing ethnic borders or attaining hegemony in the region. As a consequence, the 
twentieth century in the Balkans began and ended with ethnic wars, giving it a 
reputation as Europe’s ‘powder keg’ and other negative stereotypes.26 This 
reputation was reinforced in the West by the wars of Yugoslavia’s succession 
throughout the 1990s.27 Frequent motives for the wars in the Balkans were ethnic-
territorial issues, with a goal to create nation-states, i.e., ethnically homogenous 
states that extend to the entire territory of one nation. The national programmes of 
most Balkan peoples emphasised the idea of an ethnic or ‘greater’ nation-state, 
with borders reflecting the nation-state’s size at the apex of its historical devel-
opment.28 Attempts at achieving these ambitions in the geographically limited and 
ethnically and culturally very heterogeneous area of the Balkans inevitably led to 
conflicts and mass migrations. In addition to ethnic conflicts, the quest for nation-
states created economically non-viable mini-states which sooner or later became 
strongholds of authoritarian regimes.29 
After World War I, the United States, France and Britain drew a new political 
map of the Balkans in an attempt to stop ethnic and territorial conflicts and 
include the region in the new international order in Europe. There were a total of 
six states on this map, five of which were essentially nation-states (Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Hungary), while the fifth – the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes.30 – was a multi-ethnic state of South (‘Yugo’) Slavs.31 The 
pre-World War II borders between Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia were 
forcibly restored and diplomatically sealed at the end of World War II, this time 
with the participation of the Soviet Union.32 The Cold War and bloc discipline 
froze national conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and borders remained in place 
until the violent implosion of the SFRY in 1991. 
                                                                                                                                               
26  See F. Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War (Washing-
ton, American University Press 1994); and R. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History 
(New York, Vintage Books 1994). 
27  See Todorova, op. cit. n. 4. 
28  See M. Mazower, The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day, 4th ed. (Lon-
don, Phoenix 2003) at pp. 101-151; and K. Mulaj, ‘A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool 
of State Building in the Yugoslav Multinational Setting’, 34 Nationalities Papers (2006) pp. 21-50. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Renamed ‘Yugoslavia’ in 1929. 
31  On the Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919, see M. MacMillan, Peacemakers – The Paris Con-
ference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London, John Murray 2003). 
32  On the Yalta Conference, see A. Beevor, The Fall of Berlin 1945 (New York, Viking Penguin 
2002). 
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This study will not repeat what has been exhaustively dealt with elsewhere 
concerning the history of the ‘Yugoslav crises’ of the 1990s.33 Instead, it will 
make use of a chronology of key events which took place on the Western Balkans 
and the international scene.34 This Balkan timeline provides a historical back-
ground for the analysis of actions, operations and strategies of the main 





5.1 Western Balkans 
 
Geographically speaking, what is currently perceived as the Balkan Peninsula 
(‘the Balkans’) is roughly the region within the natural boundaries formed by the 
Sava and Danube rivers in the north, the Adriatic, Ionian and Aegean Seas in the 
west and the south, and the Black Sea and the Bosporus in the east. With the 
Balkan Mountains running along 43 degrees latitude north, one would logically 
expect any division of the peninsula to result in the creation of a northern and a 
southern sphere. But such notions have never been coined. Instead, the phrase 
‘Western Balkans’ is widely used by policy-makers, journalists and other 
observers from the European Union to denote the group of republics consisting of 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
(including Kosovo). Less frequently, the term ‘Eastern Balkans’ is used for 
Bulgaria and Romania.35 Greece does not fall within the scope of either phrase 
because of its integration with the European Union. The same applies to Slovenia. 
Although Slovenia is a successor state of the SFRY, its EU integration trajectory 
differs dramatically from that of the other republics of the former Yugoslavia. 
After ‘only’ ten days of war in the summer of 1991, Slovenia managed to escape 
from the spiral of violence which dragged Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia 
and Montenegro further down. The EC officially recognised Slovenia as an 
                                                                                                                                               
33  See, e.g., D. Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1995); S. Woodward, 
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, Brookings Institution 
1995); L. Silber and A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, rev. edn. (London, Penguin Books 1996); M. 
Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 3rd edn. (London, Penguin Books 1996); R. Hayden, Blueprints for 
a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor, The University of 
Michigan Press 2000); M. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-
1999 (Penguin Books, London 2001); and R. Bideleux and I. Jeffries, The Balkans: A Post-
Communist History (London, Routledge 2007). 
34  See pp. 337-366. 
35  As the term ‘Eastern Balkans’ has been said to denote the region of the Lower Danube, to-
gether with the Carpathians in the north and the Thracian highlands to the south, Moldova is 
sometimes also understood to be covered by this notion. 
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independent state in January 1992 and quickly hammered out a Cooperation 
Agreement, which already entered into force in September 1993.36 As a reward 
for the country’s consistent efforts to reform its economy, administration and 
legal order, the European Union concluded a Europe Agreement with Slovenia in 
June 1996 and granted it candidate country status at the European Council 
summit of Luxembourg in December 1997.37 On 1 May 2004, Slovenia acceded 
to the Union, that is to say, even before any other successor state of the former 
Yugoslavia was granted candidate country status. 
In essence, the concept of the ‘Western Balkans’ is a political invention by the 
European Union designed for those countries in the south-eastern corner of 
Europe which, at the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not qualify for 
the conclusion of Europe Agreements.38 As Europe Agreements had already been 
signed with Romania and Bulgaria,39 and as a Europe Agreement with Slovenia 
was in the process of being negotiated, Albania remained the only country outside 
the borders of the former Yugoslavia that could be integrated into a regional 
approach aimed at economic, administrative and legal reforms and the develop-
ment of good neighbourly relations. Bilateral relations between these countries 
and the European Union would be based on a different kind of association 
agreement: the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.40 
The categorisation of the ‘Western Balkans’ is thus not coterminous with either 
‘the Balkans’ (as it excludes Romania, Bulgaria and Greece) or with the territory 
occupied by the successor states of the SFRY (as it excludes Slovenia but includes 
Albania). As in the policy documents of the European Union, the terms ‘Western 
Balkans’ and ‘South-Eastern Europe’ will be used interchangeably throughout this 
study to designate the following countries: the Republic of Albania, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM, alternatively Macedonia), the Republic of Serbia (includ-
ing Kosovo, following UN Security Council resolution 1244) and the Republic of 
Montenegro. The name ‘Kosovo’ is used in this study for ease of reference, not out 
of political conviction. The Albanian and Serb appellations for the region are 
                                                                                                                                               
36  Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Slovenia, OJ 1993 L 189/2. 
37  Negotiations on the Europe Agreement with Slovenia started in March 1995. The Agreement 
was signed on 10 June 1996 and entered into force in January 1997. See Europe Agreement 
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, acting 
within the framework of the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the 
other part, OJ 1996 L 51/3. On the decision to open accession negotiations with Slovenia, see Bull. 
EU 12-1997, point I.5.27. 
38  See Council Conclusions and Declaration on former Yugoslavia, Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 
1.4.108. 
39  The Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria were signed on 8 March 1993 and pub-
lished in OJ 1994 L 357/2 and OJ 1994 L 358/3 respectively. 
40  See chapter 5. 
CHAPTER 1 14 
‘Kosova’ and ‘Kosovo-Metohija’ respectively. Similarly, the term ‘Macedonia’ is 
used here as an informal name. Greece believes that the name Macedonia should 
properly be applied to its own northern region with origins dating from the time of 
Alexander the Great.41 The United States and Turkey, however, recognise the 
Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. Poland recently rendered a 
decision to use the Macedonian constitutional name in official communication 
between the countries, thus adopting the practice of several other EU Member 
States, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Romania.42 
The terms ‘former Yugoslavia’, ‘ex-Yugoslavia’ and ‘Yugoslavia’ should not be 
confused with the name ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (FRY). The former are 
used here to refer to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which 
was established under that name in 1974 and dissolved in the period of 1991-1992; 
the latter refers to the previous name of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
which itself ceased to exist with the declarations of independence of Montenegro 
and Serbia in June 2006. 
 
5.2 European security architecture 
 
This notion is borrowed from doctrine.43 The maintenance of peace and security on 
the European continent is the realm of several international organisations,44 mainly 
the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and, to a lesser extent, 
the Council of Europe. The founding documents of each of these universal and 
regional organisations refer, directly or indirectly, to the maintenance of peace and 
security on the European continent.45 Together, these collective security institutions 
                                                                                                                                               
41  See UNSC resolution 817 (1993) para. 2 on the admission of FYROM to the United Nations 
and UNGA resolution 225 (1993) para. 2: the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ is a 
temporary name ‘pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of that State’. 
For a legal analysis, see M. Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Issues of Statehood’, 16 Australian YIL (1995) pp. 199-239. 
42  As reported in ‘Several European Countries Use Constitutional Name of Macedonia’, seeu-
rope.net, 30 August 2005. See further chapter 3, section 2.6.4, and chapter 5, section 5.4. 
43  See, e.g., A. Williams, Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refash-
ioning of Europe’s Security Architecture (Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Group 1994); G. Aybet, 
A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy (New York, St. 
Martin’s Press 2000); and Wouters and Naert, loc. cit. n. 5. 
44  On the difficulty of defining international organisations, see J. Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) at pp. 7-13. A helpful 
definition is offered by H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law – Unity 
within Diversity, 4th edn. (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) at p. 26, para. 33: 
‘[I]nternational organizations are defined as forms of cooperation founded on an international 
agreement usually creating a new legal person having at least one organ with a will of its own, 
established under international law.’ 
45  See Preamble, Arts. 1 and 2, and chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the 1945 UN Charter; Preamble, 
Art. 2, and Title V of the 1992 TEU (as amended); Preamble, Arts. 1, 2, 5, and 10 of the 1949 North 
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create a patchwork, the geographical density of which is unique in the world. These 
organisations interact in many ways and claim to be mutually reinforcing.46 The 
question is whether that is really the case. 
The above-mentioned international organisations are just a few of the many 
foreign actors in the Western Balkans. Others are drawn from three different 
groups: governments, non-governmental organisations and the commercial sector. 
From this assortment, too, certain key players emerge: stakeholders that possess 
the political, economic, social and/or military means to influence, persuade or 
compel the Western Balkan governments to act in ways consistent with the 
development of democratic governance, market economies, civil societies and 
ethnically integrated militaries under civilian democratic control. Among the 
governments, the key stakeholders are the United States, certain Member States 
of the European Union (.particularly Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom) and Russia and 
Turkey as regional heavyweights. Within the non-governmental sector, a consid-
erable international presence comprised of Western grant-making foundations, 
advocacy groups and service providers – such as the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, the Soros Foundations Network, the International Crisis 
Group and the National Endowment for Democracy – operate at the grassroots 
level to promote democracy, transparency and civil society development, train 
local partners and provide humanitarian relief. Finally, the business community in 
the Western Balkans, though nascent in many parts, is attracting – mainly 
European – investors through the opening of markets and the privatisation of 
state-owned industries. For the purposes of this study, the stakeholders belonging 
to these three strands of the international presence in the Western Balkans will not 
be considered as belonging to the European security architecture. The definition 
of the concept ‘European security architecture’ is restricted here to the main 
international organisations with a mandate given to them by governments to 
secure peace and stability on the European continent. 
 
5.3 Stabilisation and other international security concepts 
 
Neuhold has noted that the discourse on international security, which is tradition-
ally littered with large quantities of ill-defined terms, has suffered even more 
                                                                                                                                               
Atlantic Treaty; Preamble and various principles laid down in the sections on ‘Questions relating to 
Security in Europe’ and ‘Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean’ of the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act; Preamble and Art. 1 of the 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe. 
46  See, e.g., K. Smith, ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’, and R. Vukadinović, 
‘Former Yugoslavia: International Efforts to Link Peace, Stability and Democracy’, in J. Zielonka 
and A. Pravda, eds., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: International and 
Transnational Factors (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 31-57 and 437-454. 
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from ‘terminological inflation’ at the hands of the European Union.47 In the rapid 
build-up of a CFSP/ESDP, the European Union has committed itself to develop 
capabilities to conduct a whole series of so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’, ranging 
from humanitarian and rescue tasks, via peacekeeping and crisis management, to 
peacemaking, while refraining from specifying its understanding of such opera-
tions.48 Confusion arises when international organisations give different 
explanations to the same terms. The term ‘peacemaking’, for instance, is under-
stood in the context of the United Nations as the pacific settlement of disputes, in 
particular in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter.49 In the EU context, 
however, there is little doubt that the use of military troops to enforce a solution 
on a party to a conflict exceeds the settlement methods covered by chapter VI and 
includes a resort to armed force. While terminological confusion in security 
policy may serve strategic, diplomatic or political interests, it creates legal 
uncertainty. In the absence of internationally agreed definitions of such fluid 
concepts as ‘conflict prevention’, ‘crisis management’ and ‘conflict resolution’, 
an attempt should be made at clarifying these terms. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to attempt a thorough substantive interpretation of the key security concepts 
listed below. Suffice it to state that the meaning of these concepts has been 
distilled from a wide variety of policy papers, legal documents, handbooks and 
academic texts.50 
The term ‘stabilisation’ is used here as a conceptual umbrella to cover all ef-
forts geared towards removing the determinants of conflicts and crises. The 
notion of ‘crisis’ is widely understood as an acute situation in which armed force 
                                                                                                                                               
47  H. Neuhold, ‘Terminological Ambiguity in the Field of International Security’, in K. Dicke, et 
al, eds., Weltinnenrecht: Liber Amicorum Jost Delbrück (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2005) pp. 473-
486 at p. 475. NATO is also to be blamed for creating confusion, with terms like ‘peace support 
operations’ and ‘crisis response operations’. 
48  Art. 17 TEU. On the gradual development of CFSP/ESDP, see chapter 4, section 1. 
49  See H. Neuhold, ‘The United Nations System for the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes’, in F. Cede and L. Sucharipa-Behrmann, eds., The United Nations: Law and Practice (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International 2001) at p. 59 et seq. 
50  See, inter alia, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paras. 20-
59; Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paras. 23-80; 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 
2000; NATO Handbook (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press 2001); OSCE Handbook, 
3rd edn. (Vienna, OSCE Secretariat 2000); A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003; EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2004. Vol. V 
(Paris, ISS 2005); A. Schmid, Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention 
Terms (Rotterdam, Erasmus University 1998); P. van Tongeren, H. van de Veen and J. Verhoeven, 
Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building 
Activities (Boulder, Lynne Rienner 2002); V. Kronenberger and J. Wouters, eds., The European 
Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2004); 
and N. Gnesotto, ed., EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) (Paris, ISS 
2004). 
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is (likely to be) used. The much broader ‘conflict’ is intended to denote every 
national or international situation where there is a threat or breach to priority 
values, interests and goals. The catch-all phrase ‘conflict prevention’ is under-
stood here as the adoption and implementation of measures that aim to impede the 
escalation of a non-violent dispute into a crisis. ‘Crisis management’ refers to the 
organisation, procedures and arrangements to contain a crisis and shape its future 
course while resolution is sought. ‘Conflict resolution’ refers to efforts to impose 
a (.partial) settlement in the case of a crisis and consolidate the cessation of 
violence. Actions meant to address the root causes of crises which have been 
resolved are dubbed post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation measures (or 
‘peacebuilding’). 
These are by no means hard distinctions. The lines between the different cate-
gories are often blurred. For instance, the strategies and actions aimed at inducing 
the stabilisation and association of the countries of the Western Balkans are 
adopted in the wake of crises and are intended to prevent the resurgence of armed 
violence in both the short and the longer term. As such, these strategies fall within 
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As observed in the previous chapter, the disintegrative violence on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia has been – and could again be – hard to contain. Up to the 
present, no international organisation concerned with the maintenance of peace 
and security in Europe has been able to single-handedly prevent and suppress 
outbursts of armed conflict in the Western Balkans and to take the necessary 
measures to prevent them from re-erupting. This chapter will analyse the role of 
the main international organisations that make up the European security architec-
ture and assess their effectiveness in suppressing violent conflicts in the Western 
Balkans and weeding out their root causes. To that end, it has been broadly 
divided into two parts. In the first part (sections 2-5), the conflict prevention, 
crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation tools that are at the disposal of 
each of the organisations are discussed. In the second part (sections 6-10), the 
practices of these organisations with respect to the Western Balkans are described 
and their effectiveness analysed. As explained in the previous chapter, the main 
actors on the European security stage are the United Nations (sections 2 and 6), 
NATO (sections 3 and 7), the OSCE (sections 4 and 8), the Council of Europe 
(sections 5 and 9) and the European Union (chapters 3-5). While the Western 
European Union (WEU) also mounted operations in the Western Balkans, it only 
did so in support and in the framework of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE 
and the European Union. Its operations are briefly discussed in chapter 4 of this 
book. On the basis of the overviews and impact assessments of the main organisa-
tions’ activities in and strategies for the Western Balkans, some recurring barriers 
to success will be discussed (section 10). 
 
 
2. UNITED NATIONS 
 
The United Nations occupies a central place in the constellation of international 
organisations dealing with the maintenance and restoration of international peace 
and security. Under its umbrella, policies and actions in the field of conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding have 
gradually been developed. But in spite of its unique expertise in each of these 
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areas, the United Nations still faces a significant ‘expectations-capabilities’ gap in 
its role as guarantor of international peace and security.1 
 
2.1 Legal and operational framework 
 
In the preamble of the UN Charter (UNC), ‘the peoples of the United Nations’ 
declare themselves ‘determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war’ and to that end state, inter alia, their resolve to combine their efforts ‘to 
ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest’. Article 1(1) UNC states as 
the very first objective of the organisation to 
 
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about 
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
Two obligations are aimed at contributing to this objective and thus to the 
prevention and resolution of international conflicts: all UN Member States must 
‘settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’ (Art. 2(3) UNC) 
and they must ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ (Art. 2(4) 
UNC). These cornerstone provisions state that states ought to strive to settle their 
disputes peacefully and not use force except in self-defence (Art. 51 UNC)2 or 
when authorised to do so by the UN Security Council.3 
The methods provided for in chapter VI of the UN Charter geared towards the 
peaceful settlement of disputes follow the same logic: Article 33(1) obliges  
 
[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, [to], first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.  
                                                                                                                                               
1 A variation to the famous phrase first coined by C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or 
Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, 31 JCMS (1993) pp. 305-328. 
2 The UNC sets a number of limitations on the use of the right of self-defence enshrined in Art. 
51. See A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) pp. 788-806, including references for 
further reading. 
3 Formally speaking, Art. 106 UNC is a third ground of exception, but this is a transitory provi-
sion and has now become obsolete. 
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Pursuant to Article 34, ‘any dispute, or any situation […] likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ can be investigated by the Security 
Council,4 which ‘may, at any stage of [such] a dispute […], recommend appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment’ (Art. 36(1)). Any UN Member State may 
bring such a dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council or of the 
General Assembly (Art. 35(1)). Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred 
to above fail to settle it by the means indicated in Article 33, they must refer it to 
the Security Council (Art. 37(1)). If the latter considers that ‘the continuance of the 
dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend 
such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate’ (Art. 37(2)). 
The enforcement mechanisms provided for under chapter VII of the Charter 
endow the Security Council with broad powers of forcible intervention. Once the 
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression (Art. 39), it can decide upon sanctions not 
involving the use of armed force (Art. 41)5 or take armed action against the 
aggressor or the state threatening the peace if it considers that the measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate 
(Art. 42).6 However, the ‘army’ that should have been put at the disposal of the 
Security Council by the Members through special arrangements (Art. 43) was 
never established.7 
                                                                                                                                               
4 However, this article fell into oblivion in the early years of the United Nations. See T. 
Schweisfurth, ‘Article 34’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 594-608. 
5 Art. 41 UNC gives the following examples: ‘These may include complete or partial interrup-
tion of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’ See, e.g., N. Schrijver, ‘The Use of 
Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law Perspective’, in H. Post, ed., 
International Economic Law and Armed Conflict (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1994) pp. 123-161; L. 
Damrosch, ‘Enforcing International Law through Non-forcible Measures’, 269 RdC (1997) pp. 13-
250; F. Alabrune, ‘La pratique des comités des sanctions du Conseil de sécurité depuis 1990’, 45 
AFDI (1999) pp. 226-279; and J. Frowein and N. Kirsch, ‘Article 41’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 
735-749 and the literature referred to therein. 
6 Art. 42 UNC grants the Security Council the power to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and any other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.’ See, e.g., G. Gaja, ‘Use of Force Made or Authorized by the United Nations’, in 
C. Tomuschat, ed., The United Nations at Age Fifty; A Legal Perspective (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International 1995) pp. 39-58; N. Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of 
the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’, 11 
EJIL (2000) pp. 541-568; J. Frowein and N. Kirsch, ‘Article 42’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 749-
759; N. White, ‘The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq’, 17 LJIL (2004) pp. 645-
672; E. de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2004); and N.M. Blokker and N.J. Schrijver, eds., The Security Council and the Use of 
Force: Theory and Reality – A Need for Change? (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill 2005). 
7 See J. Frowein and N. Kirsch, ‘Article 43’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 760-763. 
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In chapter VIII, the UN Charter recognises that ‘regional arrangements or 
agencies’ are appropriate means for maintaining peace and security, provided that 
their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
(Arts. 52-54 UNC). Regional peacekeeping and subcontracting of enforcement 
action have led to the question which specific institutions meet the criteria to be 
considered ‘regional’ in the sense of chapter VIII.8 The Charter itself does not 
provide a definition of ‘regional arrangements or agencies’, but merely indicates 
that such institutions have the task of taking care of the peaceful settlement of 
disputes within their own region (Art. 52 UNC). A small number of international 
organisations have explicitly identified themselves as ‘regional’, either in their 
constituent charter (e.g., the OAS) or in later declarations (e.g., the OSCE, the 
CIS and the Arab League). Others, like NATO and the European Union, have 
avoided qualifying themselves as such, and this has led to doctrinal debates.9 The 
Security Council, however, has adopted a rather pragmatic, flexible approach to 
the matter and has linked up with regional organisations that were ‘able and 
willing’ to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and maintain or restore 
international peace and security (e.g., ECOWAS, the (O)AU, the OSCE and so 
forth).10 It is likely that the UN Security Council will increasingly direct itself 
towards combined action with regional organisations. With the gradual develop-
ment of the European Union into a full-fledged international ‘crisis manager’, one 
may expect the Security Council to call on the Union more frequently in the 
                                                                                                                                               
8 See W. Hummer and M. Schweitzer, ‘Article 52’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 807-853; G. 
Ress and J. Bröhmer, ‘Article 53’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 854-890; and W. Hummer and M. 
Schweitzer, ‘Article 54’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 890-895, and the literature referred to in these 
three contributions. 
9 For a discussion on and references to literature about NATO’s perceived character as a ‘re-
gional’ organisation in the sense of chapter VIII UNC, see M. Reichard, The EU-NATO 
Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Aldershot, Ashgate 2006) at pp. 99 and 105-106. 
Frowein has argued that the European Union, especially after integrating the WEU, could also be 
regarded as a regional agency under chapter VIII. See J. Frowein, ‘Die Europäische Union mit WEU 
als Sicherheitssystem’, in O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze, eds., Festschrift für Ulrich Everling 
(Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag 1995) pp. 315-326. Wessel, on the other hand, has pointed out that, in 
its current legal constellation, neither the European Union, nor the WEU for that matter, can be 
regarded as a full-fledged regional arrangement. Practice, however, has demonstrated that the 
European Union and WEU function as a regional arm of the United Nations. See R. Wessel, ‘The EU 
as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to Give Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy’, 
in V. Kronenberger, ed., The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or 
Harmony? (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2001) pp. 405-434 at pp. 428-429. 
10  See C. Walter, Vereinte Nationen und Regionalorganisationen. Eine Untersuchung zu Kapitel 
VIII der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen (Heidelberg, Springer 1996); Z. Deen-Racsmány, ‘A 
Redistribution of Authority between the UN and Regional Organizations in the Field of Maintenance 
of Peace and Security’, 13 LJIL (2000) pp. 297-312; and M. Zwanenburg, ‘Regional Organisations 
and Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Three Recent Regional African Peace 
Operations’, 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2006) pp. 483-508. 
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future.11 As long as it respects the primary role of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and the need for an authorisation 
for enforcement action, this evolution should be welcomed. 
To a large extent, the UN Charter tends to uphold a concept of ‘negative 
peace’ (i.e., the absence of war) rather than ‘positive peace’ (i.e., the introduction 
of justice for the purpose of preventing political tensions from degenerating into 
armed conflicts as much as possible). This is not to say that the United Nations 
closes its eyes to political reality and refrains from suggesting political solutions 
calculated to prevent armed conflicts. Indeed, universal respect for human rights 
(Art. 55c) and cooperation in the economic, social and political fields are pro-
moted (Arts. 13(1)b, 62, 55a and b), and a role for the United Nations was also 
envisaged in regard to furthering cooperation in respect of disarmament (Art. 
11(1)). Here again, as in many other provisions of the UN Charter, a link was 
established with the maintenance of international peace and security. Stability is 
considered an essential condition for the development and maintenance of 
peaceful relations among states. Through some of its specialised agencies and 
organs (e.g., ECOSOC, the UNDP, etc.), the United Nations has promoted human 
rights, disarmament and economic and social cooperation in various fields (both 
through technical assistance and via the conclusion of treaties). 
 
2.2 The evolution of UN conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict peacebuilding 
 
The United Nations’s record of preventive and enforcement action has been rather 
mixed. Faced with a more or less constant stalemate in the Security Council 
during the Cold War, an alternative UN policy has been developed since the 
1950s for which the UN Charter did not make any provision and which has been 
referred to – in the words of the UN’s second Secretary-General Dag Ham-
marskjöld – as ‘chapter six and a half.’ action: peacekeeping operations.12 Such 
operations have evolved over time, from so-called ‘first generation’ (monitoring 
ceasefires), via ‘second generation’ (interpositioning troops between adversarial 
                                                                                                                                               
11  See S. Blockmans, ‘A New Crisis Manager at the Horizon – The Case of the European 
Union’, 13 LJIL (2000) pp. 255-263; S. Duke, The EU and Crisis Management: Development and 
Prospects (Maastricht, EIPA 2001); J. Wouters and T. Ruys, ‘UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis 
Management’, in J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys, eds., The United Nations and the 
European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) pp. 229-258; 
M. Trybus and N.D. White, eds., European Security Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007); S. 
Blockmans, ed., The European Union and International Crisis Management: Legal and Policy 
Aspects (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2008, forthcoming); and chapter 4 of this book. 
12  See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping: In the Ser-
vice of Peace. An Evolving Technique, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/1. 
htm>. 
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parties), to ‘third generation’ (multi-dimensional operations including political, 
military, humanitarian, police, economic, social, reconstruction and judicial 
activities) and even ‘fourth generation’ operations (whereby the United Nations 
becomes the authority that actually governs during a transitional period until a 
new, democratic state can be established).13 Incrementally, and spurred by the 
rebirth of the Security Council after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations 
has sought to put peacekeeping operations into use not only for the preservation 
of (a sometimes fragile) peace, but also for the resolution and prevention of 
conflicts. The Yugoslav crises in the 1990s provide a string of examples which 
show this developing nature of peacekeeping operations.14 
At the request of the special Security Council summit of 31 January 1992, UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a landmark report entitled 
‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992).15 The report contains an ambitious agenda for a 
more peaceful world and offers ‘a coherent contribution towards securing peace 
in the spirit of the Charter.’16 It stresses the need for an integrated approach, 
whereby the UN’s aims should be: 
 
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce 
conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before 
violence results; 
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues 
that have led to conflict; 
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by 
peacemakers; 
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding 
the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and 
building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; 
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic 
despair, social injustice and political oppression […].17 
 
In his report, the Secretary-General sought to intertwine the old and the new. For 
example, some of the classical instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
such as good offices, mediation and fact-finding were put at the disposal of (the 
                                                                                                                                               
13  The literature on the evolution of peacekeeping operations is voluminous. For overviews and 
analyses of operations, as well as further references to the literature, see UN Department of Public 
Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edn. (New York, 
UNDPI 1996); and M. Bothe, ‘Peace-keeping’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 648-700. 
14  See infra section 6. 
15  Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of 
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111 (17 June 1992). 
16  Ibid., at para. 22. 
17  Ibid., at para. 15. 
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newly defined concept of.) preventive diplomacy.18 In turn, preventive diplomacy 
was tied to other key concepts such as peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuild-
ing. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ also devotes a whole chapter to cooperation between 
the United Nations and regional arrangements, which has given an extra impetus 
to the process of regionalisation of security arrangements and organisations under 
the authority of the Security Council.19 Although Boutros-Ghali undertook 
various initiatives to make the United Nations more suited to its tasks,20 there 
were a number of practical difficulties in implementing the objectives set out in 
1992. In his 1995 ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’,21 the Secretary-General 
noted that it was not the lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas that 
constituted the greatest practical obstacle to UN actions but often the reluctance 
of one party or another to accept the UN’s assistance, due to strong sentiments of 
sovereignty and non-interference.22 The Secretary-General did not see an immedi-
ate solution to this problem.23 Instead, he hoped for a long-term solution in which 
‘a climate of opinion, or ethos, within the international community’ would 
emerge in which Member States would be more inclined to accept an offer of UN 
good offices.24 
Events in the 1990s forced the UN Secretariat to reconsider its position and to 
embrace a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis manage-
ment and post-conflict rehabilitation.25 The humanitarian tragedies of Somalia, 
Rwanda and Srebrenica, and the UN’s failures in these crises, painfully exposed 
the inadequacy of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. Faced with the reluctance of 
its members to commit resources and risk lives when no vital interests are at 
stake, the argument for more structural prevention policies carried the day.26 
Increasingly, attention at UN level has been devoted to what the organisation is 
better at: promoting incremental change and reform. A whole series of official 
reports has been devoted to the topic. In Kofi Annan’s 1999 report ‘Preventing 
                                                                                                                                               
18  For definitions of the key terms used in ‘An Agenda for Peace’, see ibid., at para. 20. 
19  See J. Wouters, ‘The United Nations, the EU and Conflict Prevention: Interconnecting the 
Global and Regional Levels’, in V. Kronenberger and J. Wouters, eds., The European Union and 
Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2004) pp. 369-392 at 
pp. 374-375. 
20  The creation of the Department of Political Affairs is a case in point. 
21  B. Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary Gen-
eral on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/50/60 – S/1995/1 
(3 January 1995). 
22  Ibid., at para. 27. 
23  Ibid., at para. 28. 
24  Ibid. 
25  See, e.g., K. Zemanek, ‘Peace-keeping or Peace-making?’, in N. Blokker and S. Muller, eds., 
Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations – Essays in Honour of Henry G. 
Schermers, Vol. I (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) pp. 29-47. 
26  See J. Wouters, loc. cit. n. 19, at p. 377. 
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War and Disaster: A Growing Global Challenge’, the Secretary-General stressed 
that ‘the United Nations has long argued that prevention is better than cure; that 
we must address the root causes, not merely their symptoms’ and that ‘[o]ur 
aspiration has yet to be matched by effective action.’27 In his well-received 
‘Millennium Report’ (2000), Annan noted that ‘strategies of prevention must 
address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms.’28 The 
Secretary-General’s recommendations were endorsed in the ‘Report of the Panel 
on UN Peace Operations’ of August 2000, better known as the ‘Brahimi Report’, 
named after the panel’s chairman.29 In the ‘Millennium Declaration’, the UN 
General Assembly resolved ‘[t]o make the United Nations more effective in 
maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for 
conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict 
peace-building and reconstruction.’30 While announcing a comprehensive report 
for the General Assembly in which he intended to present recommendations on 
how to strengthen the UN’s capacity in order to ensure that conflict prevention is 
made the cornerstone of the UN’s collective security system in the twenty-first 
century, the Secretary-General identified integrating conflict prevention further 
into its activities as the key task for the UN system in the coming years.31 Mean-
while, the Security Council held a number of open debates on a series of issues 
relating to comprehensive conflict prevention, including cooperation of the 
United Nations with regional organisations in stabilisation processes.32 
On 2 December 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
presented its report ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’, proposing 
ways of strengthening collective security and urging the adoption of new, far-
reaching ground rules to help the world face new and evolving threats in the 
twenty-first century and to strengthen the United Nations.33 Besides reaffirming the 
right of states to defend themselves – including pre-emptively, i.e., when an attack 
                                                                                                                                               
27  Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, GA Official Records, 
Suppl. No. 1, UN Doc. A/54/1, para. 1. 
28  K. Annan, We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, UN Doc. 
A/54/2000. In July 2000, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to submit a report with 
recommendations on the prevention of armed conflict. This request led to the detailed report of 7 
June 2001 ‘Prevention of Armed Conflict’, UN Doc. A/55/985 – S/2001/574. The ten principles 
which should enable the United Nations to move ‘from a culture of reaction to a culture of preven-
tion’ were expressly recognised by the Security Council in resolution 1366 (2001) on ‘the role of the 
Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts’. The General Assembly did so too in 
resolution 57/337. 
29  UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809 (21 August 2000). 
30  UNGA resolution 55/2, 8 September 2000, point 9. 
31  Interim report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, UN Doc. 
A/58/365 – S/2003/888, para. 33. 
32  See S.PV.5007 as well as the Presidential Statement S/PRST/2004/27 of 20 July 2004. 
33  UN Doc. A/59/565. 
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is imminent – and warning that ‘nightmare scenarios’ – for instance those combin-
ing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction – may call for more proactive and 
decisive measures by the UN Security Council, the High-level Panel endorsed the 
idea of a collective responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic clean-
sing and other comparable atrocities. In case sovereign states are unable or 
unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, the wider international community should 
intervene – acting preventively where possible, responding to violence if need be 
and working to rebuild shattered societies after the event. ‘Force, if it needs to be 
used, should be deployed as a last resort’ and should be authorised by the Security 
Council, according to the Panel.34 It also recommended the creation of a new UN 
body, the Peacebuilding Commission, which would identify countries at risk of 
violent conflict, organise prevention efforts and ‘marshal and sustain the efforts of 
the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding.’35 
Five years after the adoption of Millennium Declaration, in his report ‘In lar-
ger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ to the 
General Assembly, the Secretary-General urged UN members to adopt a package 
of specific, concrete proposals to tackle global problems and enable the United 
Nations to respond better to current challenges.36 The report formed the launch 
pad for the 14-16 September 2005 World Summit, which reiterated the world’s 
commitment to the so-called ‘Millennium Development Goals’ and addressed the 
possible reform of the United Nations.37 Unfortunately, much of this was eventu-
ally postponed to a later date. Notable exceptions concerned the agreement on the 
creation of a new Human Rights Council,38 the establishment of the Peacebuilding 
Commission.39 and the endorsement of the so-called ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a 
                                                                                                                                               
34  Ibid., at paras. 201-203. In para. 207, the panel proposed five criteria to guide the Council in 
deciding whether to authorise use of force: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, 
proportional means and balance of consequences (i.e., whether military action is likely to have better 
or worse results than inaction). 
35  Ibid., at para. 83. 
36  UN Doc. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005). 
37  Revised draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly 
of September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/HLPM/ 
CRP.1/Rev.2 (5 August 2005). 
38  Ibid., at paras. 138-140. The Human Rights Council was established by UNGA resolution 
60/251, 3 April 2006. Documents and background information are available at: <http://www.ohchr. 
org/english/bodies/hrcouncil>. 
39  Ibid., at paras. 76-87. The Security Council, in resolution 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005, 
acting concurrently with the General Assembly, in resolution 60/180 of 30 December 2005, formally 
decided on the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory 
body geared at assisting and mobilising support for countries emerging from conflict. To that end, 
the Peacebuilding Commission, which started its activities on 1 January 2006, will provide necessary 
information in the immediate aftermath of war and focus attention on development and institution-
building efforts necessary for recovery and will support the development of integrated strategies for 
countries emerging from conflict, in order to prevent them from relapsing into conflict. In addition, it 
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formulation of a right of humanitarian intervention developed by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and proposed by Kofi 
Annan as part of his ‘In Larger Freedom’ reform package.40 The ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ obliges the international community, through the United Nations, to 
intervene, including under chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, ‘should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect 
their populations’ from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.’41 
In spite of the proliferation of these initiatives, reports and institutional inno-
vations,42 there are a number of practical obstacles to more effective UN policies 
on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peacebuilding.43 
Firstly, the sovereignty and non-interference concerns of various of its members 
continue to make the UN’s efforts on each of these issues a delicate balancing act. 
Secondly, the lack of political will on the members’ part often leads to non-
compliance with their commitments, especially with regard to financing. And, 
thirdly, as opposed to richer regional organisations, the United Nations suffers 
from a comparative disadvantage with respect to the limited resources it has at its 
disposal. These and other limits to UN action in the field will be illustrated by a 
case-study of the role and impact of the United Nations in the Western Balkans 





3.1 Legal and operational framework.44 
 
Based on the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) adopted in Washington on 4 April 
1949,45 NATO was established as a collective defence organisation. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                                               
will provide recommendations and information to improve coordination of all stakeholders inside 
and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early 
recovery activities, and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict 
recovery. Documents and background information are available at: <http://www.un.org/peace/ 
peacebuilding>. See further C. Stahn, ‘Institutionalizing Brahimi’s “Light Footprint”: A Comment on 
the Role and Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission’, 2 IOLR (2005) pp. 403-415. 
40  Ibid., at paras. 118-120. 
41  Ibid., at para. 118. 
42  See N. Schrijver, ‘UN Reform: A Once-in-a-Generation Opportunity’, 2 IOLR (2005) pp. 
271-275. 
43  See J. Wouters, loc. cit. n. 19, at pp. 381-382. 
44  For a detailed guide to the history, structures and work of the organisation, see NATO Hand-
book (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press 2001) and <http://www.nato.int>. 
45  The Treaty is reproduced in 34 UNTS 243. It came into force on 24 August 1949, after the 
deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states. 
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NATO has been in the conflict prevention and crisis management business since 
its inception. Although the terminology was not used at the time, the commitment 
to consult when any Ally perceives a threat to its security, sovereignty or territo-
rial integrity (Art. 4 NAT) and to regard an attack on one or more Allies as an 
attack on all and to respond (Art. 5 NAT) were later referred to as the basis for 
NATO crisis management. The language of Article 4 is mirrored in the invitation 
given to states to join the Partnership for Peace (Pf.P) programme, which aims to 
enhance stability and security throughout Europe: ‘NATO will consult with any 
active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its 
territorial integrity, political independence or security.’46 A number of Pf.P 
members have perceived such threats and have requested consultations, during 
which Allies have agreed to take action to address the problems raised.47 Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty, no doubt the most pivotal element of NATO crisis 
management, consists of two elements: the commitment to view an armed attack 
against one as an attack against all and the commitment to assist in concert by 
such action that each member deems necessary, including the use of armed force. 
Article 5 NAT can best be understood as a statement of deterrence to would-be 
attackers, a statement made credible, despite its less than categorical nature, by 
the existence of the necessary capabilities (reflected in the integrated military 
structure, force commitments and readiness levels) and the evident political will 
to respond to any attack.48 
In spite of the belligerent undertone of Article 5, the parties to the Washington 
Treaty have recognised the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for 
the maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 7 NAT). Consequently, 
they agreed that nothing in the Washington Treaty can affect or shall be inter-
preted to affect the rights and obligations arising from the UN Charter. They have 
undertaken ‘to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’ 
(Art. 1 NAT). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
46  NATO, Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Brussels, 
10-11 January 1994. NAC is NATO’s principal decision-making organ and is composed of the 
permanent representatives of the members of the Alliance. For more on NACC, see infra n. 71. 
47  For example, in response to Albania’s request following the 1997 collapse of the pyramid 
savings schemes, NATO Allies agreed to a variety of measures, including assistance in developing 
Albania’s national crisis management organisation and procedures. 
48  See P. Duignan, NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future (Stanford, Hoover Press 2000); B. 
Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 1-22; and P. Gallis, ‘NATO: 
Article V and Collective Defense’, CRS Report for Congress, 17 July 1997. 
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3.2 Adaptations to the operational framework 
 
During the Cold War, the kinds of crises that the Alliance faced were largely, but 
not exclusively, military and so – to a large extent – were its tools. In the post-
Cold War era, the focus shifted to ‘out of area’ crises resulting from tensions 
generated by ethnic conflicts, extreme nationalism, intra-state political strife, 
failed or inadequate political change, severe economic problems and, since 11 
September 2001, international terrorism and the threat posed by weapons of mass 
destruction. Against the backdrop of this radical evolution of the security envi-
ronment since the end of the Cold War, the Allies reinterpreted the provisions of 
the Washington Treaty and agreed to new tools so as to enable ‘their’ Alliance to 
prevent and manage the ‘new’ kinds of conflicts and/or crises.49 The nature and 
modalities of NATO’s cooperation with other international organisations which 
contribute to international peace and security, in particular the United Nations, the 
European Union and the OSCE, were also remodelled.50 In this transformation 
process, three stages stand out: the Strategic Concepts of Rome (1991), Washing-
ton (1999) and Prague (2002). As political declarations, the Strategic Concepts 
lack any legally binding force, even if the crisis management and conflict 
prevention functions contained therein clearly go beyond the original scope of the 
Washington Treaty.51 
On 9 November 1991, NATO’s members agreed to a new Strategic Concept, 
which encompassed a broader approach to security and greater opportunities to 
achieve long-standing objectives through political means.52 Key aspects of the 
new approach included: (a) more active use of political and diplomatic means; (b) 
close interaction and cooperation with other international organisations; and (c) 
significant changes in NATO’s command and force structures. Crisis manage-
ment and conflict prevention, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations, 
were major themes in the adaptation of the Alliance to the post-Cold War security 
environment.53 The 1991 Strategic Concept also called for dialogue and cooperation 
                                                                                                                                               
49  See H. Tromp, ‘NATO and the New World Order: Anarchy?’, in S. Trifunovska, ed., The 
Transatlantic Alliance on the Eve of the New Millennium (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
1996) pp. 43-55. 
50  See Reichard, op. cit. n. 9, at pp. 99-119 (ch. 4: ‘NATO Today’), with references to further 
literature. 
51  See T. Gazzini, ‘NATO’s Role in the Collective Security System’, 8 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2003) pp. 231-263 at pp. 244-245; and U. Schürr, Der Aufbau einer europäischen 
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität im Beziehungsgeflecht von EU, WEU, OSZE und NATO 
(Frankfurt am Main, Lang 2003) at p. 107, referred to by Reichard, op. cit. n. 9, at p. 104. 
52  NATO, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, adopted by Heads of State and Government, 
Rome, 9 November 1991, reproduced in NATO Handbook (Brussels, NATO Office of Information 
and Press 2001). 
53  Ibid., at paras. 31 and 32: ‘In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the suc-
cess of the Alliance’s policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the 
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with the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other 
institutions ‘to prevent conflict since the Allies’ security is inseparably linked to 
that of all other states in Europe.’54 
Further significant changes to the Alliance’s mission statement were agreed to 
at the Washington Summit of 24 April 1999. In general terms, the Strategic 
Concept and Washington Summit Declaration delineated a broad approach to 
security, encompassing complementary political and military means and empha-
sising cooperation with states and international organisations that share NATO’s 
objectives.55 Allies noted that ‘a coherent approach to crisis management, as in 
any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance’s political authorities to 
choose and coordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and 
military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.’56 NATO 
members also stated that, in the light of the demanding nature of conflict preven-
tion and crisis management operations and the requirement for the same qualities 
of cohesion, multinational training and extensive prior planning needed for 
Article 5 situations, such operations would be handled through the same struc-
tures and procedures used for Article 5 operations.57 Allies agreed to a number of 
measures to ensure that NATO would have the necessary military capabilities for 
all NATO missions, including contributing to conflict prevention and crisis 
management. 
The new Strategic Concept listed crisis management and conflict prevention 
under the section ‘fundamental security tasks’ of the Alliance. It stated: 
 
[…] in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:  
- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in con-
formity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective 
conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including cri-
sis response operations.58 
 
The Strategic Concept of 1999 also recognised the need for ‘military capabilities 
effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances’ as ‘the basis of the 
Alliance’s ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management 
                                                                                                                                               
past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the 
security of its members […]. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the 
successful resolution of crises at an early stage. […] The success of the Alliance policy will require a 
coherent approach determined by the Alliance’s political authorities choosing and coordinating 
appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, 
including those in the military field.’ 
54  Ibid., at para. 33. 
55  NATO, ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999. 
56  Ibid., at para. 32. 
57  Ibid., at para. 29. 
58  Ibid., at para. 10. 
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through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.’59 The Allies noted that NATO’s 
preparedness to carry out such operations supported the broader objective of 
reinforcing and extending stability and would often involve the participation of 
NATO’s Pf.P countries. The latter would be done by making full use of partner-
ship, cooperation, dialogue and NATO’s links to other organisations to contribute 
to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage.60 The 
Heads of State and Government thereby highlighted the importance of consulta-
tions pursuant to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. In fact, the 1999 Strategic 
Concept identified consultations as the second of the Alliance’s ‘fundamental 
security tasks.’61 
Measures agreed upon at the Prague summit of 21-22 November 2002, includ-
ing enlargement of NATO, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO 
Response Force and the new command arrangements, all contributed to the 
Alliance’s conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities.62 Allies also 
gave additional impetus to cooperation with the European Union in crisis man-
agement (the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements),63 as well as in other areas, 
stating that 
 
[e]vents on and since 11 September 2001 have underlined further the importance 
of greater transparency and cooperation between our two organisations on ques-
tions of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, so 
that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective 
crisis management ensured.64 
 
In conclusion, while maintaining collective defence as it primary task, the greatest 
and most visible change in NATO’s activities since the end of the Cold War is its 
involvement in ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in crisis 
regions in both Europe and other parts of the world. On paper, NATO now 
attaches great importance to cooperation with non-members and other interna-
tional organisations: ‘[i]n every instance, NATO is deploying in support of the 
wider interest of the international community and working closer together with 
other organisations to help resolve deep-rooted problems and create conditions in 
which the various peace processes can become self-sustaining.’65 
                                                                                                                                               
59  Ibid., at para. 29. 
60  Ibid., at para. 32. 
61  Ibid., at para. 10. 
62  NATO Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participat-
ing in the meeting of the NAC in Prague on 21 November 2002, NATO Press release (2002)127, 21 
November 2002. 
63  See Reichard, op. cit. n. 9, at pp. 273-310 (ch. 8: ‘The Berlin Plus Agreement’); and chapter 4 
of this book, section 4.2.1. 
64  NATO Prague Summit Declaration, loc. cit. n. 62, at para. 11. 
65  NATO Briefing, Crisis Management, October 2003. 
ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE UN, NATO, THE OSCE AND THE COE 33 
3.3 Enlargement as a means to extend security and stability 
 
The end of the Cold War provided a unique opportunity to build improved 
security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area.66 Since NATO’s creation in 1949, the 
Alliance has taken in new members on five separate occasions: in 1952 (Greece 
and Turkey), 1955 (Germany), 1982 (Spain), 1999 (Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) and 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia).67 In this way, the twelve founding members.68 have grown to twenty-
six, thereby bringing in nine former members of the Warsaw Pact. The fifth (and 
largest) round of NATO enlargement may not be the last. At present, three 
Western Balkan states (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) are parties to NATO’s 
Membership Action Plan (MAP), designed to assist aspiring partner countries in 
meeting NATO standards and preparing for possible future membership (see 
below). 
Enlargement of NATO is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, 
which states that membership is open to any ‘European State in a position to 
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area.’ In addition, countries seeking NATO membership are also 
expected to meet certain political, economic and military requirements, which are 
laid down in the 1995 ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’.69 No fixed list of member-
ship conditions exists, but the ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’ points out in 
chapter 5 (.paras. 68-78) that aspirant countries should provide evidence, inter 
alia, that they: 
 
- represent a functioning democratic political system based on a market 
economy; 
- conform to the basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democ-
racy, individual liberty and the rule of law; 
- treat minority populations in accordance with the guidelines of the OSCE; 
- have resolved outstanding disputes with neighbours and have made an overall 
commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; 
- accept the acquis of the Alliance;70 
                                                                                                                                               
66  See V. Krivokhizha, ‘The NATO Enlargement: Implications and Perspectives for Transatlan-
tic Relations’, in Trifunovska, op. cit. n. 49, at pp. 57-67. 
67  See S. Larrabee, NATO Enlargement: Prague and Beyond (Brussels, CEPS 2001); and D. 
Abenheim, ‘The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement’, Hoover Digest (2003), available at: <http://www. 
hoover.org/publications/digest/3063166.html>. 
68  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, United Kingdom and United States. 
69  Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm>. 
70  These include, in particular, the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Convention, 1951); the NATO 
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- apply security rules and procedures; 
- undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making 
process on political and security issues of concern to NATO; 
- have the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance 
and to achieve interoperability with other members’ forces; and 
- are committed to democratic civil-military relations and institutional struc-
tures. 
 
Aspirant countries are expected to participate in the MAP, which presupposes 
participation in the Pf.P programme. At its Brussels Summit of 10-11 January 
1994, NATO addressed the Pf.P invitation to all states participating in the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council.71 and the CSCE who were ‘able and willing to 
contribute to the programme’.72 Thus, participation in the Pf.P comes with its own 
conditionality: 
 
Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safe-
guarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values 
fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the [Pf.P, states] recall that they are 
committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion 
and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They 
reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to 
                                                                                                                                               
Agreement on the Mutual Safeguarding of Secrecy of Inventions relating to Defence, and for which 
Applications for Patents Have Been Made (Paris, 1960); the Agreement between the Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces (London, 1951); the NATO Agreement on 
the Communication of Technical Information for Defence Purposes (Brussels, 1970); as well as the 
Strategic Concepts; Summit Declarations and NAC Decisions in ministerial and permanent session 
as reflected in NAC Communiqués, including those issued in Oslo in June 1992 and Brussels in 
December 1992 in which the Alliance undertook to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peace-
keeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, including by making available 
Alliance resources and expertise; documents on cooperation between NATO and any partner state 
already agreed when new member(s) join the Alliance (recognising that NATO’s policies are 
dynamic instruments). 
71  The establishment of the NACC in December 1991 brought together the Member States of 
NATO and, initially, nine Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) in a new consultative forum. In 
March 1992, participation in the NACC was expanded to include all members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States and by June 1992, Georgia and Albania had also become members. In 1997, 
the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In this consultative body, 
the forty-six NATO Member States and partners meet regularly to consider cooperation activities and 
political and security questions. 
72  The 1994 Pf.P Invitation is available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a. 
htm>, and as NATO Mini. Comm. M-1(94)2, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. 
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settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the 
Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the 
commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and 
arms control.73 
 
The invitation has since been accepted by a total of thirty-three countries. Most 
recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia joined the Pf.P programme 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.74 There are currently twenty-three 
countries participating in the Pf.P programme.75 
The Membership Action Plan was launched in April 1999 at NATO’s Wash-
ington Summit as a programme of advice, assistance and practical support 
tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.76 The 
MAP’s main features are: 
 
- the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national pro-
grammes on their preparations for possible future membership, covering 
political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects; 
- a feedback mechanism on aspirant countries’ progress on their programmes 
that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings 
between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North 
Atlantic Council to assess progress;77 and 
- a defence planning approach for aspirants which includes the elaboration and 
review of agreed planning targets. 
 
Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future 
membership. Aspirants must be officially invited by the North Atlantic Council to 
begin membership negotiations. The aim of these negotiations is to obtain formal 
confirmation from the invitees of their willingness and ability to meet the 
political, legal and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, 
as laid out in the Washington Treaty and in the ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’. 
The end product of these discussions is a timetable to be submitted by each 
invitee for the completion of necessary reforms, which may continue even after 
                                                                                                                                               
73  See Partnership for Peace Framework Document, para. 2, annexed to the 1994 Pf.P Invitation 
and available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>. 
74  See Riga Summit Declaration, Press Release (2006)150, 29 November 2006, para. 36 for the 
invitation to join the Pf.P and the EAPC; and NATO Update, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and Serbia join NATO Partnership for Peace’, 14 December 2006, for the effectuation thereof. 
75  Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Geor-
gia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
76  NATO, ‘Membership Action Plan (MAP)’, Press Release NAC-S(99)66, 24 April 1999. 
77  An annual consolidated progress report on activities under the MAP is presented to the Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs and Defence at their annual NAC meetings in spring. 
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these countries have become NATO members. While undertaking these reforms, 
countries can also become involved alongside NATO members in some of the 
Alliance’s operations. Participation in these operations enables candidate coun-
tries to demonstrate that, in addition to being consumers of security – benefiting 
in particular from NATO’s collective defence guarantee – they are also able to 
contribute to security and to help increase stability in and beyond the Euro-
Atlantic area. The ability to contribute militarily to collective defence, peacekeep-
ing and other new missions of the Alliance could be a factor in deciding whether 
to invite a candidate to join NATO.78 Ultimately, Allies decide by consensus 
whether to invite a candidate country to join NATO, basing their decision on their 
judgement of whether membership of a specific country would contribute to 
security and stability in the North Atlantic area. Once admitted, new members 
enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. These include 
acceptance of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by the 
other Alliance members – i.e., NATO’s acquis.79 As such, NATO enlargement 
serves as a vehicle to take away some of the root causes of conflicts on the 
European continent. 
For some time now, the three countries that are currently participating in the 
MAP (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) have been preparing themselves for the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership. But despite these aspirant states’ 
hopes for an invitation for membership at the end of 2006, NATO Heads of State 
and Government at the Riga Summit declared that the Alliance intends to extend 
new invitations to those countries that meet ‘NATO’s performance-based 
standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability’ only at 
the next summit, in the spring of 2008.80 In short, obtaining NATO membership 
represents the culmination of a long preparatory process. The seven countries that 
joined NATO in 2004 already started participating in the Pf.P shortly after it was 
created in 1994. Since 1999, all of these countries have benefited from intensified 
cooperation under the MAP, pushing comprehensive reforms well beyond 
defence and security issues and military structures. Similar timeframes will apply 
to the first three Western Balkan states to join NATO as full members.81 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
78  The seven new Member States have become involved alongside NATO partners in some of 
the Alliance’s operations, including NATO-led peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. See infra 
section 7. 
79  See supra n. 70. 
80  See Riga Summit Declaration, Press Release (2006)150, 29 November 2006, para. 30. 
81  Croatia joined the Pf.P in 2000 and the MAP in 2002. Albania joined the Pf.P in 1994 and the 
MAP in 1999. Macedonia joined the Pf.P in 1995 and the MAP in 1999. See also chapter 6. 
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4. OSCE 
 
4.1 Legal and operational framework 
 
On 1 August 1975, the participating states to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the Helsinki Final Act.82 The Final Act, a 
political document which was not meant to be legally binding, contained the 
principles for East-West dialogue and coexistence. It was also one of the first 
official documents that recognised and integrated a broad security concept: the 
so-called ‘human dimension.’83 Further, it was the start of a process which 
increasingly led from coexistence to cooperation and to a gradual institutionalisa-
tion.84 This process led to the transformation of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe in 1994.85 
With its fifty-six participating states, the OSCE is the world’s largest regional 
security arrangement.86 All European states, including Belarus, take part in the 
organisation. But the geographical scope of the OSCE is not restricted to the 
European continent. With the participation of non-European states like the United 
States, Canada and the Caucasian and Central Asian states that gained independ-
ence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the OSCE encompasses the region 
of the northern hemisphere, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Within this region, 
the OSCE sees important duties for itself in the fields of conflict prevention and 
post-conflict rehabilitation. In particular, the OSCE is engaged in activities such 
as arms control, cooperation in the economic and environmental fields, supervi-
sion of compliance with human and minority rights and the observation and 
organisation of elections.87 
The OSCE’s activities are based on the principles that security is indivisible and 
requires mutual cooperation. Politico-military issues, the protection and promotion 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental issues are 
interconnected elements of a wider security dimension; stagnation in one dimension 
                                                                                                                                               
82  Reproduced in 14 ILM 1307 (1975). 
83  See Principle VII and the ‘basket’ entitled ‘Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields’. 
See E. Decaux and L.-A. Sicilianos, eds., La CSCE: Dimension humaine et règlement des différends 
(Paris, Montchrestien 1993). 
84  See E. Suy, ‘The Development of Supervisory Mechanisms Within the CSCE Framework’, in 
Blokker and Muller, op. cit. n. 25, at pp. 83-92. 
85  See I. Dekker and R. Wessel, ‘Van CVSE naar OVSE: de sluipende institutionalisering en 
onvermijdelijke juridisering van een internationale conferentie’, 31 Vrede en Veiligheid (2002) pp. 
425-438. 
86  The Republic of Montenegro joined the OSCE most recently, on 21 June 2006. See 
MC.DEC/2/06, Decision No. 2/06 ‘Accession of Montenegro to the OSCE’ of 21 June 2006. 
87  For a detailed guide to the history, structures and work of the organisation, see Secretariat of 
the OSCE, OSCE Handbook, 3rd edn. (Vienna, OSCE 2000) and <http://www.osce.org>. 
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has a negative effect on the other security dimensions. Similarly, the security of one 
state cannot and may not be considered separately from that of another state. 
Security can never be achieved at the expense of or in competition with other states, 
only by cooperation with others.88 
The principles of indivisibility and mutual cooperation are reflected in the 
decision-making process of the OSCE. All participants have the same status and 
therefore the same voice in the decision-making process. The down-side of this is 
that the principle of having to reach consensus on political decisions (not the 
operational ones) can easily block decision-making between the fifty-six partici-
pating states.89 Exceptionally, unanimity ‘minus one’ (the ‘one’ being a state 
grossly violating its OSCE commitments) or ‘minus two’ (the parties to a 
conflict) is possible.90 OSCE decisions and documents have a political rather than 
a legally enforceable nature (e.g., the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe.91.), 
with some notable exceptions (e.g., the 1990 CFE Treaty.92.). Although some legal 
academics argue the contrary, the OSCE does not formally have international 
legal personality, despite the fact that the CSCE was rechristened as the OSCE in 
1994 in order to reflect its character as a permanent international organisation 
with its own responsibilities.93 In the mid-1990s, the OSCE acquired the status of 
a UN ‘regional arrangement’ under the terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter.94 
The OSCE has a number of permanent institutions, of which the Secretariat, 
the Conflict Prevention Centre,95 the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
                                                                                                                                               
88  For background and analysis, see, e.g., L. Nyholm, ed., OSCE – A Need for Co-operation 
(Copenhagen, The Danish United Nations Association 1998); and M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. 
Rosas, eds., The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis 
Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998). 
89  See AIV, The Netherlands and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 
2003: Role and Direction (The Hague, AIV 2002) at p. 22. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Reprinted in 30 ILM 190 (1991). 
92  Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, reprinted in 30 ILM 1 (1991), entered into 
force on 9 November 1992. The Treaty was amended in Istanbul on 19 November 1999. The 
amendment has not yet entered into force. 
93  On the discussion, see N. Blokker, ‘Internationale organisaties en hun leden. Van oude 
vragen, de dingen die voorbij gaan?’, Inaugural Lecture, Leiden University, 2001, at pp. 15-16, with 
reference to a proponent of legal personality, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘Internationale Organisationen 
aufgrund von soft law’, in U. Beyerlin, et al., eds., Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung – Fest-
schrift für Rudolf Bernhardt (Berlin, Springer Verlag 1995) pp. 229-239. 
94  See Secretary General Jan Kubis’ remarks to the Second UNCTC Special Meeting with Inter-
national, Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations, 7 October 2003, Washington D.C. 
95  Under the guidance of the Secretary General, the CPC provides support to the Chairman-in-
Office and other OSCE negotiating and decision-making bodies in the fields of early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. To assist in this, it maintains 
an Operations Centre to identify potential crisis areas and to plan for future missions and operations. 
The Forum for Security and Cooperation Support Unit in the CPC covers politico-military aspects of 
security in the OSCE area. For an evaluation of the CPC’s activities, see H. Vetschera, ‘Ten Years of 
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and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights are the most 
important ones for this study. The latter two will be briefly discussed below. In 
addition, the Permanent Council.96 and the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) play a 
pivotal role in day-to-day management. The CiO acts primarily as an honest 
broker in the process of building consensus between the participating states. This 
chairmanship rotates annually among the participating states. 
As a security organisation with a strong focus on conflict prevention, the 
OSCE has developed a whole range of tools to identify situations and develop-
ments that have the potential to escalate into violent conflicts and to react 
rapidly.97 They include fact-finding and rapporteur missions,98 personal represen-
tatives of the CiO.99 and ad hoc steering groups.100 It is interesting to note that, 
over the years, the OSCE has developed a number of measures for (ad hoc) use in 
times of crisis or increasing tension that are intended to promote direct contacts 
between the parties to a dispute, as well as the other parties involved. For exam-
ple, pursuant to the so-called ‘Vienna Mechanism’ – established in the Vienna 
Concluding Document of 1989,101 participating states are allowed, through an 
established set of procedures, to raise questions relating to the human dimension 
                                                                                                                                               
the Conflict Prevention Centre – Origins and Development’, in Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, ed., OSCE Yearbook 2001 (Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlag 2002) pp. 401-420. 
96  In addition to being responsible for the day-to-day business and decision making of the or-
ganisation, the Permanent Council also holds informal committee meetings, enabling representatives 
to exchange views on various issues pertaining to the OSCE and raise concerns regarding develop-
ments in the OSCE area. As a permanent forum for multilateral dialogue and political consultations, 
the Permanent Council can be regarded as ‘the king-spider in the OSCE’s web of conflict prevention’ 
or ‘an ongoing security council without privilege’. See A. Bloed, ‘The OSCE Main Political Bodies 
and Their Role in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management’, in Bothe et al., op. cit. n. 88, at p. 35. 
97  See, e.g., M. van der Stoel, ‘The Role of the OSCE in Conflict Prevention’, Studia Diplo-
matica (1996) pp. 33-39; J. Grussendorf, ‘Conflict Prevention in the OSCE’, in Nyholm, op. cit. n. 
88, at pp. 43-56; J. Cohen, Conflict Prevention in the OSCE: An Assessment of Capacities (The 
Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 1999); E. Bakker, ‘A Culture 
of Conflict Prevention: OSCE Experience and Cooperation with the EU’, in Kronenberger and 
Wouters, op. cit. n. 19, at pp. 393-413. 
98  These are usually comprised of short-term visits by experts and/or leading politicians or 
diplomats; the objective is to become acquainted with the facts during an on-the-spot visit. These 
missions report to the OSCE bodies. They are also employed to assess whether – and, if so, the 
extent to which – the OSCE should initiate missions and field operations. 
99  Leading diplomats or (former) politicians may be requested by the CiO to carry out a specific 
short-term task in connection with the prevention of conflicts or crisis management. In 1997, for 
example, the former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky played an important role in the restoration of 
stability and the prevention of the re-escalation of the conflict in Albania. 
100  Steering groups comprised of a limited number of members assist the CiO as the need arises. 
The three members of the Troika – the past, present and future CiO – are always members of these 
steering groups, supplemented with representatives from states which the CiO believes may be able 
to make a contribution to the resolution of the specific problem. 
101  Available at: <http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=160&lid=5431>. 
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situation in other OSCE states. The latter are under the obligation to furnish 
information when so requested by other participating states.102 The so-called 
‘Moscow Mechanism’ (established at the last meeting of the CSCE on the Human 
Dimension in Moscow in 1991) builds on this and provides for the additional 
possibility for a minimum of six participating states (consequently, in this 
instance, a consensus is not required) to establish ad hoc missions of independent 
experts to assist in the resolution of a specific human dimension problem either 
on their own territory or in other OSCE participating states.103 In addition to 
issues of relevance to the human rights dimension, consultation and cooperation 
mechanisms and procedures have been developed for emergency situations (the 
so-called ‘Berlin Mechanism’). From 1991 to 1994, this mechanism for emer-
gency situations was used four times altogether, in connection with the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. A corresponding request from 
Russia in the context of the 1999 Kosovo crisis was rejected.104 
As becomes clear from this overview, the OSCE is primarily geared towards 
conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. It has a minor role to play in 
crisis management and ‘peacemaking’.105 Of all OSCE conflict prevention and 
post-conflict rehabilitation instruments, the (long-term) missions (including 
election observation) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities contrib-
ute most directly to dispute resolution and therefore merit closer attention. 
 
4.2 OSCE field presence 
 
The decision to establish, extend and conclude field operations is usually taken by 
the Permanent Council, the principal decision-making body of the OSCE. The 
Permanent Council decides on the mandate, the number of staff and the budget of 
such operations. Field operations vary in duration of deployment. Short-term 
missions (i.e., fact-finding and expert or election observation missions) investigate 
                                                                                                                                               
102  This consultation mechanism was activated extensively prior to the first phase of the Yugo-
slav crisis (1989-1990). See Bakker, loc. cit. n. 97, at p. 399. 
103  The Moscow Mechanism is an instrument which provides for the deployment of expert 
missions to examine human rights concerns in OSCE countries. It has been activated on five 
occasions. For instance, it was activated in 1992 by the then twelve states of the European Commu-
nity and the United States on the issue of reports of atrocities and attacks on unarmed civilians in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and in June 1993 by the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials vis-à-
vis Serbia and Montenegro to investigate reports of human rights violations (this mission was unable 
to fulfil its task because of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s lack of cooperation). See: <http:// 
www.osce.org/odihr/13483.html>. 
104  See R. Zaagman, ‘OSCE Conflict Prevention and the Economic and Environmental Dimen-
sion’, 10 Helsinki Monitor (1999) pp. 40-48. 
105  See, e.g., OSCE and Swiss Institute for World Affairs, ‘Report of the Colloquium on “The 
Future of the OSCE”’, Washington, 5-6 June 2005, available at: <http://www1.osce.org/cio/ 
15467.html>. 
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specific situations and/or establish the local contacts which are required to 
respond quickly to potential threats to stability and security. Long-term missions 
fill the gap between short-term missions and traditional peacekeeping.106 Their 
ongoing presence enables them to perform an early warning role and act in 
specific ways to address (.potential) tensions. The OSCE’s missions and field 
operations are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the organisation.107 They monitor compliance 
with the OSCE’s principles and obligations – in particular with regard to respect 
for human rights, democracy and the rule of law – and submit reports to the 
OSCE concerning political and other developments in the host state. In addition, 
they promote and provide support to political processes designed to prevent 
conflicts and to foster conflict management. The OSCE began its first (long-term) 
mission in September 1992 in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina (since concluded). 
Fifteen years later, the organisation has missions or offices at almost twenty 
locations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In many ways, this field presence 
constitutes the OSCE’s core business to which no less than 80 per cent of its total 
budget is allocated.108 
Election observation is one of the most – some say the only – politically rele-
vant aspects of the organisation.109 The OSCE’s reputation as Europe’s leading 
agency in the field of election observation is built upon its systematic, compre-
hensive and verifiable election observation methodology.110 Through its Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE observes 
elections in all fifty-six participating states to assess the implementation of OSCE 
commitments relating to elections.111 Where necessary, the ODIHR offers 
recommendations to bring electoral processes into line with those commitments. 
The ODIHR also conducts technical-assistance projects to improve the legislative 
and administrative framework for elections in specific countries.112 
Other OSCE missions, for example the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kos-
ovo, are focused on the reconstruction of the state and/or society in the phase 
                                                                                                                                               
106  See Cohen, op. cit. n. 97, at p. 86. 
107  E. Bakker and B. Bomert, The OSCE and the Netherlands as Chairman-in-Office (The 
Hague, Netherlands Helsinki Committee 2003) at p. 22. 
108  See OSCE CPC Secretariat, ‘Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and Other OSCE Field 
Activities’, SEC.INF/115/04, 2 June 2004. 
109  See OSCE and Swiss Institute for World Affairs, loc. cit. n. 105. 
110  Based on the premise that an election is more than a one-day event, this methodology provides 
insights into all elements necessary for a democratic electoral process: the legal and regulatory 
framework, the election administration, the election campaign (including the media environment), the 
complaints and appeals process, voting, counting and tabulation, and the announcement of results. 
111  See the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE of 29 June 1990, ‘International Standards of Elections’. The commitments agreed upon 
emphasise fundamental principles that are central to a democratic tradition and can be summed up in 
seven key words: universal, equal, fair, secret, free, transparent and accountable. 
112  Information about these projects is available at: <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections>. 
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subsequent to the resolution of a conflict. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
elsewhere, the missions work closely together with other organisations that are 
active in the field. These missions will be described in further detail below.113 
 
4.3 High Commissioner on National Minorities 
 
In reaction to the eruption of ethnic violence and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union, the CSCE in 1992 adopted a proposal tabled by the 
Netherlands to appoint a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).114 
The Dutch diplomat and politician Max van der Stoel was appointed as the first 
HCNM, with an office in The Hague. His mandate was extended on several 
occasions. In July 2001, he was succeeded by the present incumbent, the Swedish 
diplomat Rolf Ekéus. 
The High Commissioner is an instrument for the prevention of conflicts at the 
earliest possible stage.115 His mandate is based on the principle that action on 
minorities issues should be taken as quickly as possible, that is to say, when they 
risk escalating into a conflict, thereby threatening stability and peaceful relations 
between participating states of the OSCE. The mandate bestows two main duties 
on the HCNM. Firstly, he must detect threats to peace and stability. Secondly, he 
must try to reduce tensions in crises involving minorities. In addition, he is 
required to warn the OSCE in the event that he cannot control a specific situation 
with the resources at his disposal. The political bodies of the OSCE can then 
exercise their discretion in deciding whether to take action.116 
                                                                                                                                               
113  See infra section 8. 
114  A reference to the original proposal is given by O. Brenninkmeijer, ‘The OSCE High Com-
missioner on National Minorities: Negotiating the 1992 Conflict Prevention Mandate’, PSIO 
Occasional Paper 5/2005, at p. 15, n. 3; Archive of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
‘Officiële Indiening Nederlands Voorstel Inzake HCM Commentaar: Tekst zoals werkelijk 
uitgesproken op de laatste plenaire voor het paasreces, woensdag 15 april ’s avonds’ (Official 
submission of the Netherlands proposal concerning HCM commentary. Statement as actually 
delivered on the last plenary before the Easter break, Wednesday evening, 15 April), Fax report from 
the CSCE Helsinki delegation, to DAV, The Hague, fax no. 333, 16 April 1992. The process of 
negotiation ended with the acceptance of the original mandate by all participating states at the closure 
of the CSCE’s Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (HFUM) on 10 July 1992. See CSCE Helsinki Document 
1992, ‘The Challenges of Change’, section on Helsinki Decisions, 8-14, available at: <http://www. 
osce.org/mc/13018.html>. 
115  See the literature referred to in n. 97. In addition, see M. Amor and M. Estebanez, ‘The High 
Commissioner on National Minorities: Development of the Mandate’, in Bothe et al., op. cit. n. 88, at 
pp. 123-165; H.-J. Heintze, ‘Minority Issues in Western Europe and the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities’, 7 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2000) pp. 381-392; 
and A. Inder Singh, ‘Minorities, Justice and Security in Post-Communist Europe’, Journal of 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2002), available at: <http://ecmi.de/jemie>. 
116  A description of the HCNM’s current mandate and the tools at his disposal is available at: 
<http://www.osce.org/hcnm/13022.html>. 
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The HCNM has a number of tools available for the performance of his man-
date. The most important of these are the collection of information (from OSCE 
missions, NGOs representing specific minorities and local partners – both 
governments and minorities), on-site consultations (for which the HCNM does 
not require special permission to visit the relevant country), the formulation of 
reports (some of which have contributed to the necessary amendment of national 
legislation, as well as the implementation of consultation mechanisms – or at least 
dialogue – between governments and the representatives of minorities) and the 
issuing of recommendations to governments (often as a result of a visit). The 
latter constituted perhaps the most important instrument of the first HCNM 
because they did not denounce the relevant government but instead tried to 
convince it that the country’s stability would benefit most by granting specific 
rights or freedoms to members of the national minorities. 
 
 
5. COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
5.1 Legal and operational framework 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE), established in 1949, is regarded as a security 
organisation for the purposes of this study.117 With its wide membership (forty-
seven members),118 the organisation was given a mission to promote and defend 
pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law for the purpose of realising 
the ideals and principles that are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress (Art. 1 Statute).119 The only area specifically 
excluded from the Council of Europe’s mandate is national defence (Art. 1(d)). 
But this does not mean that the CoE has no impact on security and stability in 
Europe. Quite the contrary: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the CoE’s main job 
                                                                                                                                               
117  See chapter 1 for the rationale to adopt a broad notion of security. See also J. Wouters and F. 
Naert, ‘How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo’, 50 
ICLQ (2001) pp. 540-576 at p. 546. 
118  The Republic on Montenegro was the last country to join the CoE, on 11 May 2007. In 
addition to the forty-seven members, the EC and several non-CoE members participate in this 
cooperation, notably by being party to CoE treaties which contain wider membership clauses. For 
example, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Tonga and the United States are parties to the Conven-
tion on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 112, 1983). The EC is a contracting party, for 
example, to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (ETS 
No. 104, 1979). On the basis of Art. I-7(2) TCE, the European Union could become a party to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (i) if the TCE 
enters into force (see chapter 5, section 6.2) and (ii) if the other parties to the Convention agree to the 
European Union becoming a contracting party. 
119  Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5 May 1949, ETS Nos. 1/6/7/8/11. The texts of all 
CoE treaties are available on the website of the CoE Treaty Office, at: <http://conventions.coe.int>. 
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has become to act as a political anchor and human rights watchdog for Europe’s 
post-Communist democracies. It assists the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) in carrying out and consolidating political, legal and constitu-
tional reform, especially by providing know-how. In this way, the CoE helps to 
build ‘democratic security, an essential complement to military security and a pre-
requisite for the continent’s stability’.120 
The main component parts of the CoE are the Committee of Ministers (the 
organisation’s decision-making body composed of ministers of foreign affairs or 
their representatives), the Parliamentary Assembly (bringing together 630 
members from all national parliaments), the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities (composed of a Chamber of Local Authorities and a Chamber of 
Regions), the Secretariat (headed since September 2004 by Secretary-General 
Terry Davis) and the European Court of Human Rights (which falls under the 
budget of the organisation and is composed of forty-seven judges). The CoE’s 
European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the ‘Venice 
Commission’, has provided constitutional advice in a number of conflict areas, 
notably in South-Eastern Europe.121 This Commission is composed of independ-
ent experts from the forty-seven Member States and takes its name from the place 
where it has its seat. 
 
5.2 Tools to create and enhance democratic security 
 
The Council of Europe’s ability to promote political dialogue and to ensure 
practical cooperation on the basis of fundamental values is the key to its role in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding.122 Political dialogue is particularly intense 
within the Parliamentary Assembly, much more so than in the Committee of 
Ministers. Apart from expressing the whole range of political opinions, the CoE 
has consistently – and often effectively – put pressure on governments and 
proposed innovative solutions. The CoE’s biggest achievement, however, is the 
initiation of 198 legally binding European treaties or conventions on topics 
ranging from human rights and fundamental freedoms to the fight against 
organised crime. But the Council of Europe distinguishes itself from other 
international organisations not only by the large number of binding obligations 
that Member States have entered into but also by the sophisticated mechanisms 
ensuring the compliance of Member States with these obligations, especially in 
                                                                                                                                               
120  The CoE’s Vienna Summit in October 1993 set out new political aims. The Heads of State and 
Government cast the CoE as a guardian of democratic security – founded on human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. 
121  See: <http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_calendar_ef.asp?L=E> and further section 9. 
122  See J. Kleijssen, ‘No Peace without Human Rights: The Council of Europe and Conflict 
Prevention’, in Kronenberger and Wouters, op cit. n. 19, pp. 439-449 at p. 440. 
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the field of human and minority rights. Violations of human rights are an impor-
tant cause of armed conflict. By ensuring the observance of these rights, the CoE 
is therefore addressing an important root cause of conflict. The unique feature of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950 is exactly its control 
mechanism.123 The protection of fundamental rights is entrusted to a permanent 
European Court of Human Rights. The Court can be seized by both states and 
individuals. Its judgments are legally binding upon CoE Member States. Even in 
politically highly sensitive cases, its judgments are implemented – even if not 
always immediately.124 The Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment complements the protection 
available under the ECHR by establishing a European Committee for the Preven-
tion of Torture, composed of independent and impartial experts from a variety of 
backgrounds.125 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities.126 is the first-ever legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to 
the protection of national minorities. As a counterpart to the Framework Conven-
tion, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages came into force in 
March 1998.127 
In addition to these legal instruments, the long-term institutional cooperation 
activities of the Council of Europe are important tools. Following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Council of Europe embarked on a programme of cooperation and 
assistance with the CEECs, aimed at helping them carry out democratic reforms 
and integrating them into European structures. These programmes focus on 
democratic institution building, constitutional reform, harmonisation of legisla-
tion with European standards, in particular the ECHR, reform of the judiciary, 
electoral reform, media legislation, reform of education curricula, minority rights 
and protection, training of law officers, development of local democracy and the 
promotion of civil society. These programmes are being adapted on a case-by-
case basis to help prevent the (re-)emergence of particular conflict situations.128 
 
5.3 Enlargement as a means to extend security and stability 
 
Direct negotiation and the use of political leverage in the context of obligations 
linked to the membership perspective are also amongst the CoE’s specific tools to 
                                                                                                                                               
123  ETS No. 5, 1950. 
124  See R.A. Lawson and H.G. Schermers, Leading Cases of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 2nd edn. (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri 1999). For an evaluation of the ECHR at 55, see T. 
Barkhuysen, M. Kuijer and R.A. Lawson, eds., 55 jaar EVRM (Leiden, NJCM 2006). 
125  ETS No. 126, 1987. 
126  ETS No. 157, 1995. 
127  ETS No. 148, 1992. 
128  See information on legal cooperation, at: <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/legal.asp>. 
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take away the root causes of conflict and extend the zone of security and stability 
in Europe. During the Cold War period, the CoE already demonstrated its 
capacity to integrate countries that had freed themselves from totalitarian regimes. 
Thus, in 1977, Greece was readmitted (under the Colonels’ regime it had with-
drawn from the organisation when it was about to be excluded) and Portugal and 
Spain were admitted in 1976 and 1977 respectively, following the restoration of 
democracy. The fall of the Berlin Wall finally enabled the CoE to achieve what it 
had been set up to do from the beginning: to unite the whole of Europe on the 
basis of common values. Following the accession of Montenegro on 11 May 
2007, the CoE now has forty-seven Member States and represents over 800 
million Europeans. Only Belarus is absent from the ‘European democratic 
family’. Its application for membership of 12 March 1993 has been put on ice in 
view of the repressive regime’s poor record on the protection of human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law. 
According to Article 4 of the Statute of the CoE ‘[a]ny European State which 
is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Article 3 may be invited 
to become a member of the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers’.129 
Article 3 lays down the essential membership criteria. This provision obliges every 
Member State to ‘accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by 
all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and to 
work together in the realisation of the aims for which the CoE was set up. The latter 
is an indirect reference to Article 1. In this respect, the signature and subsequent 
ratification of the ECHR has become an additional admission criterion.130 In fact, 
the Parliamentary Assembly, whose opinion the Committee of Ministers seeks 
before making a decision on the invitation of a state to accede to the organisation, 
has in recent years established a comprehensive list of political commitments 
which have to be accepted by the authorities of the countries applying for 
membership.131 These commitments are tailored to each candidate country’s 
situation and concern, inter alia, endeavours (i) to prevent or overcome conflict 
situations with political means, in line with democratic principles and respect for 
human rights;132 (ii) to sign and ratify a whole array of the CoE’s treaties and 
                                                                                                                                               
129  Article 5 lays down that, ‘[i]n special circumstances, a European country which is deemed to 
be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Article 3, may be invited by the Committee of Ministers 
to become an associate member of the Council of Europe’. 
130  This is the case since 1976. Since 1993, a time limit for the ratification of the ECHR (nor-
mally within a year from accession) has been established. See Resolution No. 1031 (1994). 
131  See R. Lawson, ‘Extending the European Family of Nations – The Response of the Council 
of Europe to Growing Membership’, in N. Blokker and H. Schermers, eds., Proliferation of 
International Organizations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2001) pp. 415-432. 
132  In the case of the countries of the Western Balkans that applied for membership after 1995, 
the commitments include sections on cooperation with the ICTY. See Opinion No. 234 (2002) on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s application for membership of the CoE and Opinion No. 195 (1996) on 
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protocols in the field of human and minority rights, local democracy and criminal 
law;133 and (iii) to ensure the proper functioning of the state’s institutions.134 The 
Committee of Ministers takes these commitments as the basis of its decision to 
invite a state to the organisation. 
The verification procedure which has been established over the years consists of 
an examination of the compatibility of the legal order of the candidate country with 
CoE’s standards. The Parliamentary Assembly, mainly through its Political Affairs 
Committee and Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, makes an evalua-
tion of legislation and other formal domestic acts by means of questionnaires, 
interviews and other contacts with national authorities and various representatives 
of the civil society (NGOs, press, etc.). Such an examination particularly concerns 
conformity with the basic conditions of a democratic state relating to the separation 
of powers, free elections, existence of political parties, freedom of the press and 
media and independence of the judiciary. The Assembly may decide to interrupt the 
examination of a request to accede.135 or include in its opinion on membership a 
suspension clause relating to the time of accession.136 
                                                                                                                                               
Croatia’s request for membership of the CoE, para. 9. Opinion No. 239 (2002) on the application for 
membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in para. 12, also demands cooperation in 
establishing the facts concerning the fate of missing people and handing over all information 
concerning mass graves. The commitments in the Opinion on Croatia’s application for membership 
reflect the fact that the opinion was adopted shortly after the end of the war: ‘The Assembly further 
expects Croatia: (i) to observe strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law, including in 
the event of armed conflict within its territory; […] (iv) to grant, without delay, a general amnesty for 
all former combatants not suspected of war crimes, in order to encourage the return of Croatian 
Serbs; […] (ix) to solve, in accordance with the standards and principles of the Council of Europe, 
the problems relating to the confiscation of property during the fascist and communist regimes.’ In 
Opinion No. 191 (1996) on FYROM’s application for CoE membership, in para. 10, the Assembly 
notes that Macedonia intends ‘to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 New York Protocol, and to ensure that asylum-seekers and refugees are not deported to 
countries where they would be at risk of human rights violations or to any other country without 
ensuring that they would be given effective and durable protection against return to a country where 
they might be at risk.’ 
133  Apart from those referred to in section 5.2 and n. 119 in this chapter, mention should be 
made of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122, 1985); the European Outline 
Convention on Trans-Frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ETS 
No. 106, 1980) and its protocols; the Conventions on Extradition (ETS No. 24, 1957), Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 30, 1959), Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141, 1990) and the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 112, 
1983); and the European Social Charter (ETS No. 35, 1961). 
134  See, e.g., Opinion No. 239 (2002) on the application for membership of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, para. 12, on the drafting of the Constitutional Charter of the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro; the organisation of referenda on independence at the end of the three-year trial period 
mentioned in the Belgrade Agreement – see chapter 6, section 4.3.3; and the peaceful dispute 
settlement concerning the future status of Kosovo. 
135  This is what happened with the membership application of Belarus. See, e.g., PACE Rec-
ommendation 1441 (2000) and Resolution No. 1306 (2002) on the situation in Belarus. 
136  See, e.g., Opinion No. 154 (1990) on Poland’s application for membership of the CoE. 
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In the case of a positive opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee 
of Ministers decides whether or not to invite the candidate country to become a 
member. Membership of a country becomes effective upon the deposit on its behalf 
with the Secretary General of an instrument of accession to the present Statute. 
Both the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers have each created a special 
monitoring procedure to verify compliance with the above-mentioned member-
ship commitments.137 Sanctions are possible when the political will to cooperate is 
found to be lacking.138 
 
 
6. EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE 




The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in the former Yugo-
slavia on 25 September 1991, when the Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 713, expressing deep concern at the fighting and calling on all states to 
implement immediately a ‘general and complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.’140 This resolution supported EC 
                                                                                                                                               
137  The Assembly follows a country-by-country approach. See complementary texts to the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the 
Council of Europe, Resolution 1115 (1997) on the setting up of an Assembly committee on the 
honouring of obligations and commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring 
Committee), available at: <http://assembly.coe.int>. The Committee of Ministers follows a thematic 
approach (freedom of information, local democracy, independence of the judiciary, etc.) towards all 
Member States. 
138  Art. 8 of the Statute states: ‘Any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously vio-
lated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of 
Ministers to withdraw under Article 7. If such member does not comply with this request, the Commit-
tee may decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the Committee 
may determine.’ For example, the Parliamentary Assembly suspended the voting rights of the Russian 
delegation in April 2000 (and restored them in January 2001) because of the human rights situation 
there. Persistent failure to comply with the organisation’s principles could result in expulsion from 
the organisation. 
139  The historical facts in the following paragraphs are largely drawn from L. Silber and D. 
Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, rev. edn. (London, Penguin Books 1996); and B. Marković, 
Yugoslav Crisis and the World: Chronology of Events January 1990 – December 1995 (Belgrade, 
Institute of International Politics and Economics 1995). 
140  On additional sanctions, see UNSC resolutions 724, 757, 787 and 820, the latter two author-
ising enforcement under the Security Council’s authority. UNSC resolution 942 ordered an embargo 
against the Bosnian Serbs. The sanctions were suspended and terminated by UNSC resolutions 943, 
1021, 1022 and 1074 (1 October 1996). For a legal analysis, see E. Kalpyris, R. Vork and A. 
Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l’ex-Yougoslavie (Brussels, Bruylant 
1995) pp. 3-73. 
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initiatives already undertaken to restore peace and dialogue in ex-Yugoslavia.141 On 
8 October 1991, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar appointed Cyrus Vance, 
former US Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the 
Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy maintained constant contact with all the 
parties to the conflict, the Presidency of the European Community, the Chairman of 
the CSCE, Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the EC’s Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia, and other interested parties in their efforts to find a solution to the 
crisis. 
It soon became clear that the most valuable contribution the United Nations 
could make at that stage was a ‘peacekeeping’ operation to create the necessary 
conditions for the pursuit of political negotiations for a peaceful settlement. With 
little peace to keep at the time, the United Nations would embark on activities that 
were very different from any that the organisation had undertaken elsewhere.142 
As part of the collective effort to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution 
to the conflict, Cyrus Vance undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and 
discussed with all parties concerned, among other things, the feasibility of 
deploying a UN peacekeeping operation. On 23 November 1991, he convened a 
meeting in Geneva at which the presidents of Serbia and Croatia signed a 
ceasefire agreement and requested the speedy establishment of a UN peacekeep-
ing force.143 The Security Council decided, however, that the conditions for the 
deployment of such a force had not been met because the ceasefire had broken 
down almost immediately.144 Subsequently, on 2 January 1992, an implementing 
accord on an unconditional ceasefire was signed at Sarajevo, and a small UN 
mission, composed of fifty liaison officers, was sent to supervise the newly 
negotiated ceasefire.145 Notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in 
Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the UN plan, the Secretary-General 
recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).146 In making this recommendation, he stressed 
that, in his view, the danger that a UN peacekeeping operation would fail for lack 
of cooperation from the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its 
dispatch would lead to a breakdown of the ceasefire and to a new conflagration. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
141  See chapter 3, section 2. 
142  See M. Bothe, ‘Peace-keeping’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 648-700. 
143  UN Doc. S/23239, Annex. 
144  See UNSC resolutions 721 and 724, both at para. 2. 
145  See UNSC resolution 727, paras. 2 and 3. The accord (UN Doc. S/23363, Annex III) is 
reprinted in D. Bethlehem and M. Weller, eds., The ‘Yugoslav’ Crisis in International Law: General 
Issues (Part I.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) at p. 487. 
146  UN Doc. S/23592 (15 February 1992), reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, ibid., at p. 492. 
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6.2 UNPROFOR (1): too little, too late 
 
6.2.1 Establishment and rapid expansion of mandate and territory 
 
UNPROFOR was established by the Security Council by resolution 743 of 21 
February 1992 ‘to create the conditions of peace and security required for the 
negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis’.147 For an initial period 
of twelve months, this peacekeeping operation was established in Croatia only, as 
an interim arrangement to ensure that the three ‘United Nations Protected Areas’ 
(UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarised and that all persons residing in them were 
protected from fear of armed attack. It was only meant to start working in Bosnia 
after the primary task of disarmament in parts of Croatia had been completed.148 
However, due to the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, this was pushed forward: on 
30 April 1992, the Secretary-General sent observers to Bosnia.149 Unfortunately, 
by that time, the conflict had already erupted. 
On 8 June 1992, as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified, 
UNPROFOR’s mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security 
and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to the city and its surroundings.150 In September 1992, UNPROFOR’s 
mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and to protect convoys of released civilian 
detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested.151 
In the wake of continuing reports of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the second half of 1992, 
UNPROFOR’s mandate was enlarged to include monitoring functions in certain 
other areas of Croatia (‘pink zones’); to enable the force to control the entry of 
civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at 
the UNPA borders and at international frontiers (to enforce the sanctions and to 
prevent the infiltration into the country of irregular units); and to include monitor-
ing of the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula, a strategic area just south of 
                                                                                                                                               
147  UNSC resolution 743 (21 February 1992) para. 5. UNSC resolution 749 (7 April 1992) 
authorised the earliest possible full deployment of UNPROFOR. The force’s mandate changed (see 
UNSC resolutions 769, 770, 776, 815 and 836), was extended and then terminated by the Dayton 
Agreement, Annex 1-A, Art. VII and UNSC resolution 1031 (15 December 1995). See also UNDPI, 
op. cit. n. 13, at pp. 488-491, 513-538 and 556-563. 
148  UNPROFOR’s mandate is contained in UN Doc. S/23280 (11 December 1991) Annex 3, 
reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, op. cit. n. 145, at p. 478. 
149  UN Doc. S/23836 (24 April 1992) para. 20, reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, op. cit. n. 
145, at p. 502. 
150  UNSC resolution 758. 
151  UNSC resolution 776. 
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Dubrovnik disputed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to 
ensure control of the Peruca dam, situated in one of the pink zones.152 
In November 1992, the government of Macedonia officially requested the 
deployment of UN observers to prevent possible developments across its borders 
to undermine the stability in the country.153 On 11 December 1992, the Security 
Council authorised the establishment of UNPROFOR’s presence in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as ‘UNPROFOR’s Macedonia Command’. Its 
mandate was to monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), strengthen, by its presence, the country’s 
security and stability and report on any developments that could threaten the 
country.154 
As the initial twelve-month mandate was about to expire at the end of Febru-
ary 1993, the Security Council, on three consecutive occasions, temporarily 
extended UNPROFOR’s mandate until 30 September so that the Secretary-
General was given enough time to take appropriate measures to strengthen the 
security of the force, in particular by providing it with the necessary defensive 
means.155 In 1992 and throughout 1993, the force, the UNPAs and the pink zones 
had regularly come under attack. By March 1993, the so-called ‘no-fly’ zone 
which UNPROFOR monitored pursuant to Security Council resolution 781 of 9 
October 1992 had already been violated on more than 500 occasions. Acting 
under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 816 
of 31 March 1993, authorised Member States to use ‘all necessary means’ to 
enforce the flight ban. Subsequently, NATO adopted the necessary arrangements 
to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights.156 
 
6.2.2 ‘Safe areas’ 
 
Almost simultaneously, the fighting in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified, 
with Bosnian Serb paramilitary units attacking several cities in the area. The 
attacks resulted in a heavy loss of life among the civilian population and severely 
impeded humanitarian relief efforts in the area. The UNHCR reported that 
thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas 
which were being attacked by Serb forces, and that thirty or forty persons were 
dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical 
                                                                                                                                               
152  UNSC resolutions 762, 769 and 779. 
153  See UN Doc. S/24923 (9 December 1992), reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, op. cit. n. 
145, at p. 570. 
154  UNSC resolution 795. 
155  UNSC resolutions 807, 815, 847. 
156  On Operation Deny Flight, see infra section 7.1, n. 293. 
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treatment.157 Despite strong political pressure from the international community 
and the Security Council,158 and the efforts by UNPROFOR and the UNHCR in 
the field, the fighting persisted and the humanitarian situation in the area contin-
ued to deteriorate. On 16 April, the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of 
the Charter, adopted resolution 819, in which it demanded that all parties treat 
Srebrenica and its surroundings as a ‘safe area which should be free from any 
armed attack or any other hostile act’ (.para. 1). The Council requested the 
Secretary-General to take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in 
Srebrenica (.para. 4) and arrange for the safe transfer of the ill and wounded (.para. 
11) and demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica 
(.para. 8). By other provisions of the resolution, the Council condemned and 
rejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of 
civilians from Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its campaign 
of ethnic cleansing (.paras. 2, 5, 6 and 7). On 6 May 1993, the Security Council 
adopted resolution 824, in which it declared that, in addition to Srebrenica, 
‘Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Žepa, 
Goražde, Bihać and their surroundings […] should be treated as safe areas by all 
the parties concerned’. The Council further declared that in those areas armed 
attacks must cease, all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units must withdraw 
and all parties must allow UNPROFOR and the international humanitarian 
agencies free and unimpeded access to all safe areas. It authorised the strengthen-
ing of UNPROFOR’s mandate by an additional fifty military observers to monitor 
the humanitarian situation in those areas. 
On 4 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 836, again acting under 
chapter VII, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect 
the safe areas, including deterring attacks against them, monitoring the ceasefire, 
promoting the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the 
Bosnian government and occupying some key points on the ground. The Council 
authorised UNPROFOR, ‘acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, 
including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any 
of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate 
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of the Force or 
of protected humanitarian convoys’ (.para. 9). The Council also decided that 
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrange-
ments, might take, under its authority, ‘all necessary measures, through the use of 
air power, in and around the safe areas’, to support UNPROFOR (.para. 10). In 
                                                                                                                                               
157  UN Doc. S/25519 (2 April 1993). 
158  See, inter alia, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25520 (3 
April 1993). 
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response to the Council’s invitation to report to it on the requirements for 
implementing resolution 836, the Secretary-General indicated that it would be 
necessary to deploy additional troops on the ground and to provide air support.159 
While the UNPROFOR Force Commander had estimated an additional troop 
requirement of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength, the 
Secretary-General stated that it was possible to start implementing the resolution 
under a ‘light option’, with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600.160 In 
adopting resolution 844 of 18 June 1993, the Security Council authorised an 
additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR by 7,600 troops as an initial approach 
and reaffirmed the use of air power in and around the declared safe areas to 
support the force in the performance of its mandate. 
On 4 October 1993, after intensive consultations and two interim extensions of 
UNPROFOR’s mandate – for a twenty-four-hour period on 30 September, and for 
another four days on 1 October – the Security Council, by its resolution 871, 
extended the mandate of the force for a period of six months, through 31 March 
1994. The Council took this action under chapter VII of the Charter, reiterating its 
determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of move-
ment. 
 
6.2.3 The question of air strikes 
 
In the meantime, talks aimed at achieving a comprehensive ceasefire were 
continuing within the framework of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY).161 In fact, UNPROFOR monitored the implementation of a 
whole series of ephemeral ceasefire agreements, while all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were trying to take tactical advantage of its presence and were 
increasingly questioning its impartiality. At the same time, the military and 
humanitarian situation continued to worsen, especially in Bosnia. Fighting in and 
around Sarajevo continued unabated, including lethal mortar attacks against 
                                                                                                                                               
159  See UN Doc. S/25939 (14 June 1993), reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, op. cit. n. 145, at 
p. 625. 
160  Ibid., at para. 6. 
161  The follow-up conference to the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia; see chapter 3, 
section 2.5. The ICFY first convened in London on 26-27 August 1992, where David Owen (EC) and 
Cyrus Vance (UN) were appointed to co-chair the conference. Vance was replaced by former 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg in May 1993, Owen by former Swedish 
Prime Minister Carl Bildt in May 1995. The ICFY had a broad mandate for conflict settlement and 
prevention but focused chiefly on the Bosnian war, producing a series of proposals to end the 
fighting, including, in January 1993, the Vance-Owen Plan for keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina together 
with ten provinces in a decentralised, demilitarised state. The ICFY continued to operate until the 
end of the Bosnian war but gradually the focus began to shift towards great power mediation through 
the Contact Group (established on 26 April 1994), which included representatives from the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. 
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civilian targets. On 5 February 1994, a mortar round fired at the central market 
killed at least fifty-eight civilians and wounded 142 others in the worst single 
incident of the twenty-two-month war. This followed a similar attack on one of 
the suburbs of Sarajevo on 4 February 1994 in which ten civilians were killed and 
eighteen injured. These acts were immediately strongly condemned by the 
international community, but the Security Council did not take any action. The 
Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative (since 3 January 1994, 
Yasushi Akashi) and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to travel to Sarajevo 
in order to supervise the investigation of the incidents and to prevent further 
atrocities. UNPROFOR established that the round fired on 4 February had come 
from a Bosnian Serb position, but that it had not been possible to locate the 
source of the attack against the central market on 5 February. In a series of letters 
to the president of the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that those 
two incidents made it necessary, in accordance with resolution 836 (1993), to 
prepare urgently for the use of air strikes to deter further attacks.162 The Secretary-
General also informed the Council that he had requested the Secretary-General of 
NATO to obtain ‘a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorise the 
Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the 
request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around 
Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks 
against civilian targets in that city.’163 
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted the request of the UN Secretary-
General. On 9 February, moving to end the strangulation of Sarajevo, it issued a 
statement calling for ‘the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under 
UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, 
artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft 
weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in the area within 20 kilometres of 
the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding the area within 2 kilometres of the centre of 
Pale.’164 It also called upon the Muslim-led government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
within the same period, ‘to place the heavy weapons in its possession within the 
Sarajevo exclusion zone described above under UNPROFOR control, and to 
refrain from attacks launched from within the current confrontation lines in the 
city.’165 The NAC decided that, ten days from 10 February 1994, heavy weapons 
of any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled 
                                                                                                                                               
162  See UN Docs. S/1994/159 (11 February 1994), S/1994/182 (16 February 1994) and S/1994/ 
217 (25 February 1994), all reprinted in Bethlehem and Weller, op. cit. n. 145, at pp. 672-675. 
163  UN Doc. S/1994/131 (6 February 1994). 
164  Decisions taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 February 1994, Press 
release (94)15, 9 February 1994, para. 6. 
165  Ibid., at para. 7. 
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by UNPROFOR, would, along with their direct and essential military support 
facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes.166 
The Security Council eventually met on 14-15 February 1994 at the request of 
the governments of Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Pakistan. Over the course of 
four meetings, it heard from a total of fifty-eight speakers. Member States 
generally welcomed the decision by NATO and the steps taken by the Secretary-
General to prepare for the use of force, adding that those actions had been fully 
authorised by existing Council resolutions. They emphasised that force was 
designed to underpin efforts by the United Nations and the European Union to 
achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict and that air strikes had to be carried 
out with caution and precision. Although the NATO ultimatum was widely 
supported, several Member States either opposed it or expressed concern that, as 
a result of air strikes, UNPROFOR might become a target for retaliatory meas-
ures. No Security Council resolution or statement was put forward during the 
meetings.167 
On 17 February 1994, following a meeting with Russian officials in Bosnia, 
the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw within two days all their heavy weapons to 
the distance set by NATO. On 20 February 1994, the Security Council met in 
informal consultations at the request of the Russian Federation, with the NATO 
deadline for withdrawal of heavy weapons scheduled for midnight that night. The 
Council was briefed by Kofi Annan, then still Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations, who reported that according to the Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, the UNPROFOR Force 
Commander and NATO, Serbian compliance with the ultimatum had been 
effective. Certain weapons on both the Serb and Muslim sides, which had not 
been removed from the exclusion zone, would be monitored in place by 
UNPROFOR. As a result, the Council decided, in coordination with NATO, not 
to recommend that air strikes be carried out.168 
 
6.2.4 Air strikes and consequences 
 
A repetition of the horrible scenario described above took place when, at the end 
of March 1994, the Bosnian Serb forces launched a big offensive against the safe 
area of Goražde. Despite the Council’s demand and UNPROFOR’s efforts to 
arrange for a ceasefire, attacks against Goražde continued unabated.169 After UN 
                                                                                                                                               
166  Ibid., at para. 10. 
167  See UNDPI, op. cit. n. 13, at pp. 529-530. 
168  Ibid., at p. 530. A few days later, on 28 February 1994, NATO fighters shot down four Serb 
aircraft violating the UN’s ‘no-fly’ zone over central Bosnia. This was the Alliance’s first use of 
force since it was founded in 1949. 
169  UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/14 (6 April 1994). 
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military observers in the city were endangered by Serb shelling, UNPROFOR’s 
Command requested NATO to use its air support for the self-defence of UN 
personnel. Consequently, on 10 and 11 April 1994, aircraft belonging to NATO 
states bombed Bosnian Serb positions.170 Notwithstanding the Bosnian Serbs’ 
repeated commitments to a ceasefire, the heavy shelling of the city did not cease. 
On 18 April, after the situation in and around Goražde became extremely dire, the 
Secretary-General asked NATO to authorise the use of air strikes, at the request 
of the United Nations, against artillery, mortar positions or tanks attacking 
civilians in Goražde, as well as in four other safe areas, namely the towns of 
Tuzla, Žepa, Bihać and Srebrenica.171 On 22 April 1994, the NAC authorised the 
use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets around Goražde if the 
Bosnian Serbs did not end their attacks against the safe area immediately, pull 
their forces back three kilometres from the city centre by 24 April, and allow UN 
forces and humanitarian relief convoys freedom of movement there.172 Although 
the Bosnian Serbs had not yet fully complied when the 24 April deadline expired, 
the Force Commander of UNPROFOR decided against the immediate use of air 
strikes. On 26 April 1994, the Secretary-General announced that Bosnian Serb 
forces had complied with the demands. 
In August and September 1994, the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
again deteriorated. Continued fighting persisted in several regions of the Republic 
and there were numerous interferences with humanitarian aid. In the safe area of 
Sarajevo, attacks, especially by snipers, escalated in frequency and deadly effect. 
The extent of heavy weapons attacks also increased. Attacks occurred in both the 
city centre and the suburbs and on many occasions were directed at residences, 
pedestrians and moving vehicles, such as trams packed with people. UN person-
nel were also targeted and suffered fatalities. Twice, on 5 August and 22 
September, UNPROFOR called in NATO warplanes to hit Serbian heavy 
weapons violating the exclusion zone around Sarajevo.173 
In the wake of a Krajina Serb assault on the safe area of Bihać in November, 
the Security Council decided that the authorisation given to Member States under 
resolution 836 (1993) to use force in support of UNPROFOR also applied to such 
measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.174 On 21 November, NATO launched 
an air strike on the airstrip used by Krajina Serbs in Croatia to attack the Bihać 
                                                                                                                                               
170  See UNDPI, op. cit. n. 13, at p. 531. 
171  UN Doc. S/1994/466, Annex. 
172  See Decisions taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 22 April 1994, Press 
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enclave across the border into Bosnia-Herzegovina.175 On 23 November, after the 
Bosnian Serb forces fired missiles at two British Harrier jets patrolling the Bihać 
area, NATO conducted air strikes against surface-to-air missile sites in the area.176 
When the Bosnian Serbs started shelling the town of Bihać again on 25 Novem-
ber, NATO planes were again called in by UNPROFOR to protect UN troops. 
The planes flew for sixty minutes but could not initiate any attack without 
endangering both UNPROFOR troops and civilians.177 Despite all efforts and 
warnings, the Bosnian Serbs continued their attack, eventually capturing some 
high ground within the Bihać safe area. Also, in an apparent retaliation for NATO 
air strikes, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs detained a number 
of blue helmets, restricted their movement, subjected some to humiliation and 
stopped most humanitarian and supply convoys in territories under Bosnian Serb 
control. The Security Council, in a statement by its president, condemned in the 
strongest possible terms all violations, in particular, the ‘flagrant and blatant’ 
entry of Bosnian Serb forces into the safe area.178 It demanded that all parties 
agree to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the Bihać region, particu-
larly in and around the safe area. The call for a ceasefire was not accepted. 
 
6.2.5 Reorganisation of UNPROFOR 
 
Despite a lull in the fighting in December and January, largely thanks to strong 
international diplomatic pressure on all parties to agree to a ceasefire, offensives 
around Travnik and Tuzla in February 1995 caused the war to continue. The 
Bosnian Serbs again began restricting UNPROFOR’s freedom of movement in 
the areas controlled by them and also increased their obstruction of humanitarian 
assistance. The security situation in Sarajevo deteriorated with increasing sniping 
and targeting of UNPROFOR and UNHCR aircraft. 
In view of the expiration of UNPROFOR’s mandate on 31 March 1995, the 
Secretary-General drew up a report in which he sketched the situation.179 In 
Croatia, the retention of UNPROFOR in its existing form no longer enjoyed the 
consent of the government. However, the total withdrawal of all UN peacekeep-
ing forces would have resulted in a grave threat to peace and security extending 
beyond Croatia’s borders. The maintenance of a reduced force under a new 
mandate seemed the only way to reduce the risks of a renewed major war. With 
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regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Secretary-General viewed UNPROFOR’s 
performance as a mixture of achievements and setbacks. The force’s presence on 
the ground had not been matched by political progress on a negotiated settlement 
and therefore operated in a sort of vacuum. While UNPROFOR continued to 
perform humanitarian and confidence-building tasks, the lack of progress at the 
negotiation table had created a situation in which it could do little but to delay 
rather than prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Understandably, the 
Bosnian government had expressed its wish for possible changes in the existing 
arrangements. The Secretary-General reported that although the military situation 
in Macedonia remained relatively calm and stable, there had been regular 
skirmishes with border patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
UNPROFOR, in close coordination with the ICFY and the CSCE, had acted as a 
successful mediator in several such encounters, achieving the withdrawal of 
soldiers on both sides. The Secretary-General noted further that the most serious 
difficulties experienced by Macedonia were economic. Social stability was 
endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting, among 
other things, from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece on 17 
February 1994 and the UN sanctions against the FRY, formerly the country’s 
primary trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and 
ethnic Albanians had also increased. Against this background, the government of 
Macedonia had expressed the wish that the UN forces in the country should be 
separated from UNPROFOR. With regard to UNPROFOR’s presence in the FRY 
(a liaison office and a mission monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka 
peninsula), the Secretary-General simply noted that the cooperation the force had 
received from Belgrade had proved vital to the effective functioning of all three 
of the operation’s commands. 
On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided, at the suggestion of the 
Secretary-General, to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate 
but interlinked peacekeeping operations collectively known as the United Nations 
Peace Forces (UNPF). By its resolutions 981, 982 and 983, the Council estab-
lished the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia 
(UNCRO), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
decided that UNPROFOR in Macedonia would be known as the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). All operations were given man-
dates until 30 November 1995. The administrative and logistic activities of all 
three operations were coordinated at the UNPF headquarters in Zagreb. 
 
6.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina: UNPROFOR (2), IPTF and UNMIBH 
 
From March to November 1995, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
dominated by three main developments. Firstly, there was an unprecedented level 
of military activity, including offensives by all sides, accompanied by major 
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movements of refugees and displaced persons and violations of international 
humanitarian law, particularly by the Bosnian Serb forces. Secondly, both 
UNPROFOR and NATO used force against the Bosnian Serbs. And thirdly, the 
US-led peace initiative, together with a country-wide decrease in fighting in 
October and November, provided a solid opportunity for a political solution to the 
conflict. 
 
6.3.1 UNPROFOR becomes part of the problem 
 
Fighting in and around Sarajevo intensified after 1 May 1995. The use of heavy 
weapons by the two sides and sustained shelling resulted in numerous civilian and 
UNPROFOR casualties and mounting calls for stricter enforcement of the 
weapons exclusion zone. After the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to respect 
UNPROFOR’s deadline for the return of heavy weapons, two NATO air strikes, 
on 25 and 26 May, were conducted against an ammunition dump near Pale.180 
Bosnian Serb forces reacted by surrounding additional UN weapons collection 
points. They took 300 UNPROFOR soldiers as hostages, using some of them as 
human shields to deter further air attacks on potential targets. They also cut 
electricity to the city. Fighting between UNPROFOR troops and Bosnian Serb 
forces erupted on 27 May 1995, when the latter seized an observation post at the 
Vrbanja bridge in Sarajevo and detained some blue helmets. The position was 
recaptured by UNPROFOR at the cost of two dead and fourteen wounded.181 
Reporting to the Security Council on 30 May, the Secretary-General stated 
that UNPROFOR’s role had become untenable and had to be changed.182 He put 
forward a number of options for consideration by the Council,183 including a 
revision of the mandate so that it included only those tasks that a peacekeeping 
operation could realistically be expected to perform in the prevailing circum-
stances (good offices; liaison; negotiation; border monitoring and monitoring 
ceasefires as long as the parties were willing to implement them; a presence in the 
safe areas; supporting humanitarian activities; and the use of force only in self-
defence). Any option which would involve the continuation of UNPROFOR in 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina would, however, need to be accompanied by measures, 
including the possible deployment of additional forces, to provide better security 
both for UNPROFOR personnel and that of the UNHCR and other civilian 
agencies.184 
 
6.3.2 Rapid Reaction Force 
 
A group of countries (France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) ex-
pressed their readiness to provide military reinforcements for UNPROFOR in 
order to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and to enhance its capacity to 
carry out its mandate.185 The Secretary-General recommended that the Security 
Council accept the proposal.186 The troops proposed for the Rapid Reaction Force 
amounted to about 15,000, of whom 2,500 were already in Bosnia. The Security 
Council, by its resolution 998 of 16 June 1995, welcomed the establishment of the 
force and accordingly decided to authorise an increase in UNPROFOR by up to 
12,500 additional troops.187 
 
6.3.3 The Srebrenica and Žepa massacres 
 
After the adoption of resolution 998, the situation on the ground further deterio-
rated. Intense fighting resumed, and the humanitarian situation consequently 
became a major concern, because it deeply affected the UNHCR’s ability to 
continue providing assistance. UNPROFOR and the UNHCR warned of develop-
ing humanitarian disasters in Sarajevo, Bihać, Goražde, Srebrenica and Žepa. Due 
to obstructive actions by Bosnian Serb forces, humanitarian supplies and relief 
workers had great difficulties in reaching those areas. 
On 6 July 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces, under the command of General 
Ratko Mladić, launched a full-scale assault against the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica. 
Despite the presence of a Dutch battalion of UN peacekeepers and an urgent 
demand by the Security Council for the Bosnian Serbs to cease their offensive 
and withdraw from the area,188 the thousands of people who had sought refuge 
under the flag of the United Nations were swept from Srebrenica. It was not until 
after the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July that, in response to a request from 
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UNPROFOR, NATO aircraft provided ‘close air support’ in the Srebrenica area, 
attacking ground targets identified by the UN forces.189 This belated action did not 
prevent the Serbs from beginning an attack on the nearby safe area of Žepa, 
which – despite an international threat that further violations of the safe areas 
would be met with decisive force, including the use of NATO air strikes.190 – fell 
to their forces on 25 July. Deeply concerned at the plight of the civilian popula-
tion in both safe areas, the Security Council demanded that the Bosnian Serbs 
give immediate access to the UNHCR, the ICRC and other international agencies 
to persons displaced from those areas and permit representatives of the ICRC to 
visit and register any persons detained.191 The Council reiterated that all those 
who committed violations of international humanitarian law would be held 
individually responsible in respect of such acts.192 
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6.3.4 Cease-fire and peace agreements 
 
On 28 August, five mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of Sarajevo’s Markale 
market, one of which killed thirty-seven people and wounded more than eighty 
others. In order to restore the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo and 
to deter any further attacks on safe areas, multiple NATO air strikes were 
conducted against ammunition supply depots and other military facilities 
throughout Eastern Bosnia.193 Soon after NATO had launched its twelve-day 
Operation Deliberate Force,194 Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces 
began to advance in the western part of the country. As a result of the offensive, 
an estimated 50,000 Bosnian Serbs were displaced to Banja Luka, a city which 
had already received large numbers of refugees from the Krajina region in August 
(see below). At the same time, the eviction of Muslim and Croat minorities from 
the area around Banja Luka continued. NATO suspended its air strikes on 14 
September for three days, following an agreement signed in Belgrade by Bosnian 
Serb military and political leaders, in which they committed themselves to 
withdrawing their heavy weapons from the twenty-kilometre exclusion zone 
around Sarajevo. After the Bosnian Serbs fulfilled those commitments and 
allowed the reopening of Sarajevo airport, NATO and UNPROFOR agreed not to 
resume the air strikes. 
The peace initiative undertaken by the United States with the support of the 
Security Council, the Contact Group and the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering 
Committee, resulted on 5 October 1995 in a country-wide ceasefire agreement. 
UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel immediately undertook various 
measures to ensure the successful implementation of the agreement, including 
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demining activities that were necessary for the repair and reopening of utilities in 
Sarajevo. 
The diplomatic initiative to end the Bosnian war culminated in the talks held 
in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.195 On 21 November, the Peace Agreement 
was initialled and, on 14 December, formally signed at a ceremony in Paris.196 
 
6.3.5 IFOR, IPTF and UNMIBH 
 
Along with plans for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the Dayton Agreement 
included a request by the parties – the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska – to the Security Council to adopt 
a resolution authorising Member States or regional organisations and arrange-
ments to establish a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) to help 
ensure compliance with the military provisions of the peace agreement.197 IFOR 
would be composed of ground, air and maritime units from the members of 
NATO and from non-NATO states.198 The parties also requested the establish-
ment of a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF).199 
The Secretary-General subsequently recommended that the IPTF’s central and 
regional headquarters should, where possible, be co-located with IFOR headquar-
ters.200 In his view, UNPROFOR’s existing mandate had to be extended for two 
months, or until an appropriate transfer of authority to IFOR had taken place. The 
Security Council, by its resolution 1026 of 30 November 1995, extended the 
mandate of UNPROFOR until 31 January 1996. 
Acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its reso-
lution 1031 of 15 December 1995, authorised Member States to establish IFOR, 
under unified control and command and composed of ground, air and maritime 
units from NATO and non-NATO countries. The Council decided to review the 
situation one year after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, in 
order to determine whether to end the authorisations granted by the resolution. It 
further decided to terminate UNPROFOR’s mandate with effect from the day the 
Secretary-General reported to it that the transfer of authority to IFOR had taken 
place. In a separate resolution, the Security Council decided to establish the IPTF 
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and a United Nations Civilian Office for a period of one year from the date of 
transfer of authority.201 Subsequently, this operation became known as the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). On 20 December 1995, 
the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place.202 
UNMIBH exercised a wide range of functions related to law enforcement 
activities and police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.203 The mission also coordi-
nated other UN activities in the country relating to humanitarian relief and 
refugees (UNHCR), demining, human rights (UNHCHR), elections and the 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction.204 It consisted of the 
UN Civilian Office and the IPTF. In addition, a UN coordinator was appointed to 
coordinate all activities in Bosnia.205 A ‘Commissioner’ was in charge of the 
IPTF, a force which was not mandated to maintain law and order. Its task 
consisted mainly of supervising the police and the justice system and advising the 
parties on matters concerning police and justice.206 Investigating human rights 
violations was later added to this.207 The IPTF had an authorised strength of 2,057 
police officers.208 
Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated 
on 31 December 2002. Through UNMIBH, the United Nations demonstrated its 
ability to complete a complex mandate in accordance with a strategic plan and 
within a realistic and finite timeframe. UNMIBH completed the most extensive 
police reform and restructuring project ever undertaken by the United Nations.209 
A follow-on mission was provided for by the European Union (EUPM).210 
 
6.4 Bosnia-Herzegovina: Office of the High Representative 
 
The High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina was appointed in 1995 to oversee 
the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The High Representative and 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) represent the international community 
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through the United Nations. The High Representative is not only the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Representative (SRSG) but also functions as the European 
Union’s Special Representative (EUSR).211 The de facto governor of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is thus a multi-hatted personality. So far, all five incumbents have 
come from EU Member States: Carl Bildt (1995-1997, Sweden), Carlos Westen-
dorp (1997-1999, Spain), Wolfgang Petrisch (1999-2002, Austria), Paddy Ashdown 
(2002-2006, United Kingdom) and Christian Schwarz-Schilling (since 2006, 
Germany).212 
The civilian aspects of the challenges facing the authorities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina at the end of the war in 1995 were daunting and required a wide 
range of activities, including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as 
long as necessary, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, 
the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced 
persons and refugees and the holding of free and fair elections. In view of the 
complexities facing them, the parties to the Dayton Agreement – the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska 
(RS) – requested in Annex 10 (‘Agreement on Civilian Implementation’) the 
designation of a High Representative ‘to facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to 
mobilise and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organisations and 
agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, 
as entrusted by a U.N. Security Council resolution, the tasks’ set out in Article II 
(Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liaison): 
 
- Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement; 
- Maintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance with 
all civilian aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation be-
tween them and the organizations and agencies participating in those aspects; 
- Coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects 
of the peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy 
within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to 
them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace 
settlement. The civilian organizations and agencies are requested to assist the 
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High Representative in the execution of his or her responsibilities by providing 
all information relevant to their operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
- Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any 
difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation; 
- Participate in meetings of donor organizations, particularly on issues of reha-
bilitation and reconstruction; 
- Report periodically on progress in implementation of the peace agreement 
concerning the tasks set forth in this Agreement to the United Nations, Euro-
pean Union, United States, Russian Federation, and other interested 
governments, parties, and organizations; 
- Provide guidance to, and receive reports from, the Commissioner of the Inter-
national Police Task Force […]; 
 
In the pursuit of his mandate, the High Representative convenes and chairs the 
Joint Civilian Commission, comprised of senior political representatives of the 
parties to the Dayton Agreement, the IFOR Commander or his representative and 
representatives of civilian organisations. The High Representative does not, 
however, have authority over IFOR and is not allowed to interfere in any way in 
the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command. It is further 
interesting to note that, according to Article III(4) of Annex 10 to the Dayton 
Agreement, the OHR and its premises, archives and other property enjoy the 
same privileges and immunities as enjoyed by a diplomatic mission and its 
premises, archives and other property under the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations. The same applies to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
the High Representative, professional and other members of his staff and their 
families. According to Article V of the same Annex 10, the High Representative 
is the final authority (‘in theatre’) regarding the interpretation of the Agreement 
on Civilian Implementation. 
From the foregoing overview, the picture emerges that the Dayton Agreement 
has established a foreign civil presence with important functions. But going by 
the black letter law, it would be going too far to conclude that these functions are 
comprehensive or that the foreign civil presence is the sole authority within the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, Dayton foresaw the parallel existence of 
two authorities: the international presence (the OHR) and the institutions of the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its political subdivisions.213 However, in 
response to massive obstructionism of the political process in the first two years 
of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, the Peace Implementation 
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Council (PIC), a group of fifty-five countries and international organisations that 
sponsor and direct the peace implementation process, drastically increased the 
mandate and powers of the High Representative at a meeting in Bonn on 10 
December 1997, enabling him to dismiss officials and impose laws if this was 
deemed necessary.214 Westendorp, Petrisch and Ashdown all made use of these 
so-called ‘Bonn powers’. During their years in office, locally-elected leaders were 
routinely overruled and sometimes sacked by international fiat.215 While the High 
Representative s ‘hired and fired’ to embolden EU-friendly reformers and 
establish the institutions necessary for a viable, modern democracy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, they also undermined popular faith in the democracy the sought to 
achieve.216 Many commentators have suggested that the transition to Bosnian 
ownership has been held back by the Dayton framework (especially the Bonn 
Powers), which created a weak central state and a country divided into two 
separate entities, the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with ten cantonal governments, as well as an autono-
mous region, Brcko.217  
Eleven years on, the idea that the post-war transition has been frustrated by an 
excess of Bosnian governing institutions, protected by their Dayton status, could 
not be further from the truth.218 While it is true that the international powers of 
administration, under the OHR, have been vastly increased, thereby reducing the 
Bosnian institutions established by Dayton to administrative shells, there has 
recently been a transition away from Dayton: from the ad hoc regulatory controls 
of the self-selected ‘coalition of the willing’ assembled in the PIC towards an 
expanded framework of European Union regulation (SAP), covering all aspects of 
the post-Dayton process.219 Thus, the Dayton solution has proved highly flexible, 
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Online (2005). 
218  D. Chandler, ‘From Dayton to Europe’, 12 International Peacekeeping (2005) pp. 336-349. 
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with external institutions rewriting their mandates and powers. As such, the 
international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has succeeded in taking the 
peace process forward and preparing the country for its ‘European’ future. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has travelled a long way in the past decade as the country 
has sought to rebuild itself with international support in the wake of Europe’s 
most devastating conflict since World War II. But progress will only be irreversi-
ble when Bosnians take responsibility for the peace process. In this context, the 
extraordinary powers of the High Representative are no longer an appropriate tool 
of international assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina and must be terminated. This 
was recognised by the PIC, which decided in June 2006 that the OHR should 
immediately begin preparations with a view to closing down on – the provisional 
date of – 30 June 2007.220 
It is the task of Christian Schwarz-Schilling, as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s last 
High Representative, to phase out the Bonn Powers and oversee the smooth 
transition from today’s quasi-protectorate to local ownership. It is his task to put 
Bosnia-Herzegovina on the rails of a process of ‘guided sovereignty’, on the way 
to future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.221 This guidance towards 
NATO and EU membership is a conditio sine qua non for a country where local 
antagonisms and the enduring threat of crime and corruption can still undermine a 
political system caught in relatively shaky institutions. While the risk of slipping 
back into armed conflict is slim, the end of the protectorate would not have to 
mean the end of the international military presence, which has played a very 
important role in stabilising society,222 nor would it have to mean the departure of 
Schwarz-Schilling. After all, he would remain the EUSR. Elections in October 
2007 should provide Bosnians with an opportunity to debate the way forward and 
choose leaders who are best equipped to secure their country’s European future. 
For they – not the High Representative – will be responsible for negotiating the 
terms and speed of their country’s entry into NATO and the European Union.223 
 
6.5 Croatia: UNCRO, UNTAES, UNMOP and UNPSG 
 
By its resolutions 981 of 31 March 1995, the Security Council established the 
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) as a 
follow-on of UNPROFOR in Croatia. On the basis of consultations conducted by 
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his Special Envoy, Thorvald Stoltenberg, the UN Secretary-General reported on 
18 April 1995 to the Security Council on the detailed implementation of the new 
UN mandate in Croatia.224 On 28 April, the Security Council approved the 
proposed arrangements and decided to authorise the deployment of UNCRO.225 
The force’s troops and observers were deployed in Serb-controlled Western 
Slavonia, Krajina, Eastern Slavonia and Baranja. Observers were also stationed 
on the Prevlaka peninsula. The new mandate included: (a) performing the 
functions envisaged in the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994,226 that is to say, 
the inter-positioning of UN forces in a zone of separation and the establishment of 
additional control points, observation posts and patrols, as well the monitoring of 
the withdrawal of heavy weapons out of range of the contact line; (b) facilitating 
implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994;227 (c) facilitating 
implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions; (d) assisting in 
controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, 
equipment, supplies and weapons over the international borders between Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Croatia and the FRY at the border cross-
ings; (e) facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia; and (f.) monitoring the 
demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula. It was decided that UNCRO should be 
an interim arrangement to create the conditions that would facilitate a negotiated 
settlement consistent with the territorial integrity of Croatia and guarantee the 
security and rights of all communities living in Croatia. 
The reintegration of Western Slavonia in May 1995 and Croatia’s big offen-
sive against the Serbs (Operation Storm), which led to the ‘liberation’ of the 
Krajina region in August, effectively eliminated the need for UN troops in those 
areas. In fact, during the offensive, the Croatian army had imposed total restric-
tions on the movement of UNCRO. This precluded normal patrolling and 
hindered access to places that might have needed prompt humanitarian assistance. 
UN observation posts were overrun and destroyed. Croatian soldiers used 
peacekeepers as human shields, arrested and disarmed them, took their equipment 
and even killed some. The mass exodus of the Krajina Serb population created a 
humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. Despite repeated demands by the 
                                                                                                                                               
224  Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council 
Resolution 981 (1995), UN Doc. S/1995/320 (18 April 1995). 
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Security Council,228 the hostilities continued. This underlined the reality that, 
without the cooperation of the parties, peacekeeping forces could not keep the 
peace. As a result, UNCRO’s overall troop strength was reduced to 8,750. In 
some sectors, troops were withdrawn altogether.229 
On 6 August, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative concluded a 
nine-point agreement with the head of the Croatian Commission for Relations 
with UNCRO to allow the United Nations, together with other international 
organisations, to cope with the humanitarian problem, monitor the human rights 
situation and permit the safe return of displaced person.230 The Special Represen-
tative established a humanitarian crisis cell to collate information and coordinate 
responses. Numerous violations of human rights of the Serb population were 
recorded.231 However, in Eastern Slavonia – the last Serb-controlled territory in 
Croatia – the mandate of UNCRO remained essentially unchanged. The govern-
ment of Croatia and the Croatian Serb leadership agreed to resolve the issue of 
Eastern Slavonia through negotiation. Following the signing of the Basic Agree-
ment on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium on 12 
November 1995,232 the Security Council expressed its readiness to consider the 
request to establish a transitional administration to govern the region and author-
ise an appropriate international force.233 Following the establishment of the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (UNTAES),234 the mandate of UNCRO was terminated on 15 January 
1996. By its resolution 1038 (1996), the Council authorised twenty-eight UN 
military observers to take over the task of monitoring the demilitarisation of the 
Prevlaka peninsula from UNCRO. The mission would be known as the United 
Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). Following the successful 
completion of its mandate, UNMOP was terminated on 15 December 2002.235 
UNTAES was established to govern the region for an initial period of twelve 
months and help it reintegrate into Croatia’s legal and constitutional system. The 
mission came with both military and civilian components. By its resolution 1037 
(1996), the Security Council decided that Member States, acting nationally or 
through regional organisations, might take all necessary measures, including close 
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air support, to defend UNTAES or help it withdraw and that such actions would 
be based on the request of UNTAES.236 In line with its mandate, the military 
component supervised and facilitated the demilitarisation of the region, as 
provided in the Basic Agreement, monitored the voluntary and safe return of 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin in cooperation with the 
UNHCR and contributed, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and 
security in the region. The civilian component established a temporary police 
force, defined its structure and size, developed a training programme and oversaw 
its implementation. In addition, it monitored the treatment of offenders and the 
prison system, undertook tasks relating to civil administration and the functioning 
of public services, and organised elections, assisted in their conduct and certified 
the results. The civilian component also undertook other activities relevant to the 
Basic Agreement, including monitoring and facilitating the demining of territory 
within the region, assisting in the coordination of plans for the development and 
economic reconstruction of the region and monitoring the parties’ compliance 
with their commitments to respect the highest standards of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
The mandate of UNTAES was extended twice for a period of six months.237 
By the end of the prescribed two-year period, UNTAES claimed the successful 
accomplishment of its key objective under the November 1995 Basic Agreement: 
peacefully reintegrating the ethnically mixed Danube region into Croatia. The 
Council endorsed the plan for restructuring UNTAES and the withdrawal of its 
military component by 15 October 1997. By adopting resolution 1145 on 19 
December 1997, the Security Council decided to establish, with effect from 16 
January 1998, a United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG) of 180 civilian 
police monitors for a single period of up to nine months in the post-UNTAES 
period, so as to continue the monitoring of the performance of the Croatian police 
in the region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons. In 
the same resolution, the Council noted the termination of UNTAES on 15 January 
1998. The Council reiterated the continuing obligation, under the Basic Agree-
ment, of the government of Croatia to respect the highest standards of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and reaffirmed the right of all refugees and 
displaced persons originating from Croatia to return to their homes of origin. The 
Council welcomed the progress made in the peaceful two-way return of displaced 
persons and the return of refugees in the region. It encouraged liaison between the 
UNPSG and the OSCE to facilitate a smooth transition of responsibility to that 
organisation. The Police Support Group helped to prevent the return of instability 
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to the region. It proved to be a cost-effective instrument in helping to maintain 
conditions conducive to an orderly handover to the OSCE, pending the ultimate 
transfer of full responsibilities to the Croatian authorities.238 After the successful 
completion of its mandate, the UNPSG came to an end on 15 October 1998. The 
OSCE took over the police monitoring responsibilities on the following day.239 
 
6.6 Macedonia: UNPREDEP 
 
Established on 31 March 1995 to replace UNPROFOR in Macedonia, the 
composition and strength of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
(UNPREDEP) were maintained. The mandate of the mission also remained the 
same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas with Albania 
and the FRY that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia.240 The 
mission continued to serve as an early-warning source for the Security Council, 
helped to strengthen mutual dialogue among political parties and assisted in 
monitoring respect for human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations in the 
country. UNPREDEP also assisted in the country’s social and economic devel-
opment along with other agencies and organisations of the UN family.241 
Despite the fact that inter-ethnic tensions continued to pose a threat to the 
country’s social fabric and its long-term stability, as the incident over the Alba-
nian-language ‘Tetovo University’ had shown,242 the security situation in 
Macedonia and bilateral relations between FYROM and its neighbours continued 
to improve.243 Consequently, UNPREDEP’s mandate was extended for relatively 
short periods of time,244 the third time with a view to reducing the mission’s 
military component by 300 personnel.245 However, in response to the crisis in 
neighbouring Albania, where the collapse of investment schemes robbed thou-
sands of their lifetime savings, the Council extended the mission and suspended 
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its reduction until after 1 October 1997.246 The Albanian-Macedonian border was 
closed during curfew hours as the authorities feared an influx of refugees that 
might disrupt Macedonia’s already fragile inter-ethnic balance. The start of the 
withdrawal of UNPREDEP, which began in the first week of March 1997, had 
thus begun at the most inappropriate time and clearly showed a lack of foresight. 
During May and June of 1997, UNPREDEP was active in preventing the further 
escalation of tension along the Albanian-Macedonian border and stayed in close 
contact with the military leadership of the Italian-led Operazione Alba.247 
In spite of the evident social unrest and the collapse of state institutions in 
Albania, as well as a tense situation in Kosovo, the Security Council, by its 
resolution 1142 of 4 December 1997, decided to extend the mandate of 
UNPREDEP for a final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal of the 
military component immediately thereafter.248 However, the situation in Kosovo 
deteriorated, with violent ethnic clashes during the summer and autumn of 
1998.249 Worried that the unfolding crisis in Kosovo might disturb the fragile 
balance maintained in Macedonia, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 
1186 on 21 July 1998, reaffirmed its commitment to the independence, sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia and decided to extend the mandate of 
UNPREDEP for another period of six months until 28 February 1999 and to 
authorise an increase in troop strength up to 1,050. The force was also charged 
with the new responsibilities of monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and 
other activities prohibited under resolution 1160 of 4 December 1997. 
Peace and stability in Macedonia continued to depend largely on develop-
ments in other parts of the region, in particular in Kosovo. The potential 
repercussions of continued violence in Kosovo on the external and internal 
security of Macedonia were serious given the large proportion of ethnic Albani-
ans in the country’s population. UNPREDEP maintained close cooperation with 
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the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje and the European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM).250 It also established a working 
relationship with NATO, the Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre and the 
NATO Extraction Force deployed in the host country.251 
The functions of UNPREDEP came to an abrupt end on 28 February 1999, 
after the Security Council failed to adopt draft resolution S/1999/201 due to the 
veto of China on 25 February 1999.252 Speaking after the vote, the representative 
of China said that peace and stability in Macedonia had not been adversely 
affected by regional developments.253 On the contrary, in China’s view, the 
situation in Macedonia had stabilised in the previous years and its relations with 
neighbouring countries had improved. Moreover, the Secretary-General had 
reported that the original goals of the Security Council in establishing 
UNPREDEP had been met. In that context, China saw no need to further extend 
the mandate of the mission, especially when the United Nations’ scarce resources 
could be put to better use in tackling conflicts in Africa and other regions. Several 
other UN members argued that there could be a spillover of the tensions in 
Kosovo across the border with Macedonia. In hindsight, China’s assessment – 
largely coloured by Macedonia’s decision to recognise Taiwan – proved entirely 
wrong. In 2001, fighting broke out which brought the country to the brink of civil 
war.254 
In any event, UNPREDEP demonstrated that preventive deployment is an 
effective form of peacekeeping and that results can be achieved even with a small, 
almost symbolic deployment of peacekeepers if it is done at the right time and 
with a clear mandate. Until February 1999, the fundamental objective of the 
operation, namely to prevent the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia from spread-
ing, had indeed been achieved. After the termination of UNPREDEP, the mission 
was renamed UN SKOPJE. 
 
6.7 Kosovo: UNMIK 
 
A lot has been written about the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and its aftermath.255 This 
section will only deal with the role and impact of the United Nations Mission in 
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Kosovo (UNMIK) in stabilising the province. A chronicle of events leading up to 
this mission is presented in section 7.3.1 below.256 
The undeclared war between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
initiated by NATO on 24 March 1999, was formally ended on 9 June 1999, with 
the signing of a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the International 
Security Force (KFOR) and the government of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via.257 One day later, on 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1244 (1999), which reaffirmed ‘the commitment of all Member States 
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 
even while pledging to secure ‘substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo’. The Security Council decided on the establishment, 
‘under the auspices of the United Nations’, of international civil and security 
presences. NATO agreed to deploy KFOR as the international security presence 
under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999), thus ‘until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task’.258 From this passage flows the 
conclusion that, formally speaking, the United Nations is the sole ‘trustee’ 
administering the tasks on the territory of the trustor, that is to say, the rightful 
sovereign.259 This conclusion is reinforced when considering the comprehensive 
list of legislative and executive powers with which resolution 1244 (1999) 
endowed the international civil presence in Kosovo:260 
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(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial auton-
omy and self-government in Kosovo […]; 
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as re-
quired; 
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections; 
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsi-
bilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local 
provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities; 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status 
[…]; 
(f.) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provi-
sional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic re-
construction; 
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces 
and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to 
serve in Kosovo; 
(.j) Protecting and promoting human rights; [and] 
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes in Kosovo.261 
 
At the request of the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General appointed 
Bernard Kouchner, founder and president of Médecins sans Frontières and 
former Minister of Health of France, as his Special Representative (SRSG) to 
head the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).262 At the same time, Kofi 
Annan appointed four other internationals to head the major components – or 
‘pillars’ – of the mission: Dennis McNamara (New Zealand) for the UNHCR-led 
first pillar concerning ‘Humanitarian Assistance’;263 Dominique Vian (France) for 
the UN-led second pillar focusing on ‘Interim Civil Administration’; Daan Everts 
(Netherlands) for the OSCE-led third pillar aimed at ‘Democratization and 
Institution Building’; and Joly Dixon (United Kingdom) for the EU-led fourth 
pillar on ‘Reconstruction and Economic Development’.264 With NATO providing 
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the international security presence in Kosovo, an unprecedented UN operation 
was set up, encompassing the activities of three non-UN organisations under the 
United Nation’s overall jurisdiction. As the most senior international civilian 
official in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner – and his successors in the job.265 – pre-
side(d) over the work of the pillars and facilitate(d) the political process designed 
to determine Kosovo’s final status.266 
In the wake of what Kouchner described as ‘forty years of Communism, ten 
years of apartheid and a year of ethnic cleansing’,267 peacebuilding in Kosovo has 
proved to be an exceptionally difficult and long-term task. Military victory was 
but the first step on a long road to building a durable, multi-ethnic society free 
from the threat of renewed conflict. The challenges for Kosovo’s interim protec-
tors have been staggering. In the year preceding NATO’s armed intervention, 
Belgrade’s security forces had scorched the province, while NATO’s bombard-
ment had caused further damage. According to the UN food agencies, Kosovo 
lost 65 per cent of its agricultural produce and livestock as a result of the war in 
the spring of 1999, with the wheat production in 1999 was able to meet only 30 
per cent of the province’s needs.268 In addition, some 120,000 houses had been 
destroyed or damaged. Estimates of the cost to rebuild the province’s economy 
have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion.269  
A second challenge, quite apart from the confirmed deaths of some 12,000 
Kosovar Albanians between February 1998 and June 1999, was the displacement 
and disappearance of persons. By early August 1999, nearly 90 per cent of the 
Albanians who had fled the province between 1998 and 1999 had returned 
(700,000 from neighbouring countries and 30,000 from countries outside the 
                                                                                                                                               
265  Kouchner served as head of UNMIK from July 1999 to January 2001. He was succeeded by 
Hans Haekkerup (Denmark), who served from February 2001 to December 2001. Michael Steiner 
(Germany) served as the third SRSG from January 2002 to July 2003. The fourth head of UNMIK 
was Harri Holkeri (Finland), who served from August 2003 to June 2004. He was succeeded by 
Søren Jenssen-Petersen (Denmark), who served from August 2004 to June 2006. The current Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo is Joachim Rücker (Germany). 
266  The SRSG reports up to four times a year to the Security Council. These reports include a 
technical assessment of the implementation of the so-called ‘Standards for Kosovo’ programme, 
which covers a range of activities designed to promote good governance and multi-ethnicity (see 
below). 
267  Cited by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, in a speech at the Los Angeles World 
Affairs Council, ‘Kosovo: The Real Story’, 6 April 2000. 
268  See FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Kosovo Province of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ‘Special report’, UN Doc. X2901/E (30 August 1999), available at: 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x2901e/x2901e00.htm>; UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition, ‘Refugee 
Nutrition Information System (RNIS), No. 28 – Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugees and 
Displaced Populations’, 28 September 1999, ch. 15; and FAO Conference, 30th Session, 12-13 
November 1999, UN Doc. C/99/INF/5. 
269  In addition to the references above, see IMF, ‘The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo 
Crisis: An Updated Assessment’, 25 May 1999, available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
kosovo/052599.htm>. See also chapter 4, section 3.3.1. 
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region).270 On the other hand, roughly 2,000 Kosovar Albanians remained 
incarcerated in Serbian prisons, having been taken hostage by Serbian forces in 
the spring of 1999, while more than 80,000 of the roughly 200,000 Serbs living in 
the province had fled Kosovo under Albanian pressure by the end of July.271  
A third challenge had to do with infrastructure, particularly education and the 
legal system. For a decade, Kosovo’s Albanians had relied on an underground 
educational system operating out of people’s homes, in conditions of extreme 
scarcity. In addition, in the mid-1990s, the Serbian authorities had pulped 
Albanian language books from the Priština National Library in an effort to erase 
the province’s cultural memory. But that was just the tip of the iceberg. About 
two-thirds of Kosovo’s 180 libraries were said to have been destroyed between 
1990 and 1999, during which time the Serbian authorities destroyed more than 
900,000 books, almost half of all library books in Kosovo. An additional 263,000 
books were destroyed by fire during NATO’s aerial campaign in the spring of 
1999.272 With the legal system also in disarray, UNMIK set about drafting a penal 
code, setting up forty-seven courts, training judges and establishing a detention 
system. The Kosovo Law Centre, established by the OSCE in June 2000 as a 
centre for legal research and publisher of all laws, regulations and decrees, is 
regarded as a building block for establishing the rule of law in the province.273 
UNMIK also undertook to train local recruits to serve in a new Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS). The first 200 graduates – Serbian and Albanian women and men – 
received their diplomas in ceremonies on 7 September 1999. As of 30 October 
2000, there were 4,130 UNMIK police officers stationed in Kosovo, alongside 
2,549 KPS officers.274  
The fourth challenge, criminality, is closely associated with the aforemen-
tioned need to develop respected legal institutions and enforcement agencies. 
Although crime rates remain high, there are at least some positive trends. The 
murder rate, for example, has dropped from 291 in 2000 to 205 in 2001, 143 in 
2002, 131 in 2003, 111 in 2004 and 101 in 2005.275  
Fifth, there was the most immediate challenge of confiscating the weapons 
held by paramilitaries in the province and establishing KFOR’s unchallenged 
ability to assure a secure environment. Although paramilitaries were not permit-
ted under the MTA, the Albanians were quick to point out that they had not been 
                                                                                                                                               
270  See UNMIK’s chronology, available at: <http://www.unmikonline.org/chrono.htm#jun99>. 
271  Ibid. 
272  See C. Frederiksen and F. Bakken ‘Libraries in Kosova/Kosovo: A general assessment and a 
short and medium-term development plan’, IFLA/FAIFE report of Joint UNESCO, CoE and Kosova 
Library Mission, April 2000, available at: <http://www.ifla.org/faife/faife/kosova/kosorepo.htm>. 
273  See: <http://www.kosovolawcentre.org>. 
274  See: <http://www.kosovopolice.com/english/index_english.html>. 
275  See UNMIK, ‘Factsheet: Kosovo in October 2006’, available at: <http://www.unmikonline. 
org/docs/2006/Fact_Sheet_Oct_2006.pdf>. 
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signatories to the agreement and for a few days there was some uncertainty as to 
the willingness of the leadership of the KLA to comply with this requirement. By 
19 June 1999, however, NATO commanders had reached a tentative agreement 
with KLA leaders that the rebel force would be disbanded and that it would 
surrender its arms.276 
In practical terms, the United Nations could not have met the challenges and 
performed the functions described above without possessing full governmental 
powers in the territory of Kosovo. That is why, on 25 July 1999, the SRSG signed 
Regulation No. 1999/1, vesting all legislative and executive authority in the 
territory in UNMIK.277 Section 1 of the Regulation states that: 
 
1. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General. 
2. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to 
perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or 
remove such person. Such functions shall be exercised in accordance with the 
existing laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations issued by UNMIK. 
 
Working closely together with Kosovo’s would-be leaders, UNMIK initially 
performed the whole spectrum of administrative functions and services of a quasi-
sovereign entity, covering such fields as health and education, banking and 
finance, post and telecommunications, and law and order.278 Gradually, however, 
UNMIK has started sharing the performance of these tasks with locally appointed 
and – as of June 2002 – elected – leaders in the so-called ‘Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government’ (PISG).279 This trend was put in motion by the adoption of 
the ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government’, signed by the 
SRSG on 15 May 2001.280 The Constitutional Framework’s purpose was to define 
                                                                                                                                               
276  Although most of these confiscations have involved Albanian-held weaponry, KFOR peace-
keeping troops reported that they had found assault rifles, light anti-tank weapons and various other 
armaments in a search of two Serbian villages in Kosovo on 1 November 1999. More on KFOR’s 
activities in section 7.3.3. 
277  UNMIK/REG/1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, 25 July 
1999, later amended. 
278  For an evaluation of UNMIK’s performance during this first stage, see E. Chevallier, 
‘L’ONU au Kosovo: leçons de la première MINUK’, 35 EUISS Occasional Paper (2002). 
279  In December 1999, three Kosovar Albanian political leaders signed a landmark agreement to 
share the provisional management of Kosovo with UNMIK until elections. See Press release 
UNMIK/PR/115, ‘Kosovo Political Leaders Agree to Share Administration of Kosovo with 
UNMIK’, 15 December 1999. The agreement established a Kosovo-UNMIK joint Interim Adminis-
trative Council. Municipal elections took place in October 2000. In the long aftermath of the 
November 2001 general elections – LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) won 47 seats, PDK 
(Democratic Party of Kosovo) 26, the (ethnic Serb) Coalition Povratak 22 and (Alliance for the 
Future of Kosovo) AAK 8 – Ibrahim Rugova (LDK) was elected President of Kosovo in March 
2002. A multi-ethnic provisional self-government was installed on 13 June 2002. 
280  See UNMIK/PR/581, ‘SRSG Signs Constitutional Framework’, 15 May 2001. 
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the shape and power of the interim institutions to which UNMIK could transfer 
further power and responsibility until the determination of Kosovo’s final status. 
In this document, the PISG were granted greater autonomy, in order to share 
provisional interim management of Kosovo with UNMIK, while respecting 
resolution 1244 (1999) and the legislative and executive authority retained by the 
SRSG.281 Thus, the bottom line is that the full range of governmental powers 
remains vested in UNMIK until such time as the Security Council agrees upon 
Kosovo’s final status.282 
In its activities, UNMIK has been guided by its ‘Standards for Kosovo’, set 
out in a document published in Priština on 10 December 2003 and subsequently 
endorsed by the Security Council.283 The ‘Standards for Kosovo’ document set a 
target for Kosovo as a truly multi-ethnic, stable and democratic entity that 
approaches European standards. In essence, Kosovo was expected to make 
progress on eight standards: functioning democratic institutions; the rule of law; 
freedom of movement; return and reintegration; the economy; property rights; 
dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps, a civilian emergency 
services organisation set up a part of the transformation of the KLA.284 The 
Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) of 31 March 2004 listed the 
concrete actions needed to meet the ‘standards’ and defined who was responsible 
for each of the actions and the timeframe in which they should be performed.285 
As such, the standards process was in harmony with the European Union’s 
parallel Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism (STM) for 
Kosovo,286 but the ‘Standards for Kosovo’ document remained the target, and 
progress concerning the latter was the basis for the decision to begin the political 
process concerning Kosovo’s final status. Despite the fact that UNMIK gradually 
transferred a large number of competences to Kosovo’s PISG and that many of 
the ‘standards’ were achieved, poverty and unemployment remained widespread.287 
                                                                                                                                               
281  As UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) is rather elusive on the latter point, all regulations adopted 
by the SRSG, in their preamble, take account of UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 on the Authority of the 
Interim Administration in Kosovo. 
282  On the final status process, see chapter 4, section 3.3, and chapter 6, section 4.3. 
283  The ‘Standards for Kosovo’ were agreed between the PISG and UNMIK and subsequently 
launched by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Harry Holkeri and 
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi on 10 December 2003. See Press release UNMIK/PR/ 
1078 of that date. The ‘Standards’ were endorsed by the Security Council on 12 December 2003. See 
Presidential Statement S/PRST/2003/26. 
284  See UNMIK/REG/1999/8 on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Force, 20 Septem-
ber 1999. More information on the KPC is available at: <http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/ 
kpcorps.htm>. 
285  The KSIP is available at: <http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/ksip_eng.pdf>. 
286  See chapter 5, section 3.2.5. 
287  In 2004, over half of Kosovo’s two million inhabitants were living on or below the poverty 
line. The average daily income was €3 and the official unemployment rate was 39.7 per cent. There 
were daily debilitating power cuts. See Statistical Office of Kosovo, Series 1: Kosovo in Figures 
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Bitterness and resentment grew over the ‘corrupt’ and ‘colonial’ ways of 
UNMIK’s international staff.288 Local frustrations connected to the ambiguity 
regarding the final status spilled over into organised inter-ethnic violence, as 
witnessed in March 2004.289 The status quo – that is, ‘standards before status’ – 
had become unsustainable and forced the international community to develop a 
fresh approach to promoting reforms and development in Kosovo. It was eventu-
ally acknowledged that working on the standards in the context of the future 
status was a better strategy than insisting on the complying with standards before 
discussing status issues.290 Following the comprehensive review of the situation in 
Kosovo by UNSG Special Envoy Kai Eide in the summer of 2005, the UN 
Security Council on 24 October 2005 endorsed final status talks.291 This decision 
had been facilitated by the rapprochement between Priština and Belgrade after the 
resignation of Ramush Haradinaj as Kosovo’s Prime Minister on 9 March 2005 
and his surrender to the ICTY to face charges of persecuting Serbs, gypsies and 
suspected collaborators among the ethnic Albanians.292 
 
 
7. EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE 




Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the scene of many ‘firsts’ for NATO, and decisions 
taken in response to events in Bosnia have helped shape NATO’s evolution since 
                                                                                                                                               
2005, January 2006, available at: <http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/index_english.htm>. See also chapter 
6, section 4.3.1. For an evaluation of UNMIK’s state-builing activities, see R. Everly, ‘Reviewing 
Governmental Acts of the United Nations in Kosovo’, 8 German Law Journal (2007) pp. 21-37. 
288  See H. Smith, ‘Angry Kosovars call on “colonial” UN occupying force to leave’, The Ob-
server, 19 October 2003; and Press release UNMIK/PR/1053, 4 November 2003. For an academic 
analysis, see B. Knoll, ‘Legitimacy and UN-Administration of Territory’, 8 German Law Journal 
(2007) pp. 39-56; and, more generally, O. Korhonen, ‘International Governance in Post-Conflict 
Situations’, 14 LJIL (2001) pp. 495-526. 
289  See chapter 1, n. 7. 
290  See B. Knoll, ‘From Benchmarking to Final status? Kosovo and the Problem of an Interna-
tional Administration’s Open-ended Mandate’, 16 EJIL (2005) pp. 637-660. 
291  See UN Doc. S/PRST/2005/51. See also chapter 4, section 3.3, and chapter 6, section 4.3.1. 
292  As a result of the October 2004 general elections, a government coalition had formed be-
tween LDK and AAK, and AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj had become Prime Minister. Haradinaj 
decided to resign and depart to The Hague when he was indicted by the ICTY on 8 March 2005. Two 
weeks later, a new government led by Bajram Kosumi (AAK) was formed on the basis of the same 
coalition. On 21 January 2006, President Ibrahim Rugova (LDK) died of lung cancer. In February, 
the Assembly elected Fatmir Sejdiu (LDK) as the new President. A subsequent change of govern-
ment took place in March 2006, when former KLA Commander Agim Çeku (AAK) replaced Bajram 
Kosumi as Prime Minister. 
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the end of the Cold War. Under the cloak of Operation Deny Flight, the Alliance 
first used armed force on 28 February 1994 when it shot down four of six Bosnian 
Serb jets that were violating the UN-imposed flight ban.293 NATO also launched 
its first air campaign (Operation Deliberate Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
August and September 1995.294 NATO’s operations against Bosnian Serb 
positions in August and September 1995 helped pave the way for the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. In line with UN Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), 
which authorised Member States to establish a multinational military force to 
implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO launched Operation Joint 
Endeavour, its inaugural peacekeeping force (IFOR) and largest military opera-
tion ever, to put in place the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement.295 On 16 
December 1995, the deployment of 60,000 troops (50,000 NATO and 10,000 
non-NATO) and equipment from thirty-two states began.296 Adopted on the basis 
of chapter VII of the UN Charter, resolution 1031 and the rules of engagement 
allowed for the robust use of force by IFOR, if necessary, to carry out its mission 
and protect itself. IFOR’s tasks were to ensure compliance with Annex 1A of the 
Dayton Agreement, which constituted the military portion of the agreement. 
Summarised, these clauses instructed IFOR to (i) maintain the cessation of 
                                                                                                                                               
293  Operation Deny Flight was conducted from 12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995. The mis-
sion of the NATO Operation was (i) to conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with 
UNSC resolution 816 in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the ‘no-fly’ zone; (ii) to provide close 
air support to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, UNPROFOR under the 
provisions of UNSC resolutions 836, 958 and 981; and (iii) to conduct, at the request of and in 
coordination with the United Nations, approved (‘dual-key’) air strikes against designated targets 
threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas. Almost 4,500 personnel from twelve NATO 
countries were deployed for this NATO operation. For other occasions on which NATO conducted 
air strikes in the framework of this operation, see supra section 6.2.4. 
294  Although initiated in response to the Bosnian Serb army’s shelling of the Sarajevo market 
place on 28 August 1995, Operation Deliberate Force was the culmination of events and related 
planning over a long period. The air attack plan, triggered by a ‘dual-key’ decision, was intended to 
reduce military capability to threaten or attack safe areas and UN forces. Targets included fielded 
forces and heavy weapons; command and control facilities; direct and essential military support 
facilities; and supporting infrastructure and lines of communication A twenty-four-hour suspension 
of air strikes beginning on 1 September was requested by UNPROFOR in support of negotiation 
efforts. The suspension was extended until 5 September, when it turned out that negotiations had 
been unsuccessful. That day, in coordination with the United Nations, NATO resumed its air strikes. 
On 14 September, offensive operations were suspended in response to the warring factions’ 
agreement to the conditions set out in the UN-brokered Framework Agreement: (i) cease all 
offensive operations within the Sarajevo exclusion zone; (ii) remove heavy weapons from the zone 
within 144 hours; (iii) unimpeded road access to Sarajevo; (iv) Sarajevo Airport opened for 
unrestricted use; (v) Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnian Serb army commanders meet to formalise a 
cessation of hostilities agreement. Compliance with all conditions left the United Nations and NATO 
to agree on 20 September that the mission of Operation Deliberate Force had been accomplished. 
See also supra section 6.2.4. 
295  See supra section 6.3.5. 
296  See IFOR fact sheet, available at: <http://www.nato.int/sfor>. 
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hostilities; (ii) separate the armed forces of the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the 
Republika Srpska; (iii) transfer territory between the two entities; (iv) move the 
forces and heavy weapons into authorised cantonment sites; (v) create a secure 
environment for civil aspects of the agreement; and (vi) control the airspace over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Within one year, IFOR made substantial progress in carrying out its tasks in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.297 No significant military activity occurred after its arrival. 
By February 1996, all forces were withdrawn from the zone of separation on 
either side of the agreed ceasefire line and in March a new zone of separation was 
established along a so-called inter-entity boundary line. By April, the final stages 
in the military agreement concerning cantonment of heavy weapons were 
completed, and the peace plan was in full operation. Joint Military Commissions 
were developed, air defence radar was shut down, hostile forces withdrew from 
the zone of separation and most heavy weapons and non-demobilised forces were 
moved to barracks or designated areas. All in all, and certainly in comparison to 
the civilian responsibilities of the Dayton Peace Agreement, IFOR was im-
mensely successful in its primary functions. By securing a relatively peaceful 
environment, it enabled the High Representative of the international community 
and other international organisations to start their work with regard to the 
implementation of the civil aspects of the peace agreement. It is here that signifi-
cant difficulties remained, especially in the field of freedom of movement for 
regular citizens and prisoner release. Even more ominous were the political, 
social and economic problems that remained unresolved and still led to violent 
inter-ethnic attacks. The biggest problem left after IFOR completed its activities 
on 20 December 1996 concerned the organisation of democratic elections. While 
nation-wide ‘entity’ elections took place on 14 September 1996, the planned 
municipal elections were postponed for one year. 
To support the ongoing international activities in the civil field, the UN Secu-
rity Council appointed NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in resolution 1088 
(1996).298 As a follow-on to its Operation Joint Endeavour, NATO launched 
Operation Joint Guard for an initial period of eighteen months. Despite a contin-
gent roughly half the size of its predecessor, SFOR essentially had the same 
peacekeeping mandate and mission.299 It consisted of thirty-four participating 
countries (sixteen NATO and eighteen non-NATO, of which fourteen Pf.P 
                                                                                                                                               
297  Ibid. 
298  Para. 18. 
299  Even though the role of IFOR was to implement the peace and the role of SFOR was to 
stabilise the peace. The difference in tasks is reflected in the name of the missions. SFOR’s specific 
tasks were to (i) deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace; (ii) promote a 
climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward; and (iii) provide selective 
support to civilian organisations within its capabilities. 
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partners) and was authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to carry out its mission 
and protect itself.300 Low-level violence continued throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, especially in Mostar and in the villages in and around the zone of 
separation. In the first year of SFOR’s deployment, there were several violent 
incidents involving displaced persons trying to return to their homes, and houses 
were destroyed by arson and explosion. Demining was not complete, and both 
Bosniak and Bosnian Serb parties were still non-compliant in relation to the 
mandatory return of prisoners. Despite the efforts of SFOR, the IPTF and the 
UNHCR, resettlement did not go smoothly, largely because freedom of move-
ment remained a major problem. SFOR was active in helping the OSCE with its 
preparations for the municipal elections of 13-14 September 1997, but these 
proved to be a ‘fake’ show of democracy.301 For all these reasons, the UN 
Security Council prolonged NATO’s mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina.302 Opera-
tion Joint Guard (21 December 1996-19 June 1998) was succeeded by Operation 
Joint Forge, which ran until 2 December 2004, when the European Union took 
over responsibility for the international community’s military presence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.303 Whereas SFOR’s initial size was around 32,000 troops, the North 
Atlantic Council decided on 25 October 1999, having taken into account the 
improved security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to restructure the force and 
reduce it to about 12,000 troops by the beginning of 2003. After the handover of 
authority to the European Union, NATO maintained (and still maintains) a 
military headquarters in Sarajevo to carry out a number of specific tasks related, 
in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures to 
meet the requirements to join NATO’s Pf.P programme.304 
One of the internationally most visible tasks of SFOR was supporting the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in carrying out 
its mandate.305 In order to create a ‘safe and secure environment’ in Bosnia-
                                                                                                                                               
300  Paras. 19-21. Facts, figures and documents about SFOR are available at: <http://www.nato. 
int/sfor>. 
301  See CSCE, The 1997 Municipal Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 1997); and D. 
Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, 2nd edn. (London, Pluto Press 2000) at pp. 122-
125. 
302  It did so on six occasions for an additional period of twelve months, see S/RES/1174 (1998), 
S/RES/1247 (1999), S/RES/1305 (2000), S/RES/1357 (2001), S/RES/1423 (2002), S/RES/1491 
(2003) and, for a final period of six months, S/RES/1551 (2004). 
303  See chapter 4, section 4.1.2. 
304  For the mission statement of the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo Mission (NHQSa), see: 
<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/NHQSA/index.htm>. 
305  See, inter alia, N. Figa-Talamanca, ‘The Role of NATO in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’, 7 EJIL (1996) pp. 164-175; and P. Gaeta, ‘Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to 
Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 9 EJIL 
(1998) pp. 174-181. The author of the second paper concludes that the NATO-led force is entitled 
but not obliged to arrest persons indicted by the ICTY, nor that such an obligation is incumbent upon 
individual troop-contributing states. 
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Herzegovina, SFOR detained and transferred to the ICTY twenty-seven persons 
indicted for war crimes when it came across them in the course of its normal 
duties. Another three were killed during attempts to arrest them. On 28 February 
and 1 March 2002, SFOR soldiers moved to detain Radovan Karadžić, but for 
reasons that are still not entirely clear Karadžić was not arrested.306 This incident 
and the ongoing failure to catch both him and Ratko Mladić (despite a 300-strong 
presence in NHQSa tasked with, inter alia, the capture of the remaining ICTY 
indictees) have tarnished the shining armour of NATO’s white knights.307 
Nevertheless, the history of NATO’s first deployment of ground forces outside 
its traditional area of operations has been extremely significant in the metamor-
phosis of NATO as an international peacekeeper. The results in Bosnia-
Herzegovina clearly indicate major accomplishments for NATO in carrying out 
its specific military goals and objectives. Without the presence of IFOR and 
SFOR, the chances of achieving peacebuilding, reconstruction and civilian 
transformation would have been extremely unlikely in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
NATO has shown that it can be employed ‘out of area’ and operate successfully 
under the authority of the UN Security Council. With the employment of NATO 
as its military arm, the Security Council – indeed the international community at 
large – finally came to understand what was needed in the Balkans, namely a 
consensus on political purpose and objectives, unity of diplomatic and military 




In 2001, NATO, in close cooperation with the European Union and the OSCE, 
helped stave off civil war in Macedonia through timely and coordinated interven-
tion.308 At the request of the Macedonian government, then NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson despatched a crisis management team to negotiate a 
ceasefire with the so-called ‘National Liberation Army’ (NLA), an armed group 
of ethnic Albanian rebels who had taken control of large swathes of territory in 
the western part of the country. At the time, the very survival of the Macedonia 
was at stake. A factor contributing to the unrest in Macedonia in 2001 was 
instability in neighbouring Kosovo. The NATO team succeeded in helping the 
European Union to persuade the NLA to agree to a ceasefire and to support the 
ongoing political negotiation process which culminated in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement of 13 August 2001. 
                                                                                                                                               
306  See ‘NATO Comments by SecGen on SFOR Operations to Detain Radovan Karadzic’, 1 
March 2002, available at: <http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0203&L=natodata>. 
307  A variation of the title of the famous book by C. Bellamy, Knights in White Armour: The 
New Art of War and Peace (London, Hutchinson 1996). 
308  For the background to the crisis, see chapter 4, section 3.1. 
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In the wake of this agreement, NATO deployed a force of only 4,000 troops in 
Operation Essential Harvest to oversee the NLA’s disarmament.309 During its 
thirty-day mission (27 August-26 September 2001), NATO collected close to 
4,000 voluntarily surrendered weapons at several designated points. At the end of 
September, NATO declared that the task was complete and that the NLA had 
ceased to exist as a structured armed organisation. This step was a key precondi-
tion for a peace process to get underway as set out in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement. After completing Operation Essential Harvest, NATO retained, at 
Skopje’s request, a follow-on force of several hundred military personnel in the 
country to protect civilian observers tasked with monitoring the re-entry of the 
state security forces into former crisis areas – first in Operation Amber Fox (27 
September 2001-15 December 2002)310 and then in the further reduced Operation 
Allied Harmony (16 December 2002-31 March 2003).311 On 31 March 2003, 
NATO handed over the responsibility for this operation to the European Union, 




As noted earlier, a lot has already been written about the Kosovo crisis of 1999 
and its aftermath.313 This study is not concerned with what has been exhaustively 
dealt with elsewhere concerning the legitimacy and legality of NATO’s ‘humani-
tarian intervention’ in Kosovo,314 nor with the legal accountability of NATO 
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255, at pp. 203-215; M. Guillaume, ‘Le cadre juridique de l’action de la KFOR au Kosovo’, ibid., at 
 
ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE UN, NATO, THE OSCE AND THE COE 87 
(members) and its (their) forces for inflicting ‘collateral’ damage.315 Like previous 
paragraphs, this section will restrict itself to an examination of the role and 
impact of NATO’s actions in Kosovo. 
 
7.3.1 Chronicle of an intervention foretold 
 
During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar 
Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes.316 The international 
community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humani-
tarian consequences and the risk of it spreading to other countries, notably 
Macedonia and Albania. President Slobodan Milošević’s disregard for diplomatic 
efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis and the destabilising role of the 
militant KLA were also of concern. UN Security Council resolution 1199 (1998), 
among other things, expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by 
the Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army and called for a ceasefire by 
both parties to the conflict. On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the 
situation, the North Atlantic Council decided to issue activation orders for both 
limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia, the execution of 
which was to begin approximately ninety-six hours later.317 This move was 
designed to support US-led diplomatic efforts to make the Milošević regime 
withdraw its forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence 
and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following 
further diplomatic initiatives, including visits to Belgrade by NATO’s Secretary 
General Javier Solana, US envoys Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill and 
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the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, President 
Milošević agreed to international demands and the air strikes were called off.318 In 
the spirit of Security Council resolution 1199, limits were set on the number of 
Serbian forces in Kosovo and on the scope of their operations, following a 
separate agreement with NATO Generals Naumann and Clark.319 It was agreed, in 
addition, that the OSCE would establish a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) 
to observe compliance on the ground and that NATO would establish an aerial 
surveillance mission.320 The establishment of the two missions was endorsed by 
UN Security Council resolution 1203 (1998). 
Despite these steps, the violence in Kosovo flared up again at the beginning of 
1999, following a number of acts of provocation on both sides and the use of 
excessive and disproportionate force by the Serbian army and special police. 
Some of these incidents were defused through the mediation efforts of the OSCE 
verifiers, but the one at Račak was the proverbial straw that broke the interna-
tional community’s back. It concerned a clash in a small village by that name on 
15 January 1999 between Yugoslav security forces and KLA fighters in which 
forty-five Kosovar Albanians died. Internationally, the deaths were widely 
blamed on the actions of the Yugoslav security forces, which were accused of 
having committed a deliberate massacre, but the government of the FRY consis-
tently claimed that it was a legitimate police operation where no crime was 
committed by the state forces.321 The Račak incident was one of the bloodiest 
incidents to have occurred in the conflict in Kosovo up to that point and later 
featured among the war crimes charges for which Milošević was eventually 
indicted and put on trial by the ICTY.322 Renewed international efforts were made 
to give new political impetus to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The 
Contact Group met on 29 January 1999. It was agreed to convene urgent negotia-
tions between the parties to the conflict, under international mediation. NATO 
supported and reinforced the Contact Group efforts by agreeing on 30 January to 
the use of air strikes, if required, and by issuing a warning to both sides in the 
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conflict.323 These concerted initiatives culminated in initial negotiations in 
Rambouillet (near Paris), from 6 to 23 February, followed by a second round in 
Paris, from 15 to 18 March. At the end of the second round of talks, the Kosovar 
Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement but the talks broke 
down without a signature from the Serbian delegation.324 Immediately afterwards, 
Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity of their operations 
against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, moving extra troops and tanks into the 
province in a clear breach of compliance with the October agreement. Tens of 
thousands of people began to flee their homes in the face of this systematic 
offensive. 
On 20 March 1999, KVM was withdrawn from the region, having faced ob-
struction from Serbian forces to the extent that the OSCE verifiers could no 
longer continue to fulfil their task. Holbrooke then flew to Belgrade, in a final 
attempt to persuade President Milošević to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians 
or face imminent NATO air strikes. Milošević refused to comply and on 23 
March, in the absence of a clear mandate from the UN Security Council, NATO 
launched its air campaign under the banner of Operation Allied Force.325 
 
7.3.2 Operation Allied Force 
 
NATO’s objectives in relation to Operation Allied Force were set out in the 
statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held 
on 12 April 1999 and were reaffirmed by the Heads of State and Government at 
the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April 1999: 
 
- a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and 
repression; 
- the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces; 
- the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; 
- the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; 
- the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis 
of the Rambouillet accords, in conformity with international law and the Char-
ter of the United Nations.326 
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Throughout the conflict, the achievement of these objectives, accompanied by 
measures to ensure their full implementation, was regarded by the Alliance as the 
prerequisite for bringing to an end the violence and human suffering in Kosovo. 
NATO chose to counter violence with violence. After first targeting the FRY’s 
air defences, NATO gradually expanded the campaign. Despite using ‘precision-
guided’ weapons and avoiding civilian casualties to the greatest extent possible 
(by reviewing target selection at multiple levels of command to ensure that it 
complied with international law, was militarily justified and minimised the risk to 
civilian lives and property), Human Rights Watch estimated that between 488 and 
527 civilians lost their lives due to NATO’s attacks.327 TV broadcasts of the 
‘collateral damage’ caused by NATO bombs led to a public outcry and caused 
strains between the Allies. But the Alliance managed to hold together during an 
air campaign that lasted for seventy-eight days and in which more than 38,000 
sorties (10,484 of them strike sorties) were flown, without a single Allied 
fatality.328 
After consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from 
General Clark that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo had 
begun, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on 10 June 1999 announced that 
he had instructed General Clark to temporarily suspend air operations against the 
FRY.329 The withdrawal was in accordance with both the Military Technical 
Agreement, concluded between NATO and the FRY on the evening of 9 June,330 
and the diplomatic agreement between the FRY and the EU and Russian special 
envoys Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin, reached on 3 June.331 On 10 
June, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244 (1999) welcoming the 
acceptance by the FRY of the principles for a political solution to the Kosovo 
crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its 
military, police and paramilitary forces. Resolution 1244 announced the Security 
Council’s decision to establish international civil and security presences in 
Kosovo under UN auspices.332 Acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council decided that the political solution to the crisis would be based on 
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the general principles adopted on 6 May by the G-8 and the principles contained 
in the agreement of 3 June.333 These documents were included, respectively, as 
Annex 1 and Annex 2 to the resolution. Apart from an end to all hostilities and 
the withdrawal of FRY forces, the principles contained therein included, among 
other things, the deployment of an effective international security presence, with 
substantial NATO participation, aimed at deterring renewed hostilities, demilita-
rising the KLA and establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees 




Following the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), General Michael Jackson, 
designated as the Commander of the International Security Force (or ‘Kosovo 
Force’ – KFOR) and acting on the instructions of the North Atlantic Council, 
made immediate preparations for the rapid deployment of the Security Council-
mandated force. As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement of 9 June 1999, 
the deployment of KFOR was synchronised with the departure of Serb security 
forces from Kosovo. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR 
was well-established in Kosovo. At its height, KFOR comprised approximately 
50,000 personnel from thirty-nine troop-contributing countries. Nowadays, the 
force consists of approximately 16,000 personnel from thirty-seven countries, 
including nine Pf.P partners.334 
In accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), KFOR has a mandate to secure 
public safety and enforce law and order until the UN Mission in Kosovo can fully 
assume this responsibility. To this end, NATO conducts air surveillance, patrols 
and search operations, operates checkpoints, confiscates weapons and ammuni-
tion, responds to emergency calls, controls the borders, investigates criminal 
activities and arrests or detains suspected criminals. Since the start of KFOR’s 
deployment on the ground, the KLA was disbanded and is in the process of being 
transformed through resettlement programmes, the creation of the Kosovo Police 
Service and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps – an unarmed civil 
relief organisation involved in the rebuilding of Kosovo’s infrastructure.335 KFOR 
itself has also been active in the reconstruction effort, transportation, railway 
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operations, mine clearance, fire services, protection of international workers, food 
distribution, removal of unexploded ordnance, mine awareness education, 
medical services and so forth. Since mid-June 1999, more than 775,000 refugees 
and displaced people have returned. A dramatic drop in the rate of murder, arson 
and looting has also confirmed the stabilisation of the situation. But despite its 
presence, ethnically-motivated violence continues. The recurring violence in and 
around the divided town of Mitrovica and the March 2004 riots that left nineteen 
Kosovar Serbs dead have exposed NATO’s inability to fully control the security 
situation and have drawn special attention to the protection of Kosovo’s minori-
ties, who are often the victims of ethnic tensions and hatred.336 
 
 
8. EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE 
WESTERN BALKANS: OSCE 
 
The OSCE used to claim an important role in the European security architecture, 
its strength being its wide membership.337 But for the very same reason, the 
mechanism of the OSCE was never efficient, as the various interests and positions 
of the participating states often lay too far apart. Although the OSCE was 
involved in the ‘Yugoslav’ crises from the very beginning,338 it did not achieve 
any major successes. Despite a long-standing presence on the ground, countless 
unpublicised missions by the High Commissioner on National Minorities and a 
series of mini-successes, the remaining pictures that capture the OSCE’s ineffec-
tiveness in the Balkans are the ones showing a convoy of orange OSCE jeeps, 
obstructed in their path by Serbian troops and the subsequent departure of OSCE 
verifiers from Kosovo. As can be seen from the descriptive overview of activities 
in the Balkans in this section,339 the CSCE/OSCE did make and continues to make 
important efforts to prevent deadly conflict and rehabilitate war-torn societies. 
Election monitoring is the prime example.340 However, it is clear that the instru-
ments at the disposal of the OSCE are very weak, especially in situations when 
the parties to a conflict are not interested in any form of international mediation or 
intervention. During the different episodes of the crises in the Balkans, boundary 
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and verification missions were deprived of efficient tools to combat mutual hate. 
Traditional instruments of international diplomacy have proved insufficient and 
inefficient, in particular since the OSCE was neither able, nor entitled, to propose 
unorthodox solutions and remained within the framework of classical interna-
tional law (e.g., maintenance of territorial integrity of SFRY although ex-
administrative units were entitled by other international actors to claim sover-
eignty). The OSCE’s failures in the Balkans have caused some to deplore the 
death of the organisation’s dispute management mechanisms,341 while others have 
stressed the necessity of strengthening the competence of the organisation,342 
including the OSCE itself.343 
 
8.1 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje 
 
The decision to establish a CSCE monitoring mission in Macedonia was taken in 
mid-1992 in the context of the efforts to extend the European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to other successor states of the SFRY to help avoid 
the spread of tension to their territories.344 The CSCE Spillover Monitoring 
Mission to Skopje started its work with a fact-finding visit to Skopje on 10-14 
September 1992. It continues its activities until today.345 The objectives of the 
mission are to monitor developments along the Macedonian-Serb border and in 
other areas of Macedonia which may suffer from the spillover of the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia ‘in order to promote respect for territorial integrity and the 
maintenance of peace, stability and security and to help prevent possible conflict 
in the region’.346 To this end, the tasks of the Spillover Monitor Mission consist, 
inter alia, of conducting dialogue with Macedonian governmental authorities, 
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political parties, NGOs and ordinary citizens, assessing the level of stability and 
the possibility of conflict and unrest, maintaining a high profile in the country 
and, in the case of incidents, assisting in establishing the facts. 
According to the modalities and the financial implications, the authorised 
strength of the mission is eight members, to be supplemented as required. On a 
number of occasions, the size and mandate of the mission were adjusted in view 
of developments in the region. In a special session on the Kosovo crisis on 11 
March 1998, the Permanent Council decided to temporarily enhance the monitor-
ing capabilities of the Spillover Monitor Mission in order to allow for ‘adequate 
observation of the borders with Kosovo, FRY, and prevention of possible crisis 
spillover effects’.347 In the first half of 2001, the Permanent Council, noting the 
reports of the mission indicating an upsurge of violent actions by ethnic Albanian 
armed groups in the area of the northern border regions in Macedonia, decided to 
increase the size of the mission to better monitor developments along the bor-
der.348 In the wake of the August 2001 Ohrid Peace Agreement, the mission 
reached its peak size, with a further increase of seventy-two international confi-
dence-building monitors, sixty police advisers and seventeen police trainers, as 
well as ten internationals to deal with administrative and support matters, for a 
total of 210 internationals.349 In addition to police matters and confidence-building 
activities, the mission has been particularly active in media issues, decentralisa-
tion and support to the national ombudsman. 
 
8.2 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
At its December 1995 meeting in Budapest, the OSCE Ministerial Council 
decided to establish a Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to carry out its tasks as 
requested by the parties to the Dayton Agreement:350 
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- taking into consideration the role of the High Representative as defined in the 
Peace Agreement and in the conclusions of the Paris Meeting as well as the 
need to co-operate with other international actors, the Mission concentrated on 
providing assistance for the preparation and conduct of municipal elections in 
1997 and on providing assistance in the establishment of a permanent election 
commission, in accordance with Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement, with respect 
to the elections scheduled to close the consolidation period; 
- to assist in democracy building and be active in human rights promotion and 
monitoring, in particular in support of the Ombudspersons throughout Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; 
- to continue assisting the Parties in implementation of regional stabilization 
measures; 
- the Head of Mission will co-ordinate closely with the Chairman-in-Office and 
report to the Permanent Council regularly, at least every two months. 
 
The Head of Mission started to work in Sarajevo on 29 December 1995, relying 
initially on the infrastructure of the existing OSCE mission in Sarajevo.351 Since 
its date of inception, the mission has been prolonged each year for a further 
period of twelve months.352 The mission, which currently totals 114 internation-
ally seconded members, has four regional centres in Banja Luka, Mostar, 
Sarajevo and Tuzla. In addition, it has twenty-one field offices in the two entities 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an additional office in Brcko. The mission works in 
close cooperation with all other international stakeholders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
8.3 OSCE Mission to Croatia 
 
In its Decision of 18 April 1996, the Permanent Council noted the reports of the 
Fact-Finding Mission of the OSCE to Croatia (6-10 October 1995) and of the 
Personal Representative of the CiO on his visit to Croatia (20-23 February 1996), 
reaffirmed the OSCE’s principles and commitments and its full support for the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and welcomed the 
invitation of the government for an OSCE mission.353 The Permanent Council 
decided that: 
 
- The Mission will provide assistance and expertise to the Croatian authorities at 
all levels, as well as to interested individuals, groups and organizations, in the 
field of the protection of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities. In this context and in order to promote reconciliation, the 
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the mission’s budget at €18.4 million. 
353  Permanent Council, 18 April 1996, PC.DEC/112. 
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rule of law and conformity with the highest internationally recognized stan-
dards, the Mission will also assist and advise on the full implementation of 
legislation and monitor the proper functioning and development of democratic 
institutions, processes and mechanisms. 
- In carrying out its tasks, the Mission will co-operate with and use the expertise 
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and of the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. It will also co-operate with other 
international organizations and institutions, notably the Council of Europe, the 
ECMM, the Special Envoy for Regional Issues, UNHCR, the ICRC and rele-
vant NGOs. 
- The Mission will offer close co-operation to UNTAES, in particular as regards 
confidence-building and reconciliation, as well as the development of democ-
ratic institutions, processes and mechanisms at the municipal and 
district/county level.354 
 
The mission started working in Zagreb on 4 July 1996.355 It has coordination 
centres in Knin, Vukovar, Sisak and Daruvar and a Zagreb area office co-located 
with the headquarters. In June 1997, the Permanent Council authorised the 
mission to assist with and monitor the implementation of Croatian legislation and 
agreements and commitments entered into by the Croatian government on the 
two-way return of all refugees and displaced persons and the protection of 
persons belonging to national minorities.356 One year later, the OSCE expressed 
its readiness to deploy a maximum of 120 civilian police monitors to assume the 
responsibilities of the United Nations Police Support Group deployed in the 
Croatian Danubian region, in anticipation of the end of the UNPSG’s mandate on 
15 October 1998.357 For two full years, the OSCE Police Monitoring Group 
contributed to the peaceful integration of the Danube Region. The OSCE ceased 
the operations of this distinct unit on 31 October 2000 by integrating the interna-
tional civilian police officers into the structures of the mission.358 
 
8.4 OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
 
In Kosovo, the OSCE contributes to the implementation of UN Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999), in particular the relevant parts of operative paragraph 11. 
                                                                                                                                               
354  Ibid. 
355  The mission’s original mandate lasted until 31 December 1996. The most recent prolonga-
tion, until 31 December 2006, was decided at the 580th PC Meeting, PC.DEC/695, 17 November 
2005. The PC authorised the mission to build up mission personnel to a ceiling of 250 expatriates 
with a view to full deployment by October 1998. The current number of mission members is sixty-
four. The OSCE Unified Budget for 2006, adopted on 20 December 2005, PC.DEC/712, established 
the mission’s budget at €8.7 million. 
356  Permanent Council, 26 June 1997, PC.DEC/176. 
357  Permanent Council, 25 June 1998, PC.DEC/239. 
358  Permanent Council, 21 September 2000, PC.DEC/373. 
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The present OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was established on 1 July 1999 as 
a follow-up to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and the Task Force for 
Kosovo.359 After heavy international pressure over its human rights record in 
Kosovo,360 the FRY agreed with the CiO of the OSCE on the terms of the 
establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission.361 The KVM was established 
on 25 October 1998 with the aim of verifying the compliance of the authorities of 
the FRY (and the KLA) in Kosovo with the requirements set forth by the interna-
tional community in UN Security Council resolution 1199 (1998), in anticipation 
of a political solution to the crisis in the province.362 Approximately 1,500 inter-
national staff were deployed by February 1999.363 But these unarmed verifiers 
were unable to carry out the full scope of the tasks allocated under the FRY-
                                                                                                                                               
359  On the KVM, see also supra section 7.3. 
360  See Kokott, loc. cit. n. 255. 
361  See Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Missions, signed in Belgrade on 16 Octo-
ber 1998, by the CiO of the OSCE and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY 
(CIO.GAL/65/98/Corr.1). 
362  See Permanent Council, 15 October 1998, PC.DEC/259; and Permanent Council, 25 October 
1998, PC.DEC/263. The KVM’s responsibilities are specified in chapter III of the Agreement. The 
KVM was tasked to: 
‘ - verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements. […] investigate reports of cease-fire 
violations; 
 -  receive weekly information from relevant FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo 
regarding movements of forces […]. Upon request of the Verification Mission Director, Mission 
personnel may he invited to accompany police within Kosovo; 
 -  look for and report on roadb1ocks and other emplacements which influence lines of communica-
tions erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control; 
 -  maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movement units with 
border control responsibilities […]. The Verification Mission, when invited by the FRY authori-
ties or upon its request, will visit border control units and accompany them as they perform their 
normal border control roles; 
 -  when invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in Kosovo as 
they perform their normal policing roles; 
 -  assist UNHCR, ICRC and other international organizations in facilitating the return of displaced 
persons to their homes […]. The Mission will verify the level of co-operation and support pro-
vided by the FRY and its entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs […]; 
 -  as the political settlement defining Kosovo’s self-government is achieved and implementation 
begins, the Mission Director will assist, both with his own resources and with augmented OSCE 
implementation support, in areas such as elections supervision, assistance in the establishment of 
Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo; 
 -  the Mission Director will receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities concerning 
eventual allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status of disciplinary 
or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses; 
 -  maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, Kosovo authorities and with ICRC 
regarding ICRC access to detained persons; 
 -  convene representatives of national communities and authorities to exchange information and 
provide guidance on implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission; 
 -  report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or lack of full co-operation from any side to 
the OSCE and other organizations.’ 
363  Under the terms of part IV of the Agreement of 16 October 1998, a maximum of 2,000 
unarmed verifiers from OSCE Member States would be permitted. The HQ (in Priština) and support 
staff (including a small liaison office in Belgrade) are included in this total. 
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OSCE Agreement.364 They were hindered in the performance of their duties by 
both Yugoslav troops and members of the KLA. Following a steady deterioration 
in the security situation in the province and the global broadcast of TV images of 
orange KVM vehicles being refused access to some of the hotspots, the OSCE 
CiO decided to withdraw the mission on 20 March 1999. With the bulk of its 
members repatriated, the core of the KVM was temporarily based in Skopje, inter 
alia, to plan the re-entry of an OSCE Mission to Kosovo. The KVM was later 
dissolved and the Task Force for Kosovo created in its stead was primarily tasked 
with preparing for redeployment to Kosovo and continuing to assist the United 
Nations and other international organisations.365 The Task Force for Kosovo was 
dissolved on 1 July 1999 and replaced by OMIK. 
Since 1 July 1999, OMIK constitutes a distinct component, or ‘pillar’, within 
the overall framework of UNMIK. Within this overall framework, OMIK takes 
the lead role in matters relating to Human Resources Capacity and Institution 
Building and Human Rights. As such, it cooperates closely with other relevant 
organisations – intergovernmental and, as appropriate, non-governmental – in the 
planning and implementation of its tasks. According to its constituent document, 
OMIK concentrates its work in the following interrelated areas: 
 
1. Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo 
police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and oper-
ate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at 
various levels, in co-operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe; 
2. Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, 
non-governmental organizations, political parties and local media; 
3. Organization and supervision of elections; 
4. Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, 
the establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, inter alia, 
with the UNHCR; 
5. Such tasks which may be requested by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations or his Special Representative, which are consistent with the UNSC 
Resolution 1244 and approved by the Permanent Council.366 
 
According to the same document, OMIK is guided by the importance of bringing 
about mutual respect and reconciliation among all ethnic groups in Kosovo and 
establishing a viable multi-ethnic society where the rights of each citizen are fully 
                                                                                                                                               
364  See W. Czaplinski, ‘The Activities of the OSCE in Kosovo’, in Tomuschat, op. cit. n. 255, at 
pp. 37-44. 
365  Permanent Council, 8 June 1999, PC.DEC/296. 
366  Permanent Council, 1 July 1999, PC/DEC/305. The mission was prolonged until 31 Decem-
ber 2006 by 580th PC Meeting, PC.DEC/693, 17 November 2005. The OSCE Unified Budget for 
2006, adopted on 20 December 2005, PC.DEC/712, established the mission’s budget at €35.2 
million. 
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and equally respected. The mission’s headquarters are located in Priština. OMIK 
totals 296 international staff and has a strong field presence with eight OSCE 
offices, which allows it to cover all thirty municipalities effectively. Like the 
other UNMIK Pillar Heads, the Head of OMIK (since April 2005, Werner 
Wnendt of Germany) also serves as Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations (DSRSG). 
 
8.5 OSCE Mission to Serbia.367 
 
The OSCE Mission to Serbia was originally established as the OSCE Mission to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,368 later renamed the OSCE Mission to Serbia 
and Montenegro,369 and most recently the OSCE Mission to Serbia.370 As stipu-
lated in its original mandate, the mission, acting in close cooperation with the host 
government, will provide assistance and expertise to the authorities at all levels, 
as well as to interested individuals, groups and organisations, in the fields of 
democratisation and the protection of human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities. In this context, and in order to promote 
democratisation, tolerance, the rule of law and conformity with OSCE principles, 
standards and commitments, the mission has been tasked to: 
 
- assist and advise on the full implementation of legislation in areas covered by 
the mandate; 
- monitor the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions, 
processes and mechanisms; 
                                                                                                                                               
367  Long before the OSCE mission described in this section, the OSCE had missions in three 
autonomous regions in Serbia: Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. The mandate of the missions, 
contained in the 15th CSO Meeting, 14 August 1992, Journal No. 2, Annex 1 and reiterated in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 28 October 1992 in Belgrade, was to (i) promote 
dialogue between the authorities concerned and representatives of the populations and communities 
in the three regions; (ii) collect information on all aspects relevant to violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and promote solutions to such problems; (iii) establish contact points for 
solving problems that might be identified; and (iv) assist in providing information on relevant 
legislation on human rights, protection of minorities, free media and democratic elections. The 
missions started their work on 8 September 1992. According to the MoU, the duration of the 
missions was limited to an initial period of six months. Extension of this period was subject to 
mutual agreement by the parties. In a protocol signed by the government of the FRY and the Head of 
Mission on 29 April 1993, the period was extended until 28 June 1993. The missions were with-
drawn in July 1993 after expiration of the MoU, since the FRY authorities refused the CSCE’s 
request to prolong it. In the modalities and financial implications, the size of the missions was limited 
to twelve members, to be supplemented as required, but the missions never exceeded a total of 
twenty members. 
368  Permanent Council, 11 January 2001, PC/DEC/401. 
369  Permanent Council, 13 February 2003, PC/DEC/533. 
370  Permanent Council, 29 June 2006, PC/DEC/733. 
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- assist in the restructuring and training of law enforcement agencies and the 
judiciary; 
- provide assistance and advice in the field of the media; 
- in close co-operation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, provide advice and support in order to facilitate the return of 
refugees to and from neighbouring countries and from other countries of resi-
dence as well as of internally displaced persons to their homes within the 
territory of Serbia. 
 
In carrying out its tasks, the mission cooperates with and uses the expertise of the 
HCNM, ODIHR, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the Coordina-
tor of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. The Conflict Prevention 
Centre assists, inter alia, by organising training workshops and seminars in the 
field of confidence and security-building measures and other issues in the 
politico-military field. The mission closely cooperates with the representation of 
the Council of Europe in Serbia in order to coordinate programmes and efficiently 
plan joint projects. It also coordinates its activities with representatives of other 
international organisations and institutions in the host country, notably the 
European Commission, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,371 UN 
agencies, the ICRC and NGOs. The mission has its headquarters in Belgrade and 
is currently staffed by fifty-one internationals and 123 locals.372 It has a multi-
ethnic police training facility in Mitrovo Polje, operated in close cooperation with 
the Serbian authorities.373 
 
8.6 OSCE Mission to Montenegro 
 
The OSCE Mission to Montenegro was established shortly after Montenegro 
declared its independence.374 As stipulated in its mandate of 29 June 2006, the 
tasks of the mission are to: 
 
- assist and promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments 
as well as the cooperation of the Republic of Montenegro with the OSCE, in all 
dimensions, including the politico-military, economic and environmental and 
human aspects of security and stability; 
                                                                                                                                               
371  See chapter 4, section 3.3.1, and chapter 5, section 2.2. 
372  The mission’s mandate has been extended annually and is currently valid until 31 December 
2006. PC Decision 741 of 27 July 2006 established the budget of the mission at €8.6 million. On the 
day of the establishment of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the former OSCE field office in 
Podgorica was closed down. 
373  For an evaluation of the OSCE’s activities in the field of police reform, see M. Trivunovic, 
‘Police Reform – Introduction’, 15 Helsinki Monitor (2004) p. 171; and M. Trivunovic, ‘Status of 
Police Reform After Four Years of Democratic Transition in Serbia’, 15 Helsinki Monitor (2004) pp. 
172-186. 
374  Permanent Council, 29 June 2006, PC/DEC/732. The mission has a mandate until 31 De-
cember 2006. PC Decision 742 of 27 July 2006 established the budget of the mission at €951,800. 
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- facilitate contacts, coordinate activities and promote information exchange with 
the CiO, OSCE institutions and, as appropriate, OSCE field operations, as well 
as cooperation with international organisations and institutions; 
- establish and maintain contacts with local authorities, universities, research 
institutions and NGOs and assist in arranging events with OSCE participation. 
 
The mission is headquartered in Podgorica and currently consists of fifteen inter-
national and thirty local staff. 
 
8.7 OSCE Presence in Albania 
 
On the basis of the reports by the Personal Representative of the CiO, Franz 
Vranitzky, on his visits to Albania on 8 and 14 March 1997, the Permanent 
Council decided to establish an OSCE Presence in Albania.375 It started working 
in Tirana on 3 April 1997, under the wings of the Italian-led Operazione Alba, 
which was deployed almost simultaneously to help create a safe environment for 
the international organisations operating in Albania.376 The total number of 
international staff is currently thirty, with international staff at the headquarters in 
Tirana and at four field stations in Gjirokaster, Kukes, Shkoder and Vlora.377 In 
cooperation with the Albanian authorities, the OSCE has since provided the 
coordinating framework within which other international organisations have 
played their part in their respective areas of competence. As such, the OSCE has 
tried to support a coherent international strategy and facilitate improvements in 
the protection of human rights and basic elements of civil society. In particular, 
the OSCE has provided advice and assistance to the Council of Europe in the 
fields of democratisation, the media and human rights, election preparation and 
monitoring. Furthermore, it has supported NATO by monitoring the collection of 
weapons. 
The OSCE Presence’s mandate was substantially changed on two occasions. 
In a special session devoted to the aggravating humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the 
Permanent Council decided to temporarily enhance the monitoring capabilities of 
                                                                                                                                               
375  See Permanent Council, 20 March 1997, PC/DEC/158; and Permanent Council, 27 March 
1997, PC/DEC/160. 
376  Italy’s early deployment of troops prevented the crisis in Albania over the collapse of the 
pyramid savings schemes from spiralling out of control. Operazione Alba was authorised by 
Permanent Council Decision 160 of 27 March 1997 and endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 
1101 (1997). For background and analyses of the operation, see G. Kostakos and D. Bourantonis, 
‘Innovations in Peace-keeping: The Case of Albania’, 29 Security Dialogue (1998) pp. 49-58; E. 
Foster, ‘Ad hoc in Albania: Did Europe Fail? A Rejoinder’, 29 Security Dialogue (1998) pp. 213-
219; and P. Tripodi, ‘Operation Alba: A Necessary and Successful Preventive Deployment’, 9 
International Peacekeeping (2002) pp. 89-104. 
377  The OSCE Unified Budget for 2006, adopted on 20 December 2005, PC.DEC/712, estab-
lished the budget of the OSCE Presence in Albania at €3.8 million. 
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the OSCE Presence in Albania in order to allow for adequate observation of the 
borders with Kosovo, the FRY and the prevention of possible crisis spillover 
effects.378 With the end of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the border monitoring 
activities of the OSCE Presence were progressively downscaled and the border 
monitoring field stations were transformed into normal field stations. At the end 
of 2003, the Permanent Council decided to bring the mandate in line with the 
overall progress achieved in Albania in the preceding years, as well as the 
increased central position that the country’s institutions had taken.379 Working in 
close consultation and cooperation with the government of Albania, the OSCE 
Presence now provides assistance and expertise in the following areas: legislative 
and judicial reform, including property law reform; regional administrative 
reform; electoral reform; parliamentary capacity building; anti-trafficking and 
anti-corruption, including supporting the implementation of relevant national 
strategies; development of effective laws and regulations on the independent 
media and its Code of Conduct; promotion of good governance and targeted 
projects for strengthening of civil society; and police assistance, in particular 
training for border police, within a coordinated framework with other interna-
tional actors in the field. 
 
 
9. EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE 
WESTERN BALKANS: COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
The Council of Europe has always been firmly committed to supporting the social 
and political stability of multi-ethnic societies in the Western Balkans. The 
organisation’s actions have been concentrated on the creation of democratic 
institutions, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law in line 
with CoE norms and standards. When discussing the Council of Europe’s role in 
the Western Balkans in concreto, two sorts of useful activities stand out: technical 
and legal assistance through the implementation of programmes and advice on 
constitutional matters. 
As far as the former is concerned, the Council of Europe has, since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, conducted programmes on fulfilling post-accession commit-
ments, especially with regard to the functioning of judicial systems, judicial 
training and law faculty reform (all Western Balkan countries); the strengthening 
of (higher) education (e.g., Macedonia), court administration (e.g., Albania) and 
                                                                                                                                               
378  Permanent Council, 11 March 1998, PC/DEC/218. 
379  Permanent Council, 18 December 2003, PC/DEC/588. See also C. Jaenicke, ‘The OSCE 
Presence in Albania – Raison d’Etre and Future Plans’, Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy at the University of Hamburg, ed., OSCE Yearbook 2003 (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag 2004) 
pp. 125-138. 
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self-government (e.g., Montenegro and Serbia); support for parliamentary 
institutions (e.g., Serbia); reform of prison systems (e.g., Macedonia); reconstruc-
tion of religious monuments and sites (Kosovo); and support for the freedom of 
the media (e.g., Serbia). All these programmes are designed to help (new) 
Member States forward with their institutional, legislative and administrative 
reforms. Since 1993, most of these programmes have been jointly funded by the 
European Commission – mostly by way of its special EuropeAid programme: 
‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ (EIDHR)380 – and the 
Council of Europe. By combining forces in this way, the complementarity of the 
relevant activities of the European Union and the Council of Europe has been 
enhanced, as there is considerable overlap in the membership requirements for 
aspirant countries from, inter alia, the Western Balkans. To underline the 
importance of such joint programmes and offer more systematic means of 
programming and priority setting, both organisations signed a Joint Declaration 
on Cooperation and Partnership on 3 April 2001.381 Most joint programmes are 
country-specific. They cover, inter alia, Albania (since 1993), Serbia and 
Montenegro (since 2001), Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 2003) and Macedonia 
(since 1996). Other Joint Programmes, for instance for Croatia, have also been 
implemented in the past. In addition, there have been multilateral thematic joint 
programmes, for example, on national minorities and the fight against organised 
crime and corruption.382 
With regard to assistance offered by the Council of Europe on constitutional 
issues, the work of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better 
known as the ‘Venice Commission’, occupies a central place.383 The primary task 
of the Venice Commission is to assist and advise individual countries in constitu-
tional matters at the request of those countries. Such assistance goes from 
providing assistance in the drafting of constitutional texts to the writing of an 
                                                                                                                                               
380  See: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/index_en.htm>. Programmes have also been 
concluded with the European Commission’s CARDS programme. In 2001, two joint programmes 
were established with the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). On CARDS and EAR, see 
chapter 5, section 3.4. The Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission 
and the Council of Europe’s Directorate of Strategic Planning (as well as other services as applica-
ble) set and match priorities for the purpose of Joint Programmes. Sometimes, the Council of Europe 
makes proposals to the European Commission for urgent joint undertakings. EuropeAid is the 
structure within the European Commission involved in the final selection and administrative follow-
up of programmes. The Council of Europe counterpart throughout the project cycle is the Directorate 
of Strategic Planning, in close consultation with the different Council of Europe Directorates General 
responsible for the implementation of the activities. In recent years, the European Commission 
Delegations in the beneficiary countries have increasingly been implied in the Joint Programmes. 
Equally, Council of Europe Secretariat Offices in the field support planning and implementation. 
381  Available at: <http://www.jp.coe.int/programmes/general/JointDeclaration_EF.asp>. 
382  A list of joint programmes, with logframes and activities, is available at: <http://www.jp.coe. 
int/CEAD/JP/default.asp>. 
383  See supra section 5.1. 
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opinion on whether a draft legislative text meets European standards and how to 
improve the draft accordingly. The Commission tends to pay particular attention 
to countries which have experienced or are experiencing ethno-political conflicts. 
In this respect, the continued assistance of the Venice Commission in drafting the 
electoral legislation in Albania (1997, 2000 and 2003) and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1997), both in close cooperation with ODIHR,384 and developing and interpreting 
the constitutional law of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina stand out.385 More 
recently, its opinions on the human rights situation in Kosovo,386 the new Consti-
tution of Serbia.387 and its assistance in the constitutional reform activities in the 
newly independent Republic of Montenegro.388 are worth noting. Thanks to its 
independent character and high level of expertise, the non-legally binding 
opinions of the Venice Commission carry a lot of weight and are usually reflected 
in the final result of legislative texts. As such, the Venice Commission plays a 
highly specific but important role in the stabilisation of the Western Balkans. 
 
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
10.1 European security architecture: lessons learned from the Western 
Balkans 
 
The wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, in particular the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, caught the international community largely unprepared. The early 
responses to these crises highlighted the shortcomings of the European security 
architecture following the end of the Cold War. After the European Communities’ 
actions ran into quicksand,389 the United Nations was the principal institution 
attempting to broker an end to hostilities. But except for the fleeting ceasefires, 
there was hardly any peace to keep. The UN’s task in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to 
try to make peace while attempting to mitigate the cruel effects of war. 
UNPROFOR proved largely ineffective. The United Nations was more successful 
                                                                                                                                               
384  See supra section 4.2. More information on the Venice Commission’s work in the electoral 
field is available at: <http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Elections_Referendums_E.asp>. 
385  For a list of opinions, comments and recommendations on constitutional matters per (West-
ern Balkan) country, see: <http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Country_ef.asp?L=E>. 
386  See ‘Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo: possible establishment of review mechanisms 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 60th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 October 2004)’, CDL-
AD(2004)033, 11 October 2004. 
387  See ‘Constitution of Serbia as approved by the National Assembly on 30 September 2006’, 
CDL(2006)089, 1 December 2006. 
388  See speeches by K. Tuori, A. Bradley, A. Eide and G. Neppi Modona, at the Expert Meeting 
on the Constitutional Reform of the Republic of Montenegro (Podgorica, 28 November 2006), 
CDL(2006)106, 7 December 2006. 
389  See chapter 3, section 2. 
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in Macedonia, where a real peacekeeping force prevented the armed conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from spreading. 
Over the years, NATO (and the WEU)390 became involved in support of the 
United Nations through various air and sea-based support operations – enforcing 
economic sanctions, an arms embargo and a ‘no-fly’ zone – and the implementa-
tion of a peace plan.391 These measures helped to contain the conflict and save 
lives, but in the end proved inadequate to bring an end to the war. The turning 
point in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina came in the summer of 1995, with the 
murder of thousands of men and boys at Srebrenica, Europe’s first genocide since 
World War II.392 The Srebrenica massacre prompted the involvement of the 
United States on both the diplomatic and the military front. American engage-
ment proved decisive for breaking the vicious cycle of war. The UN Security 
Council gave a mandate for NATO to launch a two-week air campaign against 
Bosnian Serb forces. This paved the way for the Dayton Agreement, the peace 
accord which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and under which a 60,000-
strong NATO-led Implementation Force took military responsibility for the peace 
process. 
The deployment of IFOR was the Alliance’s first military engagement on land 
and has contributed greatly to reshaping its post-Cold War identity. Indeed, in 
only a few years, NATO transformed itself into an increasingly effective instru-
ment for military and political crisis management. The adaptation and learning 
process was evident in the way in which peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
under IFOR and its successor SFOR has evolved and fed into the approach 
adopted for KFOR since June 1999. NATO deployed in Kosovo after a seventy-
eight-day air campaign launched to halt a humanitarian catastrophe among 
Kosovar Albanians at the hands of Belgrade. The decision to intervene, which was 
                                                                                                                                               
390  See chapter 4, section 1. 
391  See also chapter 4, section 2.2. 
392  See Case No. IT-98-33, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004. 
The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) is another landmark court case where, for the 
first time in the sixty-year history of the International Court of Justice, one state, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, accused another state, Serbia and Montenegro, of genocide. The ICJ handed down its 
judgment on 26 February 2007. Accepting the ICTY’s findings that the Srebrenica massacre was 
genocide, the ICJ ruled that Serbia could not be held financially liable for acts of genocide committed 
by Bosnian Serb forces in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war because the Serbian state did not aim to 
‘destroy in whole or in part’ the Bosnian Muslim population. The ruling thus relieved Serbia from 
having to pay billions of euros in potential reparation claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Court did 
conclude, however, that Belgrade financed and supplied weapons to local perpetrators and that 
Milošević’s regime should have used its ‘known influence’ to restrain the Bosnian Serbs to ‘try and 
prevent the tragic events then taking shape’. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, the ICJ’s president, said the 
onus remained on Belgrade to arrest and extradite Ratko Mladić. For comments on the ruling of the 
ICJ, see T.D. Gill, ‘The “Genocide” Case: Reflections on the ICJ’s Decision in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia’, 2 Hague Justice Journal (2007) pp. 43-47. 
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controversial under international law because of the lack of a mandate from the 
UN Security Council, followed after more than a year of fighting within Kosovo, 
the failure of the United Nations and other international efforts to resolve the 
conflict by diplomatic means and a strong determination on the part of the NATO 
Allies to prevent the kind of ethnic-cleansing campaigns seen earlier in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia. Military victory over Serbia was but the first step 
towards post-conflict peacebuilding in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
The international community established international protectorates in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (under the powers of the Office of the High Representative) and in 
Kosovo (under the authority of the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo). Today, in addition to helping to preserve a secure environment, the 
United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the CoE (and, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, the European Union) are actively involved in helping refugees 
and displaced persons return to their homes, seeking out and arresting individuals 
indicted for war crimes and helping to reform domestic structures in such a way 
as to prevent a return to violence – all tasks that require a long-term commitment. 
The international organisations that make up the European security architecture 
have learned that they cannot successfully engage in conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation in isolation. The key to long-term 
conflict resolution is cooperation between different functionally specialised 
institutions. Another important lesson that has been drawn from the violent 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia can be captured in the age-old adage that 
‘prevention is better than cure’. Whereas it took close to three-and-a-half years of 
bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a year of fighting in Kosovo before the 
international community intervened to bring these armed conflicts to an end, 
NATO and the European Union became engaged in the spring of 2001, at the 
request of the government in Skopje, in what turned out to be a successful effort 
to prevent an escalating conflict in Macedonia from degenerating into full-scale 
civil war. In 2003, the European Union, in cooperation with NATO and the 
OSCE, took over the responsibility to further a process of reconstruction, recon-
ciliation and reform. 
What then are the determinants for effective conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement and post-conflict rehabilitation? In the sections below, some ideas are 
offered for overcoming some recurring barriers to success. 
 
10.2 Lack of consent; sovereignty and non-interference 
 
To be effectively implemented, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict peacebuilding need to be based on the explicit or tacit consent of at least 
one of the parties involved. All OSCE missions are based on the prior consent of 
the host country. This is particularly true as one moves further through the 
conflict life cycle: peacekeeping, to be effective, must be seen as being impartial. 
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The successful deployment, in Macedonia, of the first-ever UN preventive 
peacekeeping operation was made possible by the invitation and cooperation of 
Macedonia’s president. More often than not, however, protagonists in conflicts do 
not wish and/or cannot be forced to accept external preventive action. Despotic 
leaders have a direct interest in creating and sustaining the conditions of conflict 
(notably by demonising adversaries, terrorising target populations, promoting 
hostile and/or divisive messages, etc.) and, thus, in refusing any external media-
tion or intervention.393 
The issue of consent is intertwined with that of the inviolability of state sover-
eignty. In the case mentioned above, the fact that Macedonia was already 
recognised by the international community as a sovereign state also helped in the 
decision to deploy UNPREDEP. In contrast, as demonstrated in Kosovo with 
regard to NATO’s Operation Allied Force, there is traditionally major reluctance 
on the part of members of international organisations to intervene in an interna-
tionally recognised territory without the consent of the parties concerned. Thus, 
generally speaking, the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs continue to prevail over humanitarian considerations in the post-
Cold War era. 
 
10.3 Lack of political will within international organisations 
 
In the slipstream of what was discussed in the previous section, it should be noted 
that international organisations are member-driven. They are only as effective as 
their members allow them to be. In crisis situations requiring operational action, 
decisions must be taken in a speedy manner. Even though some international 
organisations now allow some exceptions to the unanimity rule, in practice action 
is taken by consensus. The ever-present possibility of a veto from one of the 
members (a permanent member of the UN Security Council, participants in the 
OSCE, etc.) acts as a major brake on international intervention, especially in 
cases where sovereignty is an issue. In the case of the United Nations and, to a 
lesser extent, NATO and the OSCE, divisions in international organisations are 
often symptomatic of diverging patterns of interest and culture. Cultural sensitiv-
ity, in particular, is crucial in conflict prevention. The dilemma for democracies 
concerning the use of force in crisis management (beyond humanitarian-oriented 
deployment) is especially acute in the case of the European Union, whose 
foundations are based on non-coercive (economic and functionalist) pacification 
of antagonist actors (originally France and Germany). However, not all powers 
                                                                                                                                               
393  For example, Milošević’s non-cooperative stance in the Rambouillet negotiations. See R. 
Väyrinen, ‘Challenges to Preventive Action’, in K. Spillmann, et al., eds., Peace Support Opera-
tions: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives (Bern, Peter Lang 2001) at p. 59. 
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and cultures take the same approach to military intervention. Public opinion in the 
United States, for example, is traditionally much more supportive of the use of 
force (including ground troops, in spite of possible casualties) than EU public 
opinion.394 
 
10.4 Competing international organisations 
 
The implementation of coordinated international prevention actions is compli-
cated by competing international organisations. Of course, not all international 
organisations are involved in every conflict situation, but, in the course of a 
conflict’s life cycle on the European continent, the United Nations, NATO, the 
OSCE and the CoE (and of course the European Union) can all claim to have a 
role to play in the stabilisation effort. The OSCE, for instance, shares with the 
CoE (and the European Union) the role of promoting democratic values and 
structures in Central and Eastern European countries, including the countries of 
the Western Balkans. Practice has shown that these organisations embark on 
similar missions (fact-finding, election monitoring, etc.), which creates overlap. 
The problem of such a lack of synergies is that local actors can become involved 
in an uncoordinated manner and work at cross-purposes. This was the case, inter 
alia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where NATO advocated resorting to air power 
while the United Nations feared that military force would jeopardise its 
UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission on the ground. But the often cited lack of 
synergy should not overshadow cases of good cooperation between international 
organisations. This is particularly apparent in the international community’s post-
conflict rehabilitation efforts, where there is a plethora of examples of fruitful 
coordination between international organisations. There are, however, also 
problems of diffusion of responsibility between international actors, whereby 
each international organisation abdicates responsibility to another. 
It would of course be best if all participating states could agree to let one of 
‘their’ organisations take the lead in a particular field. However, in the world of 
power politics, it is not always the most efficient and effective solution which 
                                                                                                                                               
394  This study is undertaken at a time when the United States still seems prone to reject multilat-
eral organisations as venues for the effective promotion of US foreign policy, especially in so far as 
unilateral ‘preventive wars’ are concerned. While it is difficult to contradict this stance in the case of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is also apparent that the United States has always had a different 
approach to conflict management lato sensu. Yet, in many policy areas, the United States still 
considers that multilateralism can help achieve its goal, especially in so far as burden-sharing is 
concerned. Apart from the international fight against terrorism, an excellent example of this is 
provided by Operation Concordia in Macedonia, where the United States agreed to the dispensing of 
its assets in the multilateral framework of NATO so as to enable EU-led operations (see chapter 4, 
section 3). The US stance on the use of force can thus be complementary to that of ‘soft security’ 
oriented institutions. 
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prevails. Major powers naturally favour the action of the international organisa-
tions where their weight is greatest. Hence the insistence of the United States, for 
example, on OSCE intervention in the Balkans instead of intervention by way of 
the Council of Europe, where it is not a full member. 
At the other end of the spectrum, membership of different international or-
ganisations offers important inducements to prospective members to achieve the 
principles of good governance. The prospect of membership creates momentum 
for reform in aspirant countries. Enlargement of the European security organisa-
tions is seen as the best way to entrench peace, stability and democracy on the 
European continent. Parallel enlargements of the Council of Europe, NATO and 
the European Union catalyse compliance with a set of structural standards within 
the realm of peacebuilding. More poignantly, it converts the economic power of 
the European Union and the hard security clout of NATO into driving forces for 
the adoption of norms of good governance. 
 
10.5 Lack of resources 
 
A lack of resources has to be seen in relation to the mandate. For instance, 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly lacked the necessary means to act in 
self-defence, let alone prevent massacres and deportations. As a result of its 
limited resources, UNPROFOR personnel were made hostage to Bosnian Serb 
forces, and this aggravated the situation on the ground. Limited resources 
aggravate the dilemma between ex ante prevention and ex post management. As 
international organisations’ resources are strained, the tendency to focus on 
problems that have reached the stage of open conflict (and public opinion) at the 
expense of preventive action is exacerbated. Although lack of funding is particu-
larly acute in the case of the United Nations, in view of its wide-ranging 
commitments, it is a feature that is common to all international organisations. The 
‘expectations-capabilities’ gap will only be bridged with appropriate resource 
commitments on the part of the Member States of international organisations. As 
international organisations exist by the grace of their members’ willingness to pay 
for the fulfilment of the organisations’ tasks, Member States of the European 
security architecture should put their money where their (organisation’s) mouth is 





THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ACTIONS TOWARDS THE 
SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 






At the very beginning of the ‘Yugoslav’ crises, the European Communities, and 
later the European Union, were at the forefront of the international effort to stop 
the escalation of armed conflict. Despite Jacques Poos’ optimistic claim that ‘the 
hour of Europe ha[d] dawned,’1 the crisis arrived at the ‘wrong’ moment for the 
European Communities.2 The instruments through which the EC/EU could wield 
influence were primarily economic (e.g., suspension of trade and aid relations and 
sanctions), to a much lesser extent diplomatic and political (e.g., peace confer-
ences and shuttle diplomacy), but by no means military in nature.3 The lack of a 
comprehensive set of instruments to address the violent conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia may well explain why the autonomous efforts of the EC/EU were 
sometimes partially successful but generally failed miserably to attain their 
objectives.4 
The analysis in this chapter is devoted to the autonomous actions of the 
EC/EU during four successive stages of the Yugoslav wars. After the outbreak of 
war in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the EC spearheaded international efforts to 
find a peaceful solution to the conflict (section 2). This first stage is characterised 
by the adoption of a wide range of economic and political instruments. The 
                                                                                                                                               
*  This chapter is a revised and extended version of my contribution ‘The European Union’s 
Troubled Relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-2001)’, in J.W. de Zwaan, et al., 
eds., The European Union, an Ongoing Process of Integration: Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Keller-
mann (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2004) pp. 337-356. 
1 Declaration of J. Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, to the international press, 29 June 
1991. 
2 See T. de Wilde d’Estmael, La dimension politique des relations économiques extérieures de 
la Communauté européenne: sanctions et incitants économiques comme moyens de politique 
étrangère (Brussels, Émile Bruylant 1998) at pp. 282-283. 
3 The lopsided, unfinished structure of the European Union was a point of major criticism at the 
time. See, e.g., the legal analysis of D. Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe 
of Bits and Pieces’, 30 CML Rev. (1993) pp. 17-69. 
4 The literature on the European Union’s handling of the Yugoslav wars between 1991 and 1995 
is voluminous. Two of the more focused studies worth noting are S. Lucarelli, Europe and the 
Breakup of Yugoslavia. A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International 2000); and R. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics – 
Baptism by Fire (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001). 
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escalation of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) led the United Nations to 
take over from the EC in trying to coax the belligerent parties into a peace 
agreement. During the Bosnian war and in its aftermath, European involvement in 
the Yugoslav crises consisted primarily of supporting UN-adopted initiatives, 
instruments and activities. Nevertheless, some autonomous action towards the end 
of this second stage is worth pointing out (section 3). The third stage of EU action 
in the wars in the former Yugoslavia concerns the array of unilateral sanctions 
adopted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the crisis in Kosovo. 
These sanctions ran parallel to those adopted by the UN Security Council (section 
4). The ethnic conflict in Macedonia (2001) forms the last stage during which the 
European Union adopted new punitive measures to prevent the conflict from 
spreading and force the warring parties back to the negotiating table (section 5). 
The chapter closes with some concluding remarks (section 6). 
As most of the European Union’s (re)actions during the Yugoslav wars in-
volved the adoption and implementation of sanctions, a few preliminary remarks 
are appropriate. The legal debate on EC/EU sanctions has so far mostly revolved 
around the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, with a focus on 
the European Union’s decision-making powers and procedures in the field of 
economic and financial sanctions, in particular the separate roles of the Commu-
nity and its Member States.5 However, these aspects have more or less been 
settled with the incorporation of Articles 60 and 301 into the EC Treaty.6 The 
                                                                                                                                               
5 For an analysis of the problems encountered by the European Union and its Member States in 
this context, see, inter alia, S. Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the 
European Community’, 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 256-268; K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘The United 
Nations and the European Union: Living Apart Together’, in K. Wellens, ed., International Law: 
Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of E. Suy (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998) pp. 
439-458; D. Bethlehem, ‘Regional Interface between Security Council Decisions and Member States 
Implementation: The Example of the European Union’, in V. Gowlland-Debbas, ed., United Nations 
Sanctions and International Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2001) pp. 291-305; and the 
literature referred to in the next note. 
6 Art. 301 TEC reads: ‘Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted 
according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and 
security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, 
economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent 
measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.’ The 
article refers to CFSP measures adopted on the basis of Arts. 14 and 15 TEU. Art. 60(1) TEC reads: 
‘If, in the cases envisaged in Article 301, action by the Community is deemed necessary, the Council 
may, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 301, take the necessary urgent 
measures on the movement of capital and on payments as regards the third countries concerned.’ See 
P. Eeckhout, The External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 422-464. More recently, in the wake of a new wave of 
judgments of the European Court of Justice in a series of sanctions cases, see, inter alia, R. van Ooik 
and R. Wessel, ‘De Yusuf en Kadi-uitspraken in perspectief. Nieuwe verhoudingen in de interne en 
externe bevoegdheden van de Europese Unie’, 54 SEW (2006) pp. 230-241; M. Bulterman, 
‘Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Financial Sanction Regime: The Kadi and Yusuf 
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analysis in this chapter is limited to sanctions imposed autonomously by the 
European Union, that is to say, not as a derivative of the obligations resting upon 
the Member States to implement sanctions adopted at the level of the UN Security 
Council. The European Union’s own sanctions policies in dealing with the SFRY 
and its successor states since 1991 will be analysed and evaluated. The decisions 
to adopt sanctions will be briefly presented against their specific political back-
grounds. After a legal analysis of the sanctions, their impact will be evaluated. 
Sanctions imposed by EU Member State governments (individually or collec-




2. LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE EFFORTS (1991) 
 
2.1 Political objectives 
 
The first episode of the wars in the former Yugoslavia (between 27 June 1991 and 
11 January 1992) saw the lighting of the fuse in the wake of the declarations of 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia (both on 25 June 1991) and the escalation 
of hostilities after Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from the SFRY (on 20 December 
1991).8 In the absence of direct initiatives or involvement from the United 
Nations, NATO, the CSCE, the CoE and the United States at the outset of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities’, 19 LJIL (2006) pp. 753-772; 
P. Eeckhout, ‘External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, 
International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law – General Report’, presented at FIDE 
2006, at pp. 10-12 and 26-29, available at: <http://www.fide2006.org>; and by the Community 
Rapporteur at FIDE 2006, M. Cremona, ‘External Relations of the EU and the Member States: 
Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law’, 
EUI Working Papers (2006/22) at pp. 12-13 and 33-36. 
7 Examples of such individual sanctions are various orders enacted by the United Kingdom to 
prohibit exports to Serbia and Montenegro, including the Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations 
Sanctions) Order 1992, which broadly covered the same ground as Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
1432/92 of 1 June 1992 prohibiting trade between the European Economic Community and the 
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, OJ 1992 L 205/2; and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3534/92 
of 7 December 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1432/92 prohibiting trade between the 
European Economic Community and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, OJ 1992 L 358/16. 
For a judicial consideration of the issues that arose as a result of the overlapping nature of these 
measures, the respective obligations to act in implementation of sanctions by the Community and its 
Member States and the relationship between the two sets of measures in the event that both apply, 
see the judgments of the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Searle and Others, 3 CMLR (1995) p. 196; 
of the English High Court in R. v. HM Treasury and Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com Srl, 1 
CMLR (1994) p. 109; and of the ECJ in Cases C-124/95 R. v. HM Treasury and Bank of England, ex 
parte Centro-Com Srl [1997] ECR I-81; and C-177/95 Ebony Maritime SA v. Prefetto Della 
Provincia di Brindisi [1997] ECR I-1111. 
8 For references to the literature, see chapter 1. 
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war, the EC found itself sitting alone in the front row to address this new situa-
tion, a problem of considerable political magnitude and complexity.9 The EC 
assumed leadership and responsibility and tried to call a halt to the conflict by 
imposing a comprehensive solution on the warring parties. It sent a troika to 
Belgrade and Zagreb that secured a ceasefire accord by threatening the belliger-
ents to block trade and withdraw the economic aid of which the SFRY was a 
major beneficiary.10 It was the success of this first European intervention in the 
Slovenian crisis which led Jacques Poos to make the boast that would haunt him 
forever, for it soon proved that the assurances that the troika had received in 
Belgrade and Zagreb were the first of a long series of (dis)illusions. The fighting 
in Slovenia and Croatia continued and forced the Community to follow up on its 
threat. 
On 5 July 1991 the European Communities suspended the second and third 
protocols to the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the SFRY.11 
The Member States also imposed an arms embargo against Yugoslavia and 
appealed to others (the CSCE, the United States and the United Nations) to follow 
suit, which they did.12 The adoption of these sanctions and intensive diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                               
9 In a certain way, it seems that the international community had delegated the task of bringing 
peace to the Balkans to the Europeans. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, did not want to put the matter to the Security Council, fearing that an intervention of the 
United Nations would be perceived as ‘une sorte d’ingérence dans les efforts européens.’ Reported in 
Agence Europe, No. 5527, 4 July 1991. See a similar comment made by Thomas Pickering, the US 
ambassador to the United Nations at the time, reported in Le Monde of 5 July 1991: ‘Les Etats-Unis 
n’ont aucun rôle à jouer en Yougoslavie, sauf si les efforts des Européens échouaient.’ More 
generally, see O. Rehn, ‘The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe’, Sussex 
Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, No. 6 (July 1994). 
10  A declaration of the European Council, which was strangely enough only published in Agence 
Europe, No. 5523, 29 June 1991, served as the mandate for the troika. The content of the declaration 
was supposed to have been presented to the Yugoslav authorities to make it absolutely clear what the 
European stance towards the crisis was. The text closed with the statement that ‘in anticipation of an 
improvement of the situation, the European Council suspends all Community and national aid 
(assistance) to Yugoslavia.’ Despite the affirmative tone of the declaration, the text should not be 
interpreted in too positivistic a manner. It did not suggest an immediate executorial title but 
constituted a threat that, if the troika’s mission would fail, financial cooperation with Yugoslavia 
would be suspended. Hanging as a sword of Damocles above the federal authorities’ heads, 
economic coercion was applied to force the Yugoslavs to accept three European demands: respect for 
a ceasefire accompanied by the return of all militaries to their barracks; a moratorium of three 
months on rendering effect to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia to facilitate 
dialogue between all the parties to the conflict; and the lifting of the Serbian reservation against the 
election of a Croat (Stipe Mesić) to the Presidency of the Federation. 
11  See infra section 2.2.1. 
12  Ibid. The United States endorsed the EC arms embargo on 8 July 1991. At its meeting in 
Prague on 3-4 September 1991, the CSCE also called for an embargo on weapons and military 
equipment against all parties to the conflict. It was only on 25 September that the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 713 (1991) imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and calling for the 
immediate cessation of hostilities. 
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pressure led the parties to sign an effective ceasefire agreement for Slovenia on 
the island of Brioni, Tito’s idyllic retreat in the Adriatic. The Brioni Accord of 7 
July was hailed as a triumph of European diplomacy, but it left every important 
item of contention unresolved, pending a three-month cooling-off period.13 By 
turning its offensive against Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia’s 
‘federal’ army (JNA) tore the heart right out of the proud, confident, new Europe. 
A pattern of negotiated ceasefires facilitated by EC mediation – and mostly 
broken by the Serb-dominated JNA – was accompanied by a series of threats by 
the European Communities to impose economic sanctions on Serbia and recog-
nise the other republics seeking independence.14 In response to the factions’ 
failure to honour the ceasefires and accept the comprehensive peace plan tabled 
by the European Communities at the Conference on Yugoslavia, which was held 
at The Hague in October 1991,15 the twelve Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 8 
November decided to unilaterally suspend all coordinated assistance to and 
relations with Yugoslavia, including the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between 
the EEC and the SFRY.16 
It was obvious that, with the latter, the aim of the European Communities was 
not merely to economically sanction the country, or rather those parts of the 
Federation supporting the war, but to take account of the factual dissolution of 
Yugoslavia as a state. This observation is confirmed by a tangible demonstration of 
                                                                                                                                               
13  For the text of the Brioni Accord, see 30 ILM (1991). 
14  See EPC Statements of 6 August 1991 (EPC, No. P 73/91) and 27 August 1991 (EPC, No. P 
82/91), followed by some sort of ultimatum on 6 October 1991 (EPC, No. P 98/91) and the final 
ultimatum on 28 October 1991 (EPC, No. P 106/91). 
15  See infra section 2.5. 
16  See EPC Statement of 8 November 1991, Bull. EC 11-1991, point 1.4.4. For the punitive 
measures, see infra nn. 27-29. The Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the SFRY was 
signed in Belgrade on 2 April 1980 and approved on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 341/83 of 24 January 1983 on the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1983 L 41/1. 
See Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1983 L 41/2; Protocol 1 on the products referred to in Article 15 of the 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1983 L 41/28; Protocol 2 on financial cooperation between the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community, OJ 1983 L 41/37; Protocol 
3 of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ 
and methods of administrative cooperation, OJ 1983 L 41/39. The Cooperation Agreement had 
already been given effect in 1980 thanks to the entry into force of an Interim Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on trade and trade 
cooperation, OJ 1980 L 130/2. Related instruments concerned sectoral agreements entered into by 
the EEC and the SFRY for sheep meat, goat meat and textiles. Finally, relations were defined by the 
mixed Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, of the other part, OJ 1983 L 41/113. 
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support for those republics in favour of the EC peace initiative. Firstly, in their 
statement of 6 October 1991, the twelve Foreign Ministers expressed their intention 
to apply a differentiated treatment to the different parties to the conflict, which 
‘inevitably’ led to the recognition of those republics wishing to be independent and 
the adoption of restrictive measures against those parties that continued to flout the 
desire of the other Yugoslav parties for a successful outcome of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia.17 Secondly, on 2 December 1991, the EC restored trade links, the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and economic and financial aid terms vis-
à-vis all Yugoslav republics, except Serbia and Montenegro.18 And thirdly, on the 
morning of 17 December, eleven Ministers of Foreign Affairs succumbed to what 
amounted to an ultimatum by their German colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher and 
agreed to invite those republics seeking diplomatic recognition to submit applica-
tions by 24 December or else lose the opportunity.19 Four republics (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia) rose to the occasion and requested 
to be recognised as sovereign states. On 11 January 1992, the EC’s Arbitration 
Commission, charged with the task of deciding on these applications, opined that 
two out of the four republics (Macedonia and Slovenia) met all the criteria to be 
recognised as new states.20 The political impact of these measures on the dissolution 
of and the war in the former Yugoslavia was significant, because EC action isolated 
and punished the Serb/Montenegrin-dominated federal authorities in Belgrade. It 
also ended the sole European stewardship of the international efforts to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict in Croatia, because the EC had to acknowledge 
the collapse of the peace talks in The Hague as well as Serbia’s distrust of the EC as 
a mediator. 
                                                                                                                                               
17  EPC Statement of 6 October 1991 (EPC, No. P 98/91), Bull. EC 10-1991, point 1.4.7. This 
view is supported by H.-D. Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin, Siedler Verlag 1995) at p. 954: 
‘unvermeidlichen Konsequenz.’ See also European Parliament, Rapport de la commission politique 
sur la proposition relative à une décision concernant la dénonciation de l’accord de coopération 
entre la CEE et la RSFY, Rapporteur: Cassanmagnago Ceretti, Doc. A3-0323/91, 18 November 
1991, at p. 6: ‘Le Parlement estime par ailleurs que le raisonnement qui est à la base de la décision du 
Conseil, à savoir la dissolution de la Yougoslavie en tant que telle […].’ One has to point out, 
however, that at the moment of the Community’s decision to suspend all coordinated assistance and 
cooperation, no Yugoslav republic had been recognised by third states. This means that the Council’s 
attitude has pushed forward the dissolution of the SFRY. 
18  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3567/91 of 2 December 1991 concerning the arrangements 
applicable to the import of products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia, OJ 1991 L 342/1. 
19  While some states – notably Britain and the United States – argued that premature recognition 
could derail the peace process, political opinion in Germany was contemptuous. Bonn argued that the 
peace process had been derailed already – by Belgrade. Genscher made it clear that if the EC did not 
move towards recognition, then Germany would break ranks and recognise some of the republics 
(especially Croatia and Slovenia) unilaterally. Needless to say that this was a bitter blow to the spirit 
of common purpose which had prevailed during the pre-Maastricht IGC. 
20  See infra section 2.6. 
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2.2 Economic and financial instruments 
 
2.2.1 Arms embargo, suspension and termination of aid and trade relations 
 
Very soon after the conflict broke out in Slovenia on 27 June 1991, the EC 
decided on a first set of economic measures designed to influence the Yugoslav 
parties. At their meeting of 5 July 1991, the twelve Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
decided upon an embargo on armaments and military equipment applicable to the 
whole of Yugoslavia.21 The arms embargo was not the EC’s but the Member 
States’ competence.22 What did fall into the shared competence of the Communi-
ties and the Member States was the suspension of the second financial protocol 
with Yugoslavia.23 The EC and the Member States expressed the hope that a 
normalisation of the situation would permit them to resuscitate the financial 
protocols ‘so as to contribute to the indispensable recovery of the country.’24 
Despite the fact that the war in Slovenia lasted for ‘only’ ten days, the political 
problems at the federal level remained unresolved. In fact, the JNA, which had 
intervened in Slovenia on the pretext that it was defending the unity of the SFRY 
against secessionist forces, was now openly and indisputably fighting for territory 
for the Serbs outside Serbia. In Croatia, it stood behind the Serb paramilitary 
forces that were engaged in a land grab to extend the territory of the self-
proclaimed ‘Serb Autonomous Oblast of Krajina’. In this situation, PHARE 
cooperation was stopped, ipso facto in the summer and formally in the autumn of 
1991.25 Belgrade tried to prevent the suspension of financial aid under the 
PHARE programme. In a note verbale sent to the European Commission on 22 
August 1991, it stated that 
 
                                                                                                                                               
21  See EPC Statement of 5 July 1991 (EPC, No. P 61/90), Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.3. 
22  See C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty’, in P. Manin, et al., eds., 
Mélanges offerts à Pierre-Henri Teitgen (Paris, Editions Pédone 1984). 
23  The application of the Second Financial Protocol (the engagement of remaining amounts 
worth 100 million ECU) was suspended, while the Council never transmitted the proposal for a 
Council decision on the conclusion of the Third Financial Protocol for the years 1991 to 1995, 
published as SEC/91/796 final in OJ 1991 C 134/5, to the European Parliament to obtain its opinion. 
For the financial consequences, see Agence Europe, No. 5523, 29 June 1991. 
24  EPC Statement of 5 July 1991, Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.3. 
25  XXVth General Report, 1991, point 818. The PHARE programme, which provided 35 million 
ECU in grants for technical assistance in the financial sector and for an enterprise reform programme 
in Yugoslavia, was suspended by an internal decision of the Community, despite the fact that 
Yugoslavia was still included in the regime laid down in Regulation (EEC) No. 2698/90 of 17 
September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 in order to extend the economic aid to 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, OJ 1990 L 257/1. In the end, this money was never 
used for the above-mentioned purposes; some of it was spent for humanitarian purposes (8.5 million 
ECU) and environmental projects (6 million ECU). 
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PHARE carries sizeable political importance as it brings benefits to all parts of 
Yugoslavia. It also enhances the stature of the Federal Government at the presently 
delicate moment.26 
 
In response to the parties’ failure to respect the ceasefires and accept the peace 
plan tabled by the EC in October 1991, the European Communities on 11 
November unilaterally suspended the trade concessions provided for by the 1980 
Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the SFRY, the application of the 
agreement and related protocols and instruments, as well as the trade concessions 
provided for by and the application of the Agreement on ECSC Products between 
the Communities, their Member States and the SFRY.27 It removed Yugoslavia 
from the lists of beneficiaries of the Community’s GSP for 1991 for both EEC 
and ECSC products.28 and restored quantitative restrictions on imports of Yugo-
slav textiles.29 The representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council of 11 November 1991, also denounced the Agreement 
between the Member States of the ECSC and the SFRY, on the basis of Article 15 
                                                                                                                                               
26  Cited in D. Lopandić, ‘The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis (1989-1992) – 
Some Issues of International Law’, 41 Jugoslovenska Revija za Medunarodno Pravo (1994) pp. 311-
349 at p. 316. 
27  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3300/91 of 11 November 1991 suspending the trade conces-
sions provided for by the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 L 315/1 (based on Art. 113 TEEC; now Art. 
133 TEC); Decision No. 91/588/ECSC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council of 11 November 1991 suspending the trade concessions provided 
for by the Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 L 315/49; and Decision No. 91/586/ECSC, 
EEC of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council of 11 November 1991 suspending the application of the Agreements between the 
European Community, its Member States and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 
L 315/47. This decision sui generis does not mention a legal basis but refers to the EPC Statements 
of 5, 6, and 28 October 1991 in which the EPC states the existence of a ‘crisis in Yugoslavia.’ For 
the legality of this decision under public international law, see infra section 2.2.4. 
28  Decision No. 91/589/ECSC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council of 11 November 1991 withdrawing Yugoslavia from the list of 
beneficiaries of the Community generalized tariff preferences scheme for 1991, OJ 1991 L 315/50; 
and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3302/91 of 11 November 1991 withdrawing Yugoslavia from the 
lists of beneficiaries of the Community generalized tariff preferences scheme for 1991, OJ 1991 L 
315/46. 
29  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3301/91 of 11 November 1991 on the arrangements for im-
ports of certain textile products originating in Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 L 315/3. This regulation replaced 
the supplementary protocol covering the trade in textile products, negotiated in 1986 and published 
in the wake of Council Decision 90/649/EEC of 24 September 1990 concerning the conclusion of a 
supplementary protocol to the cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on trade in textile products, OJ 1990 L 352/120. 
The adoption of the replacement regulation was necessary to unilaterally reimpose quantitative 
quotas on imports. 
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of this agreement.30 One-and-a-half weeks later, after having received the assent 
of the European Parliament,31 the Council finally formally denounced the Coop-
eration Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia, on the basis of Article 60 of 
this agreement.32 The agreement ceased to be applicable only six months later, on 
26 May 1992. Diplomatic relations were maintained. 
In more than one respect, the sanctions represented a precedent in the EC’s 
practice: 
 
- for the first time in the Community’s history, a Cooperation Agreement with a 
third country (based on Art. 238 TEEC; new Art. 310 TEC) was denounced; 
- it was the first time that the EC opted to suspend, almost immediately (within 
twenty-four hours), all aspects of its relations with a third country, including 
the trade regime; and 
- the peculiar situation developed whereby different trade or financial sanctions 
were applied vis-à-vis different parts of the same state. 
 
Each of these points will now be dealt with in more detail. 
 
2.2.2 Re-establishing trade relations with those republics supporting peace 
 
In a move to single out those whom it regarded as the instigators of the armed 
aggression against Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the opponents to its peace 
plans, the European Communities on 2 December 1991 – retroactively.33 – re-
established the trade concessions granted by the former Cooperation Agreement 
                                                                                                                                               
30  Decision No. 91/587/ECSC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council of 11 November 1991 denouncing the Agreement between the Member 
States of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
OJ 1991 L 315/48. 
31  The decision was delayed because the legal basis of the agreement (Art. 238 TEEC; new Art. 
310 TEC) required the assent of the European Parliament, which was delivered on 20 November 
1991 after a discussion of the Cassanmagnago Ceretti Report (see supra n. 17). On the legal basis of 
the EEC-SFRY Cooperation Agreement, see C. Flaesch-Mougin in his chronicles on the external 
accords of the EEC, 20 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (1984) p. 467 and 26 RTDE (1990) at 
pp. 89 and 92. 
32  Council Decision 91/602/EEC of 25 November 1991 denouncing the Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 
1991 L 325/23. See infra section 2.2.4. 
33  As of 15 November 1991, the date on which the restrictive measures against the whole of 
Yugoslavia entered into force. A reasoning is given by D. Lopandić, ‘Un exemple de sanctions 
économiques de la CEE: Suspension/dénonciation de l’accord de coopération entre la CEE et la 
Yougoslavie’, Revue des Affaires Européennes (1992) pp. 67-72 at n. 12: ‘L’application rétroactive 
des préférences a cet avantage de rendre d’avance sans intérêt une éventuelle action en justice des 
entreprises touchées (dans la Communauté) sur la question de la légalité des sanctions communau-
taires.’ 
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in favour of all Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Montenegro.34 The basic 
provision of Regulation (EEC) No. 3567/91 was that the imports from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia into the Communities were 
admitted without quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect 
and exempt from customs duties and taxes having equivalent effect.35 The 
exceptions to this rule were provided in the annexes to the Regulation.36 The 
regulation was in a way incomplete, because it was adopted at the end of the year 
and only concerned the trade regime for 1991. At the same time, the Council 
called on the Commission to restore the PHARE programme and to use the 
remaining 100 million ECU from the Second Financial Protocol to finance 
projects in the four republics.37 However, due to technical reasons, those last 
measures were not applied in practice.38 
Despite the fact that the Council stated that the adoption of Regulation (EEC) 
No. 3567/91 was without prejudice to the question of the recognition of the 
recipient republics, it was clear that the European Communities had de facto 
accepted the final dismemberment of the SFRY and the recognition of its succes-
sor states. It was a unique case in EC practice to grant specific trade treatment to 
products originating from different parts of the same country. In fact, this 
constituted a flagrant violation, inter alia, of the non-discrimination principle laid 
down in Article 57 of the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and SFRY.39 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3567/91 was soon thereafter replaced by another set of 
regulations and decisions covering 1992, adding tariff ceilings and Community 
surveillance for imports of certain agricultural and industrial products originating 
in the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro.40 The inclusion of Montenegro in the list of republics ‘contribut[ing] 
[…] to the furtherance of a peaceful solution to the conflict’ served to further 
isolate Serbia.41 
At the beginning of 1992, it was possible, for a while, to believe that interna-
tional mediation and the measures spearheaded by the EC were actually producing 
                                                                                                                                               
34  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3567/91 of 2 December 1991 concerning the arrangements 
applicable to the import of products originating in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia, OJ 1992 L 342/1. 
35  Art. 1, equivalent to Art. 15 of the Cooperation Agreement. 
36  Excluded from the re-establishment of concessions were certain agricultural and industrial 
products. These became subject to new tariff ceilings. 
37  See Council Communication No. 9558/91 (Presse 220-G), 2 December 1991. 
38  See Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 319. 
39  This is a reason why the whole Cooperation Agreement was suspended. 
40  Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 545-548/92 of 3 February 1992, OJ 1992 L 63/1-49; and 
Decisions Nos. 92/150-151/ECSC of 3 February 1992, OJ 1992 L 63/50-66. 
41  EPC Declaration of 10 January 1992, Bull. EC 1-1992, point 1.5.8. 
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positive effects and that the conflict was heading towards appeasement: the 
ceasefire was holding in Croatia. On 7 April 1992, in the same declaration 
recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, the European Communities even 
decided to extend to Serbia the benefits of the ‘positive measures’ granted to the 
other republics.42 However, this decision was never implemented because the war 
escalated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
While the arms embargo of 5 July 1991 remained in place against all succes-
sor states of the former Yugoslavia, no further sanctions were adopted against 
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the years to follow, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is to say, the federation of Serbia and 
Montenegro (including Kosovo), was the main target for international sanctions, 
as it was seen as the main instigator for armed conflict on the territory of the 
former SFRY. 
 
2.2.3 Effects of the measures 
 
The immediate effect of the measures adopted on and soon after 5 July 1991 was 
that Yugoslavia lost all tariff and other preferences applied to imports into the 
EC. The suspension of the Cooperation Agreement had automatically produced 
the suspension of all activities of cooperation, protocols or other actions under-
taken on the basis of the agreement. Apart from its economic impact, the 
decisions dealt a heavy political blow to the international position of Yugoslavia 
and in particular Serbia, which by then had commandeered the emptied shell of 
the federal Yugoslav government.43 As mentioned before, it was obvious that the 
aim of the EC was not only to economically sanction a country – as was the case 
in some earlier examples of EC sanctions.44 – but to take account of the factual 
dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state. 
 
2.2.4 Legality under public international law 
 
The Federal Government of Yugoslavia reacted twice to the measures adopted by 
the EC, asking it to ‘reconsider’ its decisions. By a note verbale of 28 November 
1991, the Yugoslav government stated that the termination of the agreements 
constituted ‘a unilateral implementation of economic sanctions in violation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
42  Bull. EC 4-1992, point 1.5.4. 
43  Apart from Serbia, only Montenegro and Bosnia were represented in the Federal Government. 
See V. Bojičić and D. Dyker, ‘Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel’, Sussex Working 
Papers in Contemporary European Studies, No. 1 (June 1993). 
44  Cf., the sanction regimes against Greece (1967) and Turkey (1980). See J. Pertek, ‘Les sanc-
tions politiques à objet économique prises par la CEE à l’encontre des Etats tiers’, 26 Revue du 
Marché Commun (1983) p. 205. 
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universally recognized norms of international law […]. [These measures] will 
lead to the weakening of Yugoslavia, internally and internationally […].’45 In a 
second note verbale of 23 December 1991, the Federal Government asked the 
EEC to convene an extraordinary meeting of the EEC-Yugoslavia Cooperation 
Council in order to examine the economic and political consequences of the 
measures adopted by the Community.46 The Community did not reply to either of 
these notes, as it did not consider itself, at that stage, bound by the Cooperation 
Agreement.47 But was the Community’s decision to combine the immediate 
suspension of the entire Cooperation Agreement (the political objective) and its 
termination in a period of six months (the contractual clause in the agreement) 
justified under international law? 
While the termination of the Cooperation Agreement was foreseen in Article 
60, nothing in the agreement permitted its immediate and total suspension.48 
Such suspension could therefore be justified only by general rules of interna-
tional law allowing a deviation from the traditional canon of pacta sunt 
servanda. Of course, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides for some exceptional means for the suspension and termination of 
treaties: Article 61 mentions ‘the impossibility to execute the treaty’, Article 62 
talks about a ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ (rebus sic stantibus) and 
Article 65 sets up a procedure concerning the termination or suspension of a 
treaty.49 
The European Communities and their Member States based their decision of 
11 November 1991 to immediately suspend the EEC-SFRY Cooperation 
Agreement (and related protocols and instruments), as well as the Agreement on 
ECSC Products, on two international legal elements. First, they invoked UN 
Security Council resolution 713 (1991), which expressed the concern that the 
continuation of the situation in Yugoslavia would constitute ‘a threat to interna-
tional peace and security’. While this is a somewhat ambiguous reference to 
Article 39 of the UN Charter, the resolution in no way mentioned the possibility 
of economic or legal sanctions (Art. 41 UN Charter), at least not in the way 
envisaged by the European Communities and their Member States. The only 
explicit reference to the provisions of chapter VII relates to the imposition of an 
arms embargo in paragraph 6 of the resolution. However, had the Security 
                                                                                                                                               
45  Cited in Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 319. 
46  Ibid. 
47  This was the main reason why the EEC suspended not just the commercial parts but the Co-
operation Agreement as a whole. 
48  Art. 60 reads as follows: ‘This agreement is concluded for an unlimited period. Either Con-
tracting Party may denounce this Agreement by notifying the other Contracting Party. This 
Agreement shall cease to apply six months after the date of such notification.’ 
49  8 ILM (1969) p. 679. 
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Council wanted to rupture the economic and financial relations of states with the 
SFRY in September 1991, it would have sufficed to add a few simple words to 
that paragraph. Secondly, Decision No. 91/586/ECSC, EEC stated in its pream-
ble that ‘the pursuit of hostilities and their consequences on their economic and 
trade relations, both between the Republics of Yugoslavia and with the European 
Community, constitute a radical change in the conditions under which the 
Cooperation Agreement […] and its Protocols, as well as the Agreement 
concerning the European Coal and Steel Community, were concluded,’ which 
‘call into question the application of such Agreements and Protocols.’50 The only 
further justification for the denunciation of the Cooperation Agreement, men-
tioned in Council Decision No. 91/602/EEC of 25 November 1991, was that ‘the 
situation prevailing in Yugoslavia no longer permits the above-mentioned 
Agreement and the related instruments to be upheld.’51 While the Communities 
and their Member States did not explicitly mention the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention, the language used leaves no doubt that the clauses on ‘change of 
circumstances’ (Art. 62) and ‘impossibility of execution’ (Art. 61) of the Vienna 
Convention were implicitly invoked. 
The EEC-SFRY Cooperation Agreement was a typical example of a mixed 
agreement, concluded between the SFRY, on the one hand, and the EEC and its 
Member States, on the other. While the 1969 Vienna Convention was concluded 
to govern treaties agreed to between states, it does not apply to treaties con-
cluded between states and international organisations. The latter are the subject 
of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations.52 Although 
the 1986 Convention is not yet in force, there can be little doubt that its provi-
sions, which are only slight modifications to the rules of the 1969 Convention to 
take into account the different nature of international organisations,53 are 
generally accepted as applicable law.54 Moreover, it flows from Article 3(b) of 
the 1969 Convention that, in so far as the rules of the Convention reflect the 
                                                                                                                                               
50  Preamble to Decision No. 91/586/ECSC, EEC of the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 11 November 1991 suspending the 
application of the Agreements between the European Community, its Member States and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 L 315/47. 
51  Preamble to Council Decision (EEC) No. 91/602 of 25 November 1991 denouncing the Co-
operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1991 L 325/23. 
52  25 ILM (1986) p. 543. 
53  The first seventy-two articles deal with the same subjects as Arts. 1-72 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention. 
54  See P. Manin, ‘The EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations’, 24 CML Rev. (1987) p. 457 et 
seq. 
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rules of customary international law applicable to treaties with international 
organisations, they will apply.55 
The principle, recognised by domestic law, that a person may no longer be 
bound by a contract if there has been a fundamental change in circumstances 
which existed at the time it was signed, has been frequently abused in the past, 
particularly between the two World Wars. The use of the conditions under which 
the rebus sic stantibus clause could be invoked in international relations has thus 
always raised strong arguments, both in practice and in legal doctrine.56 The most 
widely accepted mode of terminating treaties was denunciation by one of the 
contracting parties. However, in this field it was questionable if and under what 
circumstances a state could denounce a treaty when the right of denunciation was 
not provided for in the treaty itself. One of the major advances made in the 1969 
Vienna Convention were the strictly defined (cumulative) conditions under 
which the principle of rebus sic stantibus may be invoked. In particular, it was 
clarified in Article 62(1) that to warrant recourse to the clause, 
 
[a] fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those 
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the 
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the 
treaty unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still 
to be performed under the treaty. 
 
The concept has been invoked many times, has been recognised by treaties and 
has been applied by an international tribunal. In its 1997 Gabčíkovo judgment (in 
which the principal treaty at issue predated the entry into force of the 1969 
Convention for the parties to the case), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
brushed aside the question of possible non-applicability of the Convention’s 
rules to questions of termination and suspension of treaties and applied Articles 
60-62 as reflecting customary international law, even though they had been 
considered rather controversial.57 
                                                                                                                                               
55  See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2003) at p. 8. 
56  See O. Lissitzyn, ‘Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus)’, 61 AJIL 
(1967) p. 895 et seq. 
57  Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, at 7, paras. 42-46 and 
99. See also the judgment of the ICJ in Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v. Iceland.), ICJ 
Reports 1973, at 3, para. 36: ‘[t]his principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it is subject, 
have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in 
many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject of the 
termination of a treaty relationship on account of change of circumstances.’ 
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In the case at hand – the suspension and denunciation of the EEC-SFRY Co-
operation Agreement – it is hard to shake off a serious suspicion of the arbitrary 
application of the clause. Was there truly a radical change in the nature of the 
obligations of the Community towards Yugoslavia? The fact that the EEC, soon 
after the suspension, unilaterally – and retroactively – re-established the essence 
of trade concessions towards four of the Yugoslav republics suggests that it was 
possible to execute the (trade) obligations of the Cooperation Agreement and that 
the nature of the obligations had not changed.58 Moreover, it is difficult to accept 
that only a change in political circumstances would be sufficient to invoke the 
clause without a simultaneous change in international legal conditions. At the 
time of the suspension of the Cooperation Agreement, the SFRY was still the 
only international subject of its territory, and the so-called ‘Badinter Arbitration 
Commission’59 had not yet opined that the SFRY was in a state of dissolution. 
Even in the case of a very serious disturbance of the political and constitutional 
order of a country, it is doubtful that this single fact opens up the possibility to 
other states and international organisations to suspend or immediately repudiate 
their international obligations. After all, the ICJ has made it clear in its Gabčík-
ovo judgment that the stability of treaty relations requires that Article 62 VCLT 
be applied only in the most exceptional of circumstances.60 Otherwise it could be 
used as an excuse to evade all sorts of inconvenient treaty obligations. Another 
question is whether the rebus sic stantibus clause could be used together with the 
denunciation clause of Article 60 of the Cooperation Agreement. It seems that, in 
this case, the changed circumstances doctrine would be acceptable only if there 
was absolute material or legal impossibility for a party to execute some of the 
obligations of the agreement. It would be unacceptable to use Article 62 only in 
order to hasten the termination of a treaty or indeed the situation on the ground. 
In spite of the above-mentioned suspicions, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in its Racke judgment of 16 June 1998 upheld Council Decision No. 
91/586/ECSC, EEC.61 The ECJ accepted that, since the changed conditions in 
Yugoslavia could amount to a fundamental change of circumstances, in adopting 
the decision, the Council of Ministers had not made ‘a manifest error of assess-
ment.’62 However, the Court approached the matter as one of judicial review, and 
the Article 62 point was not dealt with in much depth. The ECJ said, in effect, 
                                                                                                                                               
58  It should be noted that, apart from trade obligations, the rights of Yugoslav workers living in 
the EEC were also directly based on the Cooperation Agreement and therefore suspended. 
59  See infra section 2.6. 
60  Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ Reports 1997, at 7, para. 104. 
61  ECJ, Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655. 
62  Ibid., at para. 56. 
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that the Council had not been clearly wrong; it also did not say that the Council 
had been right to apply to principle.63 
Whatever the case may be, a serious problem was that the suspension covered 
not only trade parts of the Cooperation Agreement but also the articles concern-
ing the settlement of disputes, that is to say, the procedural requirements for the 
suspension and termination of the agreement.64 The European Communities 
ignored Yugoslavia’s requests for consultations under the provisions of the 
bilateral agreement as well as under Article 65 VCLT.65 Instead, a political 
compromise was struck because certain Member States preferred to keep six 
months’ room for manoeuvre through the application of the denunciation 
clause.66 This led to a contradiction of legal solutions, whereby Regulation 
(EEC) No. 3300/91 and Decision No. 91/586/ECSC, EEC did not sit easily with 
the Council decisions denouncing the agreements (91/602/EEC and 
91/597/ECSC) even if they were adopted simultaneously: the suspension of the 
agreements should logically lead towards the non-application of the denunciation 
(or revocation) clause; conversely, the denunciation of the agreements, which 
would take effect after six months, would be contrary to the logic and the 
justification of the decisions to immediately suspend the same agreements. 
The logic adopted by the EC, if generalised, was dangerous because it could 
have produced anarchy in international (treaty) relations and could have harmed 
the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.67 It is, however, possible to 
imagine that from the point of view of the European Communities and their 
Member States, the October 1991 Hague Conference on Yugoslavia was already 
the appropriate conciliatory forum. By the same logic, the delay given to the 
parties to accept the conference proposals could be considered as the appropriate 
delay of the notice of the suspension of the Cooperation Agreement. But all this 
is not very convincing. Posterior international practice implicitly acknowledges 
the doubtful method used by the Communities and their Member States in the 
case of the immediate suspension of the EEC-SFRY agreements. In agreements 
concluded with the new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe, an 
                                                                                                                                               
63  See J. Kokott and F. Hoffmeister, ‘ECJ, Case C-162/96, A. Racke & Co. v. Hauptzollamt 
Mainz’, 93 AJIL (1999) pp. 205-209. 
64  Art. 56 foresees consultations in the framework of the Cooperation Council and an arbitration 
procedure. 
65  See Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 338. Art. 65 excludes the right to an absolutely unlimited 
right to unilateral termination of a treaty and provides for (i) the notification of the other parties to 
the treaty of the intent to suspend the treaty; (ii) a three-month period for reply of the other parties; 
(iii) a settlement procedure; and (iv) a compulsory conciliation procedure. 
66  See Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 33, at p. 67, n. 35. 
67  Ibid., at n. 42: ‘La logique appliquée par la Communauté conduirait en effet à permettre à tout 
État tiers de se délier immédiatement de toute obligation envers la Yougoslavie qui est pourtant 
restée l’État universellement reconnu. Ceci introduirait un élément d’anarchie juridique dans les 
relations entre les États et porterait préjudice même aux successeurs éventuels de l’État yougoslave.’ 
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explicit provision was included concerning the possibility of immediate suspen-
sion of the agreement if there would be a breach of its ‘essential elements’.68 
 
2.3 Joint statements  
 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) has been the principal institutional 
framework in which the twelve Member States tried to coordinate their positions 
and actions.69 They used all existing instruments to exert influence over the 
parties to the conflicts, namely EPC declarations and troika visits. As the crisis 
continued, the Twelve progressively brought into play more specific instruments, 
such as a monitoring mission, an international peace conference and an arbitration 
commission. 
Article 30 of the Single European Act had codified the practice of joint diplo-
matic actions of the Twelve. During the crises over the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
the EPC produced a considerable number of joint statements during the 1991-
1992 period (twenty-one statements in 1991 and twenty-four in 1992). Despite 
this activity, the positions of the Member States were often different and even 
opposed. While the majority of Member States favoured a cautious and well-
balanced approach, Germany pressed hard in order to satisfy Slovenia’s and 
Croatia’s desire to be internationally recognised. These differences are reflected 
in the changing positions within the EPC during 1991.70 In a few important 
statements, one can see the evolution of the positions adopted by the EC: 
 
(a) United Yugoslavia: The EPC Joint Statement of 26 March 1991 said that ‘[i]n 
the view of the Twelve, a united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best 
chance to integrate itself in the new Europe.’71 The same formula was repeated 
in several declarations, but as of July 1991, the Twelve dropped the concept of 
‘unity’ and started talking about the future organisation of Yugoslavia. 
(b) New situation: Following the outbreak of war in Slovenia, the Hague Joint 
Statement of 5 July 1991 stated that ‘in Yugoslavia all parties concerned accept 
the reality that a new situation has arisen’ and that the future of Yugoslavia 
                                                                                                                                               
68  See, e.g., Arts. 2 and 127 of the 1996 Europe Agreement with the Republic of Slovenia, OJ 
1999 L 51/3. For essential elements clauses in the new contractual relations with the states of the 
Western Balkans, see chapter 5. 
69  On the EPC, see A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels, eds., European Political Coop-
eration in the 1980s – A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1988); S. Nutall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992); and T. 
Jürgens, Die gemeinsame Europäische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Cologne, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag 1994). 
70  For more details, see M. Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Social-
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 86 AJIL (1992) pp. 569-607. 
71  Bull. EC 3-1991, point 1.4.6. 
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should be based on the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the 
Paris Charter for a new Europe, in particular respect for human rights, includ-
ing rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination in 
conformity with the Charter of the UN and with the relevant norms of inter-
national law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states (Charter 
of Paris).72 
 
The EPC Joint Statement of 19 September clearly expressed the basic prin-
ciples of the EC in the crisis: 
 
(i) the unacceptability of the use of force; 
(ii) the unacceptability of any change of borders by force; 
(iii) respect for the rights of all who live in Yugoslavia, including minorities; 
(iv) the need to take account of all legitimate concerns and aspirations.73 
 
(c) Recognition of independence: The recognition of the Yugoslav republics 
was, for the first time, publicly envisaged in a Joint Statement of 6 October 
1991, which linked recognition to the end of a negotiating process and to the 
question of minorities: 
 
At the meeting of 4 October, it was agreed that a political solution should be 
sought in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those repub-
lics wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith 
and involving all parties. The right to self-determination of all the peoples of 
Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of 
ethnic minorities within the individual republics.74 
 
(d) Immediate recognition: Two-and-a-half months later, the EC decided to 
recognise any Yugoslav republic that requested recognition, after the ac-
complishment of some preliminary procedures for arbitration. Two declara-
tions adopted on 16 December 1991 – one concerning the ‘Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ and 
the other on Yugoslavia more in particular – were of tremendous impor-
tance, in particular in view of the armed conflict which erupted in Bosnia-
Herzegovina the following year.75 
 
                                                                                                                                               
72  Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.3. 
73  Bull. EC 9-1991, point 1.4.7. 
74  Bull. EC 10-1991, point 1.4.7. 
75  ‘Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union”’ and ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’, Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting 
(Brussels), EPC Press Releases P. 128/91 and P. 129/91, 16 December 1991; reproduced in Bull. EC 
12-1991, points 1.4.5. and 1.4.6; and 31 ILM (1992) p. 1486. See infra section 2.6.2. 
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2.4 European Community Monitoring Mission (later EUMM) 
 
Another type of EPC action was the troika missions. They were frequent in the first 
period of the crisis, under the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies. After the EC 
set up its Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991, this type of action was 
abandoned. The troika missions in June and July 1991 paved the way for an 
effective ceasefire agreement in Slovenia, agreed to at Brioni.76 This arrangement 
was supposed to create the framework for negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia 
and contained the seeds for a series of memoranda of understanding on the dispatch 
of a mission with the objective of monitoring the ceasefires in Slovenia and Croatia: 
the EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM). The first Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia concerned Slovenia and Croatia and 
was signed in Belgrade on 13 July 1991 by a representative of the Dutch Presidency 
for the EC and its Member States, a representative of the federal authorities of 
Yugoslavia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia and a representative of the 
government of Slovenia. In line with the CSCE’s recommendations, it was agreed 
that the EC should send a delegation of up to fifty members to stabilise the cease-
fire. A second MoU was signed in Belgrade on 1 September 1991 to allow for an 
extension of monitoring activities until 13 October of that year. It was signed by 
Hans van den Broek, European Commissioner for External Relations, the presidents 
of the six constituent republics, as well as the Presidency and the Federal Executive 
Council of the SFRY. The second MoU was one of the last arrangements concluded 
between the EC and the SFRY. A third MoU of 1 October 1991 concerned the 
extension of the activities of the Monitor Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The text 
of ECMM’s mandate is to be found in these MoUs.77 
In fact, it was the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, during its first-ever 
emergency meeting, that recommended the dispatch of an EC-based mission to 
supervise the ceasefire and a CSCE ‘good offices’ mission to assist in political 
dialogue because the new Conflict Prevention Centre of the CSCE had failed to 
reach the necessary unanimity on sending a CSCE observer mission.78 On the 
basis of the three above-mentioned MoUs, a multinational mission of approxi-
mately 200 EC monitors (.plus 400 support staff.) was deployed, first in Slovenia 
and Croatia, and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina.79 Initially, its duration was three 
months, but the mandate of ECMM was extended indefinitely at The Hague on 14 
October 1991.80 
                                                                                                                                               
76  See supra section 2.1. 
77  On file with the author. 
78  See M. Weller, The ‘Yugoslav’ Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Part I.) (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) at p. xxviii. 
79  Sanctioned by the UN Security Council in resolution 713 (1991). 
80  Agreement on Prolongation and Extension of Activities of the Monitor Mission to Yugosla-
via, signed by representatives of the EC and its Member States, SFRY, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia. Slovenia was not a party to this agreement. On file with the author. 
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The ECMM’s mandate encompassed: (i) rendering assistance in the stabilisa-
tion of the ceasefires; (ii) monitoring the suspension of the implementation of the 
declarations of independence; and (iii) monitoring the release and return of 
prisoners of war. With regard to the latter, in particular, the ECMM was to have 
unrestricted freedom of movement in the mission area. The EC Monitoring 
Mission was not a military operation, although some of its members had a 
military background. The duties of the EC monitors were of an impartial nature. 
They enjoyed diplomatic immunities (Art. X MoU 13 July 1991) and did not 
carry arms or wear uniforms (Art. VI MoU 13 July 1991). Only the EC flag was 
displayed on the premises and vehicles of the ECMM (Art. IV MoU 13 July 
1991). The Head of the ECMM was a national of the Member State holding the 
EC Presidency and was required to report, through the Presidency, to all partici-
pating states on the activities and findings of the mission (Art. VII(1) and (2) 
MoU 13 July 1991). It is interesting to note that the Presidency was under an 
obligation to promptly inform the CSCE (Art. VII(3) MoU 13 July 1991). This is 
only logical, as nationals of CSCE countries other than the EC Member States 
were included in the activities of the ECMM.81 
At the outset of its deployment, the warring parties were willing to let the 
ECMM play its role. The protection of minorities against gross human rights 
abuses became one of the fields in which the ECMM was able to reach isolated 
successes. This was done by organising meetings, overt patrolling, political 
pressure, attending to local requests and investigations. But as the conflicts 
increased in scope and cruelty, the ECMM was increasingly frustrated in carrying 
out its mandated activities. Access to a growing number of areas was denied, and 
the ECMM’s movements were otherwise restricted by the parties (especially in 
the Serb Autonomous Oblast of Krajina and Bosnian Serb-controlled areas in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina). There was also a dramatic increase in incidents against 
monitoring officers that resulted in infringements of their immunity. The ECMM 
lost a great deal of its credibility with the parties to the conflicts and was eventu-
ally only approached for minor tasks, like prisoner or body exchanges.82 
Despite the fact that the ECMM did not manage to decrease the tensions in the 
region overall, EC monitors did play a positive role at a more grass-roots level. 
Their mere presence reduced the level of fighting. In addition, some channels of 
indirect communications were established between the belligerents. But for the 
conclusion of ultimate ceasefires in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, more was 
needed than just a monitoring mission. 
                                                                                                                                               
81  Canada, Poland, Sweden and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In 2000, the fifteen EU 
Member States, Norway, and Slovakia had observers serving the mission. 
82  See the bitter address by Jacques de Baenst, Head of Mission of ECMM, to a meeting of the 
HRC on 16 September 1993. On file with the author. 
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The ECMM was maintained throughout the later stages of the Yugoslav crises 
to supervise the Dayton Peace Agreement and assist in confidence building 
throughout the region. The ECMM implemented a restructuring of its organisa-
tion only in 2000. On 22 December 2000, the Council adopted Joint Action 
2000/811/CFSP, whereby the ECMM became the European Union Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM).83 The EUMM’s mandate has since been amended and ex-
tended on a number of occasions.84 The primary objective of the EUMM is to 
contribute by its activities (information gathering and analysis), in line with 
directions from – and appointments by – the Secretary General/High Representa-
tive and the Council, to the effective formulation of EU policy towards the 
Western Balkans. The particular focus of the EUMM is to monitor political and 
security developments as well as borders, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns. 
The EUMM also contributes to early warning and confidence-building measures. 
By its nature, the EUMM is very flexible and adaptable to the particular needs of 
the developments in the region, so further organisational changes could occur. 
The mission is no longer instructed by the Presidency, but primarily by the 
SG/HR. Equally, the common costs of the mission are no longer financed by the 
Presidency and later refunded by the Member States on the basis of an agreed 
formula. The EUMM is now financed by a budget decided in Brussels and funded 
by the European Commission. As such, the ECMM could be regarded as an 
instrument of the Member States, whereas the EUMM can be described as a true 
instrument of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
EUMM currently has approximately 120 monitors and seventy-five locally 
employed support staff. It operates in Bosnia-Herzegovina,85 Macedonia,86 Serbia, 
Kosovo and Montenegro.87 Previously, the EUMM also operated in Croatia and 
Albania. 
                                                                                                                                               
83  Council Joint Action of 22 December 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission, OJ 
2000 L 328/53. 
84  See Council Joint Action 2006/867/CFSP of 30 November 2006 extending and amending the 
mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), OJ 2006 L 335/48 (until 31 
December 2007); and Council Joint Action 2007/40/CFSP of 22 January 2007 amending Joint 
Action 2002/921/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission, OJ 2007 
L 17/22. 
85  The operation of EUMM in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still governed by the MoU concluded in 
1991. The same was the case for Albania and Croatia, which agreed to a MoU on the monitoring of 
their borders with the former Yugoslavia by the ECMM on 21 December 1992. On file with the 
author. 
86  Council Decision 2001/682/CFSP of 30 August 2001 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) on the activities of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in FYROM, OJ 
2001 L 241/1. 
87  Council Decision 2001/352/CFSP of 9 April 2001 concerning the conclusion of the Agree-
ment between the European Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the activities of 
the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the FRY, OJ 2001 L 125/1. 
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2.5 Conference on Yugoslavia 
 
The idea to start negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia with EC assistance was 
already included in the Brioni Declaration. After it became clear that the Yugo-
slav parties themselves were unable and/or unwilling to organise such 
negotiations, the EC decided to convene a peace conference, for it could not 
‘stand idly by as the bloodshed […] increases day by day […].’88 The Joint 
Statement of 3 September 1991 provided for several issues concerning the 
organisation of the conference.89 Participants were to include the Federal Presi-
dency and the Federal Government of the SFRY, the presidents of the constituent 
republics, the president of the EC Council and representatives of the Member 
States and the Commission. The EC proposed Lord Carrington, the former British 
Foreign Secretary, as chairman of the conference. The mandate of the Conference 
on Yugoslavia was formulated as follows: 
 
The Conference will adopt arrangements to ensure the peaceful accommodation of 
the conflicting aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, on the basis of the following 
principles: no unilateral change of borders by force, protection of the rights of all 
in Yugoslavia and full account to be taken of all legitimate concerns and legitimate 
aspirations.90 
 
An arbitration procedure was also envisaged. 
The conference opened in the Peace Palace in The Hague on 7 September 
1991. It lasted until August 1992, without producing any significant achieve-
ments. After the first phase (September-October 1991), during which a plan for a 
global solution of the Yugoslav crisis was proposed, the conference was politi-
cally ‘killed’ by the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (December 1991-
January 1992).91 Those two republics basically lost interest in the project and 
succeeded in limiting further negotiations to the issue of succession of the SFRY 
and the question of constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfor-
tunately, the peace proposals developed in the second phase of the conference 
remained unsuccessful. Following the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
April 1992, Muslim representatives blocked further negotiations. At the same 
time, the Serbian representatives proclaimed the ‘Republika Srpska’ in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while Croats established the ‘Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’. 
As far as the composition of the participants is concerned, two remarks are 
important. First, the ‘autonomous provinces’ of Vojvodina and Kosovo were, as 
                                                                                                                                               
88  See EPC Joint Statement of 28 August 1991, Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.25. 
89  See EPC Joint Statement of 3 September 1991, Bull. EC 9-1991, point 1.4.2. 
90  Ibid. 
91  For more details, see infra section 2.7. 
THE EU’S ACTIONS TOWARDS THE SFRY AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES 133 
such, not represented at the conference. In this way, the EC seems to have 
implicitly recognised that these provinces were the internal problem of Serbia and 
not of the Yugoslav Federation.92 Second, as of January 1992, the representatives 
of the federal organs were no longer invited to participate in the conference. 
Despite the protests of the remaining federal representatives, the chairman of the 
conference in this way implemented the Badinter Arbitration Commission’s 
Opinion No. 1 on the dissolution of the SFRY and the EC decision on the 
recognition of two out of the six Yugoslav republics.93 
In light of the perceived failure of the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugosla-
via, the United Kingdom, as holder of the EC Presidency, announced on 25 July 
1992 that an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) would 
be held in August, involving the EC, the United Nations, the CSCE and the 
principal governments and parties to the conflict.94 The ICFY convened in 
London on 26-27 August 1992. At this conference, the resignation of Lord 
Carrington as chairman of the EC-led peace process was announced. David 
Owen, like Carrington a former British Foreign Secretary, was named as his 
successor. With Cyrus Vance, the UN Special Envoy for Yugoslavia, Lord Owen 
was to co-chair the ICFY.95 
 
2.6 Badinter Arbitration Commission 
 
2.6.1 Institutional aspects 
 
Following a French proposal,96 an Arbitration Commission was established at the 
same time as the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague. The EPC Joint 
Statement of 28 August 1991 announced the creation of an Arbitration Commission 
                                                                                                                                               
92  The constitutional position of the two provinces was specific in the SFRY, as they were part 
of Serbia and, at the same time, were directly represented in the federal organs. At the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, the question of minorities living in those provinces was treated as a question of 
minorities living in Serbia. 
93  On the interrelationship between the Conference on Yugoslavia as the primary political vehi-
cle through which the disputing parties would meet and the Badinter Arbitration Commission as the 
legal organ within the Community’s framework to stabilise the region, see S. Terrett, The Dissolution 
of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual Study of Peace-making Efforts 
in the Post-Cold War World (Aldershot, Ashgate 2000) at pp. 119-198. 
94  See Weller, op. cit. n. 78, at p. xxxvii. 
95  For further details, see chapter 2, sections 6.2.3, 6.2.5 and 6.3.4. 
96  The idea of creating a ‘European Court of Conciliation and Arbitration’ in the framework of 
the CSCE had already been floated by Robert Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Court, 
in the spring of 1991. See R. Badinter, ‘L’Europe du droit’, 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 15-23 at p. 20. As 
Steve Terrett explains, the EC’s motives for creating an arbitration procedure highlight the unusual 
situation it faced in Yugoslavia. In the absence of established mechanisms (ICJ, ECJ and CSCE 
‘Valetta Mechanism’) for dealing with such intra-state conflicts, the EC was compelled to create an 
ad hoc organ for these purposes. See Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at p. 121. 
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of five members chosen from the presidents of the constitutional courts of EC 
Member States.97 Three members were to be appointed by the European Commu-
nity and two members were to be appointed unanimously by the Presidency of the 
SFRY.98 The ‘relevant authorities’ would submit their differences to arbitration 
and the Arbitration Commission would give its decision within two months. In 
the EPC Joint Statement of 3 September 1991, it was added that: 
 
In the framework of the Conference, the Chairman will transmit to the Arbitration 
Commission the issues submitted for arbitration, and the results of the Commis-
sion’s deliberations will be put back to the Conference through the Chairman. The 
rules of procedure for arbitration will be established by the Arbitration Commis-
sion […].99 
 
There was no mention of the law to be applied by the Arbitration Commission, 
but in its jurisprudence, the Badinter Arbitration Commission, as it became 
known, mentioned the principles of public international law and referred to the 
peremptory norms of general international law. Thus, the Commission decided 
that the parties’ differences had become international law issues and that this was 
the applicable law.100 However, the choice of constitutional experts as members of 
the Arbitration Commission indicates the presumption of the EC, at least at the 
beginning of the Conference on Yugoslavia, that the questions to be dealt with 
would be more of an internal (constitutional) than of an international nature.101 
The Arbitration Commission never publicly established its rules of procedure. 
They always remained ‘extremely flexible, informal, and discrete.’102 On each 
‘difference’, a rapporteur was appointed and the views of the parties were given 
in written form and collected by fax. There were no hearings, in spite of requests. 
Decisions could have been taken by a simple majority of the Commission’s 
members, but it seems that all the arbitral opinions were adopted unanimously.103 
                                                                                                                                               
97  See Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.2.1. 
98  The Presidency of the SFRY did not appoint any members, so it was the EC that appointed all 
five members: Robert Badinter (President, French), Aldo Corasaniti (Italian), Roman Herzog 
(German), Irène Petry (Belgian) and Francisco Tomas y Valiente (Spaniard). For a background to the 
creation, composition, procedure and jurisdiction of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, see 
Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at pp. 120-141; and M. Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration 
Commission on Yugoslavia’, 66 BYIL (1996) pp. 333-413. 
99  Bull. EC 9-1991, point 1.4.2. 
100  See the introductory note by M. Ragazzi, ‘Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commis-
sion’, 31 ILM (1992) pp. 1488-1493; and A. Pellet, ‘Note sur la Commission d’arbitrage de la 
Conférence européenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie’, 37 Annuaire Français de Droit International 
(1991) pp. 329-348. See also Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at p. 138. 
101  See Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at p. 123. 
102  Pellet, loc. cit. n. 100, at p. 332. 
103  Ibid. 
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One of the main characteristics of the procedure was its speed. According to 
the EPC Joint Statement of 28 August, the Arbitration Commission had to give its 
decision within two months from the start of the procedure. In practice, the 
opinions were issued even faster: nine days to note that the SFRY was in a 
process of dissolution; about twenty days, including Christmas holidays, to 
propose which republics should be recognised; and about a month and a half for 
the other opinions. While this speed corresponded well with the overall atmos-
phere of the Conference on Yugoslavia and the need to find fast political 
solutions, it is extremely fast when compared to the usual length of proceedings 
in international judicial bodies. 
Considering the above, one would be tempted to conclude that, even if the 
Commission itself ruled otherwise,104 the Badinter Arbitration Commission 
neither constituted nor acted as an arbitration body within the meaning of 
international law.105 After all, the Commission was not constituted by the parties 
to the dispute, that is to say, the SFRY and the constituent republics, but by a 
third party (the EC),106 and it did not adopt binding awards but issued non-legally 
binding ‘opinions’. It therefore seems more appropriate to conclude that it acted 
merely as a fact-finding and consultative body of the Conference on Yugoslavia 
and of the EC, which were given opinions which they chose to follow, or not.107 
Ragazzi points out that, in fact, there was a ‘complex interaction between the 
deliberations of the Arbitration Commission and the political decisions of the EC 
institutions and the Member States.’108 The deliberations of the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission were politically influenced and, in turn, had considerable political 
effects.109 It seems that the arbitrators based their opinions on common sense, 
while taking strongly into consideration the EC’s policy aims in the Yugoslav 
                                                                                                                                               
104  Arbitration Commission, Interlocutory Decision, 32 ILM (1992) at p. 1520, point 2: ‘[…] the 
intention was to create a body capable of resolving, on the basis of law, the differences which were to 
be submitted to it by the parties, which precisely constitutes the definition of arbitration […].’ It 
continued inn para. 9, stating that ‘the Commission can give a judgment only in law, in the absence 
of any express authorization to the contrary by the parties, it being specified that in this case it is 
called upon to express opinions on the legal rules applying.’ 
105  See Craven, loc. cit. n. 98, at pp. 337-349, who refers, inter alia, to the International Law 
Commission’s 1958 Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, GA Official Records, 13th Session, Suppl. 
No. 9, UN Doc. A/3859, at 5-8. 
106  However, the SFRY and all the republics implicitly accepted the existence and competences 
of the Arbitration Commission by participating in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and, for the first 
opinions, in the arbitral procedure. 
107  See Pellet, loc. cit. n. 100, at p. 335. 
108  See Ragazzi, loc. cit. n. 100, at p. 1490. 
109  For example, in Opinion No. 8, the Arbitration Commission quotes the statement of the 
Council of 27 June 1992 to prove that the SFRY had ceased to exist. Subsequently, in the EPC Joint 
Statement of 20 July 1992, the EC expressly refers to the Arbitration Commission’s conclusions 
concerning the succession of Yugoslavia. 
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crisis and in Europe.110 But even if the Badinter Arbitration Commission cannot 
be seen as an independent judicial body stricto sensu, it was certainly independent 
of the disputing parties. Also, it attempted to conduct its activities in a broadly 
judicial manner and it sought to found its opinions on general international law. 
As such, its opinions may be treated as non-binding but authoritative statements 
of the relevant law.111 
 
2.6.2 Arbitral opinions 
 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission issued a total of fifteen opinions, dealing 
with a range of issues of international law including questions of statehood, 
recognition, self-determination and succession. From November 1991 until July 
1992, the Commission issued ten opinions, one interlocutory decision and one 
comment concerning Croatia’s constitutional law on minorities.112 There are two 
groups of opinions in this first batch. One set of opinions was given at the 
initiative of Lord Carrington, the chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and 
includes Opinions Nos. 1 (actual status of the SFRY), 2 (status of the Serbian 
people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), 3 (boundaries), 8 (dissolution of 
Yugoslavia), 9 (state succession) and 10 (has the SFRY been transformed into the 
FRY, a state comprising two constituent republics, Serbia and Montenegro?). The 
questions underlying Opinions Nos. 2 and 3 were first raised by the Republic of 
Serbia but were redrafted by the chairman. The second group of opinions (Nos. 4 
to 7), in which the Arbitration Commission considered the question of recognition 
of four Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mace-
donia), was delivered in accordance with a mandate given by the EC Council of 
Ministers on 16 December 1991 in its ‘Declaration on the “Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”’ and its 
‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’.113 Following this first batch of opinions, the co-
chairmen of the steering committee of the ICFY submitted a further six questions 
to the Arbitration Commission on 20 April 1993, concerning succession of state 
property, archives and debts. These issues were addressed in Opinions 11-15.114 It 
is beyond the scope of this study to address all issues raised in all arbitral opin-
ions. For that reason, a brief presentation will be given below of the contents of 
                                                                                                                                               
110  See Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 331. 
111  See Craven, loc. cit. n. 98, at p. 334. 
112  All texts are published in 31 ILM (1992) p. 1494 et seq. One of the most striking points of the 
arbitral opinions, apart from the speed at which they were delivered, is their extreme brevity. Both 
legally and politically complex and difficult questions were dealt with in two to three pages on 
average, almost without discussion of the contradictory arguments and without motivation or 
explanation of the reasoning of the Arbitration Commission. 
113  Bull. EC 12-1991, points 1.4.5 and 1.4.6; and 31 ILM (1992) at p. 1486. 
114  32 ILM (1993) at p. 1586 et seq. 
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the first ten opinions, after which a number of legal and political issues will be 
selected for discussion.115 
 
- Opinion No. 1 (29 November 1991): The question was whether the ongoing 
process in Yugoslavia was a secession of some republics from the federation 
or the dissolution of the SFRY. The opinion was that the SFRY was ‘in the 
process of dissolution’.116 
- Opinion No. 2 (11 January 1992): The question was whether the Serbian 
population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peo-
ples, had the right to self-determination. The answer was that, because ‘the 
right of self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers’, the 
Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia was entitled to the 
protection given to minorities (‘as opposed to ‘peoples’) under international 
law. 
- Opinion No. 3 (11 January 1992): The question was whether the internal 
boundaries between the Yugoslav republics could be considered as frontiers 
under international law. The answer was that ‘the former boundaries become 
frontiers protected by international law’. 
- Opinion No. 4 (11 January 1992): The opinion was that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was not yet entitled to recognition because ‘the will of the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’ was not fully established. It was proposed to organise a referen-
dum. 
- Opinion No. 5 (11 January 1992): The opinion was that Croatia did not fully 
comply with the provisions concerning the special status for minorities in 
chapter II, section 2(c) of Lord Carrington’s draft Convention (autonomy in 
respect of local government, local law enforcement and the judiciary, educa-
tional systems and other specific matters)117 but that it otherwise met ‘the 
necessary conditions for its recognition’. 
- Opinion No. 6 (11 January 1992): The opinion was that Macedonia satisfied 
the test for recognition. 
- Opinion No. 7 (11 January 1992): The opinion was that Slovenia satisfied the 
test for recognition. 
- Opinion No. 8 (4 July 1992): The question was whether the dissolution of the 
SFRY was complete. The answer was affirmative. 
                                                                                                                                               
115  For further details and discussion on the background, composition, (revised and clarified) 
rules of procedure and the opinions of the ‘reconstituted’ 1993 Arbitration Commission, see 32 ILM 
(1993) at p. 1572 et seq.; Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at pp. 199-253; and Craven, loc. cit. n. 98, at pp. 396-
409. 
116  This opinion was given after the Community and its Member States had decided to adopt 
sanctions, precisely because Yugoslavia was dissolving. See supra section 2.2.1. 
117  See infra section 2.6.4. 
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- Opinion No. 9 (4 July 1992): The question was how to settle the problems of 
succession of the SFRY. The answer was that the successor states must nego-
tiate equitable solutions, based on the principles of the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 
- Opinion No. 10 (4 July 1992): The question was whether the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (the federation of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo) 
was a new state eligible for recognition in accordance with the ‘Guidelines’ 
adopted by the EC. The answer was positive. 
 
2.6.3 The question of self-determination 
 
One of the most important contributions of the Badinter Arbitration Commis-
sion’s practice in connection with the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the primacy 
given to the right of self-determination over the other principles of integrity of the 
state, non-intervention in internal matters and inviolability of borders.118 In 1990, 
Hurst Hannum wrote that 
 
[p]erhaps no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously pro-
moted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to self-determination. Yet the 
meaning and content of that right remain as vague and imprecise as when they 
were enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles.119 
 
Precisely because self-determination is ‘one of those unexceptionable goals that 
can be neither defined nor opposed’,120 I will make use of a working definition so 
as not to unnecessarily complicate the nature of this study. Generally speaking, 
the right to self-determination is the right of all peoples of existing states to freely 
determine their political and legal status (external self-determination) and to 
choose for themselves a form of democratic government and pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development (internal self-determination).121 
Self-determination is enshrined as a principle in Article 1 of the UN Charter 
and as right of all peoples in Article 1 of the 1966 UN Conventions on Human 
Rights as well as in a number of other international documents.122 Today, it is 
                                                                                                                                               
118  See Terrett, op. cit. n. 93, at pp. 254-308. 
119  H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Con-
flicting Rights (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press 1990) at p. 27. 
120  M. Halperin, D. Scheffer and P. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Wash-
ington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1992) at p. xi. 
121  This begs the question what is meant by the term ‘peoples’. It is generally accepted that this 
entails all persons living in a given state that comprise a distinctive grouping on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, religion, etc. For detailed legal analyses, see the literature referred to infra n. 123. 
122  E.g., Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, Part III, Principle 8; and Art. 20 of the 1981 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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generally accepted that self-determination is not merely a political principle but a 
legally enforceable collective human right of a peremptory nature.123 However, 
before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the right of self-determination was 
generally applied only to the situations of colonised and dependent peoples 
overseas (from Europe, i.e., in Africa and Asia). The question as to whether it 
could be applied in a post-colonial context and within an existing state was more 
controversial at the beginning of the nineties than it is now. In its first statement 
mentioning self-determination in the Yugoslav context, the Community did not 
solve the dilemma and just quoted parts of the Paris Charter: ‘the right of peoples 
to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the UN and with the 
relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial 
integrity of states.’124 It was not until a few months later, in their ‘Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States’, that the EC Member States adopted a more clear-
cut attitude and declared: ‘The Community and its Member States confirm their 
attachment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in 
particular the principle of self-determination.’125 With that document, and the 
‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’,126 they declared their readiness to recognise differ-
ent Yugoslav republics on the basis of unilateral declarations of independence and 
without consideration of the fact that there no agreement had been reached within 
the Yugoslav federation or between the republics themselves.127 
Interestingly, several provisions of the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia ex-
pressly proclaimed that Yugoslavia was based upon and actually constituted an 
incarnation of the principle of self-determination of peoples, nations and nation-
alities and also pursued self-determination as an objective of foreign policy.128 But 
                                                                                                                                               
123  See, e.g., C. Tomuschat, ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht, Martinus Nij-
hoff Publishers 1993); A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples – A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1995); and D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002). 
124  EPC Joint Statement of 5 July 1991, Bull. EC 7/8-1991, point 1.4.3. 
125  Bull. EC 12-1991, point 1.4.5. 
126  Bull. EC 12-1991, point 1.4.6. 
127  For the reaction from the side of the remaining federal bodies, see 32 Yugoslav Survey (1991) 
at p. 4. The Federal Assembly, composed only of Serbian, Montenegrin and some Bosnian and 
Macedonian representatives, adopted a declaration on 21 December 1991 which stated: ‘Unilateral 
acts of recognition of individual Yugoslav Republics, by individual states or groups of states would 
be incompatible with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States, and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States, as well as with those of the CSCE. Consequently, such acts would be a 
gross violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SFRY and of the principle of 
inviolability of its frontiers.’ 
128  The 1974 Constitution is reprinted in S. Trifunovska, ed., Yugoslavia Through Documents: 
From its Creation to its Dissolution (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) at pp. 125-134. 
See, e.g., the Preamble (‘Introductory Part – Basic Principles’), Principles I, III and VII, as well as 
Arts. 1, 2, 244-249. The 1974 Constitution was amended in 1988 but no right of self-determination 
was provided for. 
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the Constitution did not make specific provision for the right of one of the six 
constituent republics to secede. On the contrary, Article 5(4) stipulated that ‘[t]he 
frontiers of the [SFRY] may not be altered without the consent of all Republics 
and Autonomous Provinces.’ The achievement of independence by Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia could therefore be seen as a 
revolutionary process that had taken place beyond the control of the existing body 
of laws.129 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission tackled some general legal problems in 
its first three opinions. In doing so, the Commission did not directly consider the 
applicability of the principle of self-determination in relation to the acts of 
independence of the various republics, but it did stress the importance of the 
‘rights of peoples and minorities’ and even defined the norms that provided for 
these as part of jus cogens.130 In the following four opinions, the Commission 
made pronouncements on the requests for recognition made by four of the six 
republics. In all four opinions, the Commission ascertained, in particular, whether 
referenda on independence had been held in each republic and whether each 
republic had committed itself to respecting the rights of individuals, groups and 
minorities. Strikingly, whereas in the cases of Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia it 
was found that these requirements had been satisfied, in the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina it was emphasised that no referendum had been held involving the 
whole population.131 and therefore that not all criteria for statehood had been 
fulfilled. The Commission went on to say that this appraisal could be modified if 
‘safeguards’ were established by Bosnia-Herzegovina, ‘if necessary by way of a 
referendum in which all citizens of the Republic were to participate, under 
international supervision.’132 
There is little doubt that Opinion No. 1 and the legal reasoning in the other 
opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, together with the practice of 
the EC Council, have legally recognised the right of secession of federal units, 
                                                                                                                                               
129  However, the Yugoslav breakaway republics deemed it fit to hold referenda before declaring 
their independence. Slovenia: on 23 December 1990, 94.5 per cent voted in favour of independence; 
Croatia: on 19 May 1991, 93.2 per cent voted in favour of independence; Macedonia: on 8 Septem-
ber 1991, 95 per cent voted in favour of independence. On 11 April 1991, the presidents of the six 
republics reached agreement to hold a referendum in each of the republics except for Slovenia (thus 
including Bosnia-Herzegovina) on the future of the country. However, the referendum proposals ran 
into problems towards the end of April as divisions occurred on the scheduling of the vote. 
130  See Opinion No. 1. 
131  Instead, a plebiscite had been held on 10 November 1991 by the ‘Serbian people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina,’ which had opted for a ‘common Yugoslav state’. 
132  From 29 February to 1 March 1992, a Bosnian referendum was held. The turnout was 63 per 
cent. The overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs, accounting for 31 per cent of the population, 
boycotted the vote. Of those voting, 99.4 per cent opted for independence. Subsequently, on 6 April 
1992, the EC and the twelve Member States granted their recognition, followed the next day by the 
United States and Croatia. Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the United Nations on 22 May 1992. 
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albeit under the basic condition that a referendum is held in which all the citizens 
of a republic are to participate. The Badinter Arbitration Commission thus 
elevated the referendum, the ‘internal’ dimension of self-determination, to the 
status of a basic requirement to legitimate unilateral secession. Hence, the 
Yugoslav crisis reveals that, as a consequence of the dissolution of a state, 
peoples are not legally precluded from exercising a qualified right to unilateral 
secession, even outside the colonial context.133 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission (as well as the EC and its Member 
States, for that matter) stopped short of granting all peoples a right to secession, 
regardless of the circumstances. It seems to have made a distinction between two 
types of situations. On the one hand, the right to external self-determination was 
granted to peoples inhabiting regional units, the territorial limits of which had 
previously been defined by an autonomous government and administration and 
which were direct constituent parts of the federation (i.e., ‘republics’). Contrary to 
what was laid down in the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, the Serbian ‘autono-
mous provinces’ of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which were represented at the federal 
level but which belonged to the Republic of Serbia, were not granted the same 
right to external self-determination. On the other hand, a special status was 
granted to persons belonging to groupings (i) that were minorities within repub-
lics (e.g., Serbs in Croatia); (ii) that belonged to a majority living in another 
republic of the SFRY or another state altogether (e.g., Albanians of Kosovo); and 
(iii) whose territorial limits were not predefined (e.g., Serbs or Croats in Bosnia-
Herzegovina). Such minorities were offered legal protection under Article 27 of 
the 1966 UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights.134 In the Yugoslav case, it 
therefore seems that the Badinter Arbitration Commission, the EC and its 
Member States linked the granting of the right to external self-determination to 
territorial units dubbed ‘republics’ and not directly to the peoples inhabiting 
them.135 This is especially clear from Opinions Nos. 2 and 4 concerning the 
question of the Serbian ‘population’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recognition 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively. In Opinion No. 2, Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were declared to be a minority, entitled to minority and human rights 
recognised in international law but not to the right of secession.136 In Opinion No. 
                                                                                                                                               
133  See Weller, loc. cit. n. 70, at p. 606; J. Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in 
Relation to Secession’, 69 BYIL (1999) pp. 85-117; and Raič, op. cit. n. 123, at pp. 308-397, in 
particular at pp. 342-366 and 386-394. 
134  For a critical note in this respect, see Craven, loc. cit. n. 98, at pp. 390-391. 
135  Contrary to what is laid down in the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, which speaks in its 
preamble and Article 1 of the right to self-determination and secession of the Yugoslav peoples, not 
of the administrative units. 
136  The Arbitration Commission, while discussing their rights, did not take into consideration the 
internal and constitutional aspects of the position of the national communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia. Opinion No. 2 was issued several months before Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised, 
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4, as discussed above, the ‘citizens’ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without distinction, 
were recognised as having a unilateral right of self-determination by means of 
referendum.137 
The underlying idea for the Community’s stance towards the implementation 
of the right to self-determination was, of course, to pose certain limits on the 
disintegration of states in order to safeguard, as far as possible, the principle of 
inviolability of borders and, thus, to be able to counter claims from existing states 
to agree to a real territorial autonomy of their minorities abroad.138 However, it is 
dubious whether the level of protection of national minorities would have been 
better if there was a parallel tendency to offer less protection to the stability of the 
existing republics.139 
 
2.6.4 The question of recognition 
 
As has been highlighted already, another question considered during the first 
episode of the Yugoslav crises concerned the conditions of recognition of the 
former federal units which had declared independence. Contrary to the case of the 
former Soviet Union, there was no internal agreement on the independence of the 
federal units of the SFRY, and the question of recognition was dealt with in 
parallel with the armed conflict.140 In its ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States’,141 the EC warned that it would not recognise entities that were the result 
of aggression, which seemed applicable only to newly emerging entities (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                               
but the entire opinion was based on principles of international law only. For the Serbian position on 
the question of self-determination, see the position of the Presidency of the SFRY, published in 43 
Review of International Affairs (1992) pp. 21-23. 
137  There was no ‘majority’ nation/people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, ‘self-
determination’ was not based on the right of a ‘people’ but of all ‘citizens’. 
138  See C. Warbrick, ‘Recognition of States (Current Developments)’, 41 ICLQ (1992) at p. 480: 
‘The idea of self-determination looks to be an inherently destabilizing notion.’ 
139  A good example is the situation in Croatia. The self-determination granted to the Croat 
people greatly contributed to the disappearance of the SFRY. On the other hand, the Serb community 
in Croatia was deprived the status of ‘equal’ and ‘constitutive’ people of Croatia, granted by the 1974 
Constitution of the SFRY. Serbs were promised a ‘special status’, but Croatia was recognised in spite 
of the fact that it did not fulfil its obligations concerning this status. Moreover, it is difficult to see 
how the creation of small ‘nation states’ in the Balkans, replacing the SFRY, would in any way 
improve the position of minorities within each of those states. As for the protection given by 
international law, Pellet states: ‘A vrai dire, “les droits reconnus aux minorités par les conventions 
internationales en vigueur” se limitent à peu de choses.’ Pellet, loc. cit. n. 100, at p. 339. 
140  On the recognition of states, see, e.g., R. Bieber, ‘European Community Recognition of 
Eastern European States: A New Perspective for International Law?’, 86 Proceedings of the ASIL 
(1992) p. 374 et seq.; R. Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union’, 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 36-65; C. Warbrick, ‘Recognition of States: Part 2’, 42 ICLQ (1993) pp. 
433-442; Weller, loc. cit. n. 70; and P. Hilpold, ‘Die Anerkennung der Neustaaten auf dem Balkan’, 
31 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1993) pp. 387-408. 
141  Bull. EC 12-1991, point 1.4.5. 
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after 16 December 1991), but not to the former federal units engaged in the 
struggle. 
The ‘Guidelines’ prescribed that only states that fulfilled ‘the normal stan-
dards of international practice’ (i.e., statehood)142 and ‘the political realities’143 
would be entitled to recognition, if they had: 
 
(i) ‘constituted themselves on a democratic basis’ (i.e., if they had organised 
referenda on independence); 
(ii) accepted the appropriate international obligations (e.g., the UN Charter, the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris); and 
(iii) ‘committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotia-
tions’. 
 
Furthermore, the EC enumerated all the conditions for the recognition of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including respect for the rule of law, 
democracy, human and minority rights, respect for borders and a commitment to 
disarmament and to peaceful dispute settlement by way of arbitration. In addition, 
the Yugoslav republics were to accept the ‘draft Convention’ under consideration 
by the Conference on Yugoslavia, and especially the provisions of chapter II on 
human rights and the rights of national and ethnic groups.144 It is interesting to 
note that the principal issues of discussion in the Badinter Arbitration Commis-
sion concerned not so much the legal conditions of recognition, but the political 
requirements, such as the principle of effective control, a classic criterion for 
recognition of states but absent from the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States’ and the ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia.’145 
Although the EC and its Member States reiterated, in various ways, their reli-
ance on traditional international legal criteria for recognition, their policy of non-
recognition of various states was far from being a consistent application of legal 
criteria.146 Thus, Slovenia, which had fulfilled all traditional criteria since July 
1991 (Opinion No. 7), remained unrecognised by the EC until mid-January 1992. 
                                                                                                                                               
142  Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19 
(1933): ‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with other states.’ On the concepts of and (traditional and additional) criteria for statehood, see, 
extensively, Raič, op. cit. n. 123, at pp. 19-168. 
143  Rich, loc. cit. n. 140, at p. 43, observes that this rider is a stark reminder of Lauterpacht’s 
comment that recognition of states is a matter of policy, but that it has rarely been expressed in such 
a direct way. See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1947) at p. 1. 
144  EPC ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’, Bull. EC 12-1991, point 1.4.6. 
145  See Warbrick, loc. cit. n. 138, at p. 482. 
146  It is important to note that the Badinter Arbitration Commission itself was accurate and 
consistent in its Opinions Nos. 4-8. 
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Macedonia, which also fulfilled all criteria, at least since the end of 1991 (Opin-
ion No. 6), remained unrecognised for a much longer period due to a dispute over 
its name.147 Serbia and Montenegro, as republics with equal standing in law, 
constituted a new state (the FRY) and were recognised as such by the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission in Opinion No. 8, a decision which was not heeded with 
serious action by the EC and its Member States. On the other hand, Croatia was 
recognised even though it had not fully implemented the provisions concerning 
the ‘special status’ for the Serb minority (Opinion No. 5), a fact which remained 
without consequences for months.148 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was unable to 
fulfil the criterion of effective control, was recognised in April 1992 after it had 
organised a referendum, as it had been urged to do by the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission in its Opinion No. 4.149 
It is clear that the legal conditions incorporated in the ‘Guidelines on the Rec-
ognition of New States’ and the ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’, as imposed on the 
breakaway states of the former Yugoslavia by the Badinter Arbitration Commis-
sion in its opinions, were manipulated by the EC Member States to influence and 
direct the behaviour of the recipients.150 EC recognition of the ex-Yugoslav 
                                                                                                                                               
147  This problem was eventually spelled out in an EPC Statement of 2 May 1992, Bull. EC 5-
1992, in which the EC Member States referred to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and 
said that they were ‘willing to recognise that state as a sovereign and independent state within its 
existing borders and under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned.’ At the European 
Council summit in Lisbon on 26-27 June 1992, the EC even went a step further when it once again 
declared its willingness to recognise that republic ‘under a name which does not include the term 
Macedonia.’ See Bull. EC 6-1992, point I-1. The latter condition was unacceptable to Macedonia. 
See M. Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of 
Statehood’, 16 Australian YIL (1995) pp. 199-239. 
148  See the Badinter Arbitration Commission’s comments on Croatia’s constitutional law of 4 
December 1991, as amended on 8 May 1992, 31 ILM (1992) at p. 1505. 
149  D. Türk, ‘Recognition of States: A Comment’, 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 66-71 at p. 69 argues that 
‘it would be wrong to conclude that recognition and admission of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the UN was 
necessarily a political mistake. The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not only fair and just, but 
also – paradoxically, in accordance with state practice. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina it should 
have been clear that the emerging state would need more than formal recognition, admission to the 
UN and establishment of diplomatic relations. The Conference on Yugoslavia could have been – but 
was not – used for the purpose of creating appropriate guarantees for the independence of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This omission was probably due to (i) divergent opinions among the major powers 
regarding the approach to the Yugoslav crisis in general, and (ii) the lack of readiness to act by force, 
if necessary, to protect the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus to give credibility to the 
international support for Bosnia’s independence.’ 
150  See J. Charpentier, ‘Les declarations des Douze sur la reconnaissance des nouveaux Etats’, 
96 RGDIP (1992) p. I-343 et seq. at p. I-353. It could also be argued that the two declarations made 
the process of recognition more difficult because they purport to retain the ‘normal standards of 
international practice’ while adding a series of new requirements. Rich is of the opinion that, in fact, 
‘the new requirements have tended to supplant the previous practice [on the recognition of states,] 
which was largely based on meeting the traditional criteria for statehood.’ In his view, these two 
documents have significantly transformed recognition law. See Rich, loc. cit. n. 140, at pp. 42-43. 
For a recent analysis of the strategic logic of conditional recognition by the EC in the case at hand, 
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republics was an entirely optional and discretionary political act. The recognition 
of states at a stage where they had not really consolidated their authority over the 
claimed territory would have constituted an illegal intervention under the tradi-
tional standards of international law. Nevertheless, the EC Member States 
recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, thus transforming ‘early recogni-
tion’ into a regulatory mechanism in order to secure the precedence of the right of 
self-determination over the competing claim for sovereignty still raised by the so-
called ‘federal’ authorities.151 Admittedly, there are good reasons for using 
recognition in such a way. A community of Western European states which has 
lifted self-determination to the heights of being one of the fundamental principles 
of international law – a norm of jus cogens – should not look aside when a 
ruthless regime tries to smother justified claims of self-determination in a 
bloodbath.152 Doing so would mean that the international community degrades its 
fundamental norms to pure rhetoric. 
 
2.6.5 The question of frontiers 
 
A state can be recognised without its frontiers being fully defined.153 The question 
of recognition is therefore not directly linked to border disputes. This was ac-
knowledged by the EC in its EPC Joint Statement of 31 December 1991: 
 
Recognition shall not be taken to imply acceptance by the European Community 
and its Member States of the position of any of the republics concerning the terri-
tory which is the subject of a dispute between two or more republics.154 
                                                                                                                                               
see R. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2005) at pp. 49-72. 
151  See S. Oeter, ‘Selbstbestimmungsrecht im Wandel: Űberlegungen zur Debatte um Selbstbes-
timmung, Sezessionsrecht und ‘vorzeitige’ Anerkennung’, 52 ZaöRV (1992) pp. 741-780. 
152  In fact, even heavier duties rest upon the shoulders of the international community of states 
to make sure that human rights and fundamental freedoms – of a jus cogens nature – are not grossly 
and persistently violated. On the (conditional) duty to intervene (if need be militarily) in a state’s 
internal affairs on humanitarian grounds, see, e.g., M. Sornarajah, ‘Internal Colonialism and Humani-
tarian Intervention’, 11 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1981) p. 75 et seq.; 
H.G. Schermers, ‘The Obligation to Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States’, in A. Delissen and 
G. Tanja, eds., Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict – Challenges Ahead. Essays in Honour of Frits 
Kalshoven (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) pp. 583-593; V.P. Nanda, ‘Tragedies in 
Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti – Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention 
under International Law – Part I’, 20 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (1992) pp. 
305-334; A. Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 23-30; S. 
Blockmans, Moving into UNchartered Waters: An Emerging Right of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention’, 12 LJIL (1999) pp. 759-786. 
153  Cf., Albania (1912) and Israel (1948). 
154  Bull. EC 12-1991, point 1.4.13. 
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The argument that self-determination must not involve changes to existing 
frontiers at the time of independence can easily be accepted as regards established 
international borders.155 The real question was whether the formerly internal 
boundaries that demarcated the various republics within the SFRY for administra-
tive purposes, especially between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, could 
be regarded as international borders. This was vehemently opposed by Serbia and 
the remaining federal representatives (from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia), which linked the issue to the question of self-
determination of ‘constituent nations’ in each of the republics (e.g., the Serbs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina). The Federal Presidency stated that the republican borders 
were drawn up by the Communist regime in 1945, without democratic or public 
procedure and without consideration of ethnic, economic, political or other 
principles.156 It argued that these borders should consequently be regarded as mere 
administrative demarcations. According to the Federal Presidency, prior to the 
recognition of separate republics, ‘borders between the new states would have to 
be drawn with due respect for the relevant international legal norms.’157 The 
position of the other Yugoslav republics was that the internal administrative 
borders should automatically become international frontiers. 
 In its Opinion No. 3 of 11 January 1992, the Badinter Arbitration Commission 
took the view that 
 
[e]xcept where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected 
by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for 
territorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis, which is 
today recognized as a general principle. 
 
As explained by the ICJ in the Burkina Faso and Mali Frontier Dispute case, uti 
possidetis juris ‘is a general principle, which is logically connected with the 
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious 
purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endan-
gered by fratricidal struggles.’158 The Commission’s decision to generally apply 
the principle of uti possidetis juris outside the context of decolonisation – which 
was new for Europe.159 – is explained by Marc Weller as the enlargement of the 
                                                                                                                                               
155  See, e.g., ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’, 
UNGA resolution 1514 (1960); and ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’, UNGA resolution 2625 (1970). 
156  See 43 Review of International Affairs (1992) at p. 23. 
157  Ibid. 
158  ICJ Reports 1986, at 554. 
159  For an overview of the subtle changes in the evolution of the principle of uti possidetis, see J. 
Klabbers and R. Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’, in C. 
Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck, eds., Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) pp. 37-42; and Raič, op. cit. n. 123, at pp. 293-305. 
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protection of international law to the ‘nascent states’ on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.160 As a question of policy, there is a strong case for arguing an 
expansive view of the principle’s field of application. The application of uti 
possidetis in the Yugoslav case was preferable, in the short term at least, to the 
delimitation of boundaries on the basis of unstable and shifting forces of national-
ist sentiment or on the basis of a strict application of the principle of effective 
control. The escalation of violence, provoked essentially by territorial disputes, 
prompted the EC Member States to take a more defined view and urge Belgrade 
to commit itself to the ‘respect for the integrity of all borders of all republics.’161 
Nevertheless, one may question whether this is a legal technique that will provide 
a permanent and pacific settlement of the underlying territorial disputes. If uti 
possidetis is to apply to all cases of ‘independence’, there is nothing to preclude 
its further application within each of the republics even after their statehood has 
been established. 
 Ultimately, two different processes are at work here. Firstly, the identification 
of presumptive units of statehood, whether it be in virtue of the principle of 
effective control or self-determination. And secondly, the determination of 
boundaries within which those entities are to be confined. In its original guise, the 
principle of uti possidetis only serves to address the second question and does not 
provide a coherent basis for establishing the statehood of the emerging entities. 
The manner in which the Badinter Arbitration Commission addressed the issue, 
however, was to use uti possidetis as a tool for establishing the presumptive 
statehood of the entities to emerge from the dismemberment of the SFRY and to 
deny the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, as well as the self-
proclaimed Serbian republics in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the benefit of 
that presumption. If the Arbitration Commission’s first opinions are taken 
together as a coherent whole – which is not unreasonable given the fact that the 
first three were handed down on the same day – one is left with the view that, 
owing to a collapse in central government, the SFRY fell into a process of 
dismemberment in which, through application of the principle of uti possidetis, 
the succeeding entities were presumptively deemed to be the six republics. This 
being the case, it is clear that the principle of self-determination had little overall 
influence on territorial settlement. It is also apparent that the principle of effective 
control played only a subordinate role – it being suggested that in virtue of the 
internationalisation of their borders, each of the constituent republics of the 
former SFRY enjoyed prima facie statehood, irrespective of the effectiveness of 
their government. The principle of uti possidetis was employed a priori to protect 
the integrity of the constitutionally-defined territorial units which were then, and 
                                                                                                                                               
160  See Weller, loc. cit. n. 70, at p. 589. 
161  EPC Joint Statement of 5 May 1992, Bull. EC 5-1992, point 1.3.4. 
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only then, able or entitled to exercise some form of external self-determination, 
whether that be full independence or integration into a confederation of states. In 
other words, a principle of boundary delimitation was used as the primary 
determining tool not only for the shape of the new territorial entities but also for 
their international personality as states. 
 
2.6.6 The question of succession 
 
Another object of disagreement between the six republics was whether, legally 
speaking, some of them seceded from the SFRY or whether the federation simply 
dissolved and disappeared. Of course, the differences had more important 
political – rather than legal – implications for the republics. 
 The Vienna Conventions on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 
(1978)162 and Succession in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 
(1983)163 lay down, in a similar fashion, the rules of succession in the cases of 
dismemberment and secession. Perhaps the most important difference between 
the two scenarios concerns the membership of a state in international organisa-
tions, which is automatic in the case of the continuity of the state. In the 
Declaration on the Promulgation of the Constitution of the FRY of 27 April 1992, 
the parliament of the new federation stated that: 
 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the state, international legal and 
political personality of the SFRY, shall strictly abide by all the commitments that 
the SFRY assumed internationally in the past.164 
 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission declared on 4 July 1992 that ‘the process 
of dissolution of the SFRY is now complete and that the SFRY no longer ex-
ists.’165 It also ruled that ‘the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state which 
cannot be considered the sole successor of the SFRY.’166 The consequences of the 
foregoing were that the FRY should not automatically succeed to the SFRY’s 
seats in international organisations or its property abroad. The property had to be 
divided equitably between the SFRY’s various successor states by agreement or 
arbitration.167 Unsurprisingly, the EC Council of Ministers adopted the same 
position: ‘[i]t is for Serbia and Montenegro to decide whether they wish to form a 
                                                                                                                                               
162  Reprinted in 72 AJIL (1978) p. 971. 
163  22 ILM (1983) p. 306. 
164  Cited in Lopandić, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 345. 
165  See Opinion No. 8. 
166  See Opinion No. 10. 
167  The UN Security Council dealt with the question in a more definitive way in its resolution 
777 of 19 September 1992. This resolution, and UNGA resolution 47/1 of the same date, settled the 
continuity issue by specifically denying the FRY’s claims. 
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new federation. But this new federation cannot be accepted as the sole successor 
to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’168 
For reasons already mentioned, these decisions made political sense. But, from 
a legal point of view, this attitude is questionable, as neither the Badinter Com-
mission nor the EC and its Member States took into account that there was no 
formal interruption in the functioning of the Yugoslav federal organs and that 
Serbia and Montenegro did not declare their independence from the SFRY, as the 
other republics did. In addition, the FRY had the advantage of possession. The 
SFRY’s foreign service had been progressively stripped from its non-Serbian or 
non-Montenegrin representatives, and the personnel in the Yugoslav missions 
abroad were consequently by and large loyal to Belgrade. It is also interesting to 
point out the different approaches of the EC to the question of state succession in 
the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia.169 In the first case, Russia was accepted as 
continuing the international position and obligations of the former Soviet Union, 
including its status in the United Nations. For political reasons, however, the FRY 
was denied the right to continue the status of the former SFRY without a renewed 
application to the United Nations.170 
 
2.6.7 General legal observations 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, some observations can be made concerning the 
‘European’ application of international law in the first phase of the Yugoslav 
crisis. Firstly, the opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission represent a 
unique and important examination of a whole range of legal issues relating to 
statehood, recognition, self-determination, territorial integrity and succession in 
relation to the break-up of a single state. Secondly, it has become clear that the 
                                                                                                                                               
168  EPC Joint Statement of 20 July 1992, Bull. EC 7/8-1992, point 1.5.5. 
169  See M. Bohte and C. Schmidt, ‘Sur quelques questions de succession posées par la dissolu-
tion de l’URSS et celle de la Yougoslavie’, 96 RGDIP (1992) p. II-811 et seq.; R. Mullerson, ‘The 
Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’, 42 ICLQ 
(1993) pp. 473-493; O. Schachter, et al., ‘Symposium: State Succession in the Former Soviet Union 
and in Eastern Europe’, 33 Virginia JIL (1993) pp. 253-350. On succession of states, see generally 
M. Shaw, ‘State Succession Revisited’, 5 Finnish YIL (1994) pp. 34-98; M. Craven, ‘The Genocide 
Case, the Law of Treaties and State Succession’, 68 BYIL (1998) pp. 127-163; M. Mrak, Succession 
of States (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999); and J. Klabbers, M. Koskenniemi, O. 
Ribbelink and A. Zimmermann, eds., State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of 
Recognition: The Pilot Project of the Council of Europe (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
1999). 
170  The official attitude towards the FRY is contested as contrary to UN practice in Y. Blum, 
‘UN Membership of the “New” Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?’, 86 AJIL (1992) pp. 830-833. See 
also M. Scharf, ‘Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United Nations’, 
28 Cornell ILJ (1995) pp. 29-69; and K. Bühler, State Succession and Membership in International 
Organizations: Legal Theories versus Political Pragmatism (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
2001) at pp. 180-272. 
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use of international legal norms was extremely politically oriented. International 
law was an instrument which directly and immediately had to serve the political 
objectives of the EC and its Member States. Only the rules which matched these 
objectives were applied. Thirdly, international law was used in order to regulate a 
conflict which was – at the outset – an internal one. Fourthly, some principles, 
such as respect for human and minority rights and the almost absolute prohibition 
on the use of force, were a priority for the EC and its Member States in dealing 
with the Yugoslav crises, while the principle of the integrity of states and the 
stability of social and political orders seemed less important. The process of 
dismemberment did not identify per se the presumptive units for future statehood. 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission established that this was to be determined 
not by resort to the principle of self-determination, nor by a strict application of 
the principle of effective control of government over the claimed territory, but 
rather in virtue of the principle of uti possidetis: independent territorial units that 
exist within the borders of a former administrative unit have to establish their 
statehood as against the presumptive effectiveness of the unit as a whole. Finally, 
the right to self-determination was closely linked to respect for human rights, 
while at the same time it could provide grounds for the secession of federal units 
of the former Yugoslavia if some basic political conditions were met (i.e., the 
holding of a referendum representing the whole population). In the latter situa-
tion, the SFRY was not allowed to use force against democratic secessionist 
movements. In sum, a principle of boundary delimitation was used as the primary 
determining tool for the international personality of new territorial entities as states. 
 
2.7 Impact of EC intervention 
 
Despite all the efforts during one year of sanctions policies, troika mediation, the 
deployment of the EC Monitoring Mission, the organisation of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia and the work of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, the EC did not 
succeed in preventing the further escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. In August 
1992, when a new and bigger peace conference (ICFY) was organised in London, 
now under the auspices of the United Nations, the problems created by the 
destruction of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina looked much more 
difficult and complicated to resolve than a year before. Whatever the reasons for 
this, suffice it to say that the European Community was not prepared for such a 
difficult and complex conflict: it did not possess the appropriate instruments to 
influence developments on the ground and lacked the military muscle to back up 
its diplomatic efforts if need be. Its classic foreign policy instrument, the EPC, 
was crippled by the differing positions of the Member States and by the slow and 
consensual nature of its decision making. The Alleingang of Germany, which did 
not wait until the end of the arbitration process to recognise Slovenia and Croatia 
(23 December 1991), blew the EC’s cover. And while the Badinter Arbitration 
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Commission on 11 January 1992 recommended that only Slovenia and Mace-
donia be granted recognition, the EC and its Member States chose to ignore its 
opinions.171 Slovenia and Croatia were recognised (15 January 1992), while 
Macedonia was not, as its recognition was vetoed by Greece, which objected to 
the name of the country on the grounds that it implied territorial ambition towards 
Greece’s own northern province of the same name. 
Thus, the EC’s first confident experiment in common foreign policy making 
ended in shambles, the Community’s own carefully formulated legal and diplo-
matic mechanisms shot down by old-fashioned political expediency. It was a 
major blow to the principles of foreign policy, exactly at the time of signature of 
the Maastricht Treaty.172 With hindsight, one can state that perhaps the most 
important elements in the Community’s policy towards the Yugoslav crisis were 
the adoption of the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States’, the opinions 
rendered by the Badinter Arbitration Commission and the subsequent premature 
recognition of Croatia. While the political fall-out of the EC Council’s decisions 
destroyed the chances for a comprehensive solution (as well as its own role in that 
process)173 and precipitated the catastrophe in Bosnia-Herzegovina,174 the Euro-
pean Community did make serious attempts to limit the consequences of the 
violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and cajole the most bloodthirsty of warring 
parties into accepting a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The EC certainly 
showed imagination by creating specific instruments to reach a peaceful settle-
ment: a peace conference, arbitration and monitoring. In the development of these 
initiatives, the EC remained consistent in advocating peaceful means for solving 
the conflict. It condemned and tried to limit and dissuade the use of force, and 
                                                                                                                                               
171  See Türk, loc. cit. n. 149, at p. 70: ‘In short, the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of 
the Conference on Yugoslavia were legally consistent and correct, notwithstanding their inconsistent 
implementation and the silence of the Commission with regard to some questions which were of 
obvious relevance. The latter shortcoming was caused by political barriers and was not consequent 
from a decision of the Arbitration Commission itself.’ 
172  Ironically, some claim that the Yugoslav case was ‘sacrificed’ by the United Kingdom and 
France in order to satisfy the German desire to recognise Croatia and thus to achieve a balance in the 
negotiations in the pre-Maastricht IGC. See Caplan, op. cit. n. 150, at p. 48. 
173  Recognition hardened Slovenia’s and Croatia’s demands but further alienated Serbia and, as 
such, brought an effective end to the EC-sponsored peace talks in the framework of the Conference 
on Yugoslavia. In Lord Carrington’s words: ‘[Recognition] torpedo[ed] the conference,’ cited in 
Caplan, op. cit. n. 150, at p. 96. 
174  See D. Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co. 1995) at p. 46: ‘[L]ike 
pouring petrol on a smouldering fire.’ Richard Caplan has criticised the general reading that 
recognition, more than any other single factor, has aggravated and extended the war in Yugoslavia. 
He has convincingly argued that ‘in at least one critical respect the debate over recognition is 
misconceived: for the real relevance of recognition lies with the opportunities for more effective 
international action that it created. It was the failure to seize these opportunities, rather than the 
strategic effects of recognition, that better explains the tragic events that ensued.’ Caplan, op. cit. n. 
150, at pp. 97-98. 
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repeated without fail the importance of respect for human and minorities rights, 
democracy and the need for a negotiated compromise. 
 
 
3. SURFING THE WAVES OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 
(1992-1998) 
 
3.1 Political objectives 
 
As of 11 January 1992, the EC/EU gave way to the efforts of others to stop the 
escalation of war and violence in ex-Yugoslavia. The United Nations, and later 
the Contact Group and NATO, built on the record and experience of European 
mediation. All financial sanctions, visa and travel bans adopted by the EC/EU 
during this period were basically an implementation of the restrictive measures 
adopted by the UN Security Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
All restrictions aimed at calling a halt to the breaches of international peace and 
security in the region and the unacceptable loss of human life and material 
damage. The measures adopted to this end were also geared at dissuading the 
FRY from further violating the integrity and security of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
at inducing the federation of Serbia and Montenegro to cooperate in the restora-
tion of dialogue with the other parties to the conflict. For reasons explained 
above, the discussion here will only focus on unilaterally adopted sanctions by the 
European Union.175 During the period under review, only one autonomous 
sanction decision was adopted by the European Union. It has been mostly 
overlooked in the literature and is therefore worth pointing out. 
At the end of 1995, a controversial peace agreement reached after heavy 
American arm-twisting on the Patterson-Wright air force base in Dayton (Ohio) 
ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore also the need for international 
sanctions.176 One commentator has argued that, while all restrictions on economic 
and financial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were terminated 
by the European Union on 18 December 1996 following the adoption of UN 
Security Council resolution 1074 (1996),177 a whole ‘outer wall of EU sanctions’ 
                                                                                                                                               
175  See supra nn. 5-7 and accompanying main text. 
176  The present structure of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established under the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace, initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed at 
the Royaumont Palace in Paris on 14 December 1995, 35 ILM (1996) p. 75 et seq. For a brilliant 
account of the negotiations leading up to Dayton, see R. Holbrooke, To End a War (New York, 
Random House 1998). For an analysis of the problems concerning the implementation of the peace 
agreements, see S. Bose, Bosnia after Dayton – Nationalist Partition and International Intervention 
(London, Hurst & Company 2002). 
177  Common Position 96/708/CFSP of 9 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the termination of restrictions on economic 
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remained in place: a set of political conditions for the normalisation of relations 
between the FRY and the European Union, ranging from respect for the Dayton 
Agreement and cooperation with the ICTY, via the introduction of democratic 
reforms and respect for human and minority rights, especially in Kosovo, to good 
neighbourly relations with the other countries of the former Yugoslavia and 
membership of the Council of Europe and the World Trade Organisation.178 
Whereas the European Union certainly gave the impression of paternalism by 
relying on a rigorous form of conditionality to normalise relations with the FRY, 
these conditions cannot be qualified as punitive measures but should be seen as 
elements of enforcement of the (then newly adopted) Regional Approach, an 
European Union strategy of engagement that accompanied the multilateral 
Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South-Eastern 
Europe.179 
 
3.2 Arms embargo 
 
While the UN arms embargo on the states of the former Yugoslavia was lifted in 
accordance with Security Council resolution 1021 of 22 November 1995, the 
European Union continued its own arms embargo of 5 July 1991 to ensure the 
safety of the international troops and civilian personnel stationed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia during the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.180 
The EU Council decided, firstly, that during the period of the deployment of 
IFOR and UNTAES, as well as other operations including the IPTF, the EU arms 
embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment.181 would be maintained 
                                                                                                                                               
and financial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the United 
Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, OJ 1996 L 328/5; and Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2382/96 of 9 December 1996 repealing Regulations (EEC) No. 990/93 and (EC) No. 
2471/94 and concerning the termination of restrictions on economic and financial relations with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the United Nations Protected Areas in the 
Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of 
Bosnian Serb forces, OJ 1996 L 328/1. 
178  See B. Alendar, ‘Conditions for the Normalization of Relations between FR Yugoslavia and 
the European Union – The Outer Wall of Sanctions of the European Union’, 49 Review of Interna-
tional Affairs (1998) at p. 7. 
179  Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997 on the principle of conditionality governing the devel-
opment of the EU’s relations with certain countries of South East Europe, in Bull. EU 4-1997, point 
2.2.1. Conditionality, i.e., making cooperation and assistance dependent on progress by a ‘partner’ – 
was indeed a strong feature in the EU-FRY relationship. See chapter 5. 
180  Council Common Position 96/184/CFSP of 26 February 1996 defined by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning arms exports to the former 
Yugoslavia, OJ 1996 L 58/1. 
181  As listed in the Member States’ embargo list of 5 July 1991. See supra section 2.2.1. 
CHAPTER 3 154 
towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.182 
Transfers of equipment needed for demining activities were not covered by the 
embargo. Secondly, subject to UN Security Council resolution 1021 (1995), 
export licence applications to Slovenia and Macedonia would be considered on a 
case-by-case basis.183 This provision was adopted on the understanding that the 
Member States would show restraint in their arms export policy towards Slovenia 
and Macedonia, based on the common criteria for arms exports contained in the 
conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council of 28-29 June 1991 and the 
Lisbon European Council of 26-27 June 1992.184 They would also take into 
account the objectives of the European Union’s policy in the region, ‘fundamen-
tally aimed at pacification and stabilisation in the area, including the need for 
arms control and reduction to the lowest level and confidence-building measures.’ 
On the understanding that the Member States would rigorously apply the EU 
Code of Conduct on arms exports adopted on 8 June 1998,185 the EU arms 
embargo was lifted first for Slovenia (1998),186 then Croatia (2000)187 and the 
FRY (2001),188 so as to take account of the improved circumstances in these 
countries. The embargo remained in place against Bosnia-Herzegovina until it 
was finally repealed on 23 January 2006, to take account of the overall progress 
made by the country, most crucially the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina had adopted 
(and started implementing) EU-proof legislation on exports, imports and the 
transit of arms.189 
 
3.3 Effectiveness of EU sanctions 
 
As is amply demonstrated in the scholarly literature, proving the effectiveness of 
sanctions in changing the behaviour of their addressees is fraught with difficulties 
of measurement.190 Drawing reliable conclusions on the effectiveness of the EU 
                                                                                                                                               
182  Art. 2(i) of Common Position 96/184/CFSP. 
183  Art. 2(ii) of Common Position 96/184/CFSP. 
184  See Bull. EC 6-1991, point I-1; and Bull. EC 6-1992, point I-1. 
185  Council Doc. No. 8675/2/98 REV 2, Brussels, 5 June 1998, available at: <http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>. 
186  Council Decision 98/498/CFSP of 10 August 1998 amending Common Position 
96/184/CFSP defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 225/1. 
187  Council Common Position 2000/722/CFSP of 20 November 2000 amending Common Posi-
tion 96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia, OJ 2000 L 292/1. 
188  Council Common Position 2001/719/CFSP of 8 October 2001 amending Common Position 
96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia and Common Position 98/240/CFSP 
on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 2001 L 268/49. 
189  Council Common Position 2006/29/CFSP of 23 January 2006 repealing Common Position 
96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia, OJ 2006 L 19/34. 
190  See, e.g., J. Devin and J. Dashti-Gibson, ‘Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Convoluted 
Goals and Complicated Consequences’, in T. Weiss, et al., eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: 
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arms embargo in the period from 22 November 1995 (the suspension of UN 
sanctions) to 28 February 1998 (adoption of new EU sanctions against the FRY) 
is hampered by insufficient data. Nonetheless, the following general remarks can 
be made. While the EU arms embargo and the prohibition on the supply of 
equipment for internal repression and terrorism was targeted against Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY, EU sanctions were not applied against 
neighbouring Slovenia (which saw ‘only’ ten days of armed conflict) and 
Macedonia (which had been completely spared warfare). While Member States 
were expected to exercise restraint in their deliveries of weapons to Slovenia and 
Macedonia, the effectiveness of this clause was undermined by poor monitoring 
and enforcement. As a result of the sheer volume of weapons sloshing around the 
region, the enormous profit potential in moving arms from where they were in 
surplus to where they were in demand and poor sanction monitoring, weapons 
still flowed through the porous new borders and found their way to those still 
wanting to settle old scores and those in need of defending themselves against 
waves of ethnic violence.191 As such, the EU arms embargo did not prevent the 
eruption of armed violence in Kosovo (1998) and in Macedonia (2001). 
 
 
4. EU SANCTIONS AGAINST THE FRY OVER THE WAR IN 
KOSOVO (1998-2001) 
 
4.1 Political objectives 
 
In the third episode of the wars in the former Yugoslavia (from 28 February 1998 
to 5 November 2001), the European Union took a range of new restrictive 
measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of its role in 
Kosovo.192 EU actions were not based on resolutions of the UN Security Council, 
                                                                                                                                               
Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1997) 
at pp. 149-187; R. Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work’, 22 International Security (1997) 
pp. 90-136; K. Elliot, ‘The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?’, 23 International 
Security (1998) pp. 50-65; D. Baldwin, ‘The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice’, 24 
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191  See M. Kaldor, V. Bojičić and I. Vejvoda, ‘Reconstruction in the Balkans: A Challenge for 
Europe?’, 2 EFA Rev. (1997) pp. 329-350 at pp. 330 and 333. 
192  Fighting began on 28 February 1998 between the Kosovo Liberation Army and a Serbian 
police patrol in Likosane. The last EU sanctions against the FRY for its role in the Kosovo crisis 
were suspended on 5 November 2001. For a political narrative of the fight for Kosovo, see T. Judah, 
Kosovo – War and Revenge, 2nd edn. (New Haven, Yale University Press 2002). 
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but instead formed a source of inspiration for restrictive measures adopted by the 
United Nations. The EU sanctions during this period were generally more 
comprehensive than the sanctions which the UN Security Council required its 
Member States to implement. 
 The inspiration for most of the European Union’s sanctions came from the 
Contact Group on Yugoslavia, which consisted of the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Russia.193 The problem which the EU 
members of the Contact Group faced was that they could not implement most of 
the sanctions themselves. They had to act through the European Union and 
therefore needed to obtain the agreement of the other Member States. That 
agreement was in most cases reached by keeping the wording of the common 
positions vague and/or ambiguous, leaving it to the European Commission to find 
a more precise interpretation that would form the basis for the directly applicable 
EC legislation.194 
Over time, the objectives of the EU sanctions gradually shifted. Initially, the 
goal was ending the use of force against and the continued oppression of the 
Albanian population in Kosovo. Later the goal was to convince the FRY regime 
to negotiate a political solution in Kosovo. Finally, the goal became bringing 
about regime change in Belgrade to enable such a political solution and to create 
lasting stability in the whole Balkan region. The European Union justified the 
increasing severity of its sanctions by pointing to the FRY regime’s continued 
violation of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights. 
 In the spring of 1999, the policy of using sanctions to coerce the FRY regime 
into compliance with the demands of the Contact Group was replaced by a policy 
of using military force. In a declaration on Kosovo on 15 June 1998, the Cardiff 
European Council ordered the regime of President Milošević to comply with a set 
of conditions to normalise the situation. Unless the regime responded without 
delay, 
 
[…] a much stronger response, of a qualitatively different order, will be required 
from the international community to deal with the increased threat to regional 
peace and security. The European Council welcomed the acceleration of work in 
international security organisations on a full range of options, including those 
which may require an authorisation by the UN Security Council under chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.195 
                                                                                                                                               
193  See chapter 2. 
194  See A. de Vries, ‘European Union Sanctions Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting’, in D. Cortright and G. Lopez, eds., Smart 
Sanctions – Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2002) 
pp. 87-108 at pp. 90-91. 
195  Bull. EU 6-1998, point I-35. 
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The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations at the end of 1998 and the serious 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo in early 1999 led to the announced 
stronger response (i.e., the NATO intervention occurring between March and 
June 1999), which was conducted without the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council.196 
As a means of supporting the military intervention, existing sanctions were 
strengthened and an oil embargo was imposed. Financial sanctions were rein-
forced and investments were banned, but these measures took effect only in June 
1999, just after the government of the FRY had agreed to withdraw its army 
from Kosovo and NATO military air raids had been suspended. The aims of the 
sanctions were redirected towards reaching lasting regional stability in the 
Balkans, as indicated in Common Position 1999/318/CFSP of 10 May 1999.197 
Following the September and December 2000 electoral victories of the democ-
ratic opposition in the FRY and the end of President Milošević’s rule, most of 
the sanctions were lifted.198 As noted before, the arms embargo and the ban on 
the sale and supply of equipment which might be used for internal repression or 
terrorism remained in place until 8 October 2001, when they were lifted in order 
to give effect to UN Security Council resolution 1367 (2001).199 The financial 
sanctions against the late Milošević, those persons associated with him and 
ICTY indictees remain in place until today.200 
The EU sanctions imposed against the FRY can be divided into the following 
broad categories: an arms embargo, including a prohibition on equipment for 
internal repression and terrorism; travel restrictions, including a visa and a flight 
ban; an oil embargo; and financial sanctions, including a ban on new investment. 
The terms ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions are often used for such restrictive 
measures. In principle, ‘targeted sanctions’ are restrictive measures that are 
designed and implemented in such a way as to affect only those (groups of.) 
persons that are held responsible for breaches of or threats to international peace 
and security.201 However, arms embargoes may withhold arms from both armed 
                                                                                                                                               
196  See chapter 2. 
197  Common Position 1999/318/CFSP of 10 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union concerning additional restrictive measures against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1999 L 123/1. 
198  See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No. 2156/2001 of 5 November 2001 repealing Regulation 
(EC) No. 926/98 concerning the reduction of certain economic relations with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, OJ 2001 L 289/5. Other measures are included in the sections below. 
199  Council Common Position 2001/719/CFSP of 8 October 2001 amending Common Position 
96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia and Common Position 98/240/CFSP 
on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 2001 L 268/49. 
200  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 68/2006 of 16 January 2006 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2488/2000 maintaining a freeze of funds in relation to Mr Milosevic and those persons 
associated with him, OJ 2006 L 11/11. Despite his death, the assets of Milošević remain frozen. 
201  Based on the definition used in the so-called Interlaken Process, the first comprehensive 
attempt to examine the feasibility of targeted financial sanctions, initiated by the Swiss government 
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rebel groups and legitimate governments, flight bans may hit innocent travellers 
more heavily than members of the targeted regime and financial sanctions can 
also have strong effects on general commerce by denying the possibility of 
payment. It may thus be useful to add to the definition that targeted sanctions are 
intended not to hurt innocent parties or cause ‘collateral’ damage, or at least to 
minimise such effects, because they are concentrated on those (groups of.) 
persons that are held accountable for the violation of international law. 
 
4.2 Arms embargo 
 
At the beginning of 1998, in view of the Kosovo crisis, the UN Security Council 
imposed a new arms embargo against the FRY.202 The arms embargo targeted the 
FRY regime as well as the Kosovar organisations that used arms to promote their 
causes (notably the Kosovar Liberation Army). Since the EU arms embargo of 5 
July 1991 had been extended in 1996 and had remained in place until then,203 the 
European Union could suffice on 19 March 1998 by confirming the existing arms 
embargo and imposing an extra prohibition on the export to the FRY of equip-
ment that could be used for internal repression and terrorism.204 Here again, 
parties on both sides of the conflict were targeted. After long discussions, the 
Council of Ministers agreed on a list of prohibited equipment used for internal 
repression and terrorism.205 The list did not contain dual-use goods, but Member 
States were subject to the European Community’s regime and procedures on the 
exports of dual-use goods in their exports to the FRY.206 
On 10 September 2001, The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1367, 
thereby terminating the prohibition to sell or supply arms to the FRY. The 
European Union considered that its arms embargo and ban on the supply of 
equipment that might be used for internal repression or for terrorism had thereby 
                                                                                                                                               
in 1998. See A Manual for Design and Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions – Contribu-
tions from the Interlaken Process (2001), available at: <http://www.watsoninstitute.org>. 
202  S/RES/1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998. 
203  Common Position 1996/184/CFSP of 26 February 1996 defined by the Council on the basis 
of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia, 
OJ 1996 L 58/1. 
204  Common Position 98/240/CFSP of 19 March 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 95/1. 
205  Council Regulation (EC) No. 926/98 of 27 April 1998 concerning the reduction of certain 
economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 130/1. 
206  Council Regulation (EC) No. 3381/94 of 19 December 1994 setting up a Community regime 
for the control of exports of dual-use goods, OJ 1994 L 367/1 (as amended); and Council Decision 
94/942/CFSP of 19 December 1994 on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods, OJ 1994 L 
367/8 (as amended). 
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also become redundant. Both sets of sanctions were lifted on 6 November 2001, it 
being understood that, with respect to arms exports to the FRY, the Member 
States would strictly apply the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports adopted on 
8 June 1998.207 
 
4.3 Visa restrictions 
 
The package of restrictive actions adopted by the European Union on 19 March 
1998 included a visa ban with respect to persons who had been identified as having 
clear security responsibilities as well as other senior FRY and Serbian representa-
tives responsible for repressive action in Kosovo.208 A list of ten persons, on which 
President Milošević himself did not appear, was published initially. It was an-
nounced that other senior FRY and Serbian representatives would be added to the 
visa ban list in the case of a failure by the authorities to respond to the demands of 
the international community. A second list of nineteen persons was established in 
December 1998.209 This list contained the names of persons deemed to have played 
a major role in diminishing and curtailing the role of the independent media, 
thereby violating recognised international norms and showing a further lack of 
respect for democratic principles. Again, President Milošević was not listed. It was 
only in May 1999, when all hope of Milošević agreeing to a negotiated resolution 
of the conflict was abandoned, that the president himself was subjected to the visa 
ban, together with his family, all ministers and senior officials of the FRY and 
Serbian governments and persons close to the regime whose activities supported the 
president.210 This latter category included a number of military leaders, as well as 
directors and other chief executives of companies and organisations. After January 
2000, members of the police and security forces and of the judiciary were also 
                                                                                                                                               
207  Art. 2 of Common Position 98/240/CFSP was repealed by Council Common Position 
2001/719/CFSP of 8 October 2001 amending Common Position 96/184/CFSP concerning arms 
exports to the former Yugoslavia and Common Position 98/240/CFSP on restrictive measures against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 2001 L 268/49. See also Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2156/2001 of 5 November 2001 repealing Regulation (EC) No. 926/98 concerning the reduction of 
certain economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 2001 L 289/5. 
208  Common Position 98/240/CFSP of 19 March 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 95/1. 
209  Common Position 1998/725/CFSP of 14 December 1998 defined by the Council on the basis 
of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures to be taken against persons in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acting against the independent media, OJ 1998 L 345/1. 
210  Common Position 1999/318/CFSP of 10 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union concerning additional restrictive measures against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1999 L 123/1; and Council Decision 1999/319/CFSP of 10 May 
1999 implementing Common Position 1999/318/CFSP concerning additional restrictive measures 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1999 L 123/3. 
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added to the list. Between May 1999 and August 2000, the list grew from about 280 
to almost 800 names.211 
The selection of persons to be included on the list was mostly based on reports 
from the ICTY and the diplomatic representatives of the Member States and the 
European Commission in Belgrade. In January 2000, Common Position 
2000/56/CFSP was adopted, identifying the categories of persons against whom 
visa restrictions would be imposed: 
 
- persons indicted for crimes as defined in Articles 1 to 5 of the [ICTY] statute; 
- the following persons: President Milošević, his family and all Ministers and 
senior officials of the Federal and Serbian Governments; 
- persons whose activities support President Milošević politically and/or finan-
cially (including publishers, editors-in-chief and SPS party members); 
- leaders of the military and police forces and those responsible for intelligence 
or security services; 
- persons involved in repression activities.212 
 
These categories were rather broad, and a considerable degree of discretionary 
power and political compromise was necessary to keep the list restricted to those 
who really mattered. In the same common position, the Council also indicated 
that persons to whom the criteria were no longer applicable would be deleted 
from the list.213 
                                                                                                                                               
211  See Council Decisions 1999/424/CFSP of 28 June 1999, OJ 1999 L 163/86; 1999/612/CFSP 
of 13 September 1999, OJ 1999 L 242/32; 2000/177/CFSP of 28 February 2000, OJ 2000 L 56/2; 
2000/348/CFSP of 22 May 2000, OJ 2000 L 122/7; 2000/370/CFSP of 5 June 2000, OJ 2003 L 
134/1; and 2000/495 of 3 August 2000, OJ 2000 L 200/1. 
212  Art. 1(2) of Council Common Position 2000/56/CFSP of 24 January 2000 amending and 
supplementing Common Position 1999/318/CFSP concerning additional restrictive measures against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 2000 L 21/4. 
213  Art. 1(3) of Council Common Position 2000/56/CFSP. Art. 1(7) of the Common Position 
also stated that ‘[i]n exceptional cases, exemptions may be made if this would further vital Union 
objectives and be conducive to political settlement […].’ Still, the burden of proof of mistakes was 
left with the person listed and there was no recourse to judicial authorities within the European 
Union. On the (lack of.) judicial protection within the legal order of the European Union against 
targeted sanctions, see S. Blockmans, ‘De EU toont haar melktanden. Het instellen en implementeren 
van gerichte sancties ter handhaving of herstel van de internationale vrede en veiligheid’, in T.M.C. 
Asser Instituut, ‘Veiligheid’ en het recht van de Europese Unie (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2002) pp. 85-96 at pp. 91-96. For a contextual discussion on the recent judgments of the CFI, in 
Joined Cases T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission [2005] ECR II-3533 and T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission 
[2005] ECR II-3649, in which the CFI noted the lack of judicial protection of persons placed on 
sanctions lists, see R. Wessel, ‘The Invasion by International Organizations. De toenemende 
samenhang tussen de mondiale, Europese en nationale rechtsorde’, Inaugural Lecture, University of 
Twente, 2006, and the literature referred to supra n. 6. 
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Following the democratic elections that removed Milošević from the presi-
dency, the visa ban was confined to Milošević and the natural persons associated 
with him.214 While the black list was considerably reduced, it still contained a 
substantial number of persons identified for non-admission to the European 
Union.215 After the free and fair legislative elections in Serbia in December 2000, 
the Council further confined the visa restrictions to Milošević, his family and 
persons indicted by the ICTY (.just thirteen persons in all).216 
 
4.4 Flight ban 
 
Following the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, the European Union 
complemented the sanctions it had adopted in the course of 1998 with Regulation 
(EC) No. 1901/98 of 7 September 1998, which imposed a flight ban against the 
FRY.217 While the Council had already decided in June 1998 to ban all flights by 
Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European 
Union,218 the delay in rendering the decision effective was caused by the fact that 
the flight ban could form a violation of bilateral air services agreements that 
several Member States had concluded with the FRY.219 Greece and the United 
Kingdom initially agreed that the flight ban could only take effect after the end of 
the mandatory notification period for terminating their agreements (six and 
twelve months respectively). In September, the United Kingdom rallied to the 
position of the other thirteen Member States and the Commission that the flight 
ban did not necessitate a termination of the bilateral air services agreement but 
was justified as a countermeasure against the breaches by the FRY of its erga 
                                                                                                                                               
214  Council Common Position 2000/696/CFSP of 10 November 2000 on the maintenance of 
specific restrictive measures directed against Mr Milosevic and persons associated with him, OJ 
2000 L 287/1. 
215  Council Decision 2000/697/CFSP of 10 November 2000 implementing Common Position 
2000/696/CFSP concerning the maintenance of specific restrictive measures against Mr Milosevic 
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216  Council Common Position 2001/155/CFSP of 26 February 2001 amending Common Position 
2000/696/CFSP on the maintenance of specific restrictive measures directed against Mr Milosevic 
and persons associated with him and repealing Common Position 98/725/CFSP, OJ 2001 L 57/3. See 
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218  Common Position 98/426/CFSP of 29 June 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community, OJ 1998 L 190/3. 
219  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 107, n. 14. 
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omnes obligations.220 In an implicit preambular reference to the violation of such 
higher norms, the Council stated: 
 
Whereas the Government of the FRY has not stopped the use of indiscriminate 
violence and brutal repression against its own citizens, which constitute serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and has not taken 
effective steps to find a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through a process 
of peaceful dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian community in order to maintain 
the regional peace and security[.]221 
 
The flight ban did not apply to EU carriers or to those of third countries.222 In the 
same regulation, a symbolic but nevertheless important exemption was made for 
charter series flights between Leipzig and Tivat by Montenegro Airlines. In 
January 1999, the scope of this exemption was broadened to cover all individual 
or charter series flights by Montenegro Airlines between Montenegro and the 
European Union, on the condition that the Montenegrin government provided 
conclusive evidence to the Commission that neither the Serbian nor the FRY 
authorities would benefit, directly or indirectly, from the revenues resulting from 
the flights authorised.223 Primarily aimed at JAT (Jugoslovensko Aviontransport), 
a state-owned company and the Yugoslav national flag carrier, the flight ban was 
a targeted measure intended to deprive the FRY regime of revenues from air 
traffic services.224 The European Union clearly broke new ground in adopting this 
flight ban (i) as a countermeasure by relying on (ii) the violation of erga omnes 
obligations by the FRY.225 
                                                                                                                                               
220  Barcelona Traction, Power & Light Co. case, ICJ Reports 1970, para. 33. Certain fundamen-
tal human rights and rules of humanitarian law (.jus cogens) should be protected at all times and 
impose obligations erga omnes; i.e., they give rise to a claim for their execution that accrues to any 
other member of the international community. Examples are the prohibition of genocide, torture, 
slavery and racial discrimination. See P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International 
Law?’, 77 AJIL (1983) pp. 413-442. 
221  Preamble to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98. 
222  Another exemption related to emergency landings on the territory of the Community and 
ensuing take-offs. See Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98. 
223  Council Regulation (EC) No. 214/99 of 25 January 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1901/98 concerning a ban on flights of Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via and the European Community, OJ 1999 L 23/6. 
224  Art. 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98. However, JAT was allowed to make flights 
over the European Union. Not allowing these overflights, it was feared, would lead the FRY to deny 
EU carriers the rights to fly over the FRY, which would impose significant costs on these EU 
carriers. 
225  The measure has not been challenged before the CFI and/or ECJ, either by way of direct 
action against the institutions or via a preliminary ruling from a national court. The ban was 
challenged in the Belgian courts, however, where JAT requested provisional measures. The Cour 
d’Appel de Bruxelles rejected the request on several grounds. In considering the legality of 
Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98 itself, it was considered to fulfil the following conditions: ‘ces mesures 
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 The flight ban was extended to cover all flights between the European Union 
and the FRY when the NATO intervention began in 1999.226 An exemption was 
made for strictly humanitarian flights.227 In the autumn of 1999, the Council 
decided to expand the existing exemptions for flights to and from the Republic of 
Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo as well as for Montenegro Airlines.228 
These two exemptions to the flight ban were clearly intended to support the 
opposition of the Montenegrin government to the FRY regime in Belgrade. 
 A six-month suspension of the flight ban was decided in March 2000 and was 
later extended for another six months in August 2000.229 This suspension was 
officially presented as a concession to the Yugoslav opposition, which claimed 
that the flight ban was hitting innocent Yugoslavs harder than members of the 
regime.230 It was assumed that the visa ban would be sufficient to prevent the 
FRY’s ruling elites from using air traffic services. The flight ban was completely 
lifted in the first half of October 2000.231 
                                                                                                                                               
répondent à une violation antérieure du droit international; cette violation autorise les contre-
mesures; ces contre-mesures ne sont pas d’une illicitée absolue; elles sont proportionnées à la 
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(1999), 693. See generally, P. Palchetti, ‘Reactions by the European Union to Breaches of Erga 
Omnes Obligations’, in E. Cannizzaro, ed., The European Union as an Actor in International 
Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002) pp. 219-230. 
226  Common Position 1999/318/CFSP; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999 of 21 May 
1999 imposing a ban on flights between the European Community and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98, OJ 1999 L 129/27. 
227  Art. 3(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999. See infra n. 235 for the consul-
tation procedure on the basis of which the Commission could monitor, on a case-by-case basis, the 
authorisations of flights by the Member States. 
228  Art. 2 of Council Common Position 1999/604/CFSP of 3 September 1999 amending Com-
mon Position 1999/273/CFSP concerning a ban on the supply and sale of petroleum and petroleum 
products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Common Position 1999/318/CFSP 
concerning additional restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1999 L 
236/1; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2151/1999 imposing a ban on flights between the territories 
of the Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia other than the Republic of Montenegro or 
the Province of Kosovo, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1064/1999, OJ 1999 L 264/3. 
229  Common Position 2000/176/CFSP of 28 February 2000, OJ 2000 L 56/1; and Council Regu-
lation (EC) No. 607/2000 of 20 March 2000, OJ 2000 L 73/4; Common Position 2000/454/CFSP of 
20 July 2000, OJ 2000 L 183/1; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1746/2000 of 3 August 2000, OJ 
2000 L 200/24. 
230  This does not exclude the fact that strong lobbying from the European business community, 
notably the EC air carriers, also helped to convince the Council to suspend this type of sanction. 
231  Council Common Position 2000/599/CFSP of 9 October 2000 on support to a democratic 
FRY and the immediate lifting of certain restrictive measures, OJ 2000 L 255/1; and Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 2227/2000 of 9 October 2000 repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2151/1999 
imposing a ban on flights between the territories of the Community and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia other than the Republic of Montenegro or the Province of Kosovo, OJ 2000 L 255/2. 
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4.5 Oil embargo 
 
At the end of April 1999, when NATO was already engaged in air strikes in 
Kosovo, the EU Council decided to impose an oil embargo on the whole of the 
FRY in order to deprive its army of essential supplies of petroleum and petroleum 
products.232 The EU oil embargo against the FRY initially also covered the 
Republic of Montenegro (with its oil import facilities in the ports of Bar and the 
Bay of Kotor) and Kosovo. For the selection of products to be embargoed, the 
Commission proposed to copy the list of petroleum and petroleum products that 
was established for the implementation of the UN Security Council oil embargoes 
imposed on Angola and Sierra Leone. This was done to avoid protracted technical 
debates in the Council. The proposal was adopted without discussion.233 
 Exemptions from the oil embargo were approved for sales, supplies or exports 
for verified and strictly humanitarian purposes, in particular for the needs of 
internally displaced persons and returnees.234 With a view to avoiding different 
interpretations by the Member States of the term ‘strictly humanitarian’, a 
specific consultation system was set up.235 Another exception concerned sales, 
supplies, and exports to diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States 
and the international military peacekeeping presence within the FRY.236 This was 
necessary to allow the aircraft involved in the NATO air strikes to ‘import’ fuel 
into the FRY. An initiative from some Member States to allow NATO naval 
forces to check and search ships in the international waters of the Adriatic Sea 
failed to obtain the necessary support.237 
                                                                                                                                               
232  Common Position 1999/273 of 23 April 1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning a ban on the supply and sale of petroleum and 
petroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 1999 L 108/1; and Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 900/1999 of 29 April 1999 prohibiting the sale and supply of petroleum and 
certain petroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 1999 L 114/7. 
233  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 95. 
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235  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1084/1999 of 26 May 1999 establishing the list of compe-
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236  Art. 2(1)a of Council Regulation (EC) No. 900/1999. 
237  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 95. 
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 The oil embargo was continued after the end of the military intervention. In 
September 1999, a common position was adopted calling for exceptions for the 
Republic of Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo.238 The Council regulation to 
this effect entered into force in October 1999.239 The delay of the partial lifting of 
the embargo was needed for the Commission to create a system whereby the 
exceptions would not create loopholes through which petroleum and petroleum 
products could slip into the rest of the FRY.240 The Commission cooperated with 
the competent authorities of the Republic of Montenegro to establish a control 
mechanism that would guarantee the effectiveness of the EU oil embargo. A 
similar agreement could not be reached with the UN administration in Kosovo 
because its mandate did not authorise cooperation with third parties on an oil 
embargo against the FRY.241 As a result, petroleum exports from the European 
Union to Kosovo could only take place if the competent authorities within the 
European Union obtained conclusive evidence that the products sold, supplied or 
exported stayed within that province. Under the circumstances, such evidence was 
difficult to obtain. The oil embargo was partially suspended in March 2000 and 
then lifted in October 2000, following the electoral victory of the democratic 
opposition in the FRY and the end of President Milošević’s rule.242 
 
4.6 Financial sanctions 
 
The first financial sanctions imposed against the FRY were included in the 
package adopted on 19 March 1998 and concerned a moratorium on government-
financed export credit support for trade and investment, including government 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 2000 L 255/3. 
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financing for privatisations, in Serbia.243 The prohibition of financing for privati-
sation was intended to deny financial benefits to the FRY/Serbian governments as 
owners of the companies to be privatised. But of course the general denial of 
trade or investment support hurt all companies in Serbia. The Republic of 
Montenegro was exempted from this measure. These sanctions were lifted in 
November 2000.244 
 In June 1998, the Council ordered by Regulation (EC) No. 1295/98 that all 
funds held outside the territory of the FRY and belonging to the government of 
the FRY and/or the government of the Republic of Serbia were to be frozen or 
denied.245 Financial institutions in the European Union were prohibited from 
making funds available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of those 
governments. The funds to be frozen or denied were defined in Article 1 of the 
regulation as ‘funds of any kind, including interest, dividends or other value 
accruing to or from any such funds.’ When it was realised that this approach did 
not cause real financial problems for the FRY/Serbian regime, the Council in June 
1999 decided to strengthen the financial sanctions by extending the range of 
targets and the scope of funds to be frozen. According to Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1294/1999, the targets of financial sanctions included not only the 
government of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia, but all 
 
[…] agencies, bodies or organs, companies, undertakings, institutions and entities 
owned or controlled by that Government, including all financial institutions and 
State-owned and socially-owned entities organized in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia as of 26 April 1999, any successors to such entities, and their respec-
tive subsidiaries and branches, wherever located, and any persons acting or 
purporting to act for or on behalf of any of the foregoing.246 
 
At the same time, the scope of the assets to be frozen and prohibited was ex-
panded to include: 
                                                                                                                                               
243  Art. 3 of Common Position 98/240/CFSP of 19 March 1998 defined by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 95/1; and Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 926/98 of 27 
April 1998 concerning the reduction of certain economic relations with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, OJ 1998 L 130/1. 
244  Common Position 2000/599/CFSP of 9 October 2000 on support to a democratic FRY and 
the immediate lifting of certain restrictive measures, OJ 2000 L 255/1; and Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 2488/2000 of 10 November 2000 maintaining a freeze of funds in relation to Mr Milosevic and 
those persons associated with him and repealing Regulations (EC) Nos. 1294/1999 and 607/2000 and 
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 926/98, OJ 2000 L 287/19. 
245  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1295/98 of 22 June 1998 concerning the freezing of funds held 
abroad by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, OJ 
1998 L 178/33. 
246  Art. 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1294/1999 of 15 June 1999 concerning a freeze of 
funds and a ban on investment in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and repealing 
Regulations (EC) No. 1295/98 and (EC) No. 1607/98, OJ 1999 L 153/63. 
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[…] financial assets and economic benefits of any kind, including, but not neces-
sarily limited to, cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other 
payment instruments; deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances 
on accounts, debts and debt obligations; publicly and privately traded securities and 
debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, 
bonds, notes, warrants, debentures, derivatives contracts; interest, dividends or 
other income or value accruing from or generated by assets; credit, right of set-off, 
guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments; letters of credit, 
bills of lading, bills of sale; documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial 
resources, and any other instrument of export-financing.247 
 
The government of Montenegro and all its agencies, bodies and organs at any 
level, as well as the UN administration in Kosovo, were excluded from these 
sanctions. 
It was the Council’s intention to safeguard the Yugoslav private sector from 
the financial sanctions insofar as persons in that sector did not act on behalf of or 
for the benefit of the FRY or Serbian governments.248 To highlight this aspect of 
the sanctions regime, the Commission proposed to attach a so-called ‘white list’ 
to the regulation that would contain the names and other relevant data of compa-
nies that would not be subjected to the sanctions. Initially, the Council did not 
adopt this proposal, no doubt for fear that publicising the identity of such compa-
nies would make them targets for ownership or control by the FRY or Serbian 
governments.249 But not providing such a list meant that only the most conspicu-
ously targeted companies in the FRY were subject to the freeze of funds. This 
situation prevailed until April 2000, when the Council finally adopted the 
necessary amendments in Regulation (EC) No. 723/2000 in order to better target 
the freeze of funds and enhance the effectiveness of the existing financial 
sanctions.250 This was done, inter alia, by closing loopholes and improving 
enforcement. In this regulation, the Council established a ‘white list’ of compa-
nies in Serbia (minus the Province of Kosovo and the Republic of Montenegro) 
that were deemed not to be owned or controlled by the FRY/Serbian govern-
ments, directly or indirectly. To qualify for this white list, companies in the FRY 
had to submit evidence to that effect. If a company in Serbia was not listed, it was 
                                                                                                                                               
247  Ibid., Art. 1(3). 
248  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 97. 
249  Ibid. 
250  Council Regulation (EC) No. 723/2000 of 6 April 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1294/1999 concerning a freeze of funds and a ban on investment in relation to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 2000 L 86/1. Because most Member States were not able to execute the 
screening of FRY companies within the foreseen deadline, the most relevant articles dealing with the 
increased targeting of the FRY/Serbian regime entered into force only on 1 July 2000 by way of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1059/2000 of 18 May 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No. 723/2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1294/1999 concerning a freeze of funds and a ban on investment in 
relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 2000 L 119/1. 
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deemed to fall within the scope of one or more of the four so-called ‘black lists’ 
which were also included in Regulation (EC) No. 723/2000 to target the freeze of 
funds of companies, undertakings, institutions or entities which were owned or 
controlled by the FRY/Serbian governments.251 By reversing the burden of proof, 
it was expected that better targeting would be possible.252 Regulation (EC) No. 
723/2000, in Article 1(6), sub 2, stipulated that a company, undertaking, institu-
tion or entity in Serbia would be presumed to be ‘white’ if it fulfilled any of the 
following criteria: 
 
- [being] able to withhold from the Government of the FRY and the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia, its revenues obtained from transactions with natural 
or legal persons within the Community; 
- [being] engaged in transactions with natural or legal persons within the Com-
munity not exceeding, on a monthly basis, a value of EUR 100,000; [or] 
- [not being active in] the following sectors: banking and financial services, 
energy and fuel supply, production of or trade in military or police equipment, 
transport, petrochemicals, iron and steel. 
 
A first – and as it turned out last – list of about 190 ‘white’ companies was 
published on 1 July 2000.253 As noted before, the financial sanctions against 
companies were already lifted in November 2000, as a consequence of the 
democratically held presidential elections of 24 September 2000.254 
 The strengthened financial sanctions of June 1999 also applied to individuals. 
Annex 1 to Regulation (EC) No. 1294/1999 contained a list of names of individu-
als to whom the assets freeze would be applied. This list was identical to the list 
drawn up for the visa ban. It was regularly updated in conformity with the updates 
of the visa ban list, although the criteria for being listed were oriented to in-
volvement in economic and financial activities rather than police, security, 
military or judicial activities. The assets freeze against individuals was the only 
financial sanction that was not lifted in November 2000, although the list of 
persons to which it applied was significantly reduced, mostly by deleting a large 
                                                                                                                                               
251  For the text of the white and black lists, see Art. 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
723/2000. 
252  This reversal of the burden of proof did not apply to the Republic of Montenegro and the 
Province of Kosovo. Indeed, in those two areas the sanctions were alleviated to the extent that only 
companies deemed to be owned or controlled by the FRY/Serbian governments were put on a black 
list. If not on the black list, any company in the Republic of Montenegro or the Province of Kosovo 
would be considered to be ‘white’. 
253  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1440/2000 of 30 June 2000 amending Annex VI to Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No. 1294/1999 concerning a freeze of funds and a ban on investment in relation 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), OJ 2000 L 161/68. 
254  Common Position 2000/599/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2488/2000. 
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number of military officials.255 In June 2001, the Commission further reduced the 
number of persons listed in Annex I to bring it in line with the list that was used 
to deny Milošević, his family and persons indicted by the ICTY admission to the 
EU Member States.256 
 
4.7 Investment bans 
 
In July 1998, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1607/98 imposed a general ban on 
new investments in the Republic of Serbia.257 However, the prohibition concerned 
only the transfer of funds or other financial assets to Serbia ‘insofar as such funds 
or other financial assets are transferred for the purposes of establishing a lasting 
economic link with the Republic of Serbia, including the acquisition of real estate 
there.’ An exemption was made for the transfer of funds used solely for projects 
in support of democratisation, humanitarian and educational activities and 
independent media. A year later, the investment ban was strengthened in Regula-
tion (EC) No. 1294/1999 by prohibiting any participation in or ownership or 
control of any real estate, company, undertaking, institution or entity located, 
registered or incorporated within the Republic of Serbia or, wherever else located, 
registered or incorporated, owned or controlled by the government of the FRY or 
the government of the Republic of Serbia.258 The ban concerned not only state-
                                                                                                                                               
255  Common Position 2000/696/CFSP of 10 November 2000 on the maintenance of specific 
restrictive measures directed against Mr Milosevic and persons associated with him, OJ 2000 L 
287/1; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2488/2000 of 10 November 2000 maintaining a freeze of 
funds in relation to Mr Milosevic and those persons associated with him and repealing Regulations 
(EC) Nos. 1294/1999 and 607/2000 and Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 926/98, OJ 2000 L 287/19. 
Annex I still listed thirty-seven persons against whom a freeze of funds was maintained: Slobodan 
Milošević, five of his family members and thirty-one members of the FRY government. 
256  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1205/2001 of 19 June 2001 amending, for the first time, 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2488/2000 maintaining a freeze of funds in relation to Mr Milosevic 
and those persons associated with him, OJ 2001 L 163/14. In January 2006, the regulation was 
amended, albeit just to take account of the changed addresses of some EU financial institutions. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 68/2006 of 16 January 2006 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 2488/2000 maintaining a freeze of funds in relation to Mr Milosevic and those persons 
associated with him, OJ 2006 L 11/11. So far, no amendment has been adopted to take account of the 
death of Milošević on 11 March 2006. Thus, the former president’s assets remain frozen. 
257  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1607/98 of 24 July 1998 concerning the prohibition of new 
investment in the Republic of Serbia, OJ 1998 L 209/16. The regulation was based on Common 
Position 98/374/CFSP of 8 June 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union concerning the prohibition of new investment in Serbia, OJ 1998 L 165/1. 
Earlier, Common Position 98/240/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 926/98 had already 
prohibited (a) ‘the provision and/or use of government and/or other official financial support, 
insurance and/or guarantees in respect of new export credit for trade with or investment in the 
Republic of Serbia […]; (b) the provision or use of government and/or other official financing for 
privatizations in the Republic of Serbia […].’ 
258  Art. 4(1). 
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owned or state-controlled companies but also private companies in Serbia. 
Investments in the Republic of Montenegro were exempted, although this 
exemption only applied to companies that were not owned or controlled by the 
FRY or Serbian governments. In principle, the investment ban covered the 
Province of Kosovo, but investments in that province could be authorised to avoid 
serious damage to an EU company or industry or to the interests of the Commu-
nity itself.259 The investment ban was lifted in November 2000.260 
 
4.8 Effectiveness of EU sanctions 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of specific types of targeted sanctions is extremely 
difficult, especially when they are applied in combination with one another and in 
combination with UN sanctions, like during the Kosovo crisis. Nevertheless, a 
few observations can be made on the impact of each of the above-mentioned 
specific measures adopted by the European Union.261 
 A basic requirement for judging the effectiveness of smart sanctions is 
whether such measures deny targets the fulfilment of what they may consider an 
important or essential need. Evidence to that effect in the case of the visa ban is 
not available. Also unknown is the extent to which the targeted individuals were 
able to use false passports. While this ban may have annoyed those listed, it did 
not necessarily make them change their behaviour. The same can be said of the 
arms embargo, which targeted the armies of the FRY and the KLA. As the 
embargo was poorly enforced, it did not prevent the warring parties from obtain-
ing what they needed. The oil embargo was intended to deprive the army of the 
FRY of the means to prolong its repressive activities in Kosovo. Thanks to the 
cooperation of the FRY’s neighbouring states, the embargo was effectively 
implemented during NATO’s intervention and may have assisted in prompting 
Belgrade’s decision to withdraw from Kosovo. After NATO’s intervention, 
however, the embargo crumbled and may have even had the opposite effect, as 
the regime profited from smuggling. But, again, concrete evidence is lacking. It is 
also difficult to judge the effectiveness of the flight ban. Of course, the clear 
visibility of the measure made it difficult to ignore. The resistance of the FRY 
against the ban could be interpreted as proof that this sanction was a real hit.262 On 
the other hand, the countermeasures and threats made by the FRY could also be 
seen as a sign of confidence that the measure was not sustainable or at least could 
become very costly to the European Union itself. 
                                                                                                                                               
259  Art. 8. 
260  By Common Position 2000/599/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2488/2000. 
261  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 87. 
262  Serbian authorities imposed a $30 per passenger tax against EU carriers applying the ban. 
When most of the carriers refused to pay the tax, because payment would have been a violation of the 
EU financial sanctions, they were threatened with non-approval of their seasonal flights. 
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On the other hand, the investment ban may have had a major impact on the 
FRY regime. The biggest and most powerful companies in Serbia were owned or 
controlled by the FRY/Serbian governments. The investment ban deprived those 
companies of access to new capital, debt relief, capital goods and patents. As a 
result, those companies could not transfer funds to the FRY or Serbian govern-
ments. The investment ban thus hit the regime more than the private sector. 
The freezing of funds may have been the most effective in pressurising the 
regime in Belgrade to comply with international law, although, here again, one 
should guard against strong conclusions. The initial financial sanctions, precisely 
because they were too narrowly targeted, may not have deprived the regime of 
access to hard foreign currency. Even the strengthening of the freezing of funds in 
June 1999 had little effect. The freezing of assets of designated individuals did 
not result in the seizure of a significant amount of funds with regard to compa-
nies. Most EU Member States continued to permit payments into accounts of 
Yugoslav banks and companies. The competent authorities of the Member States 
did not devote sufficient resources to determining which companies were to be 
sanctioned. Unless there was strong evidence to the contrary, most FRY compa-
nies received the benefit of the doubt. The provision of significant loans to 
companies in the FRY seems not to have taken place, but this may have been due 
not only to the freezing of funds but also to the poor state of the Yugoslav 
economy, which provided sufficient grounds for a reluctance to provide loans. 
The introduction of the reversal of the burden of proof in July 2000 stopped 
almost all payments to the FRY. But because of the very limited number of 
‘white’ companies, many non-targeted companies were hit by the sanctions. 
Moreover, those companies that were listed as white companies were hit by 
retaliatory measures by the FRY regime. This factor and the almost indiscrimi-
nate nature of the financial sanctions may have contributed significantly to the 
massive opposition to the regime as expressed by the electoral outcome of 23 
September 2000 and the protests during the following weeks. Thus, by becoming 
less targeted, the financial sanctions may have had their biggest effect on regime 
change in Belgrade. 
Partly as a consequence of their relative success, a number of the European 
Union’s smart sanctions were maintained and reinforced after the Kosovo conflict 
had ended. In this regard, their aim was not so much to dissuade parties from 
escalating the conflict but to target (individuals who aided or abetted) persons 
who were suspected to have committed crimes against humanity not only during 
the war in Kosovo but also during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia.263 
                                                                                                                                               
263  See Council Common Position 2003/280/CFSP of 16 April 2003 in support of the effective 
implementation of the mandate of the ICTY, OJ 2003 L 101/22, renewed for another twelve months 
by Council Common Position 2007/150/CFSP of 5 March 2007 renewing measures in support of the 
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5. EU SANCTIONS AGAINST EXTREMISTS IN FYROM 
 
In the context of the Macedonian crisis of 2001,264 the Council adopted a common 
position to impose a visa ban on Albanian extremists who endangered peace and 
stability in Macedonia and thereby blocked international efforts to settle their 
dispute with the government in a peaceful manner.265 However, the decisions 
needed to implement the visa ban were never taken, as a peace deal that ended the 
crisis was already reached three weeks later. Despite an overall improvement of 
the situation during the two-and-a-half years after the signing of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, certain individuals continued to promote or take part in 
violent activities challenging the agreement’s basic principles of stability, territo-
rial integrity and the unitary and multi-ethnic character of Macedonia. These 
actions undermined the concrete implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. In 
2004, targeted measures in the form of restrictions on the admission on the terri-
tory of the Member States were adopted against twelve such individuals, some of 
whom resided outside Macedonia.266 In 2005, the application of these restrictive 
measures was extended for a year and nine persons were added to the list of 
extremists.267 Following the second review of Common Position 2004/133/CFSP, 
the Council in 2006 and 2007 extended the admission ban for another year and 
                                                                                                                                               
effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ 2007 L 66/21. In parallel, Council Common Position 2004/694/CFSP of 11 
October 2004 on further measures in support of the effective implementation of the mandate of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ 2004 L 315/52, and Council 
Regulation 1763/2004 of 11 October 2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of 
effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ 2004 L 315/14, were adopted, by which efforts were stepped up to close the 
net around Karadžić, Mladić, Gotovina and other persons publicly indicted by the ICTY for war 
crimes and who were not in the custody of the Tribunal. Most recently amended by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 1053/2006 of 11 July 2006 amending, for the 10th time, Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1763/2004 imposing certain restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of 
the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), OJ 2006 L 
189/5. 
264  See chapter 4, section 3.1.2. 
265  Council Common Position 2001/542/CFSP of 16 July 2001 concerning a visa ban against 
extremists in FYROM, OJ 2001 L 194/55. 
266  Council Common Position 2004/133/CFSP of 10 February 2004 on restrictive measures 
against extremists in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and repealing 
Common Position 2001/542/CFSP, OJ 2004 L 39/19. 
267  Council Common Position 2005/80/CFSP of 31 January 2005 extending and amending 
Common Position 2004/133/CFSP on restrictive measures against extremists in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), OJ 2005 L 29/45. Apart from the EEA countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania, as acceding countries, and Turkey and Croatia, as candidate countries, declared that they 
shared the objectives of the Council’s Common Position and stated that they would ensure that their 
national policies would conform to this decision. See Declaration by the Presidency, Doc. 6243/1/05 
REV 1 (Presse 29) P 11/05, 10 February 2005. 
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reviewed the list of targeted persons.268 Like in previous sanctions policies, the 
restrictive measures come with a procedure for exemptions that can be granted by 
Member States in cases where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humani-
tarian need or for the purpose of attending intergovernmental meetings (including 
those promoted by the European Union) where a political dialogue is conducted 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As well as political and diplomatic questions, the crises in the former Yugoslavia 
raised a number of (European and international) legal issues to which the EC/EU 
had to provide an answer. At the beginning, the basic problem was how to treat a 
conflict that was at the same time inter-republican and inter-ethnic. Internal conflict 
and civil war were intermixed with international legal issues and increasing foreign 
involvement. The tendency was to ‘simplify’ the conflict by transforming it from 
the internal, federal, constitutional issues of a state called Yugoslavia to an interna-
tional problem of relations between former Yugoslav republics. One of the first 
steps in that direction was the suspension of the EEC-SFRY Cooperation Agree-
ment. The issue arose whether this action was legal under the rules of international 
law. Another step was the transformation of internal, inter-republican relations into 
international relations by way of recognition of the right to self-determination for 
individual federal units, that is to say, the Yugoslav republics. Incidentally, the 
internal borders between these federal units were recognised as international. At the 
same time, the EC had to deal with the political and legal questions revolving 
around the continuity and succession of the former Yugoslavia. The aim of the first 
part of this chapter was to investigate whether the EC was simply applying the 
classic rules of international law or whether we have witnessed the emergence of 
some new rules adopted to satisfy the new European realities. The answer to this 
question tends to include both of the elements just raised. 
                                                                                                                                               
268  Council Common Position 2006/50/CFSP of 30 January 2006 extending and amending 
Common Position 2004/133/CFSP on restrictive measures against extremists in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), OJ 2006 L 26/24; and Council Common Position 2007/86/CFSP 
of 7 February 2007 extending and amending Common Position 2004/133/CFSP on restrictive 
measures against extremists in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2007 L 35/32. 
269  See Art. 3(2) of Council Common Position 2004/133/CFSP: ‘A Member State wishing to 
grant exemptions […] shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption will be deemed to be 
granted unless one or more of the Council Members raises an objection in writing within 48 hours of 
receiving notification of the proposed exemption. In the event that one or more of the Council 
Members raises an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to authorise the 
proposed exemption.’ 
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From 1991 until the end of the war in Bosnia (i.e., phases one and two of the 
Yugoslav wars), the EC/EU, much like other international actors, was preoccu-
pied with attempts to contain and ultimately end the violent conflicts in the 
former SFRY. Despite a number of mostly reactive and punitive initiatives 
against the SFRY, and later the FRY, no coherent EC/EU sanctions policy existed 
in its own name. In fact, most of the sanctions imposed by the EC/EU on these 
targets were derivatives from obligations that originated at the level of the United 
Nations and were terminated once the Security Council decided to that effect. The 
only exceptions thereto, and thus the only examples of autonomous EU action 
during this period, were the precursors to the multilateral sanctions in 1991 (the 
arms embargo of July and the unilateral withdrawal of trade preferences in 
November) and the continuation of the arms embargo after the United Nations 
lifted its embargo on the states of the former Yugoslavia in 1995. 
 The third episode of the wars waged on the territory of the former SFRY 
shows a distinctively more ambitious development of the European Union’s own 
sanctions policy. When studying the EU sanctions against the FRY as a reaction 
to the war in Kosovo, one notices a development from a very narrow targeting of 
the FRY and Serb governments in the first half of 1998 to a broader range of 
measures extending the impact to a larger group of persons and entities, becoming 
almost non-targeted in the cases of the oil embargo and the flight ban in mid-
1999. After that, the sanctions were once again narrowed down to the Milošević 
regime, diminishing the impact on non-targeted sectors of the population, 
although in the summer of 2000 the financial sanctions severely impacted on 
many non-targeted companies and entities. After the elections of 24 September 
2000, most of the sanctions were lifted, although a limited visa ban and assets 
freeze affecting approximately 600 individuals remained in place as of January 
2001. The need for unanimity to adopt common positions that had allowed the 
more reluctant Member States to limit the scope and severity of the initial 
sanctions in 1998 gave the Member States that favoured stronger sanctions the 
leverage in 2000 to trade off the suspension of the flight ban and mitigation of the 
oil embargo against a strengthening of the financial sanctions.270 Of course, such 
divergences in opinion within the Council put the Commission in a difficult spot 
with respect to the design and execution of sanctions. This lack of conviction and 
the resulting inaction in the implementation of sanctions may have allowed the 
FRY regime to ignore the sanctions. 
At a time when the European Union is actively seeking to increase its capacity 
to master international conflicts on its own or to be an equal partner with other 
countries, notably the United States, concrete steps should be taken to ensure that 
military and non-military means and procedures can be deployed rapidly and 
                                                                                                                                               
270  See De Vries, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 87. 
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effectively to manage crises and prevent conflicts. One would expect that the 
sanctions described in this chapter, as non-military coercive instruments, would 
have a place in the arsenal of the European Union. But they apparently do not sit 
well with most Member States. A discussion on the role of sanctions as instru-
ments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has not even started yet. If that 
remains the case, the probability is that any new sanctions adopted by the 






THE WESTERN BALKANS AS A TESTING GROUND FOR A 




1. THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP/ESDP 
 
History has shown that rogue leaders with bad intentions only understand the 
language of diplomacy backed by force.1 Since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Maastricht, the Member States of the European Union have actively used the 
diplomatic structures with which they endowed ‘their’ Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). At first, this manifested itself primarily in reaching 
political agreement internally to adopt economic and other sanctions against 
(leaders of.) third states.2 But since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP 
(SG/HR), supported by his staff at the Council, has made the most of the cautious 
wording of his tasks in Article 26 TEU. In the Western Balkans, the European 
Union, by way of its SG/HR, was instrumental in brokering a peace deal between 
the government and the Albanian separatists in Macedonia (2001) and in ham-
mering out the Belgrade Agreement (2002) to prevent the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia from falling apart and having a knock-on effect on the precarious 
balance reached in Kosovo. The question remains, however, whether such 
diplomatic constructs can sustain the disintegrative forces at work in the Western 
Balkans. For long it has been clear that the European Union is in need of other, 
more persuasive instruments to force parties (that are intent on) fighting each 
other in an armed conflict not to commit heinous crimes such as ethnic cleansing 
and religious persecution and to settle their differences in a peaceful manner. 
The need to move beyond the paper security structures that were introduced in 
the Treaty on European Union during the 1991 IGC quickly became apparent 
with the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia at the end of that year and the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (1992-1995). In the absence of its own security and 
defence capabilities, the European Union could avail itself of the Western 
European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the 
                                                                                                                                               
∗ An earlier version of this chapter was published as ‘Role and Impact of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy towards the Western Balkans (2001-2006)’, in 2 Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy (2006) pp. 209-264. 
1 See R. Holbrooke, To End a War (New York, Random House 1998) at p. 146. 
2 See chapter 3. 
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Council that had ‘defence’ implications.3 The word ‘defence’ was to be inter-
preted in a broad sense, since it explicitly did not include the common defence of 
the territory of the European Union. The term referred to military cooperation in 
‘out-of-area’ actions. Reviewing the significant changes that had taken place in 
the security situation in Europe after the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, the 
WEU Council of Ministers, at its meeting in Petersberg (near Bonn) on 19 June 
1992, redefined its operational role so as to include the deployment of military 
units of WEU Member States for ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ to 
implement conflict prevention or crisis management measures adopted within the 
framework of the OSCE or the United Nations.4 While military units of the ten 
WEU Member States (all EU Member States) conducted operations in the 
Adriatic.5 and on the Danube,6 they did not do so in support of the European 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Article J.4(2) TEU. See also the document on the ‘Relations between the Union and the WEU’, 
adopted by the Council of the European Union on 26 October 1993 and accepted by the WEU 
Council of Ministers on 22 November 1993, published in Bull. EU 10-1993 and as Document 1412 
of the Assembly of the WEU, 8 April 1994. For more details on the legal relationship between the 
two international organisations, see R. Wessel, ‘The EU as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to 
Give Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy’, in V. Kronenberger, ed., The European 
Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2001) pp. 405-434. 
4 The WEU Declaration of 19 June 1992 is reproduced in C. Hill and K. Smith, European For-
eign Policy: Key Documents (London, Routledge 2000) pp. 205-211. On the question whether the 
WEU, in extending its original collective defence task to completely new functions, was acting ultra 
vires, see R. Wessel, ‘The Legality of the New Functions of the Western European Union: The 
Attribution of Powers Reconsidered on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Brussels Treaty’, 
in A. Deighton and E. Remacle, eds., The Western European Union, 1948-1998: From the Brussels 
Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam, published as 1-2 Studia Diplomatica (1998) pp. 15-28. 
5 See: <http://www.weu.int>. In July 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU 
naval forces would participate in monitoring the UN embargo against the former Yugoslavia in the 
Adriatic. NATO was also conducting its own operation at the time. On 8 June 1993, the WEU and 
NATO Councils met to approve a combined concept for a joint operation in support of UNSC 
resolution 820 (1993). The agreement established a unified command for Operation Sharp Guard, 
which began on 15 June 1993. In the course of that operation, the WEU deployed four ships and 
some six maritime patrol and early warning aircraft. Almost 6,000 ships were inspected at sea, and 
more than 1,400 were diverted and inspected in port. Six ships were caught while attempting to break 
the embargo. 
6 Ibid. Following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 
5 April 1993, it was agreed that WEU Member States would provide assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube. In June 1993, the three 
riparian states accepted this offer and agreed with the WEU on the setting-up of a police and customs 
operation. Some 250 WEU personnel were involved when the operation was at its height. Equipped 
with eight patrol boats and forty-eight vehicles, WEU personnel carried out 6,748 inspection and 
monitoring operations resulting in the discovery of 422 infringements. This operation was a practical 
example of concrete cooperation with the Associate Partners, within the WEU, and of OSCE-WEU 
coordination, through the WEU Presidency delegation to the OSCE Sanctions Coordination 
Committee in Vienna. Following the Dayton Peace Agreement and the termination of the UN arms 
embargo, the Adriatic and Danube operations were wound up. 
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Union. The only official request from the Union during the first half of the 1990s 
to make use of WEU capabilities in the Western Balkans was related to support 
for the EU administration of the Bosnian town of Mostar (1994).7 Unfortunately, 
this operation was generally perceived as a failure, especially by the parties to the 
conflict.8 With the crises in Albania (1997) and Kosovo (1999), the European 
Union was further embarrassed at how little it could contribute to the prevention 
and/or ‘management’ of conflicts on its doorstep. Reliance upon US diplomacy 
and NATO’s military strength condemned the Union to paying the bills for 
reconstruction while not moving the emphasis to conflict prevention and crisis 
management. 
Frustration at such inadequacies and calls for change by others, notably the 
United States, led France and the United Kingdom, the EU Member States that 
pack the most military punch, to prod their colleagues at the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999 into carrying forward work on the development of the 
Union’s own military (and non-military) crisis management capability, with the 
objective of a strengthened and credible European policy on security and de-
fence.9 At its meeting in Helsinki, the European Council underlined its 
determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where 
NATO as a whole was not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military 
operations in response to international crises.10 To this end, the European Council 
agreed that: 
 
by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, [Member States] will be able to 
deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks 
as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations 
up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces 
should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, 
as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in 
full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response 
                                                                                                                                               
7 Three later requests by the European Union for WEU support pursuant to Article J.4(2) TEU 
concerned: the clearance of landmines in Croatia, general security surveillance of the Kosovo region 
and the provision of advice and training to instructors of the Albanian police. See infra section 2.2. 
8 See infra section 2.1. 
9 As a result of a meeting between French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair at Saint-Malo, a joint Franco-British declaration on European defence was issued on 4 
December 1998, stating that ‘[t]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up 
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.’ The joint declaration is reproduced in Hill and Smith, op. cit. n. 4, 
pp. 243-244. 
10  The WEU Council facilitated this ambition of the European Union by deciding ‘to prepare the 
WEU legacy and the inclusion of those functions of the WEU, which will be deemed necessary by 
the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of crisis-management tasks.’ See WEU Ministerial 
Council, Luxembourg Declaration, 23 November 1999, para. 4. 
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elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to 
sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool 
of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide 
replacements for the initial forces.11 
 
This so-called ‘common European headline goal’ represented a political commit-
ment by the Member States to develop a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and to 
progressively improve the Union’s military capabilities for crisis management 
operations. In subsequent steps, the European Council agreed to the institution of 
new political and military bodies, structures and procedures to be established 
within the Council to ensure political guidance and strategic direction;12 the 
principles for consultation and cooperation with non-European allies and NATO 
in crisis management;13 measures to enhance the Union’s civilian capabilities in 
the area of crisis management;14 the European Security Strategy (ESS), the 
Union’s first comprehensive approach to security issues;15 measures to enhance 
                                                                                                                                               
11  Bull. EU 12-1999, Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1 to Annex IV. 
12  Following up on an agreement reached by the defence ministers of the European Union at 
their informal meeting at Sintra on 28 February 2000, the interim structures that prepared the ground 
for the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff 
started their activities in Brussels on 1 March 2000. See Bull. EU 3-2000, point I-20. In December 
2000, the Council decided to make the interim committees permanent in the year 2001. See Bull. EU 
12-2000, point I.6. The process to enhance European capabilities has recently been given a fresh 
impetus with the creation of the European Defence Agency. See Council Joint Action 
2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ 2004 L 
245/17. See A. Ambos, ‘The Institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP’, in D. Mahncke, A. Ambos and 
C. Reynolds, eds., European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality? (Brussels, Peter Lang 2004) 
pp. 165-192. 
13  On the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements of 16 December 2002, which allow the European 
Union to draw on some of NATO’s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations, see infra 
section 4.2.1. 
14  The June 2000 Feira European Council decided to set up a European Security and Intelligence 
Force (ESIF) which is eventually meant to consist of 5,000 well-armed police officers, of whom 
1,000 are to be deployable within thirty days, able to carry out preventive as well as repressive 
actions in support of global peacekeeping missions. See Bull. EU 6-2000, point I.8.11. See further 
Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of 
crisis management, OJ 2000 L 127/1; and Council Conclusions of 12 December 2005, Press Release 
No. 14960/05 (Presse 317) on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. See A. Nowak, ed., Civilian Crisis 
Management: the EU Way (Paris, EUISS 2006). 
15  Bull. EU 12-2003, point I.32.83. The ESS, on page 8, includes the following reference to the 
Western Balkans when listing strategic objectives for the Union: ‘Our task is to promote a ring of 
well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean 
with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in 
the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international 
partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The 
credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The 
European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.’ On the ESS, see, 
inter alia, R. Kissack, ‘The European Security Strategy: A First Appraisal’ 2 CFSP Forum (2004) 
pp. 19-20; S. Duke, ‘The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for 
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EU military capabilities (the new Headline Goal 2010); and a timetable for 
carrying forward work on all these issues.16 
Thus, in a very short timeframe, the European Union disentangled itself from 
the WEU.17 and developed what was needed to create an ability of its own to 
undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks.18 These developments found their 
way into the Treaty of Nice of December 2000.19 The European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) was – somewhat prematurely – declared operational at 
the European Council of Laeken on 14 and 15 December 2001.20 The most 
striking manifestation – and raison d’être – of this policy is the Union’s capacity 
to back its diplomatic efforts by action on the ground, namely its crisis manage-
ment operations. Since 2001, the European Union has affirmed its operational 
capability through the launching of sixteen ESDP operations, five of which – 
nearly one third of all EU operations – took or are still taking place in the 
Western Balkans: the EU Police Mission (since 2003) and EUFOR Althea (since 
2004) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Concordia (2003), Proxima (2003-2005) and 
                                                                                                                                               
Secure Alliances in a Better World?’, 9 EFA Rev. (2004) pp. 459-481; A. Toje, ‘The 2003 European 
Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal’, 10 EFA Rev. (2005) pp. 117-134; A. Bailes, The 
European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History (Stockholm, SIPRI 2005); and S. Biscop, The 
European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power (Aldershot, Ashgate 2005). 
16  For an overview of the Union’s efforts to build an ESDP, see, e.g., S. Blockmans, ‘A New 
Crisis Manager at the Horizon – The Case of the European Union’, 13 LJIL (2000) pp. 255-263; S. 
Duke, The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects (Maastricht, EIPA 2001); A. 
Deighton, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 
(2002) pp. 719-741; H. Neuhold and E. Sucharipa, eds., The CFSP/ESDP After Enlargement: A 
Bigger EU = A Stronger EU? (Vienna School of International Studies, Favorita Papers 2003); N. 
Gnesotto, ed., EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) (Paris, EUISS 
2004); S. Biscop, ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, 9 EFA Rev. 
(2004) pp. 509-527; and S. Biscop, ed., E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European 
Union (Brussels, Academia Press 2005). 
17  In the Marseille Declaration of 13 November 2000, the WEU Council decided on the transfer 
of some WEU institutions (the Satellite Centre and the EUISS) and suspended the routine consulta-
tion mechanisms between the WEU and the European Union and between the WEU and NATO. The 
European Union agreed to take over the WEU institutions as well as the WEU activities that were 
still running (MAPE; the Demining Assistance Mission to the Republic of Croatia was continued 
under the responsibility of Sweden until 9 May 2001, when its mandate expired). The WEU thus 
returned to the organisation that was originally set up to deal with collective defence matters in 1948, 
namely, the Brussels Treaty Organisation. See Wessel, loc. cit. n. 3. 
18  The content of which had already been codified to a great extent in Art. 17(2) TEU by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
19  In Art. 17 TEU, as amended, all references to the WEU were deleted. See R. Wessel, ‘The 
State of Affairs in European Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice’, 8 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2003) pp. 265-288. 
20  Bull. EU 12-2001, points I.5.6 and I.28. The Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 
June 2003 admitted recognised shortfalls in the European Union’s operational capability across the 
full range of Petersberg tasks, but considered that they could be alleviated by the further development 
of the Union’s military capabilities. See Bull. EU 6-2003, point I.23.56. 
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EUPAT (2005-2006) in Macedonia.21 At the time of writing, the European Union 
is preparing for its biggest civilian ESDP operation in Kosovo.22 
This chapter explores a variety of legal and political aspects of the European 
Union’s actions in the Western Balkans that helped shape the CFSP during the 
early stages of its development. One ESDP operation avant la lettre is discussed: 
the civilian administration of the town of Mostar (1994-1996) (section 2).23 After 
that, attention is paid to the European Union’s diplomatic efforts to prevent or 
suppress violent conflicts in Macedonia, between Serbia and Montenegro and in 
Kosovo (section 3). Subsequently, the role and impact of the five ESDP opera-
tions that have been launched in the Western Balkans since 2001 are examined 
(section 4). Answers are provided to the question whether these operations have 
been or are being conducted selon la lettre. Conclusions will be drawn in section 
5. This chapter is not concerned with the institutional changes of the Union’s 
CFSP and ESDP as a result of the conflicts in the Western Balkans.24 
 
 
2. ESDP OPERATIONS AVANT LA LETTRE 
 
2.1 EU Administration of Mostar.25 
 
The geography, history, and population of Mostar are special. Mostar embraces 
both banks of the Neretva river. The proximity of mountains makes the left river 
bank steep, while the right bank is flatter and extended. Mostar was named either 
after the bridge keepers (mostari) or after the two towers from where they worked 
(mostare). Right in the centre of Herzegovina, the town of Mostar has long been 
the seat of both a mufti, an Orthodox episcopacy and – since the middle of the last 
century – a Catholic bishop. Until the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1878, Mostar had been under Ottoman rule. 
During the two World Wars, Mostar was heavily damaged. In 1991, the historical 
capital of Herzegovina was one of the most culturally cosmopolitan and nation-
ally diverse towns in Yugoslavia. Of the 76,000 inhabitants, 34 per cent were 
                                                                                                                                               
21  For a list of ESDP operations, see: <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang= 
EN&mode=g>. 
22  See infra section 3.3.4. 
23  For the EUMM – the other CFSP/ESDP mission avant la lettre – see chapter 3, section 2.4. 
24  See, inter alia, S. Duke, ‘From Amsterdam to Kosovo: Lessons for the Future of CFSP’, 2 
Eipascope (1999) pp. 2-15; C. Piana, ‘The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 7 EFA Rev. (2002) 
pp. 209-226; and P. Latawski and M. Smith, The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War 
European Security (Manchester, Manchester University Press 2003) in particular pp. 120-142. 
25  The facts about Mostar are largely drawn from H. Boškailo-Šikalo, Mostar (Mostar, Mi-
crobook Publishing 2004). 
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Muslim, 29 per cent Croat and 19 per cent Serb, while as many as 18 per cent 
were self-declared ‘Yugoslavs’. In 1992, Mostar again came under attack. As a 
result of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the eastern part of Mostar became 
Muslim-controlled while Bosnian-Croat forces controlled the western parts of 
town. The overwhelming majority of the town’s Serb population fled or was 
expelled. On 9 November 1993, soldiers of the Croatian army destroyed the Old 
Bridge (1566) over the Neretva. Broadcasts of the demolition went all over the 
world and shocked the international community into action. As a result, the 
ongoing peace negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats gained 
more momentum. 
Because the fate of Mostar was one of the key points of contention between 
Croats and Muslims during the peace negotiations that led to the Washington 
Agreement of March 1994, which established the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (FBiH),26 the reintegration of the town was viewed by the interna-
tional community as a key indicator of the viability of that precarious federation. 
Mostar was therefore subject to a special degree of international attention.27 
Between July 1994 and January 1997, the town was placed under a special 
supervisory regime: the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM).28 
The aim was to overcome Mostar’s ethnic division through a process of recon-
struction, a feat that was to provide a much-needed model of cooperation for the 
rest of the FBiH. The European Commission effectively ran the civilian admini-
stration in Mostar from 23 July 1994 to 22 July 1996 in what must be regarded as 
the first civilian crisis management operation of the European Union.29 Hans 
Koschnick, former mayor of Bremen, took up the post as ‘EU Administrator’ of 
the divided town.30 At the request the Council of the European Union, the WEU 
                                                                                                                                               
26  The text is available at: <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/washagree_03011994.html> 
(last visited 19 March 2006). 
27  Mostar’s status was determined in the Agreement Implementing the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, para. 1 juncto Annex on Mostar, 10 November 1995, 35 ILM (1996) pp. 170-183. 
28  The EUAM was established by Council Decision 94/308/CFSP of 16 May 1994 adapting and 
extending the application of Decision 93/603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by the 
Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on support for the convoying of 
humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ 1994 L 134/1; and Council Decision 94/790/CFSP 
of 12 December 1994 concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the 
town of Mostar, OJ 1994 L 326/2. The Memorandum of Understanding approved by the Council at 
its meeting on 13 and 14 June 1994 and signed in Geneva on 5 July 1994 set out the conditions of 
application of Council Decision 94/790/CFSP. See Bull. EU 7/8-1994. The constituent instruments of 
the EUAM were repeatedly extended and eventually terminated on 22 July 1996; see infra n. 35. 
29  See, A. Nowak, L’Union en action: la mission de police en Bosnie (Paris, ISS 2003); P. Ja-
kobsen, ‘The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity – A “Real Added Value” for the 
UN?’, Background paper for the Copenhagen Seminar on Civilian Crisis Management arranged by 
the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8-9 June 2004. 
30  The Council formally appointed Koschnick during its meeting on 18 April 1994. See Bull. EU 
4-1994. A controversy over the size of a neutral ‘central zone’ in the decimated town-centre (strongly 
resisted by the Croats) led to the resignation of Koschnick in March 1996. See S. Bose, ‘Mostar: 
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contributed a police contingent to the EUAM.31 The aim of the WEU Police Force 
was to monitor the demilitarisation of Mostar with UNPROFOR, to restore and 
maintain public order with local police forces and to establish and train a unified 
police force in Mostar (UPFM) capable of carrying on after the final departure of 
the EUAM and the WEU Police Force.32 
In the two years of its administration of Mostar, the European Union spent a 
total of ECU 144 million ‘winterising’ damaged residences and rebuilding 
damaged schools, medical facilities, courthouses, government offices, hotels, a 
theatre and railway and bus stations.33 With this money, the Union also funded the 
reconstruction of Mostar’s infrastructure, rebuilding water and electricity lines, 
repairing streets and restoring bridge connections over the Neretva river.34 Most 
of this work was concentrated in East Mostar, which was far more damaged in the 
war than West Mostar. The European Union hoped that equalising conditions in 
the town’s two halves would foster reconciliation. However, its success in 
reconstructing Mostar’s ruined buildings and infrastructure took place against the 
background of its inability to reconstruct Mostar’s ruined political, social and 
cultural institutions.35 
In line with Article 4 (1) of the MoU signed at Geneva on 5 July 1994, the 
EUAM’s mandate ended on 22 July 1996. In order to ensure the gradual transfer 
of the responsibilities exercised by the EUAM to the newly elected unified local 
administration and consequently ensure the objective of phasing out the EUAM, 
the European Union appointed Sir Martin Garrod as its Special Envoy in Mo-
star.36 It was his task to ensure the rapid integration of Mostar into the overall 
                                                                                                                                               
International Intervention in a Divided Bosnian Town, 1994-2001’, in P. Siani-Davies, ed., 
International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 (London, Routledge 2003) pp. 68-87 at pp. 74 
and 85. The Council of Ministers on 25 March endorsed the appointment of Spain’s Ricardo Perez 
Casado to replace Koschnick. See Bull. EU 3-1996, point 1.4.55. 
31  See: <http://www.weu.int>. The request of the Council was not presented in an official deci-
sion. The cooperation was not based on Art. J.4(2) TEU since no defence issues were involved. See 
J.-F. Paganon, ‘Western European Union’s Pivotal Position Between the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union’, in A. Deighton, ed., Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, 
Integration (Oxford, European Independent Research Unit 1997) pp. 93-102 at p. 97. 
32  The WEU’s mandate in reproduced in Special Report No. 2/96 concerning the accounts of the 
Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) accompanied by the replies 
of the Commission and the Administrator of Mostar, OJ 1996 C 287/1, Annex 1, sub c. In May 1995, 
the Permanent Council of the WEU accepted the offer of contributions to the police force from 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, which enabled it to reach its maximum strength of 181 personnel 
during the summer of that year. Ibid., paras. 15 and 51. 
33  Ibid., paras. 31-39. 
34  Ibid., paras. 13-30. 
35  See F. Pagani, ‘L’administration de Mostar par l’Union européenne’, 42 AFDI (1996); and S. 
Bose, ‘Mostar: International Intervention in a Divided Bosnian Town, 1994-2001’, in Siani-Davies, 
op. cit. n. 30, pp. 68-87. 
36  See Joint Action 96/442/CFSP of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the nomination of a Special Envoy of the European Union in 
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structures for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia-
Herzegovina.37 The WEU police contingent continued to assist him until he 
transferred his public order executive powers to the local authorities on 15 
October 1996. The EUAM was replaced by the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR) for Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Carl Bildt. 
The EU Administration of Mostar was the first major CFSP joint action of the 
European Union. By way of the EUAM and the Office of the Special Envoy in 
Mostar, the Union demonstrated its commitment to peace, reconciliation and 
stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a very concrete way. The EUAM was under-
taken in the extremely difficult circumstances of the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The objectives that were set for the mission were extremely ambi-
tious, and the EUAM did not itself control the key elements that influenced whether 
or not the objectives could be achieved.38 Progress on the primary objective of the 
EUAM – ensuring the establishment of a basis for a functioning unified local 
administration in the town with a joint police force – was extremely slow, due to the 
unwillingness of the local parties to work together. In the end, the elected authori-
ties assumed the main responsibility for the management of the town’s affairs, 
albeit under the auspices of the OHR. However, considerable progress was 
achieved in the areas of rehabilitation, reconstruction and redevelopment. Until the 
late summer of 1995, while the town was still subject to sporadic shelling, the only 
significant rehabilitation effort in the east was that undertaken by the EUAM. 
However, many problems persisted in Mostar after the European Union handed 
over its administrative authority, including continuing expulsions, harassment, 
intimidation and the influence of organised crime. Some local parties continued to 
obstruct political progress.39 Hence, in terms of taking away the root causes of 
conflict in Mostar, the Union was not very successful.40 Then again, a major 
reconstruction and reconciliation effort was needed throughout the whole of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – a task that was not assigned to the European Union. 
                                                                                                                                               
the city of Mostar, OJ 1996 L 185/1; Joint Action 96/476/CFSP adopted by the Council on 26 July 
1996 on interim arrangements concerning the phasing out of the European Union Administration of 
Mostar, OJ 1996 L 195/1; Council Decision 96/508/CFSP of 9 August 1996 setting the date on 
which Joint Action 96/442/CFSP adopted by the Council on 15 July 1996 shall take effect, OJ 1996 
L 212/1; and Council Decision 96/744/CFSP of 20 December 1996 on the phasing out of European 
Union operations in Mostar, OJ 1996 L 340/1. 
37  On the UN-supervised International Police Task Force (responsible for police monitoring, 
training and restructuring), the OSCE (responsible for framing electoral rules and conducting 
elections), NATO’s Stabilisation Force (guarantor of overall security) and the Office of the High 
Representative, see chapter 2. 
38  See J. Monar, ‘Mostar: Three Lessons for the European Union’, 2 EFA Rev. (1997) pp. 1-5. 
39  Bull. EU 12-1996, point I.37, Declaration of the European Council on former Yugoslavia. 
40  For (very) critical assessments of the European Union’s performance in Mostar, see, e.g., S. 
Orucević, ‘Mostar: Europe’s Failure’, 15 Bosnia Report (1996); and S. Markotich, ‘Pursuing Balkan 
Peace’, 30 OMRI Special Report (1996). 
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2.2 EU interventions by way of the WEU 
 
During the second half of the 1990s, the European Union requested WEU support 
pursuant to Article J.4(2) TEU on three occasions: for the provision of advice to 
and training of instructors of the Albanian police, for general security surveillance 
in the Kosovo region and for the clearance of landmines in Croatia. 
 
2.2.1 Multinational Advisory Police Element to Albania 
 
Although the crisis which erupted at the beginning of 1997 in Albania in the wake 
of the collapse of the ‘pyramid’ speculation systems would have lent itself par 
excellence for the launch of a so-called ‘Petersberg mission’ of the European 
Union, the principal responsibility for managing the chaos and violence in 
Albania was left to a military operation launched by a ‘coalition of the willing’ 
under Italian leadership in the context of the OSCE (Operazione Alba).41 In May 
1997, the WEU Council decided to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element 
to Albania (MAPE) as part of the efforts undertaken in that country by the 
OSCE.42 A key part of MAPE’s work was to provide advice to the Ministry of 
Public Order on restructuring the Albanian police. A new State Police Law was 
drawn up with MAPE’s support and contained the foundations for building a 
democratic police to internationally accepted standards. In addition, approxi-
mately 3,000 police officers were trained in the Tirana Training Centre (Police 
Academy), in a second training centre in Durres and through field training 
programmes.43 
On 2 February 1999, the WEU Council approved plans for an enhanced 
MAPE mission with a mandate until April 2000.44 This mission was conducted by 
WEU at the request of the European Union on the basis of Article J.4(2) TEU, 
among other things enabling a major part of the costs to be met from the EU 
budget.45 MAPE enhanced its geographical coverage and increased its operational 
mobility. The mission expanded its training and advice to selected ministries, 
                                                                                                                                               
41  See, e.g., G. Kostakos and D. Bourantonis, ‘Innovations in Peace-keeping: The Case of Alba-
nia’, 29 Security Dialogue (1998) pp. 49-58; and E. Foster, ‘Ad hoc in Albania: Did Europe Fail? A 
Rejoinder’, 29 Security Dialogue (1998) pp. 213-219. 
42  See chapter 2, section 8.7. 
43  For background information on MAPE, see: <http://www.weu.int>. 
44  Ibid. 
45  See Council Decision 98/547/CFSP of 22 September 1998, adopted on the basis of Article 
J.4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, on the study of the feasibility of international police 
operations to assist the Albanian authorities, OJ 1998 L 263/1; Council Joint Action 1999/189/CFSP 
concerning a contribution by the European Union to the re-establishment of a viable police force in 
Albania, OJ 1999 L 63/1; and Council Decision 1999/320/CFSP concerning an EU contribution to 
the collection and destruction of weapons in Albania, OJ 1999 L 123/12. 
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directorates and ‘low risk’ police districts down to the operational unit level. 
MAPE consisted of 143 personnel by mid-1999. The WEU’s mission played an 
important role during the Kosovo refugee crisis from April 1999 by supporting 
the Albanian police in their responsibilities for receiving, registering, supervising 
and escorting refugees. The MAPE mission terminated on 31 May 2001.46 
 
2.2.2 General security surveillance mission in Kosovo 
 
In November 1998, the WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of general 
security surveillance in the Kosovo region. The aim of the mission was (i) to 
gather information for the European Union as well as the NATO and OSCE 
missions in Kosovo on the state of implementation of the agreements signed in 
Belgrade between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE on 16 
October 1998 and between the FRY and NATO on 15 October 1998; (ii) to 
provide full support for the OSCE and its Kosovo Verification Mission; and (iii) 
to provide support to the European Union’s readiness to contribute to the assis-
tance to refugees and displaced persons.47 Again, this mission was launched at the 
request of the European Union pursuant to Article J.4(2) TEU. The mission was 
conducted in close coordination with the WEU Military Staff, which provided 
additional information for each of the Satellite Centre reports transmitted to the 
European Union, NATO and the OSCE. In view of the changed situation in 
Kosovo, with KFOR troops and other representatives of the international commu-
nity on the ground, the Satellite Centre from July 1999 concentrated its work on 
the finalisation of a geographic information system (GIS) on Kosovo. The GIS 
was a digital map of the entire Kosovo region with visualisation and analysis 
tools and could be used to assist in several aspects of reconstruction work 
(including demining) in Kosovo.48 
 
2.2.3 WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia 
 
On 9 November 1998, the Council of the European Union adopted two decisions 
with the aim of launching a mission to supervise and train mine clearance 
specialists in Croatia. In Council Decision 98/627/CFSP, an amount of up to ECU 
435,000 (charged to the EC budget) was reserved to cover the operational 
                                                                                                                                               
46  Council Joint Action 2000/798/CFSP supplementing Joint Action 1999/189/CFSP concerning 
a contribution by the European Union to the re-establishment of a viable police force in Albania, OJ 
2000 L 324/1, which was not prolonged after it ceased to apply on 31 May 2001. 
47  Council Decision 98/646/EC of 13 November 1998, adopted on the basis of Article J.4(2) of 
the Treaty on European Union, on the monitoring of the situation in Kosovo, OJ 1998 L 308/1. For 
the background to the NATO and OSCE operations in Kosovo, see chapter 2, sections 7.3 and 8.4. 
48  See: <http://www.weu.int>. 
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expenditure to which the implementation of the decision would give rise.49 In 
Council Decision 98/628/CFSP, the European Union requested the WEU to 
implement the demining assistance mission.50 Unlike the former, the latter 
decision was based on Article J.4(2) TEU because the action would require staff 
having military expertise. The institutions of the WEU had already given their 
agreement to the practical arrangements set out in the annex to Decision 
98/628/CFSP.51 Within the framework of the WEU Demining Assistance Mission 
in Croatia, which began operations on 10 May 1999, the WEU provided advice, 
technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre in the 
areas of programme management, planning, project development and geographic 
information.52 Sweden acted as lead nation for this mission. The mission termi-




In the 1990s, the European Union’s CFSP towards the Western Balkans was 
largely of a declaratory nature.54 This is logical if one considers the lack of 
operational capabilities and hardware at the European Union’s disposal. In the 
military field, the Union was obliged to outsource ‘its’ actions in the Western 
Balkans. Only in those relatively minor areas of post-conflict rehabilitation left by 
the international protagonists (the United States and NATO) could the Union 
make use of WEU capabilities in support of its actions. As such, the WEU 
conducted operations in Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, while the European Union 
paid the bills. The Union’s civilian administration of Mostar was the only 
operation over which the Union itself kept control; the only ESDP operation 
avant la lettre. While it was supported by a WEU police contingent, the European 
Union’s Administrator pulled the levers. Unfortunately for the Union, the EUAM 
                                                                                                                                               
49  Council Decision 98/627/CFSP of 9 November 1998 adopted on the basis of Article J.3 TEU 
concerning a specific action of the Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance, OJ 1998 L 
300/1. See also Council Decision 2000/231/CFSP of 20 March 2000 supplementing Decision 
98/627/CFSP concerning a specific action of the Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance, 
OJ 2000 L 73/2. 
50  Council Decision 98/628/CFSP adopted on the basis of Article J.4(2) TEU on the implemen-
tation of a Council Decision concerning a specific action of the Union in the field of assistance for 
mine clearance, OJ 1998 L 300/2. 
51  Ibid., preamble. 
52  See: <http://www.weu.int>. 
53  The budget for the mission was prolonged for the second and last time – until 30 November 
2001 – by Council Decision 2001/328/CFSP of 24 April 2001 supplementing Decision 98/627/CFSP 
concerning a specific action of the European Union in the field of assistance for mine clearance, OJ 
2001 L 116/1. 
54  The Member States, by way of the Presidency or through the Council, adopted a huge number 
of declarations, statements and common positions concerning the situation in ex-Yugoslavia. 
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was generally perceived as a failure, especially by the parties to the conflict. With 
the crisis in Kosovo (1999), the European Union was further embarrassed at how 
little it could contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management in its own 
‘backyard.’ Kosovo made it clear to the Union that, if it ever wanted to play a 
more important role on the international scene, it had to put its M&M (men and 
money) where its mouth was. At the turn of the millennium, the Member States 
carried ‘their’ CFSP agenda forward to narrow what has been famously called the 
‘capabilities-expectations’ gap.55 The crises in Macedonia (2001) and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (2001-2002) proved more fertile ground for the develop-
ment of a more comprehensive CFSP. 
 
 
3. DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVOURS 
 
3.1 Coupe macédoine.56 
 
3.1.1 Protecting minority rights.57 
 
In 2001, a conflict erupted between Albanian and Slavic Macedonians that 
brought the country to the brink of an outright civil war. Macedonia had never 
really succeeded in integrating its Albanian citizens. The Albanian Macedonians 
boycotted the 1991 referendum on independence from the SFRY and the atten-
dant census because the Macedonian Constitution did not recognise them as a 
constituent nation of Macedonia.58 In January 1992, they held a plebiscite of their 
own in which they opted for autonomy. They publicly and recurrently rejected the 
results of the 1994 internationally monitored census (according to which Albani-
ans made up 23 per cent of the population, amended by a later census to 26 per 
cent). Many Albanians in Western Macedonia felt closer to their kith and kin in 
                                                                                                                                               
55  See C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International 
Role’, 31 Journal of Common Market Studies (1993) pp. 305-328; and C. Hill, ‘Closing the 
Capabilities-Expectations Gap?’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen, eds., A Common Foreign Policy for 
Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP (London, Routledge 1998) pp. 18-38. See supra section 1. 
56  A dessert consisting of a mixture of fresh fruit. For analyses on the history of Macedonia 
since the break-up of Yugoslavia, see J. Pettifer, ed., The New Macedonian Question (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave 2001). 
57  The facts described in this paragraph are primarily based on the Balkan Crisis Reports of the 
London-based Institute for War & Peace Reporting, available at: <http://www.iwpr.net>. 
58  The Constitution of Macedonia was altered in 1989 from ‘[Macedonia is] the state of the 
Macedonian people and the Albanian and the Turkish minorities’ to read ‘[Macedonia is] the national 
state of the Macedonian nation’. The Albanians demanded to be explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution as a ‘constituent nation’. In the 1946 and 1974 Constitutions of the former Yugoslavia, 
constituent nations had the right to secede. It is therefore no wonder the Macedonians rejected this 
formulation. 
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Kosovo than to the Macedonian state. Albanians occasionally accused the Slavic 
Macedonians of discrimination in the labour market, in secondary and higher 
education, in expenditure on infrastructure (many Albanian villages still lack 
proper roads and are not connected to the national water and electricity grids) and 
in public administration. Albanians claimed that police brutality, discriminatory 
legislation and the exclusive use of the Macedonian language violated their 
human and civil rights. Gradually, they lost faith in the Slavic Macedonians’ will 
to accommodate their demands, however legitimate. To this the Macedonians 
would retort that Albanians made up a hefty chunk of the informal economy, thus 
distorting official unemployment figures; that Albanians in Western Macedonia 
largely did not pay taxes; that their under-representation in state administration 
was due to the lack of properly qualified and educated people; and that infrastruc-
ture all over the country was decrepit. Macedonians intermittently accused the 
Albanians of illegal construction, purchases of real estate at inflated prices, mass 
immigration from Kosovo, repopulation of Macedonian villages abandoned by 
their inhabitants, ethnic cleansing of urban neighbourhoods by intimidation, 
nationalist indoctrination under the guise of religious instruction, pressuring other 
Muslims to declare themselves as Albanians and irredentism.59 
On top of these simmering tensions, during much of the 1990s, there was the 
growing problem of Albanian refugees from Kosovo in Macedonia following 
Milošević’s crackdown on Albanians in Kosovo and NATO’s air campaign of 
March-June 1999.60 Repeatedly, the Macedonian government warned the interna-
tional community that it could not allow more refugees on its soil, both for 
economic reasons and for fear of disrupting the fragile ethnic fabric of the 
country. In addition, there was a lot of evidence of massive arms smuggling 
activity in the northern regions of Macedonia bordering Kosovo and southern 
Serbia. Reports showed that Albanians in the Macedonian border villages were 
preparing themselves for an armed uprising.61 Finally, the international commu-
nity failed to establish a link between the crisis of the Preševo Valley in June 
1999 and a possible crisis in Macedonia.62 The attention of the European Union, 
                                                                                                                                               
59  See the December 2001 Progress Report of the Rome-based ‘Ethnobarometer’ network, 
published online as K. Balalovska, A. Silj and M. Zucconi, Minority Politics in Southeast Europe: 
Crisis in Macedonia (2002), available at: <http://www.ethnobarometer.org>. 
60  Some 400,000 Kosovar refugees flooded into Macedonia (equal to 20 per cent of the popula-
tion). 
61  See: <http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/timeline.html>. 
62  The crisis surfaced after the end of the war in Kosovo, when Serbian military and police 
forces were withdrawn from Kosovo and deployed in the Preševo Valley and when the pressure of 
the Serbian administration on the Albanian families there increased, forcing them to leave a number 
of villages. From June 1999 onwards, thousands of Albanians fled, mostly to Kosovo and Mace-
donia. See B. Huszka, ‘The Presevo Valley of Southern Serbia alongside Kosovo: The Case for 
Decentralisation and Minority Protection’, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 120, January 2007. 
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indeed of the international community as a whole, was focused on Kosovo and 
Serbia, whereas Macedonia was regarded as a relatively stable country in the 
Western Balkans. While it is true that the European Commission, in the months 
preceding the crisis, was engaged in Macedonia with different projects, these 
actions did not prevent inter-ethnic tensions from reaching fever pitch during the 
presidential elections of 17 November 1999, when the late President Boris 
Trajkovski’s win was attributed by the opposition to mass electoral fraud among 
Albanian voters.63 Over the next year, Macedonia continued to run on a danger-
ously high voltage. In that year, the National Liberation Army (NLA) (the 
Macedonian version of the Kosovar Liberation Army) emerged, claiming equal 
rights for ethnic Albanians by force. There was sporadic ethnically motivated 
violence in the form of terrorist bomb attacks. 
At the beginning of 2001, the Macedonian pressure cooker exploded. On 25 
January, Albanian guerrillas claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a police 
station which left one officer dead and wounded another three. On 11 February, 
the first sod was turned and construction of the disputed SEE University at 
Tetovo began.64 On 19 February, ethnic Albanian insurgents wearing the insignia 
of the NLA clashed with a military patrol in Macedonia. Due to the increasing 
violence, Macedonia put its troops on alert along the border with Kosovo to 
prevent ethnic Albanian fighters from infiltrating. Amid growing evidence that 
Albanian separatist guerrillas were using the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) around 
Kosovo to stage incursions into both southern Serbia and Macedonia, NATO 
agreed to start dismantling the buffer zone (Operation Eagle).65 At the fourth 
                                                                                                                                               
63  In the eyes of some, the European Union was even seen as siding with the Albanians by 
providing support to strengthen their administrative and judicial capacities and by contributing 
financial means to set up the South East European University in Tetovo, the first official university 
institute in Macedonia (.partly) committed to the Albanian culture, language and population. See: 
<http://www.seeu.edu.mk/english/general/history.asp>. 
64  Construction was completed within less than six months. This is even more remarkable when 
one considers that the Tetovo region witnessed some of the heaviest inter-ethnic skirmishes between 
March and August of 2001. The academic year started in October 2001. 
65  At the end of NATO’s air campaign against Serbia, the UN Security Council adopted resolu-
tion 1244 (1999), which enabled NATO to deploy KFOR troops in Kosovo. Simultaneously, 
KFOR’s First Commander, Sir Michael Jackson, and the Yugoslav military authorities agreed, inter 
alia, to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and police from Kosovo and the creation of a 
demilitarised, five-kilometre wide Ground Safety Zone in western Montenegro and southern Serbia 
along the border of Kosovo. See P. Janković and S. Gligorijević, ‘Burying the Hatchet’, NATO 
Review (Summer 2004). Part of the GSZ, around the village of Tanuševci, in the corner where the 
borders of Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia meet, had become a sort of no-man’s land after 
the withdrawal of UNPREDEP. The NLA had prospered there thanks to different kinds of trafficking 
and other illegal activities. The pending ratification by the Macedonian parliament of a Yugoslav-
Macedonian border agreement, which had been negotiated without the participation of the Albanians, 
was another reason for the NLA to launch an armed uprising. See R. Detrez, Macedonië: land in de 
wachtkamer (Antwerp, Houtekiet 2002) at p. 223. 
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Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the South-East Europe Coop-
eration Process (SEECP), which – ironically – was held under Macedonian 
chairmanship in Skopje on 22 February 2001, all delegates (including Javier 
Solana and Chris Patten, then Commissioner for External Relations) distanced 
themselves from the ethnic Albanian armed extremism and reiterated their strong 
attachment to the principle of inviolability of borders, including the territorial 
integrity of Macedonia.66 The EU Presidency delivered tough warnings to 
Albanian leaders and called on all involved ‘to isolate the extremists’.67 NATO 
Secretary General George Robertson called the rebels ‘a bunch of murderous 
thugs whose objective is to destroy a democratic Macedonia and who are using 
civilians as human shields’ in a cynical bid to provoke ‘another Balkan blood-
bath’.68 Strengthened by the international disapproval of the NLA’s actions, the 
Macedonian army called for a general mobilisation on 5 March and launched an 
offensive against the NLA’s stronghold in Tanuševci. While the Macedonian 
army seized control of the village and its surroundings, it was not able to prevent 
the violence from spreading.69 
The crowning achievement of the Albanians was their success in international-
ising the conflict. In this, they were aided by a panic-stricken Macedonian 
establishment. When the leaders of the NLA, at the end of March, emphasised 
that their sole goal for action constituted the protection of those rights for which 
they had been fighting by peaceful means for the past ten years, and not the 
ambition to create a ‘Greater Albania’, they must have convinced the ‘wise men 
of the West’ – Javier Solana, Lord Robertson, and US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell – to put pressure on the Macedonian government to start negotiations with 
the NLA to solve the conflict.70 
                                                                                                                                               
66  See: <http://www.seecp.gov.mk>. The SEECP represents a comprehensive framework for 
regional cooperation aimed at close cooperation with other international organisations and regional 
initiatives. Of particular importance are the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE, NATO, 
the Council of Europe, the Black Sea Initiative, SECI, the CEI and the BSEC. See also chapter 5, 
section 3.3.2. 
67  Bull. EU 1/2-2001, point 1.6.41. ‘The European Union urges all parties to respect the border 
demarcation agreement between the FRY and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia signed in 
Skopje on 23 February, and reiterates its strong attachment to the principle of inviolability of 
borders, including the territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A 
peaceful and stable Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – within internationally recognised 
borders – is an important condition for furthering the integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia within the European Union, soon through the signing of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement.’ 
68  As reported in ‘Macedonia “on brink of abyss”’, BBC News, 7 March 2001. 
69  The conflict spread out and in the ensuing months ethnic Albanian militants successfully 
‘liberated’ other villages in Northern Macedonia, including Aračivono in June, from where they 
threatened to launch mortar attacks on the outskirts of Skopje and on the international airport. 
70  See Detrez, op. cit. n. 65, at pp. 230-231; and The Position of the EU and NATO on the Current 
Situation in the Republic of Macedonia, available at: <http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/story3.html>. 
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3.1.2 A partnership of ‘honest’ brokers? 
 
At the beginning of April 2001, a number of EU representatives visited Skopje to 
prepare for the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
with Macedonia on 9 April in Luxembourg.71 The SAA would establish legal 
obligations for Macedonia to approximate its legislation to the acquis communau-
taire and to cooperate with the other countries of the Western Balkans. It 
involved the perspective of the establishment of a free trade area between the 
European Community and the country, provisions on cooperation in a wide range 
of fields, including justice and home affairs, and the provision of financial 
assistance to help Macedonia achieve the objectives of the agreement. Macedonia 
was the first and at the same time the least prepared country that was offered such 
an agreement. It was meant to repair the shattered confidence of Macedonia in the 
European Union and to make the government more amenable to Western diplo-
matic initiatives. Javier Solana, who had been ‘invited’ by the European Council 
at its Stockholm summit of 23 and 24 March ‘to follow the situation in the region, 
to stay in close touch with the leaders and in consultation with the Commission 
and to make recommendations to the Council’,72 used the prospect of the pending 
signature and ratification of the SAA as a strong lever to persuade the Macedo-
nian government to engage in negotiations to reform the Constitution and 
establish equal rights for both communities.73 The Albanians found comfort in 
this approach because they expected that Macedonia would never accede to the 
European Union if the Albanian question was not resolved according to ‘Euro-
pean standards’. When the Macedonian government realised that negotiations on 
a political agreement with the Albanian militants had become unavoidable, it 
decided to build a government of national unity by expanding the existing 
government with moderate Albanian politicians. In this way, the coalition would 
share the responsibility for the amendments to the Constitution and other laws 
with the two biggest ethnic Albanian parties, and it would be able to find the 
necessary two-thirds majority needed to push the reforms through parliament. 
While the fighting on the ground and the talks on forming a grand coalition 
dragged on, Western diplomats tried to hammer out a politically acceptable 
implementation plan for the future accord. At the end of June, Robert Badinter,74 
US Special Envoy James Pardew and François Léotard, the freshly appointed EU 
                                                                                                                                               
71  Negotiations were closed on 24 November 2000 and the SAA was initialled on the same date, 
during the Zagreb Summit. See COM(2001) 90 final, Brussels, 19 February 2001. See also chapter 5, 
section 3. 
72  See Bull. EU 3-2001, point I.36.66. 
73  In line with the European Parliament’s resolution of 5 April 2001. See Bull. EU 4-2001, point 
1.6.1. 
74  See chapter 3. 
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Special Representative in Macedonia,75 were sent to Skopje to mediate in the 
negotiations on a ceasefire and a political agreement between the parties to the 
conflict.76 The ceasefire agreement of 5 July was breached by Albanian extrem-
ists. This caused the negotiations to stall. As a reaction, the European Union 
adopted punitive sanctions against the ethnic extremists.77 On 25 July, NATO’s 
Special Envoy Peter Feith secured a limited ceasefire agreement in and around 
Tetovo. The following day, Solana and Robertson, accompanied by the Chair-
man-in-Office of the OSCE, Mircea Geoana, travelled to Skopje to blow new life 
into the negotiations.78 On 28 July, the negotiators decided to move the talks to 
Villa Biljana, on the idyllic shores of Lake Ohrid. Despite some heavy fighting in 
the first two weeks of August, a political deal was struck at Ohrid on 8 August. 
It can be said that the new institutional framework for the CFSP and the ESDP 
allowed EU action in Macedonia to produce a more positive outcome than in 
previous Balkan crises. Nonetheless, in terms of conflict prevention stricto sensu, 
the Union failed to identify, let alone address, some of the early signs that pointed 
to the possibility that a crisis might emerge in FYROM, long before it actually did 
in January 2001.79 The Albanian armed insurgency amounted to low intensity 
warfare but nevertheless created a humanitarian catastrophe when one considers 
the numbers of ethnic Albanian refugees that fled into Kosovo (approximately 
65,000) and internally displaced persons in Macedonia (approximately 35,000).80 
To a large extent, the Union’s success in preventing a further escalation of 
violence into full-blown civil war and suppressing the conflict is due to its 
‘preventive’ diplomacy and the leading role played by Javier Solana. The SG/HR 
travelled to Skopje on countless occasions, sometimes accompanied by Chris 
Patten. Supported on the ground by François Léotard, the European Union’s 
resident envoy, and José Pinto Teixeira, Head of the Commission Delegation, the 
SG/HR put considerable pressure on both the Macedonian and the Albanian side 
to engage in dialogue.81 The looming signature of the SAA between the European 
Union and FYROM was certainly the strongest incentive at Solana’s disposal to 
                                                                                                                                               
75  Council Joint Action 2001/492/CFSP, OJ 2001 L 180/1. 
76  In the meantime, an agreement on a broad coalition government had been struck. See Bull. EU 
5-2001, point 1.6.12. 
77  Council Common Position 2001/542/CFSP concerning a visa ban against extremists in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2001 L 194. 
78  See Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on the situation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 26 July 2001, in Bull. EU 7/8-2001, point 1.6.10. 
79  See, e.g., S. Clément, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the 
FYR of Macedonia (Paris, ISS 1997) at pp. 13-16 and 24-27. Clément draws the same conclusion 
about the limited preventive measures adopted by the international community, ‘in particular the 
European Union’, in the case of Kosovo, at pp. 21-23. See also S. Clément, ‘Former Yugoslav 
Macedonia, the Regional Setting and European Security: Towards Balkan Stability?’, in J. Pettifer, 
ed., The New Macedonian Question (Basingstoke, Palgrave 2001) pp. 285-302. 
80  UNHCR estimates reported in 261 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2001). 
81  See N. Whyte, N. Arbatova and D. Allin, ‘The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security’, ESF 
Working Papers (2001). 
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force the two parties in the conflict to arrive at an agreement by political means. 
To this end, the Commission’s brand new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) 
was also utilised.82 
But the Union could not have managed to broker the peace deal at Ohrid with-
out the support of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the United States and the OSCE. 
NATO’s involvement was evident if one considers that KFOR’s supply routes 
and logistical bases were in Macedonia. From a more geopolitical perspective, 
NATO’s southern flank – comprising the ever-adversarial Turkey and Greece – 
could be destabilised by an inter-religious conflict in the Balkans. Add to this the 
destabilising and radicalising impact upon the delicate fabric of Kosovo of the 
throngs of ethnic Albanian refugees from Macedonia and Lord Robertson’s active 
engagement becomes more understandable, as does his relentless pressure on 
local politicians to deliver a peace agreement. 
 
3.1.3 Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) 
 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed at a ceremony at the residence of 
President Trajkovski in Skopje on 13 August 2001.83 With their presence, Solana, 
Robertson, Geoana, Pardew and Léotard emphasised the importance that the 
international community attached to the agreement. The text of the Ohrid Frame-
work Agreement contained a series of commitments, in the form of basic 
principles and legislative modifications, which the parliament had to apply 
through constitutional amendments and implementing laws. Among the basic 
principles, the parties to the agreement rejected the use of violence in pursuit of 
political aims, recognised Macedonia’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity and the 
multi-ethnic character of its society, and underlined the development of local self-
government to encourage the participation of citizens in democratic life and 
promote respect for the identity of communities. The parties agreed to a complete 
cessation of hostilities, after which the ethnic Albanian armed groups would be 
completely disarmed and disbanded with the assistance of NATO. The rest of the 
                                                                                                                                               
82  Council Regulation (EC) No. 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJ 2001 L 57/5. 
The RRM allows the Commission to dispatch Community funds rapidly in case of an emergency. It 
can be used both to conduct once-off actions arising out of a crisis situation and to ‘kick-start’ 
projects or programmes which will require longer-term follow-up through other assistance instru-
ments. The RRM funds measures aimed at restoring the conditions of stability under which the main 
Community cooperation programmes can achieve their objectives. These can include measures to 
restore the rule of law, promote democracy and human rights, peacebuilding and mediation 
initiatives, the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, the reconstruction of infrastructure 
and the strategic planning of the economic, administrative and social rebuilding of countries affected 
by crisis. The funds available through the RRM were €20 million for 2001 and €25 million for 2002. 
The RRM was first used in March 2001 to pay for the reconstruction of houses destroyed or damaged 
by the fighting in the areas of Tetovo and Skopska Crna Gora. 
83  The agreement is available at: <http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf>. 
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agreement was devoted to the more concrete revision of legislation on, inter alia, 
local self-government,84 the revision of municipal boundaries one year after a new 
census (to be held by the end of 2001) and employment in public administration.85 
Special parliamentary procedures were agreed to for the amendment of the 
Constitution and the Law on Local Self-Government: a qualified majority of two-
thirds of votes, ‘within which there must be a majority of the votes of representa-
tives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population 
of Macedonia.’86 The same clause applied to the majority of votes required for the 
revision of laws affecting culture, the use of language, education, personal 
documentation and the use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local 
elections, the city of Skopje and boundaries of municipalities. 
With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction would be pro-
vided in the students’ native languages. State funding would be provided for 
university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 per cent of the 
population of Macedonia. It was agreed that Macedonian would be the official 
language of the country. Any other language spoken by at least 20 per cent of the 
population was also recognised as an official language and could be used for 
communication with central government and with and/or within decentralised 
authorities. In criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused 
person or any other party was said to have the right to translation at state expense 
of all proceedings as well as documents. Local authorities were given the right to 
place emblems marking the identity of the majority community in the municipal-
ity on the front of local public buildings, next to the emblem of the ‘Republic of 
Macedonia’. 
The Constitutional amendments attached to the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
in Annex A had to be presented to parliament immediately. The parties commit-
ted themselves to take all measures to assure the adoption of these amendments 
within forty-five days of the signature of the agreement. The legislative modifica-
tions identified in Annex B were expected to be adopted in accordance with the 
timetables specified therein. Finally, the parties invited the international commu-
nity to convene an international donor conference to address, in particular, macro-
financial assistance and the financing of the measures to be undertaken for the 
purpose of implementing the Framework Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                               
84  To reinforce the powers of elected local officials and to expand their competences in the areas 
of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, 
culture, local finances, education, social welfare and health care. 
85  To assure the equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies, 
especially the police services, and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting 
the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. 
86  Ohrid Framework Agreement, section 5.1. 
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Annex C to the Framework Agreement contained a number of issues that con-
cerned the international community. The parties ‘invited’ the international 
community to facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation of the provi-
sions of the agreement and its annexes, and ‘requested’ such efforts to be 
coordinated by the European Union in cooperation with the newly established 
Stabilisation and Association Council (SAC).87 The Council of Europe and the 
European Commission were asked to supervise the conduction of a census. The 
OSCE and other international organisations were invited to send observers to the 
parliamentary elections of 2002. Furthermore, the parties pledged to work to 
ensure the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes 
within the shortest possible timeframe and invited the UNHCR, in particular, to 
assist in these efforts. The parties invited the European Union, the OSCE and the 
United States to support and assist with the implementation of the commitment to 
ensure that by 2004 the police services would generally reflect the composition 
and distribution of the population of Macedonia, in particular through the 
screening and selection of candidates and their training. In addition, the European 
Union, the OSCE and the United States were invited to deploy international 
monitors and police advisors in sensitive areas as soon as possible. Finally, the 
parties invited the international community to assist in the training of lawyers, 
judges and prosecutors from members of communities not in the majority in 
Macedonia, in order to increase their representation in the judicial system. 
A major flaw in the Framework Agreement came in the form of the special 
governmental privileges (in respect of education and the use of languages). As 
noted, they were only granted to minorities making up ‘at least 20 percent of the 
population’.88 Ironically, the preamble of the agreement asserted that it ‘will 
promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respect-
ing the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.’ With 
thousands of Macedonian citizens of various ethnic backgrounds making up less 
than 20 per cent of the population,89 the Ohrid Framework Agreement unequivo-
cally discriminated against these citizens.90 
 
                                                                                                                                               
87  On the SAC, see chapter 5, section 3. 
88  Ohrid Framework Agreement, section 6. 
89  Macedonian 64.2 per cent, Albanian 25.2 per cent, Turkish 3.9 per cent, Roma 2.7 per cent, 
Serb 1.8 per cent, Other 2.2 per cent (2002 census). See CIA World Factbook, available at: <http:// 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>. 
90  See S. Gligorov and M. Koloski, ‘Decentralization, or Euro-Discrimination?’, 4 November 
2004, available at: <http://www.maknews.com/html/articles/koloski/koloski8.html> (last visited 19 
March 2006): ‘Public pressure against fulfilment of the Framework Agreement surfaced in the form 
of large public protests against race-based decentralisation. The Constitutional requirement for 
Referendum put democratic power back in the hands of the people when over 150,000 signed a 
petition against the Framework.’ 
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3.1.4 Sustainability of the diplomatic efforts 
 
While the Ohrid Framework Agreement has been criticised as a continuation of 
‘the infamous tradition of compacts imposed by a war-weary West on helpless 
and hapless small nations’ and was doomed to fail,91 it did, in the medium term,92 
bring an end to several months of violence between ethnic Albanian groups and 
the state security forces. In the second half of 2001, NATO collected 4,000 pieces 
of weapons from the NLA (Operation Essential Harvest.).93 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement provided for a decentralised system of gov-
ernance, an equitable representation for ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian state 
structures and the recognition of the Albanian language and culture. It is true, 
however, that additional ‘carrots and sticks’ were necessary to persuade the 
former rivals to adhere to their commitments. In October 2001, for example, the 
Commission adopted a decision to finance a Confidence Building Programme for 
Macedonia, including the use of funds of the RRM. This package, worth €10.3 
million, was inextricably linked to the full ratification of all the amendments to 
the Macedonian Constitution (16 November 2001), as well as the new Law on 
Local Self-Government (24 January 2002).94 Withholding financial incentives by 
postponing the donor conference to which the international community had been 
‘invited’ proved another useful tool to clear hurdles in the implementation process 
of the Framework Agreement. At that conference, which was held in Brussels on 
12 March 2002, the international community pledged €307 million to reform in 
Macedonia – €50 million more than the country had asked for.95 Finally, the threat 
by the European Union to revise the one-year-old SAA was another (doubtful) 
method used by the Union to cajole the Macedonian parliament into adopting the 
necessary laws on the use of languages in April 2002.96 
After a series of constitutional amendments and changes to more than seventy 
laws, the adoption of the law on use of flags of the communities on 15 July 2005 
meant that Macedonia completed the legislative agenda set out in the Ohrid 
                                                                                                                                               
91  See S. Vaknin, ‘Macedonia’s Framework Agreement’, 20 August 2005, available at: 
<http://www.globalpolitician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=1106&cid=3&sid=10> (last visited 19 March 
2006). 
92  In the months following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, ethnic Albanian 
gangs continued with isolated armed provocations and terrorist attacks, such as placing bombs in 
residential areas and intimidating Slavic Macedonians by destroying their homes and preventing their 
safe return. 
93  See chapter 2, section 7.2. 
94  European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, November 2003, 
available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/fyrom.pdf>. 
95  Ibid. 
96  See Detrez, op. cit. n. 65, at p. 257. 
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Framework Agreement.97 Despite the criticism on the Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment, its implementation has spurred a process of rapid stabilisation and 
normalisation of the situation in Macedonia.98 The country is now definitely in 
much better shape than in 2001. Instead of facing a destructive conflict, it is 
currently engaged in a constructive effort to gain membership of the European 
Union. It is to be hoped that the basis for this rapid transformation process – the 
principles of multi-ethnicity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia as 
laid down in the Framework Agreement – will stand the test of time. 
 
3.2 The death of the third ‘Yugoslavia’99 
 
3.2.1 The need to restructure relations between Serbia and Montenegro 
 
The relations between Belgrade and Podgorica had been deadlocked ever since 
Milo Djukanović and his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) beat Milošević’s 
confederates in Montenegro on a pro-independence ticket in the 1997 presidential 
and 1998 parliamentary elections.100 Djukanović’s victory revealed the fundamen-
tal flaw of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the two-state federation 
created in April 1992 from the remainder of Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic of 
                                                                                                                                               
97  See SG/HR’s statement to mark the occasion, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the 
CFSP, welcomes the completion of the legislative agenda of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
S259/05, 15 July 2005: ‘While the completion of the legislative agenda of the Framework Agreement 
marks the end of an important process, it does not mean that the Ohrid agenda is fulfilled. Mission 
accomplished can only be declared when rules are respected, realities on ground have changed, and 
long-term reforms such as decentralisation and equitable representation have been fully carried out. 
Further clarification might be needed in the area of use of languages. Tackling these challenges will 
form part the future European reform agenda.’ 
98  From the side of the Council, this process was overseen by a series of EU Special Representa-
tives. By means of Council Joint Action 2001/760/CFSP of 29 October 2001, OJ 2001 L 287, Alain 
Le Roy was appointed as the EUSR in Macedonia to replace François Léotard. One year later, Le 
Roy was replaced by Alexis Brouhns; see Council Joint Action 2002/832/CFSP of 21 October 2002, 
OJ 2002 L 258/12. Brouhns’ mandate was prolonged and widened by Council Joint Action 
2002/963/CFSP of 10 December 2002, OJ 2002 L 334/7 and Council Joint Action 2003/870/CFSP of 
8 December 2003, OJ 2003 L 326/39, inter alia, to draw clearer lines of command and to give 
guidance to the first ESDP missions in the country (see infra section 4.2). Brouhns was replaced by 
Michael Sahlin; see Council Joint Action 2004/565/CFSP of 26 July 2004, OJ 2004 L 251/18. He 
was replaced by Erwan Fouéré by means of Council Joint Action 2005/724/CFSP of 17 October 
2005, OJ 2005 L 272/26. His mandate was amended and extended until 29 February 2008 by Council 
Joint Action 2006/123/CFSP of 20 February 2006, OJ 2006 L 49/20 and Council Joint Action 
2007/109/CFSP of 15 February 2007, OJ 2007 L 46/68. 
99  The facts described in this paragraph are based primarily on the Balkan Crisis Reports of the 
London-based Institute for War & Peace Reporting, available at: <http://www.iwpr.net>. 
100  See F. Bieber, ‘Montenegrin Politics Since the Disintegration of Yugoslavia’, in F. Bieber, 
ed., Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2003) pp. 
11-42. 
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Yugoslavia: the equality of the two unequal partners in the federation.101 Between 
the inauguration of Djukanović as president of Montenegro in January 1998 and 
the fall of Milošević two and a half years later, tensions between Serbia and 
Montenegro steadily increased. In the light of the escalating conflict in Kosovo 
and the participation of the Serbian Radical Party in the Serbian government in 
early 1998, the Serbian authorities adopted an increasingly belligerent tone, using 
the considerable army presence in Montenegro to put pressure on the republican 
authorities.102 Simultaneously, the Djukanović government adopted an increas-
ingly independence-minded policy, leading eventually to an outright call for 
Montenegro’s secession from Serbia.103 Montenegro effectively ended most 
economic ties with Serbia, inter alia, by adopting the German mark in November 
1999 as a parallel currency and, as of November 2000, as an exclusive one 
(before switching to the euro in early 2002).104 In response, Serbia established 
checkpoints at the border between the two republics and started collecting 
customs duties, thus in fact confirming Montenegro’s independence in all but 
name. The FRY had become a dead letter. 
The deadlock in relations between Belgrade and Podgorica became an acute 
political dilemma after Milošević was removed from the presidential peluche in 
the wake of the epochal elections in October 2000. In the course of just a few 
months, all major players managed to manoeuvre themselves into an untenable 
position. Djukanović, expecting Milošević to win, had boycotted the federal 
elections. As a consequence, his natural allies, the reform-oriented and pro-
Western Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), took over power in Serbia but 
had to make a coalition at the federal level with the reactionary Montenegrin 
opposition. The reform drive and international credibility of the political pro-
gramme of the late Zoran Djindjić, the new prime minister of Serbia, fell prey to 
the stand-off over competences between federation and republic. The newly 
                                                                                                                                               
101  Serbia is sixteen times bigger than Montenegro in terms of population and six times in terms 
of landmass. See CIA World Fact Book, available at: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/yi.html>. In 2006, the population of Serbia and Montenegro stood at roughly 10.5 million with 
approximately 8 million living in Serbia, 1.9 million in Kosovo and 600,000 in Montenegro. The 
total landmass of Serbia and Montenegro is 102,350 sq km: Serbia accounts for 77,535 sq km, 
Kosovo for 10,877 sq km and Montenegro for 13,938 sq km. 
102  See E. Schmitt, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: The Military; NATO Commander Says Milošević is 
Moving Forces into Pro-Western Montenegrin Republic’, New York Times, 2 July 1999; and ‘Armed 
Yugoslav Troops Take over Montenegro’s Main Airport’, New York Times, 9 December 1999. 
103  See S. Erlanger, ‘Montenegrins See Split with Serbia’, New York Times, 18 October 1999. 
104  The dispute over Montenegro’s status has been considerably informed by economic consid-
erations. See B. Huszka, ‘The Dispute over Montenegrin Independence’, in Bieber, op. cit. n. 100, at 
pp. 43-62. The successful introduction of the euro is by no means an indication of economic strength 
or aptitude: Podgorica is not bound by any criteria of economic convergence. The currency is more 
convenient for legal and not-so-legal international dealings than for an ailing local economy. See 
ICG, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, Europe Report, No. 169, 7 December 2005. 
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installed president, Vojislav Koštunica, saw his lead in popularity diminish in 
comparison with Djindjić and other younger reformers, a development partly due 
to the powerlessness of his position. The nationalist opposition of former 
Milošević parties witnessed the once proud Yugoslavia become defunct, with a 
quasi-independent state in Montenegro and a quasi-protectorate in Kosovo. In 
Podgorica, his narrow victory on 22 April 2001 in the parliamentary elections and 
the rising popularity of the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP) in the 
polls determined Djukanović’s reluctance to implement his promise for a referen-
dum on independence.105 Thus, after the euphoria at the end of 2000 of finally 
having democratic negotiating partners and two constructive and apparently 
compatible platforms,106 the actual talks between Belgrade and Podgorica soon 
stalled in a ‘consent not to consent’. As all players came to realise that they had 
manoeuvred themselves into a ‘lose-lose’ situation, the perspective of closer 
relations with the European Union provided economic incentives as well as a 
welcome excuse to accept mediation of the Union’s High Representative for the 
CFSP. 
 
3.2.2 The EU as an honest broker? 
 
From December 2001 onwards, when Javier Solana took on the ‘mission impos-
sible’ to find the middle ground between Belgrade and Podgorica and prevent a 
spring referendum on the independence of Montenegro, criticism grew louder and 
louder. No doubt, Solana’s role went far beyond merely offering ‘good offices’.107 
As participants to the negotiations have indicated, Solana often dangled the carrot 
of opening negotiations on a prospective Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
                                                                                                                                               
105  See M. Tadić, ‘Montenegrin Independence on Hold’, 240 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2001). 
106  The Montenegrin negotiation position was put to paper by Djukanović on 29 December 
2000. The joint reply by Federal President Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Djindjić was 
presented on 10 January 2001. The full text of both positions is reproduced in CEPS Europa South-
East Monitor, Issue 19, January 2001. Typically, whereas the Djukanović platform dwells on the 
injustices of past Montenegro-Serbia relations and Montenegro’s ‘inalienable right to self-
determination’, the preamble of the response by Koštunica and Djindjić highlights the merits of 
federal arrangements, historic and cultural ties as well as joint economic interests. 
107  In its original meaning, good offices are aimed only at the initiation or resumption of negotia-
tions, with no active participation of the third party. In a mediatory process, on the other hand, the 
third party tries to bring the conflicting parties to an agreement for peaceful settlement by actively 
participating in the process of negotiations. In practice, however, the borderline between the two 
methods is often blurred. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
(1907) set up the same rules for offering and handling good offices and mediation (Arts. 2-8). The 
text of the Convention reproduced on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, available at: 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/BD/1907.htm>, is a translation of the French text adopted at the 
1907 Peace Conference. Nowadays, the term ‘good offices’ is generally accepted to mean the supply 
of mediation services by persons of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality to find an 
amicable settlement of a dispute between states. 
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between the FRY and the European Union, with its immediate economic advan-
tages and its alluring promise of future EU membership.108 But the SG/HR was 
also reported to have threatened Montenegro with cutting off at least half of EU 
financial aid if Podgorica pursued its plans to stage a referendum on independ-
ence.109 On 14 February 2002, the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) and International Crisis Group (ICG) published an open letter to 
the SG/HR concerning Montenegro.110 One part of the think tanks’ critique 
concerned Solana’s methods of applying extreme pressure to just one side in 
order to ‘bulldozer’ Podgorica towards the European Union’s preferred solution. 
In their view, the Union used its hegemony as a regional economic power to force 
a state union on ‘unwilling partners’.111 The other half of the critique concerned 
the dictated outcome of the negotiations: ‘a democratic Montenegro in a democ-
ratic (FR)Yugoslavia.’112 This solution was considered ‘economically and 
politically unwise’.113 Solana’s attempts to keep Serbia and Montenegro together 
were more often than not understood as blunt efforts to preserve the status quo, 
with some minor, cosmetic modifications. Consequently, the European Union 
would end up polarising the parties and supporting the line of the reactionary SNP 
nationalists in Montenegro and the parties of the former Milošević coalition in 
Serbia. 
Once both Koštunica and Djindjić had expressed their willingness to consider 
a new form of federation with Montenegro (albeit not at all costs), Solana indeed 
ended up siding with the reactionary forces at the federal level and in Montene-
gro, cajoling the pro-independence parties into making major concessions to their 
programme.114 Publicly, the European Union failed to distance its stabilisation 
objective from the die-hard conservatism of the local pro-Yugoslav forces. 
Nevertheless, the final agreement, which constituted a compromise between the 
two original position papers, ultimately favoured the reformers rather than the 
reactionaries. The ‘creation’ of the new state union of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ 
and a temporary freezing of the status issue allowed pro-Western politicians in 
both republics to pursue their reform agendas with more zeal. 
                                                                                                                                               
108  See G. Barrett, ‘EU and Serbia and Montenegro’, in D. Lopandić and V. Bajić, eds., Serbia 
and Montenegro on the Road to the European Union – Two Years Later (Belgrade, European 
Movement in Serbia 2003) pp. 37-45. 
109  See M. Tadić, ‘Montenegro: Djukanović Cornered over Independence’, 319 IWPR Balkan 
Crisis Report (2002); and M. Wisse Smit, ‘Comment: Squabbling Yugoslav Republics Set for 
Divorce’, 322 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2002). 
110  The open letter is reproduced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 
2002. 
111  Ibid. 
112  See Council Conclusions throughout 2001, published in Bull. EU 2001. 
113  CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 2002. 
114  See Wisse Smit, loc. cit. n. 109. 
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3.2.3 Belgrade Agreement (2002) 
 
A document called ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations Between 
Serbia and Montenegro’ – commonly known as the Belgrade Agreement, after the 
place were it was signed on 14 March 2002 – was the outcome of the trilateral 
negotiations between the governments of Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal 
Republic Yugoslavia, with the SG/HR as mediator and ‘witness’ to the agree-
ment.115 In the most principal set of issues, international status and representation, 
the Belgrade Agreement contains only one short reference to ‘elements of Serbian 
and Montenegrin statehood, stemming from the present-day factual situation and 
the historic rights of the two member states.’ The agreement largely follows the 
Serb position with a veto on unilateral secession. Montenegro was not granted its 
desired international legal personality, but in return Serbia (and the European 
Union) accepted the option of a referendum on independence three years after the 
adoption of the Constitutional Charter which was to implement the agreement. To 
protect Montenegro’s interests from being swamped by Serb domination of the 
joint institutions and international representative positions, specific safeguards 
were built in for proportional representation by rotation. 
As far as the more tangible issues of the relations between the federation and 
the composite republics and the division of competences are concerned, the 
Belgrade Agreement is largely uninformative. The range of joint competences 
and ministries – defence, foreign affairs, internal and international economic 
relations as well as human and minority rights (including cooperation with the 
ICTY) – copied the Montenegrin proposal, with the exception of the common 
market and the convertible currency (euro). As the composite republics were 
allowed to keep their separate economies, currencies and customs services, the 
actual competences of the federation in internal and international economic 
relations were not clearly formulated. In the sphere of defence, conscripts would 
not be forced to serve outside their own republic against their will. There would 
be only one federal army – a lesson from Bosnia. 
In terms of state institutions and decision making, the Belgrade Agreement 
followed the more pragmatic Serbian approach based on operability rather than a 
strict interpretation of equality. The impracticable system of having two republi-
can ministers of defence and two republican ministers of foreign affairs taking 
                                                                                                                                               
115  The ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro’ 
have been reproduced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 2002. For 
further analyses and commentaries, see, e.g., N. Bentzen, Fata Solana. Die Staatsunion Serbien-
Montenegro – eine Spiegelung zwischen ‘Balkan’ und EU? (Vienna University, Interdisziplinäre 
Balkanstudien – IDM 2004), available at: <http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Vedran.Dzihic/balkan_bentzen. 
pdf>; and W. van Meurs, ‘The Belgrade Agreement: Robust Mediation Between Serbia and Monte-
negro’, in Bieber, op. cit. n. 100, pp. 63-79. 
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turns in the respective nominal positions at the federal level was replaced with an 
‘exchange of roles’ by these two federal ministers and their respective deputies 
from the other republic. In line with the limited competences of the federal 
government, the Belgrade Agreement did not foresee a prime minister. The 
supervision of the ministerial council would be in the hands of the president. The 
unicameral parliament elected by all citizens of the federation pointed in the same 
direction, ignoring demands for a parallel system of republican parity next to 
individual democratic rights. 
In short, apart from the clear decision to rename the FRY, most of the conten-
tious issues had been left open, awaiting a constructive negotiation process to fill 
in the gaps. Thus, the Belgrade Agreement was essentially a declaration of intent 
rather than a constitutional blueprint. The modalities for the achievement of the 
goals set out in the agreement were to be elaborated in parallel with the Constitu-
tional Charter. The substantiation of the agreement by a mixed commission from 
the two republican parliaments and the federal parliament proved no easy task.116 
The commission presented a Constitutional Charter in June 2002. Thereafter, 
newly elected republican parliaments and eventually a federal parliament elected 
by the entire constituency of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ passed democratic judge-
ment on the new federation. The Constitutional Charter was adopted and 
proclaimed on 4 February 2003 by the parliament of Serbia and Montenegro.117 
 
3.2.4 Sustainability of the European Union’s diplomatic efforts? 
 
The Belgrade Agreement left a number of questions unanswered. An obvious 
question concerned the state’s ambiguous character between a federation and a 
confederation. Effectively, ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ was a continuation of the 
1992 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.118 At the same time, however, the fact that 
the Constitutional Charter had to be passed by the parliaments of the composite 
republics after elections indicated an institutional break with the past. Many in 
Serbia, nostalgic for the days of Tito, regretted the loss of the name ‘Yugoslavia’ 
and the ideal of a multi-ethnic state it once implied. To others in the region, 
‘Yugoslavia’ stood only for Serb ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing. After 
the extradition of Milošević, dropping the name ‘Yugoslavia’ was a second 
reassuring symbol, a farewell to the era of ethnic conflict and human tragedy. Of 
                                                                                                                                               
116  For an elaboration on the open questions, hidden caveats and difficult negotiation process, 
see Van Meurs, loc. cit. n. 115, pp. 73-78; and G. Noutcheva, ‘Negotiating a Viable State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro’, CEPS Commentary (2002). 
117  See Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro No. 1 of 4 February 2003, available at: 
<http://www.osce.org/documents/fry/2003/02/133_en.pdf>. For the European Union’s reaction, see 
Council Conclusions of 24 February 2003, Press Release No. 6604/03 (Presse 52). 
118  Recognised by not only by the European Union but also the United Nations. Serbia and 
Montenegro took the seat of the FRY in the General Assembly. 
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course, the argument that Yugoslavia in its three forms – the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (1918-1945), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(1945-1992) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2002) – was an 
historic error or that the FRY was an anti-European and anti-democratic state 
reintroduced the ideal of nation-states through the backdoor. 
Another deficit of the Belgrade Agreement concerned the economic integra-
tion of the two composite republics: each member of the state union retained its 
own economic, financial and customs systems, and Montenegro retained the euro. 
Both the EU mediators and the negotiating parties clearly gave priority to easing 
tensions over the status question, hoping that new economic momentum spurred 
by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) would make up for the 
evident disadvantages of economic separation.119 
The principal issue was the impact of the Belgrade Agreement on stability in 
the region. One of the reasons why the European Union had strongly objected to 
the idea of Montenegrin independence ever since Djukanović took office, 
although the Badinter Commission had confirmed Montenegro’s right to self-
determination,120 was concern that allowing a referendum on independence would 
create further tensions within a very divided society.121 The chief reason, how-
ever, was the Union’s worry for a precedent followed by yet another round of 
state fragmentation in a region traditionally suffering from too many state- and 
nation-building projects. The European Union was afraid that unravelling the 
Yugoslav federation would open the way to independence for unstable Kosovo 
and potentially even for the Republika Srpska. Kosovo’s unresolved status was 
the main obstacle to Montenegro’s independence, although political leaders in 
Podgorica and Priština never tired of denying any such nexus.122 
What the Belgrade Agreement achieved was gaining time rather than playing 
for time. It erased the illusion of a viable FRY and stabilised relations between 
the two republics. The agreement, given hands and feet by the Constitutional 
Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, prescribed a three-year cooling-off period 
before any of the composite republics could hold a referendum on independ-
ence.123 Even if the new state union were only a transitional solution, it ended the 
 
                                                                                                                                               
119  See D. Reljić, ‘Serbien und Montenegro einigen sich über zukünftige staatliche Gemein-
schaft’, SWP-Brennpunkte (2002). On the SAP, see chapter 5. 
120  See chapter 3. 
121  The high cost of integrating an independent Montenegro into the European Union has been 
mentioned as another reason for the Union’s opposition. See Wisse Smit, loc. cit. n. 109. 
122  Recent history has shown that Kosovar politicians have indeed not abandoned their aspira-
tions for independence, no matter what kind of constitutional acrobatics the Montenegrins perform. 
123  Incidentally, it gave the pro-independence movement in Montenegro ample time to prepare 
for a referendum. 
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constitutional confusion and political deadlock, without impeding the progress of 
either towards European integration.124 Most importantly, it gave the international 
community time to find a way to tackle the final status question for Kosovo. The 
price that the European Union was willing to pay for that was the acceptance of 
secession by Montenegro, counter to international rules on the inviolability of 
borders, as long as the vote would be ‘legitimate’, that is to say, that there would 
be a 50 per cent threshold for participation and a 55 per cent threshold for the 
approval of any result.125 
In the end, the Belgrade Agreement was a mere stopgap before a narrow ma-
jority of the Montenegrin voters (55.5 per cent) chose independence in a 
nationwide referendum held on 21 May 2006.126 In a special session on 3 June, 
the parliament in Podgorica passed a declaration on the independence of the 
Republic of Montenegro. On 5 June, the parliament in Belgrade declared the 
Republic of Serbia the legal successor to the state union and gave all state 
institutions forty-five days to complete the separation. On 12 June, the Council of 
the European Union recognised that the parliamentary acts were taken in confor-
mity with the arrangements and procedures foreseen in the Belgrade Agreement 
as well as Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter. International recognition of the 
two new states followed soon afterwards. 
Fifteen years since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Montenegro is both lucky and 
unfortunate. It is lucky because it has achieved independence while avoiding war. 
It has not seen inter-ethnic relations poisoned by ethno-nationalist mobilisation as 
elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.127 It is unfortunate because its economic and 
social situation leaves it in a precarious position. Despite a series of political, 
administrative and economic reforms, Montenegro is still among the world’s 
                                                                                                                                               
124  In the period from the signing of the Belgrade Agreement until the adoption of the so-called 
‘twin-track approach’ in November 2004, the effectiveness of the Union’s approach towards Serbia 
and Montenegro did, however, suffer from incoherence and inconsistencies between the demands of 
the SG/HR and the Council, on the one hand, and of the European Commission, on the other. See N. 
Tocci, ‘EU Intervention in Ethno-Political Conflicts: The Cases of Cyprus and Serbia-Montenegro’, 
9 EFA Rev. (2004) pp. 551-573; and R. Keane, ‘The Case of the Solana Process in Serbia and 
Montenegro: Coherence in EU Foreign Policy’, 11 International Peacekeeping (2004) pp. 1-17. 
More positively, see J. Batt, ‘The EU’s “Soft Power” at Work in the Balkans’, EUISS Newsletter, 
July 2006. See also chapter 5, section 3.2.4. 
125  See Council Conclusions of 27 February 2006, Press Release No. 6344/06 (Presse 46). 
126  The referendum was deemed to have been conducted in line with OSCE and Council of 
Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic electoral processes. See, inter 
alia, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding the referendum in 
Montenegro, Press Release P 73/06, Doc. 9730/06 (Presse 152), Brussels, 23 May 2006. See also 
ICG, ‘Montenegro’s Referendum’, 42 Europe Briefings (2006); and J. Batt, ‘Montenegro and Serbia 
After the Referendum’, EUISS Analysis, May 2006. 
127  See F. Bieber, ‘Preface’, in Bieber, op. cit. n. 100, at pp. 7-9. 
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largest recipients in terms of international assistance per capita.128 It will take 
years before Montenegro will be in the position to join the European Union.129 
 
3.3 The European Union in Kosovo 
 
3.3.1 Embedded in an international reconstruction effort 
 
The violence in Kosovo that lead to the NATO campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia triggered important qualitative changes in the European 
Union’s policy towards South-Eastern Europe as a whole. If the United States and 
NATO had done the dirty work of defeating Milošević militarily, the European 
Union offered what the rest of the international community expected it to do: 
generating economic growth and political stability in the region.130 By initiating 
the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the European Union resurrected the 
idea of the ‘hour of Europe’.131 Adopted on 10 June 1999, the day that NATO’s 
air campaign against Serbia came to an end, the Stability Pact’s founding docu-
ments solemnly declared that ‘[t]he EU will draw the region closer to the 
perspective of full integration of these countries [in South-Eastern Europe] into its 
structures.’132 However, it was rather unclear how the Stability Pact squared with 
accession to the European Union. It remained, by and large, a regional post-
conflict reconstruction strategy funded by the international financial institutions, 
the Union and its Member States.133 In terms of its approach, the Stability Pact 
                                                                                                                                               
128  See ICG, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, Europe Report, No. 169, 7 December 2005: 
‘Accusations of simulated reforms to please Western donors seem plausible. A significant part of 
economic activity – an estimated 40 to 60 per cent – is related to black market, mainly car rackets 
and cigarettes smuggling. The involvement of political parties and state administration is a foregone 
conclusion. The state needs foreign aid for social peace in a poverty-ridden country of rising 
unemployment, frequent electric power cuts and high inflation. Its economic openness (3 per cent 
tariff average) may be an asset, but tourism certainly is not its main industry at the moment.’ 
129  See J. Batt, ‘Making a Success of Montenegrin Independence – Lessons from Slovakia’, 
DANAS, Weekend Supplement, 25-26 June 2006; and K. Evenson, ‘Becoming Democratic: Now for 
the Real Work’, Transitions Online, 13 July 2006. 
130  See Agreement on the principles (.peace plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo 
crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland, 
Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representa-
tive of the President of the Russian Federation, UN Doc. S/1999/649, 3 June 1999. See also chapter 
2, section 7.3.2. 
131  See chapter 1; declaration of Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, to the interna-
tional press, 29 June 1991. 
132  For the final text of the Stability Pact of 10 June 1999, see: <http://www.stabilitypact.org>. The 
quote is to be found on p. 20 of the text. For more on the Stability Pact, see chapter 5, section 2.2. 
133  See, e.g., D. Bechev, ‘Between Enlargement and CFSP: the EU and the Western Balkans’, 
paper presented at the LSE European Foreign Policy Conference, 2-3 June 2004; and D. Vignes, 
‘The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, in C. Tomuschat, ed., Kosovo and the International 
Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002) pp. 317-325. 
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was not an accession platform. Although initiated by the German Presidency of 
the European Union and sanctioned by the European Council at its Cologne 
summit,134 it was placed under the umbrella of the OSCE. The Union was just 
one, albeit the most important, stakeholder amongst many. In fact, the Stability 
Pact exemplified a trend for the European Union in Kosovo: in July 1999, the 
Council of Ministers fulfilled the UN Secretary-General’s wish to entrust to the 
Union the task of managing the economy pillar within the United Nations’ 
administration in Kosovo,135 thus sharing responsibility for the reconstruction of 
Kosovo with a vast range of international actors. 
On the same day as the Stability Pact was launched, the UN Security Council 
passed resolution 1244 (1999), authorising the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) to begin a process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-
government, designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.136 By deciding that a 
political solution to the Kosovo crisis would have to take account of the Ram-
bouillet Accords.137 and be based on the general principles developed by the G-
8,138 as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in Annex 2 
to the resolution, the Security Council endorsed what later became known as the 
so-called ‘standards before status’ policy. In essence, Kosovo was expected to 
make progress on the eight standards to be achieved by the Provisional Institu-
tions of Self-Government (PISG) before its final status could be addressed. Those 
standards concerned: functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom 
of movement, returns and reintegration, the economy, property rights, dialogue 
with Belgrade and the professional training of the Kosovo Protection Corps, the 
successor organisation to the Kosovo Liberation Army.139 The implementation of 
the ‘standards before status’ policy was the core political project of UNMIK and 
was given fresh momentum by the adoption of the Kosovo Standards Implemen-
tation Plan of 31 March 2004.140 
                                                                                                                                               
134  Bull. EU 6-1999, point I.26.71. 
135  Council Joint Action 1999/522/CFSP of 29 July 1999 concerning the installation of the 
structures of the UNMIK, OJ 1999 L 201/1. 
136  See chapter 2, section 6.7. 
137  Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, UN 
Doc. S/1999/648, 7 June 1999. The Accords were concluded under the auspices of the members of 
the Contact Group and the European Union. See also chapter 2, section 6.7. 
138  See Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers 
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999, reproduced in Annex 1 to UNSC resolution 1244 
(1999). 
139  The ‘Standards for Kosovo’ were agreed between the PISG and UNMIK and subsequently 
launched by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Harry Holkeri and 
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi on 10 December 2003. See Press Release 
UNMIK/PR/1078 of that date. The ‘Standards’ were endorsed by the Security Council on 12 
December 2003. See Presidential Statement S/PRST/2003/26. 
140  See further chapter 2, section 6.7. 
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In the first-ever operation of its kind, the United Nations brought together four 
so-called ‘pillars’ under overall UNMIK leadership:141 police and justice (Pillar I) 
and civil administration (Pillar II) under the direct responsibility of the United 
Nations,142 democratisation and institution building (Pillar III) under the responsi-
bility of the OSCE and economic reconstruction, recovery and development 
(Pillar IV) under the responsibility of the European Union.143 Since 1999, the 
work of the European Union in Pillar IV has been geared towards modernising 
the economic framework of Kosovo, with a view to developing the structures and 
instruments that form the basis of a competitive, efficient market economy.144 
That is not to say that ‘Europe’s’ influence is only felt within the framework of 
Pillar IV. The EU Member States’ presence also extends to the other three pillars, 
for example through their participation in the work that KFOR and the OSCE 
carry out for UNMIK.145 In fact, since the end of the crisis, the European Union 
and its Member States have devoted the lion’s share of their resources – military, 
financial and human – to repairing the damage of war and decades of underin-
vestment and neglect, increasing the capacity of local administration and fostering 
reforms. Since 1999, the European Community has devoted over €1.6 billion to 
                                                                                                                                               
141  UNMIK is currently headed by the SRSG Joachim Rücker (Germany). 
142  Pillar II has since been integrated into the Office of the SRSG. 
143  Pillar IV is headed by Acting Deputy SRSG Paul Acda since March 2006. Council Joint 
Action 1999/522/CFSP was extended by Council Joint Action 1999/864/CFSP of 21 December 
1999, OJ 1999 L 328/67 and Council Joint Action 2000/175/CFSP of 28 February 2000, OJ 2000 L 
55/78; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2000 of 22 May 2000 on support for the United Nations 
Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (OHR), OJ 2000 L 122/27; Council Regulation (EC) No. 2098/2003 of 27 November 
2003 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2000 on support for the United Nations Interim Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), 
OJ 2003 L 316/1. 
144  Included among the achievements attributed by the European Union to its work in Pillar IV 
are the creation of a modern market economy through the introduction of commercial and economic 
legislation conforming to European standards; the launch of the privatisation process stimulating 
economic development and investment; the successful switch to the euro as the single currency; the 
creation of a working banking system with nine commercial banks including over 240 branches; the 
initiation of free trade agreements and the integration of Kosovo into various regional and European 
economic structures; the transformation of the customs service into a modern organisation collecting 
over 70 per cent of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget funds; the introduction of various measures to 
counter economic crime and corruption; and the stabilisation of Kosovo’s fragile power situation. 
See: <http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php>. See also Commission Staff Working 
Document, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, COM (2006) 649 final, Brussels, 8 
November 2006. For a more critical evaluation of UNMIK’s activities and achievements, with a 
special focus on the European Union in Pillar IV, see D. Papadimitriou, P. Petrov and L. Greiçevci, 
‘To Build a State: Europeanization, EU Actorness and State-Building in Kosovo’, 12 EFA Rev. 
(2007) pp. 219-238 at pp. 229-231 and 233-237. 
145  For an overview of the experiences in EU-UN cooperation in Kosovo so far, see M. Kar-
nitschnig, ‘The UN and the EU in Kosovo – The Challenges of Joint Nation-Building’, in J. Wouters, 
F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys, eds., The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger 
Partnership (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) pp. 323-351. 
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Kosovo, money which has been channelled via ECHO (which was phased out of 
the province in 2003 as the humanitarian crisis was over),146 the European Agency 
for Reconstruction (managing the bulk of CARDS funds),147 the operating costs of 
Pillar IV.148 and the Kosovo Consolidated Budget via the decision of DG ECFIN 
(the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs) on exceptional financial assistance.149 
Despite the attention and resources devoted to Kosovo by the international 
community, and the European Union in particular, economic performance 
remained in shambles and unemployment remained very high. UN Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999) effectively kept the Provisional Institutions for 
Self-Government weak. At the same, the powerful private actors, oligarchs and 
criminal syndicates generated by the wars of the 1990s largely escaped scrutiny 
and remained influential. Cumulatively, this caused the ‘standards before status’ 
policy to run out of steam. This was also due to the slowness of the Albanian 
leadership in Kosovo in implementing reforms to meet the UN-set standards 
because of its insistence on a ‘status before standards’ policy.150 Gradually, the 
international community became convinced that the open-ended mandate of UN 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) had outlived its purpose and that a 
political process had to be initiated in order to reach a settlement on Kosovo’s 
final status if the province was to move forward.151 
 
3.3.2 Final status talks 
 
On 10 November 2005, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary-
General’s intention to appoint Martti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland, as his 
Special Envoy to lead the political process, and established the following guiding 
principles for the process, as agreed to by the Contact Group: 
 
1. The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be fully compatible with interna-
tional standards of human rights, democracy and international law and contribute 
to regional security.  
                                                                                                                                               
146  See the thematic booklet published by the European Commission, ECHO in the Balkans – 12 
Years of Humanitarian Action 1991-2003 (Brussels, ECHO 2003). 
147  See chapter 5, section 3.4. 
148  Unlike the first three pillars of UNMIK, the operational expenditure of Pillar IV is almost 
fully financed out of the European Commission’s budget. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2098/2003 of 27 November 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2000 on support for UNMIK 
and OHR, OJ 2003 L 316/1. 
149  Data available on the EU Pillar’s website, at: <http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_ 
pillar.php>. 
150  See also chapter 2, section 6.7. 
151  See B. Knoll, ‘From Benchmarking to Final status? Kosovo and the Problem of an Interna-
tional Administration’s Open-ended Mandate’, 16 EJIL (2005) pp. 637-660. 
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2. The settlement of Kosovo’s Status should conform with democratic values and 
European standards and contribute to realizing the European perspective of Kos-
ovo, in particular, Kosovo’s progress in the stabilization and association process, 
as well as the integration of the entire region in Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
3. The settlement should ensure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It 
should provide effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to 
ensure the implementation of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo and of the 
rights of members of all Kosovo communities, including the right of refugees and 
displaced persons to return to their homes in safety.  
4. The settlement should provide mechanisms to ensure the participation of all 
Kosovo communities in government, both on the central and on the local level. 
Effective structures of local self-government established through the decentraliza-
tion process should facilitate the coexistence of different communities and ensure 
equitable and improved access to public services.  
5. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should include specific safeguards for the 
protection of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. This should include 
provisions specifying the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s institutions and 
sites and other patrimony in Kosovo.  
6. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen regional security and 
stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 
situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be 
unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e., no 
partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any coun-
try. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be 
fully respected.  
7. The Status settlement will ensure Kosovo’s security. It will also ensure that 
Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its neighbours. Specific provi-
sions on security arrangements will be included.  
8. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should promote effective mechanisms to 
strengthen Kosovo’s ability to enforce the rule of law, to fight organized crime and 
terrorism and safeguard the multi-ethnic character of the police and the judiciary.  
9. The settlement should ensure that Kosovo can develop in a sustainable way 
both economically and politically and that it can cooperate effectively with interna-
tional organizations and international financial institutions.  
10.  For some time Kosovo will continue to need an international civilian and 
military presence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provi-
sions of the Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for 
minorities as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued im-
plementation of standards.152 
 
It is within these parameters – no partition of Kosovo, no union with a neighbour-
ing state and no return to pre-1999 conditions – that the UN Special Envoy had to 
find a compromise agreement between Priština and Belgrade.153 Ahtisaari started 
                                                                                                                                               
152  See UN Doc. S/2005/709. 
153  On 7 November 2005, the Council of the European Union endorsed the appointment of 
Stefan Lehne as EU representative to support the UN Status Envoy in the implementation of his 
mandate. See Council Conclusions of 7 November 2005, Press Release No. 13622/05 (Presse 274). 
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the final status talks on 21 November 2005 with a fact-finding mission to both 
capitals. What he found were two irreconcilable positions. The approximately 1.5 
million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo envisaged only one outcome: an independent 
Kosovo. Bajram Kosumi, then prime minister, was reported as having said: ‘A 
small country like Kosovo would feel insecure if it didn’t have a UN seat.’154 For 
Belgrade, however, independence was anathema. Kosovo is considered to be the 
‘cradle of Serbia’, a sacrosanct place in Serbian history with a collection of 
churches, monasteries and other sites used for religious purposes to prove it. The 
Serbs, who entered the final status negotiations with the puzzling slogan ‘more 
than autonomy, less than independence’, were ready to concede de facto self-
government as long as they retained sovereignty de jure.155 With the no-
compromise Radical Party riding high in the polls, Prime Minister Vojislav 
Koštunica.156 had little negotiating space. An independent Kosovo was – and still 
is – a taboo subject. It remains historic Serb territory which no politician can give 
away. Boris Tadić, the president of Serbia and Montenegro, was reported as 
having said: ‘For Serbia it’s unacceptable to see Kosovo with a seat in the UN.’157 
The ‘secession’ of Montenegro in June 2006 complicated the Kosovo question. 
While Serbs believe that they did not lose Montenegro in the sense that they face 
‘losing’ Kosovo to the ethnic Albanians, the break-away republic of Montenegro 
scarred the Serbian soul and reduced the room for compromise even more. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the question what consequences the 
dissolution of the ‘third Yugoslavia’ would have for the guarantee of its ‘sover-
eignty and territorial integrity’ in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) has 
been raised, all the more so because this resolution referred to Kosovo as part of 
the FRY, not of Serbia. The Belgrade Agreement of 2002 included an explicit 
precaution for a possible disintegration after three years: ‘If Montenegro with-
draws from the state union, international documents related to the FRY, the UN 
Security Council resolution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on 
Serbia as its successor.’158 Thus, this weaving fault in resolution 1244 was 
                                                                                                                                               
154  See S. Wagstyl, ‘Why Kosovo might hold the key to the Balkans’ future’, Financial Times, 
19 February 2006. 
155  Under his formula, Kosovo would largely manage its own affairs – have its own executive, 
legislative and judicial authorities – but remain nominally part of Serbia and forgo diplomatic 
representation abroad – a single minister of foreign affairs, a single minister of defence and a single 
seat at the United Nations. The 100,000 Kosovo Serbs would have to benefit from a high level of 
minority rights protection. 
156  See supra section 3.2.1. Koštunica became prime minister in the spring of 2004. 
157  See S. Wagstyl, ‘Why Kosovo might hold the key to the Balkans’ future’, Financial Times, 
19 February 2006. 
158  Proceeding Points for a Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro, repro-
duced in CEPS Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 31, January/February 2002. 
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repaired.159 The suggestion that this provision violated the resolution and reintro-
duced Serb sovereignty over Kosovo seems far-fetched. Resolution 1244 (1999) 
could not deny Kosovo being a province of the Serbian republic under the 
Yugoslav Constitution, and Serbia could theoretically have upheld the defunct 
‘shell’ of the FRY even after Montenegro’s secession if only because of Kosovo. 
At the outset of the final status process, the Contact Group avoided taking 
sides, but it was clear that the United States and the United Kingdom were 
increasingly leaning towards independence for Kosovo.160 France and other EU 
Member States were more cautious, concerned that early discussion of independ-
ence could take the pressure off Priština to negotiate and risk a Serb walk-out of 
the negotiations.161 The Contact Group agreed that minority rights had to be 
guaranteed, peacekeeping troops had to stay and an international civilian mission 
– probably run by the European Union – had to be put in place.162 Russia and 
China, which had previously worried that an independent Kosovo would set a 
precedent for their claimed territories of Chechnya, Tibet and Taiwan, were 
reported as having told the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that they 
would not block the independence of Kosovo, because they considered the 
situation of Kosovo ‘unique’.163 But Russia has since swung back to its earlier 
position and is prepared to vote against a proposed UN Security Council resolu-
tion granting independence to Kosovo.164 
Instead of tackling the status question head-on, Ahtisaari initially opted for a 
bottom-up approach. On 20-21 February 2006, the first round of direct negotia-
tions between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians took place in Vienna. Middle-
ranking officials met under the auspices of Deputy UN Special Envoy Albert 
                                                                                                                                               
159  Strictly speaking, only the unlikely case of Serbia’s secession would unhinge resolution 
1244. 
160  See ‘Kosovo’s future’, SEEUROPE.NET, 15 February 2006. 
161  Ibid. 
162  See infra section 3.3.4. 
163  See G. Dinmore and D. Dombey, ‘Russia and China “pledge not to block new Kosovo”’, 
Financial Times, 14 March 2006. On the qualification of Kosovo’s ‘uniqueness’, one should observe 
that Kosovo is, of course, unique. But so is any other territory seeking independence or autonomy. 
Bosnia was and is fundamentally different from Croatia and both are entirely different from East 
Timor. Even the secessionist regions on the fringes of the former Soviet Union that receive support 
from Moscow – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabach, South Ossetia and Transnistria – are different to each 
other. However, Kosovo is in all likelihood becoming independent, not because of its uniqueness per 
se, but because that uniqueness is of such a nature that it leaves independence as just about the only 
conceivable solution. In other words, Kosovo is becoming independent because NATO stopped 
Serbia from terrorising it and expelled it from the province and because no one outside Serbia can 
argue with a straight face that letting Serbia back in any shape or form would be conducive to peace. 
But this does not mean that other regions will not be able to convincingly cite Kosovo’s independ-
ence as a precedent for their own secessionist cause. To argue that an independent Kosovo will not 
represent such a precedent is simply an insult to common sense. 
164  See J. Headley, ‘Kosovo: Déjá vu for Russia’, Transitions Online, 28 May 2007. 
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Rohan (Austria) to discuss rival schemes for the devolution of powers from 
Kosovo’s central authorities to the municipalities. Effective provisions for the 
decentralisation of government will be crucial to the status settlement, as decen-
tralisation can ensure that minority communities such as the Kosovo Serbs remain 
a vital part of Kosovo’s future. Decentralisation should also give impetus to the 
return of displaced persons who should be able to choose where they live in 
Kosovo. Although no agreement was reached on the issue, the negotiations were 
generally perceived to be largely constructive. After meeting government 
representatives in Belgrade, Ahtisaari announced that he would dispatch technical 
teams to Belgrade and Priština to pave the way for continuing negotiations on 
practical questions. On 17 March, talks resumed in Vienna. Prime Minister 
Bajram Kosumi, who stepped down over accusations of ineffectiveness by 
members of his coalition, was replaced by former KLA commander Agim Çeku, 
against whom Serbia had issued an arrest warrant. Despite protests from Bel-
grade, the European Union supported the replacement.165 The show had to go on. 
In their second round, the talks focused on cultural and religious heritage, 
minority rights and the economy, local financing, cooperation and relations 
between municipalities. Although the sides were again unable to reach agreement, 
participants described the talks as constructive and scheduled the next round. 
After seven unsuccessful rounds of technical negotiations, the final status talks 
convened in Vienna at the highest political level under the chairmanship of Martti 
Ahtisaari. But that meeting only served as a confirmation of the entrenched 
positions: the Serb ‘everything but independence’ versus the Kosovo Albanian 
‘nothing but independence’. While negotiations at the technical level continued in 
the second half of 2006, they were effectively dead. In October, Ahtisaari started 
openly doubting that a negotiated settlement for Kosovo would be possible, as the 
two parties remained diametrically opposed on the final status issue.166 
While the final status process was expected to last for several months, the 
Contact Group, together with the EU High Representative, the EU Presidency, the 
European Commissioner for Enlargement, NATO’s Secretary-General, the UN 
Special Status Envoy and the SRSG, had expressed the belief that all possible 
efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement before the end of 
2006.167 But this deadline was pushed back after a narrow majority of the Serbian 
electorate (51.6 per cent) in the 28-29 October referendum approved Serbia’s new 
Constitution, which claims sovereignty over the province of Kosovo, and general 
                                                                                                                                               
165  See Statement S074/06, ‘Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, welcomes con-
firmation of new Kosovo government’, 10 March 2006. 
166  As reported in M. Abramovitz and J. Lyon, ‘Another Balkan High Noon’, The Guardian, 24 
October 2006. 
167  Kosovo Contact Group Statement, London, 31 January 2006, available at: <http://ue.eu.int/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/88236.pdf>. 
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elections were called for.168 After consulting with the Contact Group, UN Special 
Envoy Ahtisaari decided to delay the presentation of his ‘recommendations’ on 
the future of Kosovo in order to avoid inflaming tension ahead of Serbia’s 
elections on 21 January 2007.169 Further delay was deemed risky, as it would be 
taken by Belgrade not as a cue to cooperate with an orderly process but as a 
further opportunity to wreck it.170 Further delay would also severely test Kosovo 
Albanian cohesion. The longer the Kosovo Albanians were forced to wait, the 
greater the chance that they would discredit themselves with unilateral independ-
ence moves or riots. That would have virtually finished prospects for retaining the 
Serb minority in a multi-ethnic Kosovo.171 Instead of finally closing the question 
of Western Balkan borders with an orderly settlement for Kosovo, a new chapter 
of destabilisation would be opened. 
 
3.3.3 Proposed outcome 
 
On 2 February 2007, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented his ‘Compre-
hensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ to Serbian President Boris 
Tadić.172 and to Prime Minister Agim Çeku.173 Rejected in Belgrade and welcomed 
in Priština, Ahtisaari’s draft sets out the basis for a viable, stable and sustainable 
Kosovo. While the Comprehensive Proposal offers independence to Kosovo in all 
but name (symbols, security forces, representation in international organisations, 
etc.),174 Ahtisaari’s plan is first and foremost a document designed to make Kos-
ovo a multi-ethnic society. This means that the non-Albanian communities (Serb, 
Roma, Ashkali, Gorani, Egyptian, Turk and Bosniak) that make up 10 per cent of 
the population have been granted substantial powers in all government institu-
tions and in all sectors.175 A high degree of autonomy for the Serb community, 
                                                                                                                                               
168  See ICG, ‘Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards’, 44 Europe Briefing 
(2006); and T. Judah, ‘Making Moves’, World Today, December 2006, pp. 17-18. 
169  In fact, it was feared that an early recognition of Kosovo’s independence might bring the 
ultranationalist Radical Party to power in Serbia. See further T. Judah, ‘Finding the right balance for 
Kosovo’, European Voice, 26 October-1 November 2006, at p. 17. 
170  See ICG, ‘Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky’, 177 Europe Reports (2006). 
171  See ICG, ‘Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead’, 45 Europe Briefing (2006). 
172  Caretaker Prime Minister Koštunica said that he could not receive Ahtisaari because no 
government had yet been formed after the elections of 21 January. 
173  A few days earlier, Ahtisaari had informed the Contact Group of his plan. The version of the 
Comprehensive Proposal of 2 February was only briefly available at: <http://www.unosek.org>, the 
website of the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo. A slightly amended version of the 
proposal was included in the addendum to the Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1. 
174  See Art. 1 of the Comprehensive Proposal. 
175  See especially the provisions of Annex I (Constitutional Provisions), Annex II (The Rights of 
Communities and Their Members), Annex III (Decentralisation), Annex IV (Justice System) and 
Annex V (Religious and Cultural Heritage) to the Comprehensive Proposal. 
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including in areas such as healthcare, education and cultural and religious sites, is 
a conditio sine qua non for a sustainable solution. The proposed decentralisation 
of Kosovo could enable Serb-majority municipalities to develop links with each 
other and – crucially – with the municipal authorities across the border in 
Serbia.176 In a limited and transparent manner, the Serbian government could be 
allowed to provide economic assistance to these municipalities.177 
In essence, Ahtisaari designed an asymmetric state with supervised independ-
ence. A future International Civilian Mission (ICM) should monitor the 
implementation of the status settlement, as well as – implicitly – compliance with 
European standards under the SAP,178 and intervene when the implementation is 
at risk. As such, the proposed ICM, which should be headed by the ‘double-
hatted’ International Civilian Representative (ICR)/EU Special Representative, is 
a leaner and ‘Europeanised’ version of the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with no less intrusive powers than the OHR,179 working in 
cooperation with an International Military Presence (IMP) to ensure the security 
of Kosovo (.provided for by NATO’s KFOR)180 and a civilian ESDP Mission 
(focused on the rule of law)181 in support of local authorities. The ICM would be 
led by the European Union,182 but non-EU Member States such as Russia and the 
United States could also be given a role. 
                                                                                                                                               
176  See Annex III (Decentralisation) to the Comprehensive Proposal. Particular attention should 
be paid to Article 13, proposing the official ‘division’ of Mitrovica into two municipalities, governed 
by a Joint Board (composed on the principle of parity and headed by an international representative 
selected by the International Civilian Representative) to carry out functional cooperation in the areas 
of their own competences as agreed to by the municipalities. 
177  Ibid., Arts. 10-11. 
178  On the SAP, see chapter 5, section 2.3. 
179  See Art. 2 of Annex IX to the Comprehensive Proposal, which prescribes that the ICR shall 
be the ‘final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Settlement’, 
who ensures its effective implementation ‘through the execution of specific tasks accorded’ to him. 
To that end, the ICR can ‘take corrective measures to remedy, as necessary, any actions taken by the 
Kosovo authorities that [he] deems to be a breach of this Settlement, or seriously undermine the rule 
of law, or to be otherwise inconsistent with the terms or the spirit of this Settlement; such corrective 
measures may include, but are not limited to, annulment of laws or decisions adopted by the Kosovo 
authorities’ [emphasis added]. ‘In cases of serious or repeated failures to comply with the letter or 
spirit of this Settlement, and/or in instances of serious obstruction in the work of the ICR and/or 
ESDP Mission, the ICR shall have the authority to sanction or remove from office any public official 
or take other measures, as necessary, to ensure full respect for this Settlement and its implementa-
tion.’ Also, the ICR is proposed to have the power to directly appoint persons to a number of posts 
and ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic and other 
serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated and that decisions in such cases 
are properly enforced. Compare with the overview given of OHR’s tasks, functions and powers in 
chapter 2, section 6.4. 
180  See Art. 13 and Annex XI to the Comprehensive Proposal. 
181  See Art. 12 and Annex X to the Comprehensive Proposal. 
182  See in this respect the preparatory actions of the European Union foreseen in Council Joint 
Action 2006/623/CFSP of 15 September 2006 on the establishment of a EU-team to contribute to the 
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After almost eight years in limbo, there is now a roadmap that leads Kosovo 
directly to statehood. Of course, the Comprehensive Proposal is not Ahtisaari’s 
magic wand that will instantly make things right in the province and in the 
region.183 In fact, deadly violence erupted almost instantly in Kosovo and in 
Belgrade thousands took to the streets.184 Two weeks of intensive consultations 
between Belgrade and Priština at the end of February ended without success. 
Following a final meeting between the two parties in Vienna on 9 and 10 March 
2007, Ahtisaari declared that the year-long process of negotiations had been 
exhausted, leaving no common ground between Belgrade and Priština. On 26 
March, the UN Secretary-General shifted the talks to the Security Council. Tough 
work lies ahead to rally all the members of the UN Security Council behind the 
plan. The stakes are high. If the Security Council does not get Kosovo right, then 
chaos will likely ensue and probably violence too. Kosovo’s Albanian-dominated 
parliament will no doubt declare independence and some countries, led probably 
by the United States and the United Kingdom, will recognise the new state. In this 
situation, the Serbian-dominated north of the province will, in effect, secede and 
Serbs living in enclaves in the centre of the province will probably flee or be 
‘ethnically cleansed’. Kosovo would become perpetually prone to unrest or stay 
frozen in a decades-long stalemate like Cyprus. Unless there is a new Security 
Council resolution on the future of Kosovo, then EU Member States will probably 
not endorse an ESDP mission. Faced with this prospect, it is hardly surprising that 
EU diplomats insist that there can be no alternative to the Comprehensive 
Proposal by Ahtisaari. 
Equally important – and despite the fact that Kosovo is unusual because of 
NATO’s military intervention in 1999 – the international community’s handling 
of Kosovo will be read around the globe as having broader meaning for what it 
says about minority rights, self-determination and the way to deal with breakaway 
territories (territorial integrity and sovereignty of states).185 Kosovo’s future 
independence is seemingly evident. But does this decision not retroactively justify 
the use of force and military actions to change borders and status? And what 
                                                                                                                                               
preparations on the establishment of a possible international civilian mission in Kosovo, including a 
European Union Special Representative component (ICM/EUSR Preparation Team), OJ 2006 L 
253/29. The mandate of the EU team was extended until 31 July 2007 by Council Joint Action 
2007/203/CFSP of 27 March 2007, OJ 2007 L 90/94. At the same time, the financial reference 
amount of €869,000 was increased by €807,000 to cover expenditure from 15 September 2006 to 31 
July 2006. 
183  See A. Beatty, ‘Rumbles over Kosovo’, European Voice, 8-14 February 2007, at p. 13. 
184  See F. Terdevci, ‘Kosovo’s status: ready to blow’, Transitions Online, 20 February 2007. 
185  See M. Goodwin, ‘From Province to Protectorate to State? Speculation on the Impact of 
Kosovo’s Genesis upon the Doctrines of International Law’, 8 German Law Journal (2007) pp. 1-20; 
and S. Cvijić, ‘Self-determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention: 
The Case of Kosovo’, 8 German Law Journal (2007) pp. 57-79. 
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message does this decision send to the Republika Srpska or the Albanian commu-
nity in Macedonia, or even the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina? Whatever the 
way out, there seems to be no easy and elegant exit from the ‘Kosovo trap’.186 
 
3.3.4 Future EU intervention in Kosovo 
 
At first sight, the European Union’s role in Kosovo since 1999 has been limited. 
‘Embedded’ in the international reconstruction effort, the Union acted under the 
responsibility of the United Nations. Yet, Europe’s impact on the ground has been 
tangible, as the European Union and its Member States devoted the lion’s share of 
their resources – military, financial and human – to repairing the damage of war 
and of decades of underinvestment and neglect, to increasing the capacity of local 
administration and fostering reforms. Unfortunately, paying the bills has not 
translated itself into greater visibility for the Union. But, this is about to change. 
The appointment by the UN Security Council of Martti Ahtisaari represented one 
of the first occasions since Lord Owen’s rocky involvement in the early phases of 
the Bosnian war that a European has been given such pre-eminence in Balkan 
diplomacy.187 One of the lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina is that, unless 
the chief negotiator has real powers, many in the Balkans will assume that this 
person is simply answering to his US deputy or more powerful handlers in the 
White House.188 With a European future for Kosovo, it was only logical that 
Europe should not only wield real power in the final status negotiations but also 
in the implementation process. And thus, a bigger role for the European Union in 
Kosovo looms on the horizon. If and when a settlement on the final status of 
Kosovo, with internationally recognised borders, is handed down, UNMIK will 
have to oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s PISG to institutions 
established under the settlement during a final transitional stage of 120 days.189 
The UN Security Council already made it clear in the guiding principles that it 
adopted for the final status process that, for some time, ‘Kosovo [would] continue 
to need an international civilian and military presence to exercise appropriate 
supervision of compliance of the provisions of the Status settlement, to ensure 
security and, in particular, protection for minorities as well as to monitor and 
support the authorities in the continued implementation of standards.’190 In 
                                                                                                                                               
186  See I. Berend, ‘Editorial: The Kosovo Trap’, 14 European Review (2006) pp. 413-414. 
187  As noted before, the European Union fully participates in the status negotiations through its 
representative Stefan Lehne. However, his influence has been held back by the difficulties of EU 
Member States in forming a common stance on (conditional) independence for Kosovo (United 
Kingdom v. France). 
188  See J. Norris, ‘Kosovo: Get It Right, Now’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 12 October 2005. 
189  See Art. 14 (Transitional arrangements and final provisions) of the Comprehensive Proposal. 
190  See UN Doc. S/2005/709, 10 November 2005. 
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October 2005, the SGSR initiated consultations with a view to preparing a 
technical assessment of the need for possible future international involvement in 
Kosovo, without prejudice to the outcome of the future status process.191 This 
ongoing assessment is conducted by UNMIK, together with the European Union, 
the OSCE and NATO, as well as with the UN funds and agencies and the bilateral 
donors present in Kosovo. It focuses on four main areas: the rule of law; good 
governance; democratisation, human rights and minority issues; and economic 
and fiscal issues. 
It is believed that, for some time to come, NATO will continue to perform the 
hardcore security tasks and that the European Union will restrict its future role in 
Kosovo to civilian crisis management. In December 2005, the European Union’s 
General Affairs and External Relations Council discussed a joint report by the 
SG/HR and the European Commissioner for Enlargement on the Union’s future 
role in and contribution to Kosovo.192 The report suggested that the Union should 
take over responsibility for policing Kosovo from UNMIK and train judges, 
prosecutors and prison staff to guarantee the rule of law. The report also called for 
increased aid to Kosovo and talked of a tangible European prospect, whatever the 
outcome of the status talks. The Council asked the SG/HR and the Commission 
‘to continue examination of these issues in coordination with other international 
actors, particularly in the areas of police and the rule of law (including contin-
gency planning for a possible ESDP mission), economic development and 
fostering Kosovo’s European perspective, and to keep the relevant Council bodies 
actively engaged in order to ensure continuing timely preparation of an EU role in 
Kosovo.’193 To this end, a Council/Commission joint mission was dispatched to 
Kosovo in February 2006, and a joint action was adopted by the Council on 10 
April 2006 to send an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) to the province, 
charged with designing an EU role in the fields of justice, police and rule of law 
issues as well as the smooth takeover of such selected tasks from UNMIK.194 At 
the end of 2006, the mandate of EUPT Kosovo was widened to include planning 
and taking action in relation to selected UNMIK tasks and ‘a possible EU crisis 
                                                                                                                                               
191  Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2006/45, 25 January 2006, para. 14. 
192  See Council Conclusions of 12 December 2005, Press Release No. 14961/05 (Presse 318). 
193  Ibid. 
194  Council Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP of 10 April 2006 on the establishment of an EU Plan-
ning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule 
of law and possible other areas in Kosovo, OJ 2006 L 112/19. See also Olli Rehn, ‘The Western 
Balkans’, speech to the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2006, 
SPEECH/06/125. The SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement again reported, in their 
third joint report to the Council in July 2006. See Press Release No. S200/06, ‘The Future EU Role 
and Contribution in Kosovo’, 12 July 2006. 
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management operation in the field of the rule of law and other areas that might be 
identified by the Council in the context of the future status process.’195 
At the time of writing, the political leaders of the Member States are not ex-
pected to assemble enough courage to let ‘their’ European Union enter the high-risk 
territory of Kosovo by taking over the military operation from KFOR (assuming 
that the government of Kosovo would actually prefer EU involvement over that of 
the United States within NATO). It seems that the Union is still doubtful about its 
own military capabilities. This is a pity, as most of the approximately 16,000 KFOR 
troops are European anyway.196 Already in February 2006, US Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld indicated that he hoped that US troop levels – currently standing 
at 1,700 – could be further reduced.197 A reorganisation of the European Union’s 
military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.198 and invoking the necessary ‘Berlin 
Plus’ arrangements would enable the European Union to seize an historic opportu-
nity and finally face up to the task of securing crisis situations on the continent 
without having to rely on US military might. 
A final point concerns representation. In the event that the European Union 
indeed launches a civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo, it will have to work side-by-
side with NATO, UN agencies and the international financial institutions. It 
would benefit the international community’s goals and actions if it were to speak 
with a single voice. The double-hatted ICR/EUSR proposed by the Ahtisaari plan 
draws on the lessons learned from the OHR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNMIK in 
Kosovo and other international and ESDP civilian missions elsewhere and should 
therefore be welcomed.199 
                                                                                                                                               
195  Art. 1(1) and (2) of Council Joint Action 2006/918/CFSP of 11 December 2006 amending 
and extending Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP on the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT 
Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible 
other areas in Kosovo, OJ 2006 L 349/57. The EUPT Kosovo was extended until 1 September 2007 
in principle, this date being subject to ongoing work in the United Nations and up for evaluation on 
15 July 2007. See Council Joint Action 2007/334/CFSP of 14 May 2007, OJ 2007 L 125/29. The 
fourth joint report by the SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement was sent to the Council 
on 29 March 2007. See Press Release No. S113/07 of that date. 
196  Levels of the thirty-seven troop-contributing nations are available on KFOR’s website, at: 
<http://www.nato.int/kfor>. See also the monthly reports to the United Nations on the operations of 
KFOR, e.g., UN Doc. S/2006/167, 15 March 2006, covering the period from 1 November to 31 
December 2005. 
197  See D. Sevastopulo and D. Dombey, ‘Rumsfeld wants to cut US presence in Kosovo’, Fi-
nancial Times, 3 February 2006. 
198  As suggested by Günter Platter, the Austrian Minister of Defence, at the informal meeting of 
EU Defence Ministers on 6-7 March 2006 in Innsbruck. Platter was reported as having said that 
EUFOR Althea could be reduced by 700 troops in the second half of 2006 and to 2,500 in the longer 
term. See ‘EU-vredesmacht Bosnië verkleinen’, NRC Handelsblad, 7 March 2006. On EUFOR 
Althea, see infra section 4.1.2. 
199  See M. Karnitschnig, ‘The UN and the EU in Kosovo – The Challenges of Joint Nation-
Building’, in J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys, eds., The United Nations and the European 
Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) pp. 323-351. For an 
alternative view, see G. Niessen and J. te Velde, ‘In Kosovo is geen plaats voor het Bosnisch model’, 
60 Internationale Spectator (2006) pp. 148-150. 
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4.1.1 EU Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
On 1 January 2003, the European Union launched its first-ever civilian crisis 
management operation within the framework of the ESDP: the European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.200 The Union thereby provided a 
follow-on mission to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). 
The aim of the EUPM, the mandate of which was adjusted and extended for 
another two years, is to consolidate the achievements of the IPTF and the interna-
tional community’s work to establish sustainable policing arrangements under 
Bosnian ownership in accordance with best European and international stan-
dards.201 This overall goal is to be achieved in particular through monitoring, 
mentoring and inspecting the Bosnian police at the appropriate level, as well as 
through training and technical support.202 Understandably, the EUPM does not 
have a mandate to enact legislation or to enforce the law in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
To possess either would be to undermine the principle of an independent, non-
politicised police service that the international community is seeking to instil 
more than ten years after the war ended. 
At the time of writing, a total of thirty-four countries (the twenty-seven EU 
Member States and seven third countries) are contributing to a force of 207 police 
officers and support staff.203 In accordance with Article 25 TEU, the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC, most commonly referred to by its French acronym 
                                                                                                                                               
200  As explained in section 3, the European Union had already conducted civilian crisis man-
agement missions in cooperation with both the WEU and the United Nations. The EUPM was the 
first operation for which the European Union alone assumed leadership and responsibility. After 
having been invited thereto in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 12 December 
2002 (UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/33), the European Union does, however, report to the Security Council 
on the activities of the EUPM. For the most recent report, covering the period from 1 January to 31 
December 2005, see UN Doc. S/2006/125, 23 February 2006. 
201  See Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police 
Mission, OJ 2002 L 70/1, which applied until 31 December 2005; and Council Joint Action 
2005/824/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), OJ 2005 L 307/55, applicable from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2007. 
202  Ibid. The total cost of the EUPM amounted to €38 million in 2003. See Council Decision 
2002/968/CFSP of 10 December 2002 concerning the implementation of Joint Action 
2002/210/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission, OJ 2002 L 335/1. Member States funded 
€18 million through staff secondment. The remaining €20 million in operational costs was financed 
through the Community budget. The latter figure dropped to €17.5 million per year in 2004 and 
2005. 
203  Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine have contributed police 
officers to the EUPM. The European Union has based itself on Art. 24 TEU to conclude agreements 
with these states on their (forces’) participation in the EUPM. For updates on contribution levels, see: 
<http://www.eupm.org>. 
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COPS) is tasked with exercising political control and strategic direction over the 
mission. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner is in operational control of 
the mission, reporting to the SG/HR through the EU Special Representative in 
Bosnia.204 In order to support the domestic police forces in their work, the EUPM 
initially co-located over 400 of its officers with BiH officers at medium and 
senior level in all the police forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, in the 
police forces of the two entities that make up Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim-
Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), 
and the police force of the independently administered Brčko District.205 It is the 
officers’ joint task to implement the EUPM’s seven core programmes in crime 
policing, criminal justice, internal affairs, police administration and public 
order.206 Each programme is implemented through a number of concrete projects, 
such as the Major and Organised Crime project and the Fight and Intervention 
against Human Trafficking project. In the field of internal affairs, one of the 
EUPM’s main tasks is to encourage the domestic authorities to deal with cases of 
non-compliance such as obstruction of the EUPM, failure to adhere to the terms 
of the Dayton Agreement or failure to uphold democratic policing principles. 
                                                                                                                                               
204  Sven Christian Frederiksen was appointed Head of Mission by Council Decision 
2002/212/CFSP of 11 March 2002 concerning the appointment of the Head of Mission/Police 
Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), OJ 2002 L 70/8. Bartholomew Kevin 
Carty was appointed as his successor by Council Decision 2004/188/CFSP of 23 February 2004, OJ 
2004 L 58/27. His mandate was extended until 31 December 2005 by Council Decision 
2005/81/CFSP of 31 January 2005, OJ 2005 L 29/48. Carty was replaced by Vincenzo Coppola by 
PSC Decision EUPM/1/2005 (2005/922/CFSP) of 25 November 2005, OJ 2005 L 335/58. On 1 
February 2006, Christian Schwarz-Schilling (Germany) succeeded Paddy Ashdown (United 
Kingdom) as High Representative and EUSR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Council Joint Action 
2006/49/CFSP of 30 January 2006 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, OJ 2006 L 26/21. His mandate was amended and extended until 30 June 2007 by 
Council Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP of 7 February 2007 amending and extending the mandate of the 
European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ 2007 L 35/35. Lord 
Ashdown was appointed EUSR to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 on 
the appointment of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ 2002 L 70/7. This 
‘double-hatting’ greatly facilitated the coordination of the rule of law reform programmes between 
the United Nations and the European Union. 
205  The present structure of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established under the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace, initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in 
Paris on 14 December 1995, 35 ILM (1996) at p. 75. 
206  On the activities of the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see the Agreement of 4 October 2002 
between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed to Council Decision 2002/845/CFSP of 30 
September 2002 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on the activities of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in 
BiH, OJ 2002 L 293/1. In coordination with the HR/EUSR, international organisations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as well as senior BiH police authorities, the EUPM’s first Head of Mission, Police 
Commissioner Frederiksen, set two priorities for the mission, namely combating organised crime and 
guaranteeing the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons, particularly those returning 
to an area where the ethnic group to which they belong is in the minority. The EUPM’s priorities 
developed over the course of the mission. 
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Only if the local authorities are seen to be failing in their duty to properly apply 
the disciplinary procedures will the matter be taken up by the EUPM. In the last 
instance, the EUPM Commissioner can recommend the removal of non-compliant 
officers to the HR/EUSR.207 Any officer so removed would be barred from any 
future service in the police.208 
It is difficult to objectively assess how successful the EUPM has been in the 
performance of its tasks since its inception. It is very much a question of whether 
one sees the bottle as half-full or half-empty. In the wake of the tenth anniversary 
of Dayton, travelling outside the remarkably safe and pleasant environment of 
Sarajevo, one gets a sense that Bosnia is settling into a sort of normality. People 
expelled during the war are returning. The cost of life is relatively cheap. But 
while an end to war has brought a peace dividend, elections and freedom of 
expression, it has also brought organised crime and hard drugs. On the basis of 
official press releases in the first year of operations, it seems that the EUPM was 
‘learning by doing’.209 It increased border security after the assassination of 
Serbian Prime Minister Djindjić, it raided night clubs after reports of human 
trafficking and it increased surveillance after indications of smuggling activity via 
the beaches at Neum (the twelve-kilometre strip between Dubrovnik and Split 
that provides Bosnia-Herzegovina with access to the Adriatic). Eight months 
down the road, the EUPM acknowledged that the time had come to move beyond 
responding to violent incidents after they have occurred and formulate a security 
doctrine that would enable it to prevent the eruption of renewed violence. A stable 
and secure environment in Bosnia, underpinned by a military presence, was – and 
still is – an essential element for the success of the EUPM. At the outset, the 
European Union was dependent on the military presence of NATO/SFOR to 
secure this environment, making close consultation between the EUPM on the 
one hand, and the other international actors, in particular SFOR, on the other, 
imperative for establishing the rule of law in Bosnia-Herzegovina.210 Procedures 
were simplified when, on 2 December 2004, the Union launched EUFOR Althea 
as a follow-on for SFOR.211 But this move did not translate itself into a qualitative 
or quantitative improvement of the EUPM’s record. While the EUPM was 
                                                                                                                                               
207  Para. 6 of the Annex to Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP. 
208  See C. Mace, ‘European Union Security and Defence Policy Comes of Age in the Balkans’, 
EPC Working Papers (2003), available at: <http://www.TheEPC.be>. 
209  See also A. Nowak, L’Union en action: la mission de police en Bosnie (Paris, ISS 2003). 
210  To this end, Council Joint Action 2003/188/CFSP of 17 March 2003 amending Joint Action 
2002/210/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission, OJ 2003 L 73/9 was adopted to amend the 
original mandate of the EUPM to give the SG/HR the authorisation to release classified information 
and documents up to the level ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ to NATO/SFOR, the host state and the third 
parties associated with the EU Joint Action, and up to the level ‘RESTREINT UE’ to the Office of 
the High Representative, the United Nations and the OSCE. 
211  See infra section 4.1.2. 
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supposed to turn local police into more efficient crime fighters, the International 
Crisis Group found that statistics collected by the entity police forces indicated 
that crime had in fact risen significantly since the EUPM’s mandate began.212 The 
most visible failure, however, was the inability of the EUPM to conclude an 
agreement between the various local parties on police reform.213 
Substantive police reform was long overdue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During 
the 1992-1995 war, the police were a key instrument of ethnic cleansing – 
particularly in the Republika Srpska and the Croatian areas of the FBiH.214 The 
war left Bosnia with three police forces: Bosniak, Croat and Serb, each with its 
own jurisdictions. The first two merged fairly swiftly, at least nominally, but 
police throughout the whole country remained highly politicised, carrying out the 
orders of policymakers to obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, in particular regarding refugee return, and were heavily involved in 
organised crime. The force in the Republika Srpska was filled with war criminals 
and actively supported persons indicted by the ICTY.215 While the EUPM was 
empowered to request the HR/EUSR to remove obstructionist police officers, this 
proved such a cumbersome and protracted process that the EUPM has never 
exercised the power.216 For a long time, police reform (of the structure of the 
police forces, their financing and their relationship to the courts) remained 
hopelessly blocked due to obstruction from the Serbian side. The leading party in 
the Republika Srpska – the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) – openly blocked all 
reform efforts and received active encouragement from the Serbian government in 
Belgrade, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbia’s security structures, which 
wished to annex the Republika Srpska in the context of a Kosovo final status 
                                                                                                                                               
212  See ICG, ‘Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’, Europe Report, 6 Septem-
ber 2005. John Erik Jensen, Chief of Quality Control of the EUPM, was reported as having said that 
crime had risen approximately 40 per cent since the EUPM began, but that the statistics used by local 
police agencies were extremely unreliable. 
213  The EUPM can claim formation of the State Investigation and Protection Agency, a state-
level police agency, as a success, though one that must be shared with the OHR. The Council was 
proud to devote attention to this fact by publishing a positive press report on the issue in the first 
issue of its ESDP Newsletter in December 2005. See ‘Wächter im Splitterstaat’, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 20 October 2005. For a more critical view, see M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, ‘ESDP 
Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges’, 10 EFA Rev. (2005) pp. 215-235; 
and, more elaborately, M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, European Union Peacebuilding and 
Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy (London, Routledge 2006). 
214  See L. Silber and A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, rev. edn. (London, Penguin Books 
1996). 
215  Although the Srebrenica Report of the Republika Srpska’s government listed hundreds of 
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EU’, Europe Report, 6 September 2005. See, more generally, S. Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: 
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settlement.217 The OHR, the EUPM and other international agencies in Bosnia-
Herzegovina proved incapable of convincing the Serbs to cooperate. A narrow 
interpretation of the EUPM’s rather weak mandate – to ‘monitor, mentor and 
inspect’ – did not help to break to deadlock. It was not until heavy political 
pressure was applied on both Banja Luka and Belgrade, inter alia, by making 
police reform a necessary precondition for Bosnia-Herzegovina to open SAA 
negotiations with the European Union,218 that the Bosnian Serb parliament on 6 
October 2005 backed down from blocking a key police law.219 
Keen to score an early success for its nascent European Security and Defence 
Policy, the European Union underestimated both the size and the complexity of 
the task in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EUPM took over poorly prepared and 
lacking in inspiration and expertise on how to devise a hard-hitting and non-
negotiable strategy for ‘Europeanising’ the police in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the 
end of 2005, the Council reassessed the disappointing performance of the EUPM 
and used the expiration of its mandate on 31 December 2005 to replace it with an 
institution charged, until 31 December 2007, with supervising the implementation 
of the fight against organised crime and the agreed police reforms.220 It seems 
unlikely that, with this marginal widening of the EUPM’s mandate, a robust 
police mission has been created that will remove recalcitrant police officials and 
earn respect in – as well as outside – Bosnia-Herzegovina.221 
 
4.1.2 EUFOR Althea 
 
At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the European Union 
stated its willingness to follow on from a strong NATO-led military operation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by mid-2004.222 This ambition was restated by President 
Chirac and Prime Minister Blair at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet in 
February 2003. SFOR, which operated under a robust chapter VII mandate,223 was 
set up in Bosnia in December 1996, following the Dayton Agreement that ended 
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the civil war in the republic. It had a mandate to provide security and stability as 
well as to capture alleged war criminals and transfer them to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. In June 2004, 
SFOR consisted of some 7,000 troops (reduced from 40,000 at the start, 33,000 in 
1999 and 16,000 in 2002 as part of a restructuring exercise), with European states 
contributing the majority of the force.224 Yet, leading an operation of this size 
would certainly represent a major task for the European Union. The United States 
had initially given a cautious welcome to the Union’s proposal, emphasising the 
need for a successful initial military operation in Macedonia before any takeover 
from SFOR could be considered. At the beginning of June 2003, however, the 
United States put the brakes on the European Union’s plans to take over the large 
NATO-led mission, citing security reasons, the complexity of the mission, and 
continuing problems with the transfer of war criminals to the ICTY.225 High-level 
EU diplomats were not easily persuaded that, by postponing the European 
Union’s takeover of NATO’s mission, the United States was in fact doing the 
Union a favour and not attempting to thwart its efforts at giving the ESDP real 
visibility, which the Union’s third military operation certainly would provide.226  
Discontent over the spat between the United States and a divided Europe over 
the war in Iraq certainly fuelled the Union’s eagerness to prove its military 
capabilities by taking over some of the tasks performed by NATO and the United 
Nations, especially in the nearby Western Balkans. Yet, as most of the region 
increasingly shed its dependency on large international military forces (some 
7,000 NATO-led troops in Bosnia, up to 20,000 in Kosovo and a few hundred in 
Macedonia) and slowly moved towards the stage of state- and institution-
building, the need for professionally trained police forces capable of providing 
security was growing. It was acknowledged that military missions could neither 
be open-ended nor carried out separately from building civilian structures. As 
such, the existing military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be part of a 
comprehensive approach in the country and, in particular, geared towards 
providing the necessary security regime to allow for the deployment of civilian 
missions aimed at integrating police forces, improving training and overhauling 
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the judiciary and penal systems.227 In a decision hailed by the UN Security 
Council and Member States of both organisations, NATO announced at its 28-29 
June 2004 summit in Istanbul that SFOR would be replaced by an EU-led 
peacekeeping force by the end of 2004.228 The motives, however, had less to do 
with the real security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina than with the European 
Union’s eagerness to bolster its credibility as a security actor and the desire of the 
United States to declare at least one of its long-term military deployments 
successfully over. 
On the surface, EUFOR merely had to pick up where the NATO peacekeepers 
had left off: patrolling the country, carrying out weapons collections and provid-
ing reassurance to local people. But the mission also faced two key challenges. 
The first was to deal with the issue of war criminals. While NATO managed to 
arrest twenty-eight people indicted by the ICTY, it singularly failed to arrest the 
two people at the top of the most wanted list: the former Bosnian Serb leaders 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. Although NATO maintained a residual 
military presence comprising a small 200-strong headquarters in Sarajevo 
(NHQSa) to advise the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina on defence reform, 
counter-terrorism and the capture of suspected war criminals, the spotlight shifted 
to EUFOR: could it do better in catching the big fish? Secondly, EUFOR would 
have to prove that it really could carry out a serious peacekeeping mission with 
thousands of troops on the ground. The question was whether the internal 
structures within the European Union would allow for such a mission. If so, then 
EUFOR could boost the Union’s self-confidence in the field of the EDSP and 
lead to the launching of similar missions in other trouble spots. 
Authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1575 (2004) for an initial 
planned period of twelve months,229 EUFOR Althea embarked on a mission to 
provide deterrence.230 and continued compliance with the Dayton Agreement and 
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to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.231 The 
handover ceremony from NATO to EU peacekeepers took place at Camp Butmir, 
NATO’s main base near Sarajevo, on 2 December 2004.232 With the adoption of 
resolution 1575 (2004) under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
authorised the Member States acting through EUFOR to take ‘all necessary 
measures’ to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annexes 
l-A and 2 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and stressed that the parties to those 
agreements would continue to be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR 
(and NHQSa) as might be necessary to ensure the protection and the defence of 
EUFOR (and the NATO presence). The resolution thus allowed for the use of 
force as applied by EUFOR troops in the gun battle that ensued after they stormed 
a house in Bosnia to apprehend Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Dragomir 
Abazović.233 
In terms of operation and command, the PSC, under the responsibility of the 
Council, is tasked with exercising political control and strategic direction over the 
military operation. The Council authorised the PSC to take the relevant decisions 
in accordance with Article 25 TEU.234 This authorisation included the power to 
take further decisions on the appointment of the EU Operation Commander 
and/or the EU Force Commander and to amend the planning documents, includ-
ing the operation plan, the chain of command and the rules of engagement. The 
powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of EUFOR, 
however, remained vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR. 
As part of the 1999 ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, EUFOR is drawing on NATO 
assets and capabilities for Althea.235 The EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ) 
at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons (Belgium) 
oversees EUFOR Althea. The EU OHQ draws on EU and NATO staff. The EU 
                                                                                                                                               
231  Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the European 
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Command Element at NATO’s Joint Forces Command in Naples (Italy) and the 
EUFOR HQ at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo have control of the operation, reporting 
to EU OHQ. On 24 July 2004, Admiral Rainer Feist (Germany), NATO’s Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (D-SACEUR), was appointed EU 
Operation Commander,236 but he was succeeded (in both posts) by General John 
Reith (United Kingdom) before he could even start working for EUFOR.237 The 
EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the proper execution of the EU 
military operation conducted under the responsibility of the EU Operation 
Commander.238 Major General David Leakey (United Kingdom) was appointed as 
first EU Force Commander.239 On 5 December 2005, he was replaced by Major 
General Gian Marco Chiarini (Italy),240 who in turn was replaced by Rear Admiral 
Hans-Jochen Witthauer (Germany).241 The EU Force Commander maintains 
contact with the local authorities, in close coordination with the HR/EUSR, on 
issues relevant to his mission.242 Without prejudice to the chain of command, the 
EU Commanders coordinate closely with the HR/EUSR with a view to ensuring 
consistency of the EU military operation with the broader context of the interna-
tional community’s activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.243 At the end of 2006, a 
total of thirty-four countries (twenty-four EU Member States and ten third 
countries) were contributing to a force of about 7,000 troops that operated under 
the renewed UN chapter VII mandate of Security Council resolution 1722 
(2006).244 In line with the revised operational plan agreed to by the PSC and 
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endorsed by the Council on 5 March 2007,245 EUFOR was downsized to 2,500 
troops contributed by Hungary, Poland, Spain and Turkey (backed up by ‘over-
the-horizon’ reserve forces in case of crisis). In accordance with Article 28(3) 
TEU, the operational expenditure for EUFOR Althea is paid through contribu-
tions by Member States to a financial mechanism (ATHENA) based on GDP.246 
It is now more than two years since EUFOR took over from SFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was seamless and did not 
result in a security gap. Thanks to its operational set-up and the symbiotic 
relationship with NATO and the rest of the ‘EU family’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
EUFOR has managed to establish its credibility and robustness from the outset.247 
A good start was crucial for the consolidation of the European Union’s ESDP, as 
EUFOR Althea is its most ambitious and significant operation within that 
framework. With approximately 7,000 personnel, EUFOR Althea is not only the 
largest EU military mission to date,248 but is also still part of a comprehensive 
endeavour to give Bosnia-Herzegovina the perspective of EU membership.249 The 
immediate goal of Operation Althea was to contribute to maintaining a secure 
environment for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. In this respect, 
EUFOR Althea has proved to be a success. As part of its operations, EUFOR has 
conducted searches of companies suspected of pursuing activities in contraven-
tion of the Dayton Agreement, and it has conducted operations to disrupt illegal 
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activities by those involved in organised crime. EUFOR has also supported 
demining operations and regularly carries out weapons collection activities across 
the country. Cooperating closely with the EUPM, EUFOR puts pressure on 
criminal networks.250 By doing so, it has also helped to disrupt support to ICTY 
indictees.251 In short, EUFOR’s activities have helped to create the conditions 
under which Bosnia-Herzegovina was able to make progress in several important 
respects.252 For example, in September 2005, the Republika Srpska and the FBiH 
agreed on a long-debated military reform; a number of weeks later they agreed on 
the issue of police reform. This progress has been rewarded with the opening of 
negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European 
Union.253  
As noted when discussing the role of the EUPM, however, much progress is 
still to be made. Ongoing disagreement about police reform now forms the 
obstacle to concluding the SAA negotiation process. However stable Bosnia-
Herzegovina is, the potential for instability still exists: the country is awash with 
weapons; the three constituent peoples do not all share a common vision for the 
future, and this is evident in daily politics, which is driven by nationalistic 
agendas; and progress towards self-sustainability is significantly hindered by 
widespread organised crime and corruption, which are deeply intermingled with 
public life. The reform agenda, including the defence and police reforms, still 
needs to be implemented. In 2006, a new multi-ethnic professional army under a 
central general staff and one defence ministry at federal level was created. The 
new army has replaced the military structures of the BiH entities. As the reform 
of the BiH armed forces and the build up of the BiH security sector continues, 
EUFOR (in cooperation with the NHQSa) will have to stand ready to hand over 
more and more of its responsibilities to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cooperation with 
the ICTY must continue and be enhanced. In this respect, EUFOR Althea risks 
receiving the same criticism that NATO has had to endure: Karadžić and Mladić 
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are still at large. Determining that the situation in the region continues to consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council was 





4.2.1 Operation Concordia 
 
As part of its larger commitment to Macedonia,255 the European Union deployed 
its inaugural military operation to contribute further to a stable and secure envi-
ronment in the country. On 31 March 2003, it launched Operation Concordia to 
ensure the follow-up of NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony.256 The European 
Union had already hoped to take over from NATO in Macedonia when the man-
date of the Alliance’s Operation Amber Fox came to an end in December 2002.257 
However, the EU-led operation could not go ahead until an agreement was 
reached with Turkey, within NATO, on EU access to NATO assets and capabili-
ties (the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements). The negotiations between the 
European Union and Turkey were deadlocked for months, until a breakthrough 
finally came on 12 December 2002, when the European Council of Copenhagen 
agreed that the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements and the implementation thereof would 
‘only apply to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or 
parties to NATO’s “Partnership for Peace”, and which have consequently 
concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO’.258 This formulation, which 
effectively excludes Cyprus (and Malta) from taking part in EU military opera-
tions using NATO assets, was sufficient to overcome Turkish objections and 
secure access to NATO assets.259 At the same summit, the European Council 
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confirmed the Union’s readiness to take over the military operation in Macedonia 
as soon as possible, in consultation with NATO.260 The European Council invited 
the relevant EU bodies to finalise work on the overall approach to the operation, 
including the development of military options and relevant plans. The Union’s 
wish eventually became reality at the end of March 2003. A total of twenty-seven 
countries (thirteen EU Member States.261 and fourteen non-EU countries.262.) 
contributed to a force of 350 soldiers plus fifty support staff.263 
It is worth pointing out that the Irish government decided that it was unable to 
contribute personnel to Concordia due to the lack of explicit UN Security Council 
authorisation for the operation.264 Indeed, without referring to its legal basis in the 
UN Charter or determining the situation in Macedonia a threat to international 
peace and security, Security Council resolution 1371 (2001), the single non-EU 
basis for the adoption of Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP on the establishment of 
Concordia,265 called for the full implementation of resolution 1345 (2001) and 
further simply welcomed international efforts, including those of the OSCE, the 
European Union and NATO, in cooperation with the Macedonian government, 
and other states, ‘to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area and to 
facilitate the full implementation of the Framework Agreement, thus contributing 
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82/45, to which the so-called SOFA is annexed. 
264  Nevertheless, Ireland did contribute to the mission’s joint costs and played a full role in the 
Committee of Contributors. See PSC Decision FYROM/1/2003 of 18 February 2003 on the setting-
up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union Military Operation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2003 L 62/1. 
265  Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP, preamble, recital 4. 
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to peace and stability in the region.’266 Resolution 1345 (2001) did little more than 
call on states and appropriate international organisations to consider how they 
could best give practical help to efforts in the region to strengthen democratic, 
multi-ethnic societies and assist in the return of displaced persons (.para. 11).267 
The legal basis for the adoption of this resolution was also elusive, but like 
resolution 1371 (2001) it recalled resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, which had 
determined that the situation ‘in the region’ constituted a threat to international 
peace and security and gave NATO a chapter VII mandate to deploy KFOR 
troops. While Ireland was probably right in insisting that resolution 1244 (1999), 
adopted in the wake of NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo, could not serve as 
an appropriate legal basis for the deployment of an EU peacekeeping mission in 
neighbouring Macedonia in 2003, it could hardly use this argument to not 
contribute troops to Operation Concordia. After all, the European Union (suppos-
edly) acted on the explicit request of the Macedonian government, not the other 
way around.268 
As said at the beginning, the aim of Operation Concordia was to contribute 
further to a stable and secure environment to allow the Macedonian government 
to implement the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in order to arrive at a 
situation where an international security presence was no longer needed. The 
command and control arrangements for Operation Concordia were drawn up in 
accordance with the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements so as to create an EU chain of 
command that recognised the need for coordination with NATO.269 Admiral 
Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (D-SACEUR),270 
was appointed as the first EU Operation Commander.271 The Council appointed 
                                                                                                                                               
266  S/RES/1371 (2001) of 26 September 2001. 
267  S/RES/1345 (2001) of 21 March 2001. The resolution also called on all states in the region to 
respect each other’s territorial integrity and to cooperate on measures that foster stability and 
promote regional political and economic cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter, the basic 
principles of the OSCE and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (.para. 12). 
268  President Trajkovski is supposed to have sent a formal invitation letter to the SG/HR on 17 
January 2003. See Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP, preamble, recital 5. But proof of the 
existence of this letter could not be found. On 13 March 2003, the SG/HR allegedly received a 
further letter from President Trajkovski, inviting the European Union to launch an operation in 
Macedonia. See Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP, preamble, recital 1. Proof of the existence of this 
letter could also not be found. 
269  Arts. 1-5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP. It serves little purpose to 
repeat the arrangements here. They have been described in detail when discussing EUFOR Althea, 
supra section 4.1.2. It should be emphasised, however, that the command and control arrangements 
for Althea were copied from those for Operation Concordia. See also C. Mace, ‘European Union 
Security and Defence Policy Comes of Age in the Balkans’, EPC Working Papers (2003), available 
at: <http://www.TheEPC.be>. 
270  See supra section 4.1.2. 
271  Art. 2 of Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP. 
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Brigadier-General Pierre Maral (France) as EU Force Commander.272 One of his 
tasks was to maintain contact with local authorities on issues relevant to his 
mission. Javier Solana and Alexis Brouhns (the EUSR in Macedonia at the 
time),273 each within his own mandate, acted as primary points of contact with the 
Macedonian authorities for matters relating to the implementation of Joint Action 
2003/92/CFSP.274 
In terms of crisis management, the European Union has fared well in the case 
of Macedonia. Building on the success of three NATO operations in the country 
(Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony), Operation Concordia 
provided continuity by carrying out classic peacekeeping tasks such as patrolling 
Macedonia’s crisis areas, mostly near the Kosovo border.275 While it is true that, 
overall, the situation in Macedonia was relatively straightforward when compared 
to other Balkan conflicts, the security situation in the country nevertheless 
remained precarious. Incidents that took place at the beginning of 2003 and that 
apparently were the work of ethnic Albanian extremists unhappy with the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement had served as a reminder of the potential for a resurgence 
of ethnic violence Macedonia.276 Although Concordia was a relatively small force, 
its deployment was an important first test for both the European Union’s military 
crisis management capabilities and the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements. The Union 
was successful on both counts. Concordia’s deployment heralded a period of 
normalisation and stabilisation. Initially expected to last for a period of six 
months,277 the Council on 29 July 2003 agreed to extend Operation Concordia for 
one additional period until 15 December 2003, in line with the request made to 
the European Union by the president of Macedonia.278 This shows the level of 
confidence that the Macedonian government had in the European Union as a 
                                                                                                                                               
272  See Council Press Release No. 6158/03 (Presse 38), 7 February 2003. Maral was replaced by 
Major General Luís Nelson Ferreira dos Santos (Portugal) as of 1 October 2003. On that date, 
Concordia took over from France the responsibilities at the force’s headquarters level. See Art. 2 of 
Council Decision 2003/563/CFSP of 29 July 2003 on the extension of the European Union military 
operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2003 L 190/20. 
273  See supra n. 98. 
274  Art. 6 of Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP. 
275  For an overview of Concordia’s activities, see Concordia’s website: <http://www.delmkd. 
cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/main.htm>. 
276  See, e.g., T. Stojcevski, ‘Abductions rattle Macedonians’, 395 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report 
(2003); T. Stojcevski, ‘Lions menace ends’, 401 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2003); T. Stojcevski, 
‘Militants threaten with renewed conflict’, 403 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2003); and T. Sto-
jcevski, ‘‘Extremists’ target Macedonians’ homes’, 410 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (2003). 
277  Art. 3 of Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP. 
278  Council Decision 2003/563/CFSP of 29 July 2003 on the extension of the European Union 
military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2003 L 190/20 refers to 
Trajkovski’s letter of 4 July 2003, addressed to the SG/HR, in which the president invited the 
European Union to extend Operation Concordia until 15 December 2003 with the existing mandate 
and legal framework. 
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crisis manager. Or perhaps it was the SG/HR who bought extra preparation time 
by convincing Trajkovski to wait until the end of the year before the Union’s 
first-ever military mission would be transformed into a police mission.279 
 
4.2.2 EUPOL Proxima 
 
On 15 December 2003, a ceremony and a military parade in Skopje marked the 
official end of Operation Concordia. Immediately afterwards, the opening 
ceremony of the EU Police Mission in Macedonia (EUPOL Promixa) took place 
at the mission’s new headquarters. Javier Solana spoke on both occasions.280 In 
both speeches, the SG/HR stressed the continued engagement of the European 
Union in Macedonia, a country which had moved from a situation where the main 
threat to stability was no longer armed conflict but criminality. Hence the need to 
shift the emphasis in the Union’s support actions from the military to the police. 
At the invitation of Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski,281 the European Union 
assumed responsibility for its second-ever police mission in the framework of the 
ESDP – its fourth ESDP mission of 2003. Proxima was launched for an initial 
period of twelve months.282 A planning team had been preparing its operations 
since 1 October 2003.283 As part of the SAP aimed at strengthening the rule of law 
in the region, Proxima aimed to support Macedonian efforts in moving closer 
towards the European Union.284 In particular, Proxima’s aim was to consolidate 
public confidence in policing by monitoring, mentoring and advising the local 
police and thus help fight organised crime more effectively. Proxima would 
achieve this goal by means of a comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the 
Interior, including the creation of a border police force and the development of an 
efficient and professional police service living up to European standards of 
policing, as required within the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment.285 To this end, thirty-five states (the fifteen EU Member States, the ten 
acceding countries, the three candidate countries and seven third states.286.) 
contributed to a 200- strong police mission that was placed under the day-to-day 
                                                                                                                                               
279  Already ten weeks after the European Union launched Operation Concordia, President 
Trajkovski suggested that the force be transformed into one that advises on border controls and the 
police. See E. Jansson, ‘Macedonia Seeks Greater Role for Balkans’, Financial Times, 9 June 2003. 
280  Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, attends ceremonies for termination of 
Operation Concordia and launch of Mission Proxima, Skopje, S0256/03, 15 December 2003. 
281  Letter dated 16 September 2003. 
282  Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 on the European Union Police 
Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), OJ 2003 L 249/66. 
283  The planning team was foreseen by Arts. 1 and 2 of Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP. 
284  See chapter 5. 
285  Art. 3 of Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP. 
286  Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United States. 
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supervision of Head of Mission/Police Commissioner Bart D’Hooge, who had 
also acted as the Police Head of Mission/Head of the Planning Team.287 He was 
obliged to report to the SG/HR through the EUSR.288 Like with other ESDP 
operations, the PSC provided political control and strategic direction. Uniformed 
police personnel were seconded by the Member States.289 Officers were co-
located at appropriate levels in Skopje, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Ohrid.290 
EUPOL Proxima was extended by one year in response to a request of the 
Macedonian Prime Minister Hari Kosotov on 1 October 2004.291 Brigadier 
General Jürgen Scholz was appointed as D’Hooge’s replacement.292 Under the 
political guidance of the EUSR in Skopje, Ambassador Michael Sahlin, and in 
partnership with the local authorities, Proxima police experts continued to 
monitor, mentor and advise the country’s police, focusing on middle and senior 
management. It also assisted further in the creation of a border police force. 
During its second year of activities, EUPOL Proxima focused on urgent opera-
tional needs within three programmes: Public Peace and Order, Organised Crime 
and Border Police. As a consequence, the mission expanded its geographical 
coverage to a country-wide deployment, while maintaining a higher presence in 
the former crisis area. 
                                                                                                                                               
287  Council Decision 2003/682/CFSP of 29 September 2003 concerning the appointment of the 
Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 2003 L 249/70. In accordance with Art. 13 of Council 
Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP, the Council adopted – by written procedure and on the basis of Art. 24 
TEU – a decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status and activities of the European Union Police 
Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), OJ 2004 L 16/66. The 
agreement included, where appropriate, the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary 
for the completion and smooth functioning of the police mission. The Head of Mission had to sign a 
contract with the Commission. See Art. 5(2) of Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP. 
288  The SG/HR gave guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner through the EUSR. 
Art. 7 of Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP. 
289  Each Member State had to bear the costs related to the police officers seconded by it, includ-
ing salaries, medical coverage, allowances other than per diems and travel expenses to and from 
Macedonia. See Art. 6(2) of Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP. All police officers remained 
under full command of the appropriate national authority. National authorities transferred operational 
control to the Head of Mission (Art. 5(3)). 
290  For an overview of the operational challenges faced by Proxima, see M. Merlingen and R. 
Ostrauskaite, ‘ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges’, 10 EFA Rev. 
(2005) pp. 213-235. 
291  Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on the extension of the European 
Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), OJ 
2004 L 348/40. 
292  PSC Decision PROXIMA/2/2004 of 30 November 2004 concerning the appointment of the 
Head of Mission of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EUPOL 
Proxima (2004/846/EC), OJ 2004 L 367/29. 
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The European Union’s second ESDP police mission was successfully termi-
nated on 9 December 2005.293 The closing of EUPOL Proxima preceded the 
decision of the European Council summit of 15-16 December 2005 to award 
candidate country status to Macedonia as a reward for the ‘significant progress’ it 
had made in the previous years towards meeting the political criteria for EU 
membership.294 Thus, the European Union’s relationship with Macedonia moved 




The end of EUPOL Proxima did not signify the end of EU support to police 
reform in Macedonia. With the establishment of the EU Police Advisory Team 
(EUPAT), the European Union continued its efforts in supporting local authori-
ties.295 EUPAT was launched on 15 December 2005 for a single period of six 
months.296 
The main objective of EUPAT was to help the Macedonian government mod-
ernise police structures, a priority reform area for further progress towards the 
European Union.297 The team consisted of thirty experts seconded from EU 
Member States.298 They acted under the day-to-day leadership of Brigadier 
General Scholz, whose stay in Macedonia was thereby prolonged.299 Scholz, in 
turn, acted under the guidance of EUSR Erwan Fouéré and in partnership with the 
Macedonian authorities.300 Very much like the staff of its predecessor, EUPOL 
                                                                                                                                               
293  Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on the occasion of the cere-
mony marking the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Skopje, S406/05, 9 December 2005. 
294  Bull. EU 12-2005, points I.12.23 and 24. 
295  During consultations with the European Union, the Macedonian government had indicated 
that it would welcome, under certain conditions, a police mission to bridge the gap between the end 
of EUPOL Proxima and a planned project funded by CARDS aimed at providing technical assistance 
in the field of police reform. 
296  Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU 
Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (f.YROM), OJ 
2005 L 307/61. 
297  Art. 1(2) of Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP. 
298  Art. 5(4) of Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP. The staff comprised both EU police offi-
cers and civilian experts (including law enforcement monitors), assisted by twenty national staff. The 
headquarters for the head of EUPAT and his staff were in Skopje, while EUPAT mobile units were 
co-located in Skopje, Tetovo, Ohrid, Bitola and Stip, thereby covering all police regions. The 
necessary arrangements were made regarding the extension of the agreement between the European 
Union and Macedonia on the status and activities of EUPOL Proxima to EUPAT. 
299  PSC Decision EUPAT/1/2005 of 7 December 2005 concerning the appointment of the Head 
of the EU Police Advisory Team Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (f.YROM), 
EUPAT, OJ 2005 L 346/46. 
300  Fouéré was the Head of the Commission’s Delegation in Skopje. Under the terms of Council 
Joint Action 2005/724/CFSP of 17 October 2005, OJ 2005 L 272/26, Fouéré’s mandate as EUSR 
expired on 28 February 2006. It was extended and amended by Joint Action 2006/123/CFSP of 20 
February 2006, OJ 2006 L 49/20. 
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Proxima, EUPAT experts monitored and advised the Macedonian police (.primar-
ily the middle and senior management levels) in fields spanning border 
management, public order and the fight against corruption and organised crime. 
EUPAT put emphasis on the implementation of police reforms, cooperation 
between the police and the judiciary, professional standardisation and internal 
control.301 The European Union set aside €1.5 million for this mission in Mace-
donia.302 
When EUPAT’s mandate ended on 14 June 2006, it handed over to a Euro-
pean Commission funded CARDS project that would continue to provide police 
advisors at central and local level.303 This evolution shows how far Macedonia has 
come in just five years. It also illustrates the European Union’s ability to adapt its 
different tools to specific situations with specific needs. The Union thus began by 
taking over a military operation from NATO, continued with an ESDP police 
mission and followed up with EUPAT and the European Commission projects. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The European Union has come a long way in the Western Balkans in just a few 
years. During the 1990s, while it stood by and watched the Balkans burn, it was 
the United States, in the framework of NATO, that had to put the fire out. In the 
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, the Union finally found its voice to say no to 
violent conflict in the heart of Europe. In Macedonia, it for the first time acted 
quickly and in a unified way to head off the plunge into inter-ethnic warfare. 
Thanks to the heavy involvement of SG/HR Javier Solana, and with the support 
of NATO and the OSCE, the European Union brokered the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (2001), which defined the road to a new inter-ethnic arrangement in 
Macedonia. The creation of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro marked a 
second important feat for the Union and its High Representative for the CFSP. 
This temporary arrangement helped the region to ‘cool off.’, while it bought the 
international community time to find ways to face the next challenges, most 
notably that of Kosovo’s final status, the determination of which is the key to 
creating sustainable peace and stability in the Western Balkans. 
The European sword is being forged in the Western Balkans, in order to back 
up words with force if need be. The European Union has taken its first steps in the 
field of the ESDP with the launch of its first-ever police and military missions. 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have served as good testing grounds for 
                                                                                                                                               
301  Art. 2 of Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP. 
302  Art. 8 of Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP. 
303  On CARDS, see chapter 5, section 3.4. 
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making forthcoming ESDP missions a success. Lessons learned from these 
operations should be taken to heart when the Union embarks on its biggest 
civilian mission in the high-risk territory of Kosovo. 
In this context, it is clear that the European Union cannot afford to fall prey to 
the consequences of a half-hearted policy or another ‘Balkan fatigue’. The 
Western Balkans may offer the Union’s one and only chance of developing 
credible and lasting foreign policy, security and defence arrangements. The 
Western Balkans will require continued attention and support from the European 
Union if the region is to become stable and secure. The need for further invest-
ment in peacebuilding in the Western Balkans is clear. Complicated issues need 
to be tackled urgently if the Union is to get a return on its investment in the 
region. In order to succeed, the short-term intervention actions must be under-
pinned by reinforced policies to address the root causes of radical discontent. 
Organised crime and widespread corruption need to be eradicated quickly and the 
sustainable return of internally displaced persons is vital for ethnic reconciliation. 
During the last seven years, the European Union’s SAP has made a critical 
contribution to progress achieved throughout the region in promoting peace and 
stability. The European Union’s evolving relationship with the Western Balkans 
centres around the application of the conditionality principle. This will be the 
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As noted in the previous chapter, the recent establishment of a real and credible 
Common Foreign and Security Policy towards the Western Balkans and the 
launching of the first-ever EU military and police missions in the framework of 
the European Security and Defence Policy are helpful in restoring order in the 
region. Maintaining the ‘negative peace’ (absence of armed hostilities) is a 
necessary condition for establishing and maintaining a ‘positive peace’ (social 
justice and equality) within and among the countries of the Western Balkans. 
However, it does not single-handedly deal with the underlying causes and 
conditions of the symptoms of violent conflicts in the region. The determinants of 
security stabilisation in the Western Balkans are not just political and military. A 
comprehensive approach towards reconstruction and reconciliation is key to the 
efforts geared at stabilising the region. This implies the establishment of autono-
mous communities and the creation of new or reformed administrative, legislative 
and judicial structures that guarantee the rule of law instead of the ‘law of the 
ruler’. Moreover, the establishment of effective democratic structures has to go 
hand in hand with macroeconomic stabilisation and liberalisation.1 Finally, a good 
approach will adapt to local and regional differences. This is the consequence of 
the disintegration and fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia. Hence, what is 
needed is a flexible, multi-layered approach that recognises these specificities and 
provides a form of assistance that is designed to encourage political, economic 
and social integration in the Western Balkans and in Europe; a process that would 
render states and borders relatively unimportant. Only such a comprehensive 
strategy for lasting peace can create an opposite logic to that of war. 
To fill the relative ‘Hobbesian void’ in south-eastern Europe with conflict con-
trolling and resolving mechanisms, and to create a belt of security, stability and 
prosperity stretching from Slovenia in the north-west to Greece in the south-east, 
                                                                                                                                               
∗ This chapter is a revised and extended version of my contribution ‘Western Balkans’, in S. 
Blockmans and A. Łazowski, eds., The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of 
the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2006) pp. 315-355. 
1 See M. Kaldor, V. Bojičić and I. Vejvoda, ‘Reconstruction in the Balkans: A Challenge for 
Europe?’, 2 EFA Rev. (1997) pp. 329-350 at pp. 344-346. 
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the European Union has, for some years now, engaged in longer-term conflict 
prevention, for which it is far better equipped. It has committed itself to a 
stabilisation process that capitalises on the Union’s greatest asset, namely, the 
promise of association and future membership. 
The adoption by the General Affairs Council of a Regional Approach towards 
the Western Balkans on 29 April 1997 represented the European Union’s first 
step towards the formulation of its own strategy designed to favour a progressive 
process of stabilisation and association of the countries in the region.2 Over the 
years, this strategy has been defined, refined and redefined. Central to the 
European Union’s relations with the Western Balkans is the application of the 
conditionality principle. While the conditionality principle, in one way or another, 
has always been part of EC/EU policies towards third countries, the Union’s 
strategies towards the Western Balkans have played a significant role in the 
development of this concept. Building on earlier legal and political studies on the 
evolving nature of EU conditionality,3 this chapter examines the integration of the 
principle into the main EU policy instruments targeting the Western Balkans. The 
Regional Approach, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Process will therefore be analysed (section 2). Particular 
attention is devoted to the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, the most 
prestigious legal instruments aimed at defining the relationship between the 
European Union and each of the states of the Western Balkans (section 3). This 
chapter also explores whether the European Partnerships introduce new elements 
of conditionality and whether they can bolster the European Union’s Stabilisation 
and Association Process to integrate the Western Balkan countries into the 
European Union (section 4). The specific nature of the (.potential) membership 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the EU’s 
relations with certain countries of South East Europe, Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1. 
3 See, e.g., O. Stokke, ‘Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art’, in O. 
Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London, Frank Cass 1995) pp. 1-87; K. Smith, ‘The 
Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?’, 3 EFA 
Rev. (1998) pp. 253-274; E. Lannon, K. Inglis and T. Haenebalcke, ‘The Many Faces of EU 
Conditionality in Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Relations’, in M. Maresceau and E. Lannon, eds., The 
EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies – A Comparative Analysis (London, Palgrave 
2001) pp. 97-138; F. Hoffmeister, ‘Changing Requirements for Membership’, in A. Ott and K. Inglis, 
eds., Handbook on European Enlargement – A Commentary on the Enlargement Process (The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2002) pp. 90-102; K. Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU 
Membership Conditionality’, in M. Cremona, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 105-139; C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their 
Progeny’, in C. Hillion, ed., EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2004) pp. 
1-22; M. Cremona, ‘EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality’, 30 EL Rev. (2005) pp. 3-22; 
and K. Inglis, ‘EU Enlargement: Membership Conditions Applied to Future and Potential Member 
States’, in Blockmans and Łazowski, eds., The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal 
Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration (The Hague, T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2006) pp. 61-92. 
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perspective of the Western Balkans (section 5) will be analysed in the light of the 
Union’s current constitutional impasse (section 6). In this respect, it is argued that 
the commitment to enlarge the European Union with Croatia, which is likely to be 
the first entrant for which no institutional arrangements have been made, offers a 
good opportunity to find practical solutions to reconcile the ‘deepening’ and 
‘widening’ agendas of the Union. As such, the chapter touches upon the level of 
commitment of both the European Union and the Western Balkans and recom-
mends the use of positive conditionality in the form of medium and long-term 
benefits attached to the fulfilment of the different criteria (sections 7-9). Conclu-
sions will be drawn at the end of the chapter (section 10). 
 
 
2. MAIN POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
2.1 Regional approach 
 
At the end of 1995, the Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
At first, as a consequence of the its subsidiary role in the US-led efforts to end the 
Bosnian war and bring ‘positive peace’ to the region, the European Union’s 
objectives were embedded in the international community’s initiative to adopt a 
comprehensive and encompassing approach to deal with the plethora of issues in 
south-eastern Europe. At the Royaumont Summit of 13 December 1995, which 
brought together the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member States, 
representatives of four ex-Yugoslav republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
FRY and FYROM), representatives of neighbouring countries in the region, 
delegations from the United States and Russia as well as representatives from 
NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe to formalise the Dayton Agreement, 
the international community unveiled the ‘Process for Stability and Good 
Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe’.4 The so-called ‘Royaumont Process’ 
was geared towards supporting the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and 
to encourage democratisation through regional projects in fields such as human 
rights, culture and civil society.5 
As a complement to the Royaumont Process, the European Union launched its 
own ‘Regional Approach’, designed for those countries which at the time did not 
qualify for the conclusion of Europe Agreements.6 As the Council had already 
                                                                                                                                               
4 See Council Conclusions and Declaration on former Yugoslavia, Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 
1.4.108. 
5 See H.-G. Ehrhart, ‘Prevention and Regional Security: The Royaumont Process and the Stabi-
lisation of South-Eastern Europe’, 4 OSCE Yearbook (1998) pp. 327-346. 
6 See Council Conclusions and Declaration on former Yugoslavia, Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 
1.4.108. 
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signed Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria,7 and as a Europe Agree-
ment with Slovenia was being negotiated,8 Albania remained the only country 
outside the borders of the former Yugoslavia that could be integrated into the 
Regional Approach. Within the framework of the Regional Approach, the 
European Union offered financial assistance and unilateral trade preferences, 
subject to the Western Balkan countries’ commitment to restore economic 
cooperation with each other. Since none of the countries involved had any 
significant contractual relations with the European Union, with the exception of 
Albania, which had concluded a Trade, Commercial and Economic Agreement 
with the EC,9 it was hoped that the prospect of a comprehensive cooperation 
agreement, enabling them to gain improved access to the internal market for a 
large number of their products, would serve as an incentive for economic reforms 
and the development of good neighbourly relations.10 
Apart from strong commitments to regional cooperation and the free market 
ideal, political conditionality was also at the heart of the Union’s Regional 
Approach. The Council made it clear that any consideration of establishing 
contractual relations would ‘depend on the willingness of the countries concerned 
to work towards consolidating peace and to respect human rights, the rights of 
minorities and democratic principles.’11 In addition, the Union’s offers were 
coupled to a clear expectation that all republics that had emerged from the violent 
implosion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would fully comply 
with their commitments under the Dayton Agreement, in particular those regard-
ing the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their place of origin 
and cooperation with the ICTY. The Council warned that, in the case of non-
compliance by any of the parties, it would consider taking ‘specific measures’ in 
response.12 
                                                                                                                                               
7 The EAs with Romania and Bulgaria were signed on 8 March 1993 and published in OJ 1994 
L 357/2 and OJ 1994 L 358/3, respectively. 
8 Negotiations on the Europe Agreement with Slovenia started in March 1995. The Agreement 
was signed on 10 June 1996 and entered into force in January 1997. For the text of the EA, see OJ 
1996 L 51/3. 
9 OJ 1992 L 343/1. The agreement is still in force, but Articles 3 to 14 have been suspended by 
the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, OJ 2006 L 239/2, which entered into force 
on 1 December 2006; see Council Information, OJ 2006 L 318/26. The 1992 Trade, Commercial and 
Economic Agreement will be fully replaced once the SAA Albania enters into force. See infra 
section 3.2.2. 
10  See F.-L. Altmann, ‘Die Balkanpolitik der EU – Regionalansatz und Prinzip der Kondition-
alität’, 47 Südosteuropa (1998) pp. 503-515 at p. 504; and O. Kovać, ‘Regional Approach of the 
European Union to Cooperation among Countries of the Former Yugoslavia’, 47 Review of 
International Affairs (1996) pp. 1-5. 
11  Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 1.4.108. 
12  Ibid. See also European Commission, Common Principles for Future Contractual Relations 
with Certain Countries in South-Eastern Europe, COM (1996) 476 final, Brussels, 2 October 1996. 
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The new strategy was soon put into legal practice. On 25 July 1996, the Coun-
cil adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96 relating to aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia and the FRY (the so-called ‘OBNOVA’ Regulation), which 
in Article 2 explicitly identified respect for democratic principles, the rule of law 
and human rights and fundamental freedoms as ‘essential elements’ for the 
application of the entire programme.13 The OBNOVA conditionality clause went 
one step further than comparable human rights and democracy clauses in earlier 
trade, cooperation and association agreements concluded by the Community with 
third states,14 by stating that the ‘specific conditions’ defined by the Council for 
the former Yugoslav republics were also to be regarded as essential elements of 
the regulation and, hence, their fulfilment a precondition for the granting of 
Community aid. The specific conditions mentioned in the regulation referred to 
the Council Conclusions of 26 February 1996 and the simultaneously adopted 
Declaration on former Yugoslavia.15 
However, the criteria listed in these documents were formulated in broad 
terms and thus fairly fuzzy. This problem was addressed by the Council on 29 
April 1997, with the adoption of specific guidelines in the form of ‘Conclusions 
on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the European 
Union’s relations with certain countries of south-east Europe’.16 These guidelines, 
for the first time, distinguished conditions which applied to all countries of the 
region from conditions which applied to individual countries only. The guidelines 
also established a graduated approach, within which trade preferences, financial 
assistance and the establishment of contractual relations were subject to different 
degrees of conditionality. This was meant to solve a principal dilemma of the 
European Union’s Western Balkans policy, manifested in the its desire to 
differentiate more effectively between the countries concerned in terms of their 
political and economic development, while at the same time continuing to apply a 
coherent strategy towards the region as a whole. Hence, while the Council 
reaffirmed that all offers continued to be available to all countries of the region 
and that the Union’s strategy was meant as an incentive, not an obstacle, to the 
countries to meet the relevant criteria, the refined approach towards conditionality 
                                                                                                                                               
13  OJ 1996 L 204/1. ‘Obnova’ means ‘reconstruction’ in the language formerly known as Serbo-
Croat. The regulation was repealed in December 2000 and replaced by a new funding instrument, the 
so-called CARDS Regulation. See infra section 3.4. 
14  See, generally, M. Cremona, ‘Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s Trade 
Agreements’, in N. Emiliou and D. O’Keeffe, eds., The European Union and World Trade Law: 
After the GATT Uruguay Round (London, Wiley 1996) pp. 62-77; F. Hoffmeister, Menschenrechts- 
und Demokratieklauseln in den vertraglichen Auβenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 
(Berlin, Springer 1998) pp. 117-175; E. Riedel and M. Will, ‘Human Rights Clauses in External 
Agreements of the European Communities’, in P. Alston, ed., The European Union and Human 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) pp. 723-754; and M. Bulterman, Human Rights in the 
Treaty Relations of the European Community (Antwerp, Intersentia 2001). 
15  Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 1.4.108. 
16  Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1. 
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followed the basic principle that the closer a country wanted to move towards the 
European Union, the more conditions it had to fulfil. The Guidelines of 29 April 
1997 clearly reflected a combination of both positive and negative conditionality. 
Progressive compliance with the conditions established by the Council was 
rewarded with intensified bilateral cooperation, including the establishment of 
contractual relations. However, in the case of serious and repeated non-
compliance with the conditions underpinning the respective levels of cooperation, 
trade preferences could be withdrawn, Community assistance frozen and, where 
applicable, an agreement suspended.17 
Thus, the contours of a distinctive model of EU conditionality towards the 
Western Balkans became visible. EU conditionality with regard to the Western 
Balkans was based on the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, the defining components of 
the Union’s relations with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs),18 
but extra conditions were added in the April 1997 guidelines to reflect the special 
need to stabilise the region.19 This led to an exceptionally broad range of political 
and economic conditions used by the Council: 
 
- Democratic principles: representative government and accountable executive; 
government and public authorities to act in a manner consistent with the consti-
tution and the law; separation of powers (government, administration, 
judiciary); free and fair elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot. 
- Human rights, rule of law: freedom of expression, including independent me-
dia; right of assembly and demonstration; right of association; right to privacy, 
family, home and correspondence; right to property; effective means of redress 
against administrative decisions; access to courts and right to fair trial; equality 
before the law and equal protection by the law; freedom from inhuman or de-
grading treatment and arbitrary arrest. 
- Respect for and protection of minorities: right to establish and maintain their 
own educational, cultural and religious institutions, organisations or associa-
tions; adequate opportunities for minorities to use their own language before 
courts and public authorities; adequate protection of refugees and displaced 
persons returning to areas where they represent an ethnic minority. 
- Market economy reform: macroeconomic institutions and policies necessary to 
ensure a stable economic environment; comprehensive liberalisation of prices, 
trade and current payments; setting-up of a transparent and stable legal and 
regulatory framework; demonopolisation and privatisation of state-owned or 
socially-owned enterprises; establishment of a competitive and prudently man-
aged banking sector.20 
                                                                                                                                               
17  For a detailed account of these measures and their legal bases, see C. Pippan, ‘The Rocky 
Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the 
Principle of Conditionality’, 9 EFA Rev. (2004) pp. 219-245 at pp. 229-238. 
18  Bull. EU 6-1993, point 13. See Hillion, loc. cit. n. 3. 
19  Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1, sections on ‘PHARE’ and ‘Contractual Relations’. 
20  Ibid., Annex I. 
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With this demonstrative list of standards, the European Union has helped to 
clarify the normative content of the conditionality principle that it applies towards 
the Western Balkans. 
The European Union’s Regional Approach represented an ambitious attempt 
to deal with the Western Balkans on a regional basis, recognising that all political 
issues and conflicts in the region were interconnected components of a larger 
whole: to deal effectively with any one issue or conflict means that, ultimately, 
the others have to be dealt with as well, if not simultaneously then certainly in 
sequence. Although the aim of the Regional Approach was never to put the 
Yugoslav jigsaw puzzle back together, betting on the results of such an approach 
for the Western Balkans was extremely risky at the time of its adoption. For no 
sooner had each breakaway republic become independent – in essence given itself 
a new identity – than it needed to integrate again on a regional basis and eventu-
ally become a member of a new entity. While the European Union’s efforts 
looked good on paper, in reality regional cooperation and bilateral relations barely 
progressed in the post-1997 period, and negative conditionality prevailed in the 
form of limited contractual relations and exclusions from association agreements. 
In the period from 28 February 1998 to 5 November 2001, the European Union 
even adopted a whole new range of sanctions against the FRY, because of its role 
in Kosovo.21 
 
2.2 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 
 
The Kosovo crisis of 1999 revealed the shortcomings of the Royaumont Process 
in addressing the complex and volatile situation in the Western Balkans and 
triggered a response by the international community. On 17 May 1999, amid 
ongoing NATO air strikes against Serbia, the EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
following an initiative by the German Presidency, launched the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe to replace the previous reactive crisis intervention policy in 
south-eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention 
strategy.22 
Although initiated by the European Union within its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, the Stability Pact is not an EU instrument. The Pact was endorsed 
at an international meeting held on the fringes of the European Council summit in 
Cologne on 10 June 1999 – the day that NATO’s seventy-eight-day bombing 
                                                                                                                                               
21  See chapter 3, section 4. 
22  Common Position 1999/345/CFSP of 17 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, 
OJ 1999 L 133/1. For background and analysis, see D. Phinnemore and P. Siani-Davies, ‘Beyond 
Intervention? The Balkans, the Stability Pact and the European Union’, in P. Siani-Davies, ed., 
International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995 (London, Routledge 2003) pp. 172-193. 
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campaign against the FRY ended – and its further development and implementa-
tion was vested in the OSCE.23 The Stability Pact is a political declaration of 
commitment and a framework agreement on cooperation to develop an interna-
tional strategy for stability and growth in a region wider than the Western 
Balkans.24 The Stability Pact has not, from a legal and institutional perspective, 
emerged as a new international organisation. It does not have any independent 
financial resources or implementing structures. Organisationally, the Stability 
Pact relies on the Special Coordinator, appointed by the European Union in 
consultation with the OSCE, and his Brussels-based team of approximately thirty 
members.25 The Special Coordinator’s most important task is to bring the partici-
pants’ political strategies in line with one another, to coordinate existing and new 
initiatives in the region and, thereby, to help avoid unnecessary duplication of 
work.26 To these ends, the Special Coordinator chairs the Regional Table, the 
most important political forum of the Stability Pact. The Regional Table is 
responsible for the coordination of the activities of the more than forty participat-
ing and facilitating states, international organisations and regional initiatives, 
which contribute in varying degrees to the so-called Working Tables on (1) 
Democratisation and Human Rights; (2) Economic Reconstruction, Cooperation 
and Development; and (3) Security Issues. In short, the Stability Pact serves as an 
international platform for cooperation and is geared towards supporting the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement, facilitating political stability and 
economic prosperity and improving the coordination between and, as a result of 
 
                                                                                                                                               
23  See also Bull. EU 6-1999, point I.26.71. For the final text of the Stability Pact of 10 June 
1999, see the Stability Pact’s website at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org>. See also chapter 2, section 8 
and chapter 4, section 3.3.1. 
24  The partners to the Stability Pact include, inter alia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; the EU Member States; the European Commission; 
Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States; the United Nations, the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UNHCR, NATO, the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF, the 
EBRD, the EIB, the Council of Europe Development Bank; the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 
the Central European Initiative, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative and the South-East 
Europe Cooperation Process. 
25  The first incumbent of this post was Bodo Hombach. The post is currently held by Erhard 
Busek, who was appointed in December 2001. His mandate was renewed until 31 December 2007 by 
Council Decision 2006/921/EC of 11 December 2005 on the appointment of the Special Coordinator 
of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, OJ 2006 L 351/19. Interestingly, the Council 
Decision refers to the whole EC Treaty, instead of a particular provision thereof, as its legal basis for 
adoption. 
26  Likewise, the Pact does not implement the projects that were placed under its auspices during 
the first regional funding conference of March 2000 but is an instrument for coordinating and 
facilitating the implementation of the projects of all its partners. 
THE APPLICATION OF EU CONDITIONALITY TO THE WESTERN BALKANS 249 
this, the efficiency of all actors in the region.27 As such, it resembles the model of 
the late Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).28 
What marked a fundamental shift in the European Union’s own strategy to-
wards the Western Balkans was the Council’s self-declared willingness to draw 
the countries of the region closer to the perspective of full integration into EU 
structures, through a new kind of contractual relationship, ‘with a perspective of 
EU membership on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam once the Copenhagen 
criteria have been met.’29 This explicit offer of future EU membership for the 
countries of the Western Balkans was firmly endorsed by the European Council at 
its summit in Santa Maria da Feira on 19-20 June 2000.30 It seems that, against the 
backdrop of yet another violent crisis in the Western Balkans, the political leaders 
of the European Union reached the conclusion that a policy aimed at economic 
reconstruction, political reform and regional cooperation was, as such, not enough 
to bring lasting peace and stability to the region. The additional prospect of full 
EU membership was needed to trigger the reforms necessary to achieve ‘positive 
peace’.31 Hence, the Union brought its policy for the Western Balkans in line with 
the logic behind its decision to fully open its doors to the CEECs in the early 
1990s. 
It has been argued that, in respect of the South Eastern European countries’ 
rapprochement to the European Union, ‘the Council’s unilateral “Common 
Position” on the Union’s launching of the Pact was, at the time of its adoption, 
                                                                                                                                               
27  See H.-J. Axt, ‘Der Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa: Politischer Aktionismus oder langfristig 
tragfähiges Konzept?’, 48 Südosteuropa (1999) pp. 401-416; R. Biermann, ‘The Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe: Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, C56 ZEI Discussion Papers (1999) at 
pp. 15-19; T. Buchsbaum, ‘The OSCE and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe’, 11 Helsinki 
Monitor (2000) pp. 62-79; L. Friis and A. Murphy, ‘“Turbo-charged negotiations”: The EU and the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe’, 7 Journal of European Public Policy (2000) pp. 767-786; 
M. Cremona, ‘Creating the New Europe: the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the Context 
of EU-SEE Relations’, in A. Dashwood and A. Ward, eds., The Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies – Volume 2, 1999 (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2000) pp. 463-506; D. Papadimitriou, ‘The 
EU’s Strategy in the Post-Communist Balkans’, 3 Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies (2001) pp. 69-94; F. Cameron and A. Kintis, ‘Southeastern Europe and the European Union’, 
2 Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2001) pp. 94-112; P. Jureković, ed., The 
Stability Pact for South East Europe – Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation (Vienna, National 
Defence Academy 2002); D. Vignes, ‘The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe’, in C. To-
muschat, ed., Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International 2002) pp. 317-325; and U. Dusjin, ‘The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe: 
An Avenue to EU Membership’, 53 Zbornik PFZ (2003) pp. 629-652. 
28  See Phinnemore and Siani-Davies, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 176. 
29  Common Position 1999/345/CFSP, preamble, recital 7 [emphasis added]. 
30  Bull. EU 6-2000, point I.49.67. 
31  See T. King, ‘The European Community and Human Rights in Eastern Europe’, 23 LIEI 
(1996) pp. 93-125 at p. 123; and P. Pantev, ‘Security Risks and Instabilities in Southeastern Europe’, 
in W. van Meurs, ed., Beyond EU Enlargement, Volume 2: The Agenda of Stabilisation for 
Southeastern Europe (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers 2001) pp. 118-138. 
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probably of more importance than the Pact itself.’32 Indeed, back in 1999, the 
Stability Pact was rather pompously presented as a sort of contemporary Eldo-
rado: a pledge on behalf of the international community to pour billions into the 
Balkans.33 But with the creation of expectations that, in view of the available 
resources,34 it cannot hope to meet, the Stability Pact remains ‘one of the most 
enigmatic political inventions’ for south-eastern Europe of the last century.35 
Strategically, the Stability Pact is an EU project, closely intertwined with the 
perspective of EU candidacy. But the European Union is only one out of many 
implementing partners, and the recipient countries’ participation in the Stability 
Pact does not lead to EU membership.36 Moreover, the Pact has been largely 
outdone by strategies developed in parallel, most importantly by its leading 
partner, the European Union.37 After all, since the declaration of the European 
Council at Santa Maria da Feira, the accession of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia (including Kosovo under the terms of UN Security 
Council resolution 1244) and Montenegro to the European Union is no longer a 
matter of if but of when and how. As to the how, it is reassuring to note that, by 
referring in Common Position 1999/345/CFSP to both Article 49 TEU and the 
Copenhagen criteria, the Council has emphasised that the political and economic 
criteria formulated by the European Council in June 1993 for the enlargement of 
the Union remain fully valid. In the light of the European Union’s decision at 
                                                                                                                                               
32  See, inter alia, Pippan, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 227. 
33  Former US President Bill Clinton has likened the aid needed for the Balkans to America’s 
Marshall Plan. See ‘New “Marshall Plan” for the Balkans’, USA Today, 25 July 1999. 
34  The Stability Pact secured funding for projects worth €5.4 billion at two donors’ conferences. 
In March 2000, €2.4 billion was raised in Brussels to fund 244 projects in the so-called ‘Quick Start 
Package’. At a second regional conference in October 2001 (Bucharest), an additional €3 billion was 
committed, mainly for infrastructure (€2.4 billion) and refugee issues (€0.5 billion). According to the 
Pact’s mandate, these funds are used to support projects of two, three or more countries, thereby 
engaging the governments in a process of regional cooperation. As these sums are limited in their 
ability to address the huge reconstruction efforts needed in south-eastern Europe, this money is spent 
in ‘strategic projects’ with a view to mobilising vital private investment and facilitating reforms. All 
projects in the Stability Pact framework are administered through implementing partners, such as the 
international financial institutions. More data is available on the Stability Pact’s website at: <http:// 
www.stabilitypact.org>. 
35  See W. van Meurs, ‘The Stability Pact Beyond EU Enlargement’, in D. Lopandić, ed., Re-
gional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe – Conference Proceedings (Belgrade, European 
Movement in Serbia 2002) pp. 39-45. For an exploratory assessment of the effectiveness of the 
Stability Pact to serve as a conflict prevention regime, see D. Sandole, ‘The Balkans Stability Pact as 
a Regional Conflict Management and Prevention “Space”: An Evaluation’, in P. Jureković, ed., The 
Stability Pact for South East Europe – Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation (Vienna, National 
Defence Academy 2002) pp. 20-36. 
36  In this respect, one can understand the admission of Moldova as a recipient country under the 
Stability Pact in 2001. The former Soviet republic lacked – as it still does – the perspective of EU 
accession given to the countries of the Western Balkans. See A. Skvortova, ‘Moldova’, in Blockmans 
and Łazowski, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 549-574. 
37  On the Pact’s future, see chapter 6, section 2.1.1.3. 
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Santa Maria da Feira, it is evident that the perspective of integration of the 
countries of the Western Balkans into the structures of the European Union 
requires a long-term commitment on both sides. The Union, for its part, re-
sponded to this challenge by transforming its Regional Approach into a more 
sophisticated policy framework: the Stabilisation and Association Process. 
 
2.3 Stabilisation and Association Process 
 
Initiated by the Commission in 1999,38 the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP) specifically aims to assist each of the countries of the Western Balkans in 
meeting the relevant EU criteria and being ultimately accepted as official candi-
dates for membership. The one incentive that the SAP shrank from providing, 
however, was an explicit promise of EU membership. At the 2000 Santa Maria da 
Feira Council, the European Union stated that the SAP countries were ‘potential 
candidates’, which undisputedly represented a promotion compared with the 
Regional Approach but not a breakthrough that went all the way.39 
The SAP was built on the Union’s Regional Approach and consists of modi-
fied and new offers to the states of the Western Balkans, including enhanced trade 
liberalisation, improved financial and economic assistance, a regular political 
dialogue, cooperation in justice and home affairs and, in particular, a new, tailor-
made category of contractual relations: Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAAs). The instruments covered by the SAP are open to all countries of the 
region on equal terms. Their actual availability, however, continues to depend on 
each country’s compliance with the general and country-specific conditions set 
out by the European Union. Hence, conditionality remains the glue of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. Although anchored in a common set of 
political and economic conditions, the approach of the SAP is flexible enough to 
allow each country to move ahead at its own pace. An annual review mechanism 
assesses each country’s performance in meeting the conditions. The recommenda-
tions contained in the Commission’s ‘progress’ reports and the Council’s annual 
assessment are intended to help the SAP countries focus their attention for the 
year ahead on specific priority areas. Thus, the emphasis of the SAP is placed on 
differentiation according to the specific needs and situations of each country, as 
well as on improvements in the relations within the entire region. 
The 24 November 2000 Zagreb Summit of Heads of State and Government of 
the EU Member States and the SAP countries set the seal on the SAP by gaining 
                                                                                                                                               
38  See COM (1999) 235 final, Brussels, 26 May 1999. 
39  Bull. EU 6-2000, point I.49.67. For a critical view on this promise of a perspective of mem-
bership, see O. Anastasakis and D. Bechev, EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing 
Commitment to the Process (Oxford, SEESP 2003). On the use of the concept of ‘potential’ 
candidate countries, see infra section 5. 
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the region’s agreement to the applicable set of objectives and conditions.40 At the 
21 June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, it was acknowledged 
that the SAP would remain the framework for the European course of the Western 
Balkan countries, ‘all the way to their future accession’.41 Crucially, it was agreed 
that the SAP (and the prospects it offers) would serve as the anchor for reform in 
the Western Balkans, in the same way that the accession process has done in 
Central and Eastern Europe. To this end, the SAP needed to be strengthened and 
enriched with elements from the enlargement process so that it would be better 
equipped to meet the new challenges, as the countries move from stabilisation and 
reconstruction to sustainable development, association and integration into 
European structures. In light of the latter, the European Council endorsed the 
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European 
Integration.42 The Thessaloniki Agenda served both to confirm the conditionality 
developed under the SAP and to list the domains in which progress was to be 
made: 
 
[…] the EU will continue to work closely with the Western Balkan countries to 
further consolidate peace and to promote stability, democracy, the rule of law, and 
respect for human and minority rights. Inviolability of international borders, peace-
ful resolution of conflicts and regional co-operation are principles of the highest 
importance. Terrorism, violence and extremism, be it ethnically, politically or 
criminally motivated, should be unequivocally condemned.  
The EU reiterates its support for the full implementation of Resolution 1244 of 
the UN Security Council on Kosovo and of the ‘standards before status’ policy. On 
this basis, the people of a multiethnic and a democratic Kosovo will have their 
place in Europe. The Dayton/Paris agreements and subsequent Peace Implementa-
tion Council decisions, and the Ohrid and Belgrade agreements, are key elements 
of EU policy. Full compliance by all countries and parties concerned is essential.  
Recalling that all Western Balkan countries are parties to the International 
Criminal Court, the EU urges them to support, fully and in deed, its work and the 
integrity of its statute, in line with the relevant EU decisions.  
The EU urges all concerned countries and parties to co-operate fully with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Recalling that respect 
for international law is an essential element of the SAP, the EU reiterates that full 
co-operation with ICTY, in particular with regard to the transfer to The Hague of 
all indictees and full access to documents and witnesses, is vital for further move-
ment towards the EU.43 
                                                                                                                                               
40  Bull. EU 11-2000, point I.6.57. 
41  For the full text of the declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit at Thessaloniki, see 
Bull. EU 6-2003, point 1.6.70. 
42  For the text of the Thessaloniki Agenda, see Annex A to Council Conclusions of 16 June 
2003, Press Release No. 10369/03 (Presse 166). 
43  Ibid., para. 1. 
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As such, the European Union and the Western Balkans agreed on an ‘agenda’ for 
the pre-accession process of the countries of the region, very much like Agenda 
2000 set the tune for the countries that joined the European Union in its fifth 
wave of enlargement. In addition, the Thessaloniki Agenda was meant to further 
strengthen and enhance the political visibility of the SAP, inter alia, by launching 
the high-level multilateral EU-Western Balkans Forum and ‘European Partner-
ships’ (reminiscent of the Accession Partnerships for the CEECs) as well as by 
promoting the decisions for enhanced cooperation in the areas of political 
dialogue and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, parliamentary coopera-
tion, support for institution-building, the opening of Community programmes and 




3. STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
 
3.1 Legal basis 
 
Article 310 TEC, on the basis of which the European Economic Area was 
established and the Europe Agreements (EAs) with the CEECs were concluded, 
provides the legal basis for the SAAs that the European Union is offering to 
countries in the Western Balkans.44 Content-wise, the SAAs are also based on the 
existing EAs, even if they include new elements respecting the specific situation 
of the Western Balkan countries.45 This was to be expected given the short period 
of time that the Commission had to develop the SAAs. In crisis situations – in the 
context of the Western Balkans even in a literal sense – the European Union 
traditionally acts conservatively and instinctively falls back on an existing policy 
approach (so-called ‘path dependency behaviour’).46 Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion was keen to differentiate between this ‘new type of contract’ and the EAs.47 
The Commission argued that the conclusion of SAAs would provide an appropriate 
alternative to the EAs, which are regarded as leading to EU membership, and the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which have been concluded with 
almost all the successor states to the Soviet Union and have far less ambitious 
                                                                                                                                               
44  See D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Shef-
field, Sheffield Academic Press 1999). 
45  Analysis of the two existing SAAs shows considerable similarities with the earlier EAs. See 
D. Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western 
Balkans?’, 8 EFA Rev. (2003) pp. 77-103 at pp. 79-81. 
46  See J. Peterson, ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen, A 
Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London, Routledge 1998) pp. 3-17. 
47  See COM (1999) 235 final, Brussels, 26 May 1999. 
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goals.48 As David Phinnemore explains, the reasons were essentially twofold. 
Firstly, the challenges in the Western Balkans went beyond those concerning 
economic and political transition that had been posed by the CEECs over the last 
decade. Therefore, a new type of relationship responding to the particular needs 
of the Western Balkans was deemed necessary. Secondly, by the spring of 1999, 
the European Union was making headway towards realising its most ambitious 
enlargement to date. The prospect of up to twelve new entrants over the next few 
years was unprecedented. Added to this was the question of admitting Turkey into 
the accession process. Faced with such an overwhelming enlargement agenda, 
there was little enthusiasm for widening it further by offering EAs to the countries 
of the Western Balkans, thereby raising expectations of pre-accession aid and 
encouraging membership applications. Mindful of this and anxious about causing 
concern among the candidate countries about their position in the enlargement 
process, the European Union had to avoid any formulation that might raise 
objections and potentially undermine reform efforts in those countries. This was 
recognised in the title of the SAAs: their purpose was not just association but first 




In the procedure for the conclusion of an SAA, the application of conditionality 
has to be seen as a graduated process, with the start of SAA negotiations requiring 
a lower level of compliance than the conclusion of the agreements. Before 
negotiations on the conclusion of an SAA can start, a certain level of progress 
must be made. The Commission observes and evaluates the situation in the 
country, in particular the fulfilment of the relevant conditions set out in the 
Council’s Guidelines of 29 April 1997, such as the presence of functioning 
democratic structures, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law, as well as cooperation with neighbouring countries. In doing so, the 
Commission is guided by reports of other international organisations, committees 
or institutions that are active in the region, such as NATO, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe. The results are published in annual country reports, in which 
the Commission reviews the compliance of each of the countries concerned with  
 
                                                                                                                                               
48  On the EAs, see, inter alia, M. Maresceau, ed., Enlarging the European Union: Relations 
Between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe (London, Longman 1997); and A. Mayhew, 
Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1998). On the PCAs, see C. Hillion, The Evolving System of European 
Union External Relations as Evidenced in the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine (Leiden, 
Ph.D thesis 2005). 
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the European Union’s political and economic criteria.49 Once the Commission 
judges that a country has made sufficient progress in its domestic reform process, 
it starts, with the approval of the Council, to carry out a study on the feasibility of 
opening negotiations for an SAA. Following the completion of this so-called 
‘feasibility study’ and a positive assessment by the Council that a Western Balkan 
country has indeed made sufficient progress in meeting the SAP conditions and 
that it has the capacity to negotiate and implement the far-reaching political and 
economic obligations under an SAA, the Commission submits a formal proposal 
on the negotiating directives for the SAA concerned. If adopted by the Council, 
the negotiations are conducted by the Commission in consultation with a special 
committee created by the Council for that purpose. SAAs, like EAs, are mixed 
agreements. Hence, in order to enter into force, they require the approval of the 
Council (by way of a Council decision),50 the assent of the European Parliament 
(Articles 300(3) and 310 TEC) as well as ratification by all EU Member States 
and the non-Member State concerned. In anticipation of the full ratification of an 
SAA, the trade provisions may enter into force via interim agreements. Political 
dialogue can already be established as well. 
 
3.2.1 Macedonia and Croatia 
 
At the time of writing, only the SAAs with Macedonia (signed on 9 April 2001)51 
and Croatia (signed on 29 October 2001)52 have entered into force. Ratification in 
both Macedonia and Croatia followed shortly after the agreements were signed (on 
12 April 2001 and 5 December 2001 respectively). The European Parliament was 
also quick to give its assent to the agreements (on 3 May 2001 and 12 December 
2001 respectively). In anticipation of the full ratification of both SAAs, the trade 
                                                                                                                                               
49  The individual country reports are annexed to the Commission’s annual reviews of the SAP. 
For the European Commission’s three SAP reports, see COM (2002) 163 final, Brussels, 4 April 
2002; COM (2003) 139 final, Brussels, 26 March 2003; and COM (2004) 202 final, Brussels, 30 
March 2004. In a speech to the EU-Western Balkan Forum on his first day in office as Commissioner 
for Enlargement, Olli Rehn announced that the Commission’s Annual Report on the SAP would be 
moved to the autumn to make it coincide with the Regular Reports on the candidate countries. See 
SPEECH/04/487, Brussels, 22 November 2004. Indeed, the Commission’s 2005 Enlargement 
Strategy Paper combines general reports on the progress made by Turkey and the Western Balkans. 
See COM (2005) 561 final, Brussels, 9 November 2005. This facilitates a more consistent and 
systematic approach to assessing and advising both candidate and ‘potential’ candidate countries on 
their track towards EU integration. 
50  Since the transfer of responsibility for relations with the Western Balkans from the Director-
ate General for External Relations to the Directorate General for Enlargement in November 2004, 
SAAs are signed by a ministerial representative of the country holding the Presidency of the Council, 
the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and a ministerial representative of the Western Balkan 
country concerned. 
51  See COM (2001) 90 final, Brussels, 19 February 2001. 
52  See COM (2001) 371 final, Brussels, 9 July 2001. 
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provisions already entered into force via interim agreements.53 After ratification 
by the then still fifteen Member States of the European Union, the SAA FYROM 
entered into force on 1 April 2004.54 While a majority of the Member States also 
ratified the SAA Croatia within the usual time frames, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Italy for a long time withheld (notification of.) ratification of 
the agreement because of their negative perception of Croatia’s willingness to 
cooperate with the ICTY.55 Like mixed agreements, SAAs are open to national 
interpretation, but this raises the question whether individual Member States 
should maintain the power to impose political conditionality on SAA candidates 
unilaterally and at such a late stage. Such action undermines the authority of the 
Commission to evaluate the fulfilment of the key conditions for association and 
blocks the Union’s efforts to build a common policy to engage associates. In the 
second half of 2004, when it became clear that cooperation with the ICTY would 
become a strict condition for Croatia to open accession negotiations with the 
                                                                                                                                               
53  Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of 
the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, OJ 2001 L 124/2; 
and Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part, OJ 2001 L 330/3. The Interim Agreements 
entered into force on 1 June 2001 and 1 March 2002, respectively. On the Interim Agreement with 
Albania, see supra n. 9 and infra section 3.2.2. 
54  Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, OJ 
2004 L 84/13. The SAA FYROM replaced the Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Community and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 1997 L 348/2, which had been in 
force since 1 January 1998. On 21 February 2005, the Council and the Commission adopted Decision 
2005/192/EC, OJ 2005 L 63/21, on the conclusion of the Protocol to the SAA FYROM to take 
account of the accession to the European Union of the ten new Member States. For the text of the 
Protocol, see OJ 2004 L 388/3. With the entry into force of an SAA, a new set of joint bodies is 
established at ministerial level (Stabilisation and Association Council), at senior official level 
(Stabilisation and Association Committee) and at technical level (subcommittees). Following the 
entry into force of the SAA FYROM, the first meeting of the Stabilisation and Association 
Committee took place on 3 June 2004 in Skopje. The committee is meant to ensure the continuity of 
the association relationship between Macedonia and the European Union and the proper functioning 
of the SAA. It decided to set up seven subcommittees (on trade, industry, customs and taxation; 
agriculture and fisheries; internal market and competition; economic and financial issues; justice and 
home affairs; human resources, research, technological development and social policy; and transport, 
environment, energy and regional development) covering all areas of cooperation under the SAA. 
55  See S. Rodin, ‘Croatia’, in Blockmans and Łazowski, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 357-389. These coun-
tries referred to Croatia’s apparent inability to arrest indicted General Ante Gotovina and hand him 
over to the ICTY in The Hague. Gotovina, the UN tribunal’s third most wanted fugitive, disappeared 
the day before the ICTY made his indictment public, in July 2001, and was finally arrested on 7 
December 2005 in a hotel in the resort of Playa de las Americas in Tenerife and subsequently 
transferred to The Hague. He is indicted for ordering the killing of more than 100 ethnic Serbs and 
expelling 150,000 more during and after Zagreb’s final offensive in August 1995 to recapture 
Croatian lands seized by Serb forces (Operation Storm). The pressure on Croatia to find and arrest 
Gotovina has provoked negative feelings towards the European Union, as many Croatians perceive 
him as a war hero rather than a war criminal. 
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European Union,56 the obstructive trio dropped its opposition towards ratification 
of the SAA. Thanks to this, an Enlargement Protocol to the SAA Croatia could 
also be negotiated in order to take account of the accession of ten new Member 
States to the European Union on 1 May 2004. On 21 December 2004, the 
Protocol was signed.57 Via the Enlargement Protocol, the new Member States 





On the basis of a positive evaluation of the political stability and progress on 
reforms, the Commission opened negotiations on an SAA with Albania on 31 
January 2003, but talks soon stalled. This was largely due to the Commission’s 
firm opinion that Albania was not demonstrating a great determination to fight 
organised crime, all types of ‘trafficking’, money laundering and corruption.60 
The 3 July 2005 general elections were widely seen as an important test of the 
country’s democratic credentials and a condition for reviving the SAA talks. The 
Commission, in its Progress Report of 9 November 2005, paved the way for the 
conclusion of SAA negotiations.61 By considering that the political situation in the 
country had improved, it seems that the Commission gave precedence to political 
expediency over concerns about the killing of three in electoral violence, the 
OSCE’s statement that the election complied only partially with democratic 
norms and a political comeback that was unprecedented even in the revolving-
doors world of Balkan politics. Sali Berisha – a former president (and personal 
physician to Albania’s late Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha) who was forced out of 
office in 1997 when fraudulent pyramid savings schemes sparked civil unrest – 
                                                                                                                                               
56  See infra section 5 and chapter 6, section 4.2.2. 
57  Council and Commission Decision 2005/205/EC of 21 February 2005, OJ 2005 L 68/30. 
58  Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part, to take 
account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, OJ 
2005 L 26/222. 
59  Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part, OJ 2005 L 26/3. 
60  See the Commission’s Third Annual SAP Report, COM (2004) 202 final, Brussels, 30 March 
2004. See also M. Bogdani and J. Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous 
Journey Towards Integration and Accession (London, I.B. Tauris 2007). More generally, see C. de 
Waal, Albania Today: A Portrait of Post-Communist Turbulence (London, I.B. Tauris 2005). 
61  See COM (2005) 561, Brussels, 9 November 2005, SEC (2005) 1421. In a similar vein, see 
Council Decision 2005/809/EC of 7 November 2005 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorization, OJ 2005 L 304/14. 
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and his newly installed Democratic Party government must have somehow 
convinced the Commission of the sincerity of their pledge to step up reforms and 
fight organised crime and corruption, as well as solving property issues and 
improving the work of the customs administration. European Commission 
President Barroso himself announced the conclusion of the SAA negotiations on 
18 February 2006.62 The SAA Albania was signed on 12 June 2006.63 Pending the 
full ratification of the SAA, the trade and trade-related provisions of the agree-
ment entered into force on 1 December 2006 after full ratification of the Interim 
Agreement.64 Pursuant to Article 56 of the Interim Agreement, Articles 3-14 of 
the 1992 Trade, Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement were 
suspended. The Trade, Commercial and Economic Agreement will be fully 




The substantial completion of the so-called ‘Road Map’ for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and the establishment of the first elected government for a four-year term were 
rewarded by the Commission with the launching of a feasibility study in June 
2003.65 The study was adopted on 18 November 2003.66 Nevertheless, in its Third 
Annual Report on the SAP, the Commission identified sixteen new priorities on 
which it demanded further political and economic reform and progress in 2004 to 
make the country a self-sustaining state based on the rule of law before negotia-
tions on the SAA would be considered.67 In particular, cooperation with the ICTY 
                                                                                                                                               
62  José Manuel Barroso, ‘Building for the future: Making a success of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement’, Parliament of Albania, Tirana, 18 February 2006, SPEECH/06/103. 
63  See COM (2006) 138 final, Brussels, 21 March 2006. 
64  Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, OJ 2006 L 239/2. On the entry into force 
of the Interim Agreement, see Council Information, OJ 2006 L 318/26. In addition, see Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1616/2006 of 23 October 2006 on certain procedures for applying the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, and for applying the Interim 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania, OJ 2006 L 300/1; and 
Council Decision 2007/239/EC of 5 March 2007 on a Community Position concerning Decision 
1/2007 of the Joint Committee referred to in the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related mattes 
between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, 
adopting its Rules of Procedure including the Terms of Reference and Structure of the EC-Albania 
Working Parties, OJ 2007 L 104/32. The undated Decision 1/2007 of the Joint Committee is attached 
to Council Decision 2007/239/EC. 
65  The Road Map was presented by the Commission in March 2000 and set out eighteen essen-
tial steps to be undertaken by Bosnia-Herzegovina before the European Union would consider any 
further advance of the country within the SAP. The Road Map is available at: <http://www.esiweb. 
org/bridges/bosnia/EURoadMap.pdf>. 
66  COM (2003) 692 final, Brussels, 18 November 2003. 
67  COM (2004) 202 final, Brussels, 30 March 2004. 
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was declared less than satisfactory. In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
serious inadequacies were noted on the part of the Bosnian Croats. The Republika 
Srpska was dismissed for its failure to locate or arrest even a single indicted 
fugitive. After a wave of extraditions of both Bosnian Serb and Muslim indictees 
to the ICTY in the first three months of 2005, the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement announced that Bosnia-Herzegovina could start negotiations on an 
SAA by the end of 2005, on the condition that cooperation with the ICTY would 
continue and would lead to ‘full cooperation’.68 Despite the fact that the two most 
wanted Bosnian Serb indictees, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, were still at 
large – reportedly thanks to well-organised systems of support.69 – the Commis-
sion on 21 October 2005 nonetheless recommended the opening of negotiations 
on an SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina and presented draft negotiating directives 
for adoption by the Council.70 The move was widely seen as a reward for the 
difficult agreements reached between the Federation and the Republika Srpska on 
military and police reforms.71 SAA negotiations were officially opened on 25 
November 2005, in the same week that the world celebrated the tenth anniversary 
of the Dayton Agreement. It took Bosnia-Herzegovina one year to negotiate the 
terms of an SAA with the European Union. But due to the ongoing problems 
concerning the implementation of the agreement to reform the police, the restruc-
turing of the public broadcasting sector and the establishment of a single 
economic space, the European Commission decided to postpone the formal final 
round of the SAA talks until all these criteria have been met.72 
 
3.2.4 Serbia and Montenegro 
 
Internal disputes surrounding the endorsement of the Internal Market and Trade 
Action Plan by the State Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro led the Commission 
                                                                                                                                               
68  See E. Vucheva, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina a step further on the EU path’, EUObserver.com, 
21 March 2005. 
69  The former was thought to be changing his hiding places across the borders of Serbia, Monte-
negro and Republika Srpska, while the latter was thought to be in hiding in Serbia. Interestingly, the 
outspoken Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro, Vuk Drasković, has claimed on 
several occasions that Mladić was hiding with the help of Serbian security forces. See, e.g., E. 
Jansson, ‘Serbian authorities “know where Mladić is hiding”’, Financial Times, 5 April 2005; and 
‘Serbia Min: Mladic Sheltered By Milosevic Allies – Report’, Dow Jones Newswires, 1 March 2006. 
70  Communication from the Commission to the Council on the progress achieved by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in implementing the priorities identified in the Feasibility Study on the preparedness of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European 
Union (COM (2003) 692 final), COM (2005) 529 final, Brussels, 21 October 2005. 
71  See M. Beunderman, ‘Bosnia set to follow Croats and Serbs on EU track’, EUObserver.com, 
6 October 2005. See also chapter 4, section 4.1.1. 
72  See ‘Rehn welcomes the finalisation of technical talks for a SAA with Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and encourages further reform’, European Newsletter, 15 December 2006. 
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to stall the feasibility study on an SAA with the state union. It took a full en-
dorsement of the European Union’s so-called ‘twin-track’ approach by the 
political leaders of both Serbia and Montenegro to relaunch the feasibility study 
in October 2004. The twin-track approach to SAA negotiations meant that the 
European Union dealt with the two republics on policies that they conducted 
separately, notably trade, economic and sectoral policies, while it continued to 
work with the state union where it was the competent authority, for example in 
the field of international political obligations and human rights, including 
cooperation with the ICTY. 
As far as the latter is concerned, the state union was under enormous pressure 
from the European Union’s SG/HR and the Commission to extradite alleged war 
criminals in order to finalise the feasibility report on 12 April 2005. As a result, 
the authorities made serious headway in their cooperation with the ICTY by 
‘arresting’ half a dozen suspects that were believed to be hiding in Serbia in the 
first three months of 2005.73 This change of attitude in Belgrade was rewarded by 
the Commission with the adoption of the feasibility report on 12 April 2005.74 On 
3 October 2005, the General Affairs Council gave the Commission a mandate to 
conduct negotiations on an SAA with Serbia and Montenegro.75 The opening of 
negotiations by European Commissioner Olli Rehn in Belgrade on 10 October 
2005 marked the fifth anniversary of the democratic uprising that removed 
Slobodan Milošević from the presidential peluche. On this occasion, Rehn 
warned that the conclusion of SAA negotiations would only be possible if 
Karadžić and Mladić were handed over to The Hague tribunal in the meantime.76 
However, after the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor told the BBC in February 2006 that 
General Mladić was within ‘immediate reach’ of the Belgrade authorities, a 
statement that provoked a flurry of media reports which first claimed and later 
denied that Mladić had been captured, the European Union hardened its tone.77 
                                                                                                                                               
73  The media have reported the adoption of legislation in Serbia in 2004 to provide pensions to 
its indicted war criminals. The law would give indictees a full salary, plus unspecified ‘compensa-
tion’ for family and legal expenses. Allegedly, Serbian General Vujadin Popović received a bonus of 
$1 million when he turned himself in on 14 April 2005. Popović was the commander of the Drina 
Corps in Bosnia, which conducted some of the worst ethnic-cleansing campaigns in the region. See 
R. Nordland, ‘Pensions for War Criminals’, Newsweek, 25 July 2005. Mladić was thought to be 
negotiating a similar package with the Serbian authorities. 
74  See Press Release IP/05/421, Brussels, 12 April 2005. 
75  On 12 July 2005, the Commission had submitted to the Council a mandate for negotiations 
with Serbia and Montenegro on an SAA. See Press Release IP/05/915, Brussels, 12 July 2005. On 
the adoption of the mandate, see Council Conclusions of 3 October 2005, Press Release No. 
12515/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 242). 
76  European Commission, ‘Serbia and Montenegro Open Association Talks with EU’, in 
Enlargement Newsletter, 28 October 2005. 
77  See L. Kubosova, ‘Reports on Mladic capture spark confusion’, EUObserver.com, 22 Febru-
ary 2006. 
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Although not laid down black on white in the Council Conclusions of 27 Febru-
ary 2006, the Union was reported as having given Serbia and Montenegro a one-
month deadline to send Mladić to The Hague or face disruption of the SAA 
talks.78 While Belgrade came under increased pressure from the ICTY and the 
European Union to capture Mladić in the wake of the death of Slobodan 
Milošević on 11 March 2006, the controversies over the circumstances of the 
death and the burial of the former president complicated the authorities’ efforts to 
transfer the war-time general to The Hague.79 Implicitly, this was recognised by 
the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor, when she reported positively in Brussels on Serbia 
and Montenegro’s cooperation with the Tribunal. Accordingly, the European 
Union opened the political round of SAA talks with Serbia and Montenegro on 5 
April 2006, while at the same time keeping up the pressure by extending Bel-
grade’s deadline by one month.80 As Belgrade was also unable to meet the new 
deadline, the Council supported the Commission’s decision to call off the SAA 
negotiating round scheduled for 11 May, in line with its conclusions of 3 October 
2005 and 27 February 2006.81 
In a parallel development, the European Union had declared that it was ready 
to accept any outcome of the referendum on independence that Montenegro had 
scheduled for 21 May 2006 – be it independence or federation with Serbia – as 
long as the vote would be ‘legitimate’, that is to say, that there would be a 50 per 
cent threshold for participation and a 55 per cent threshold for approval of the 
result.82 On 21 May, 55.5 per cent of the majority of Montenegrin voters opted for 
independence in a nationwide referendum that was considered to be free and fair. 
In a special session on 3 June, the parliament in Podgorica passed a declaration on 
the independence of the Republic of Montenegro. On 5 June, the parliament in 
Belgrade declared the Republic of Serbia the legal successor to the state union 
and gave all state institutions forty-five days to complete the separation. On 12 
                                                                                                                                               
78  See E. Krasniqi, ‘EU ministers back Balkans war crimes ultimatum’, EUObserver.com, 27 
February 2006; and Council Conclusions of 27 February 2006, Press Release No. 6344/06 (Presse 
46): ‘The Council noted with concern recent comments by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte 
about Serbia and Montenegro’s unsatisfactory cooperation with ICTY. The Council strongly 
supported the recent messages delivered by the Commission in Belgrade and Sarajevo that full 
cooperation with the ICTY must be achieved to ensure that the SAA negotiations are not disrupted. 
Recalling its conclusions of 3 October 2005 and of 30 January 2006, the Council urged both Serbia 
and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to take decisive action to ensure that all remaining 
fugitive indictees, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, are finally brought to justice without 
delay. The Council asked the Presidency and the Commission to remain in close contact with the 
Chief Prosecutor and to continue to keep the Council fully informed.’ 
79  See S. Wagstyl, D. Dombey and N. Macdonald, ‘Death increases pressure for capture of other 
war suspects’, Financial Times, 13 March 2006. 
80  See O. Lungescu, ‘EU pleased with Serbia “progress”’, BBC News, 31 March 2006. 
81  See Council Conclusions of 15 May 2006, Press Release No. 9001/06 (Presse 126). 
82  See Council Conclusions of 27 February 2006, Press Release No. 6344/06 (Presse 46). 
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June, the Council of the European Union recognised that the parliamentary acts 
were taken in conformity with the arrangements and the procedures foreseen in 
the Belgrade Agreement and Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter, and decided 
to develop bilateral relations with the new sovereign and independent Republic of 
Montenegro.83 The pro-independence vote in Montenegro required the European 
Union to completely disentangle the SAA talks with the two republics. In 
practice, this proved not to be a problem, as the ‘twin-track’ approach had 
become a standard working method for the Commission. The Commission 
submitted for adoption by the Council new draft negotiating directives for 
Montenegro and, as the successor state of the state union, amended negotiating 
directives for Serbia.84 On 17 July, the General Affairs Council hinted that it 
would approve the Commission’s recommendation to continue separate SAA 
negotiations with Montenegro and with Serbia.85 On 24 July, the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council adopted the decisions authorising the Commission to 
negotiate an SAA with Montenegro.86 At the same time, the Council amended the 
negotiating directives for the SAA with Serbia. The decisions have no implica-
tions for the Commission’s decision on 3 May 2006 to freeze the SAA 
negotiations as long as Serbia’s obligations to cooperate fully with the ICTY are 
not fulfilled. However, the adoption of this amendment will enable the Commis-
sion to resume the negotiations as soon as the obligations are fulfilled. To this 
end, Serbia presented the European Union with a new action plan in July 2006, 
including ways and means to arrest and extradite Ratko Mladić. But reactions 
were divided afterwards as to whether the European Union might endorse the 
SAA with Serbia if the action plan was fully implemented. Some EU Member 
States, like the Netherlands, demanded the actual arrest of the top fugitive.87 
As two independent countries, Serbia and Montenegro are now in different 
positions in terms of establishing closer links with the European Union: not only 
                                                                                                                                               
83  See Council Conclusions of 12 June 2006, Press Release No. 9947/06 (Presse 162). See also 
chapter 4, section 3.2.4. 
84  See Commission Press Release IP/06/941 of 6 July 2006. 
85  See Council Conclusions of 17 July 2006, Press Release No. 11575/06 (Presse 219): ‘The 
Council took note of the fact that all EU Member States have recognized the Republic of Montenegro 
as a sovereign and independent state. In line with the Stabilisation and Association Process and the 
Thessaloniki Agenda, the Council decided to extend bilateral political dialogue at ministerial level to 
Montenegro. A joint declaration will be prepared to that end. The Council also agreed to invite 
Montenegro to align itself with EU demarches, declarations and common positions on CFSP issues.’ 
86  See Council Conclusions of 12 June 2006, Press Release No. 11556/06 (Presse 216). On 15 
September 2006, the European Union and Montenegro agreed to establish a regular political dialogue 
to accompany and consolidate their rapprochement. See Joint Declaration on political dialogue 
between the European Union and Montenegro, OJ 2006 C 242/6. SAA negotiations with Montenegro 
were (re)opened on 26 September 2006. 
87  See E. Krasniqi, ‘EU states divided on Serbia strategy’, EUObserver.com, 18 July 2006. For a 
critique on this particular point, see chapter 6, section 4.2. 
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in terms of cooperation with the ICTY but also because the republics have quite 
different economies. While the Serbian economy is based on production, industry 
and agriculture and its internal market needs some protection, Montenegro’s 
economy is quite open and based mainly on services. Logically speaking, 
Montenegro should therefore be in a better position than Serbia to make swift 




The European perspective of the Western Balkans, as stated in the Zagreb 
Declaration of November 2000, is also open to Kosovo.89 However, pending a 
final settlement on its legal status,90 UN-administered Kosovo (as defined by UN 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)) was not able to participate as a full 
member in the SAP. To ensure that UNMIK and the PISG would follow EU-
compatible practices in the political, economic and sectoral reform process, 
UNMIK and the European Commission agreed that an instrument was needed to 
monitor and drive the process. It was deemed profitable for Kosovo to follow the 
methodology and substance of the SAP and thus avoid isolation from the path of 
EU-compatible transition and development of the rest of the region.91 To that end, 
on 6 November 2002, the Commission commenced the so-called ‘Stabilisation 
and Association Process Tracking Mechanism’ (STM).92 The STM is a joint 
technical working group of the European Commission, UNMIK and Kosovo’s 
PISG that is intended to help the authorities in Kosovo prepare for reinforced 
policy-making relations within the framework of the Union’s Stabilisation and 
Association Process.93 It tracks the progress made in the implementation of the 
European Partnership.94 and provides policy advice on building EU-compatible 
institutional, legislative, economic and social frameworks. As such, Kosovo 
benefits from all the elements of the SAP, with the notable exception of the 
                                                                                                                                               
88  For a note of caution, see chapter 4, section 3.2.4. 
89  Bull. EU 11-2000, point I.6.57. On 20 April 2005, the European Commission adopted a 
Communication entitled ‘A European Future for Kosovo,’ which reinforces the Commission’s 
commitment to Kosovo. See COM (2005) 156 final, Brussels, 20 April 2005. 
90  On the final status talks, see chapter 4, sections 3.3.2-3.3.4. 
91  The European Union was also eager to apply the same standards to the whole region. See 
chapter 2, section 6.7. 
92  EU Ministers endorsed the launch of technical talks at the Thessaloniki Summit on 21 June 
2003, Bull. EU 6-2003, point 1.6.70. 
93  In fact, STM meetings are the main channel for dialogue between the Commission and Kos-
ovo. To date, eight STM meetings have taken place. The sixth STM meeting, which was held on 16 
February 2005 in Priština, was the first meeting with the newly elected government. 
94  The STM and the Annual Progress Report are the main instruments of the European Commis-
sion for monitoring Kosovo’s progress in the SAP. On the European Partnership, see infra section 4. 
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possibility of contractual relations with the European Union. However, depending 
on the outcome of status process, Kosovo may in due course engage in contrac-
tual relations with the Union as appropriate. 
At the time of writing, the European Union’s main focus is on improving ca-
pacity-building through regular cooperation and joint initiatives with a number of 
line ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry.95 Together with these ministries, the EU Pillar in 
UNMIK has led free trade negotiations and facilitated Kosovo’s involvement in a 
number of regional and wider European initiatives, such as the Energy Commu-
nity Treaty, the South East European Transport Observatory, the European 
Common Aviation Area and the European Charter for Small Enterprises.96 
 
3.3 General principles 
 
3.3.1 Essential elements 
 
The SAAs that have already entered into force set out various principles to which 
the parties are committed.97 The preamble and Article 1(2) of both agreements 
describe the objectives of the new associations: the establishment of an appropri-
ate framework for political dialogue between the associate and the European 
Union, the approximation of the associate’s legislation to that of the European 
Union, the development of a climate conducive to increased trade and investment, 
the transition of the associate’s economy into a market economy, EC support for 
reform and regional cooperation in all fields covered by the SAA. To these ends, 
both SAAs confirm in almost identical provisions that the conclusion and 
implementation of the agreements come within the framework of the Council 
Conclusions of 29 April 1997 and that they are based on individual merits of the 
respective SAP partner (Art. 3). The conditionality clause used in Article 2 of the 
SAAs includes such ‘essential elements’ as the 
 
                                                                                                                                               
95  For factual details, see D. Papadimitriou, P. Petrov and L. Greiçevci, ‘To Build a State: Euro-
peanization, EU Actorness and State-Building in Kosovo’, 12 EFA Rev. (2007) pp. 219-238. 
96  See Council Decision No. 2006/56/EC of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as 
defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing 
Decision 2004/520/EC, OJ 2006 L 35/32. 
97  The same goes for the SAA with Albania, which will remain outside the scope of these sec-
tions because it has not yet entered into force. For an analysis of the SAAs with Macedonia and 
Croatia, see J. Marko and J. Wilhelm, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’, in Ott and Inglis, 
op. cit. n. 3, pp. 165-174; and Phinnemore, loc. cit. n. 45, at pp. 79-81. It should be noted that the 
analysis of Marko and Wilhelm was conducted prior to the publication of the SAAs in the Official 
Journal of the European Union. 
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[r]espect for the democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and 
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, respect for international law principles and 
the rule of law as well as the principles of market economy as reflected in the 
Document of the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation […]. 
 
Unlike the EAs, ‘respect for international law principles and the rule of law’ is 
also mentioned among the general principles of the SAAs. In the case of Croatia, 
a commitment to the right of return for all refugees and compliance with the 1995 
Dayton and Erdut Agreements is also reaffirmed (.preamble). 
By classifying the criteria mentioned in Article 2 as ‘essential elements’ of the 
contractual relationship, both SAAs borrow the language of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 60(3) VCLT allows for the unilateral 
suspension or termination of international agreements by one of the parties in 
cases of ‘material breach’ of a treaty, caused, for instance, by ‘(b) the violation of 
a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the 
treaty’.98 In line with the EC’s international treaty practice, the essential elements 
clause of Article 2 is complemented by a standard non-compliance clause. This 
so-called ‘Bulgarian clause’ enables either party to take ‘appropriate measures’, 
that is to say, measures taken in accordance with international law (e.g., principle 
of proportionality, etc.) if it considers that the other party has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the SAA.99 The party considering such measures must, ‘except in 
cases of special urgency, first supply the Stabilisation and Association Council 
(SAC) with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the 
situation with a view to find a solution acceptable to both parties.’ A joint 
declaration annexed to the Final Act of each SAA clarifies that the notion ‘cases 
of special urgency’ should be interpreted to mean ‘cases of material breach of the 
Agreement by one of the two Parties’. A material breach of the SAA is consid-
ered to consist of ‘repudiation of the Agreement not sanctioned by the general 
rules of international law [and] violation of the essential elements of the Agree-
ment as set out in Article 2.’ As a result, any infringement of democratic 
principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, international law principles 
(e.g., full and unequivocal cooperation with the ICTY), the rule of law and 
principles of market economy constitutes, at least in principle, a case of special 
urgency, entitling the sanctioning party to take appropriate measures, without the 
need for prior consultations in the SAC. It would seem that the immediate 
                                                                                                                                               
98  Emphasis added. 
99  See Art. 118(2) SAA FYROM and Art. 120(2) SAA Croatia. If a party takes a measure in a 
case of special urgency pursuant to these articles, the other party may avail itself of a dispute 
settlement procedure. For an explanation on the emergence and importance of the ‘Bulgarian clause’, 
see Bulterman, op. cit. n. 14, at pp. 204-205. 
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adoption of such measures, without a prior attempt to find an adequate solution in 
the SAC, is reserved for gross, widespread and persistent violations of one or 
more of the requirements enshrined in the essential elements clause. 
Christian Pippan has rightly argued that, with their references to the rights and 
freedoms contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as 
well as the political and economic principles enshrined in the Document of the 
CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, the essential elements clauses 
in the SAAs with Macedonia and Croatia set out a considerably high standard. 
From the time of the entry into force of the SAAs, the parties to these bilateral 
relationships are contractually bound, for example, to undertake ‘to build, 
consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government.’100 This 
requires, inter alia, a representative and pluralistic government, which is ‘based 
on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections’, and 
which ensures ‘accountability to the electorate’ as well as ‘justice administered 
impartially’.101 Under the SAAs, the creation of – or the return to – a non-
democratic form of government by one of the treaty partners is therefore illegal.102 
This is not only an important regional contribution to a general trend in contem-
porary international law that increasingly outlaws military or one-party civil 
regimes and endorses pluralistic, democratic governance as the only legitimate 
expression of the peoples’ right to (internal) self-determination. It is also a 
remarkable normative advancement given the fact that the UDHR, as well as the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris are, as such, legally non-binding 
instruments.103 
 
3.3.2 Regional cooperation 
 
Whereas regional cooperation was encouraged among the countries that signed 
EAs with the European Union, it was never made a distinct feature of their 
associations. In the case of the SAAs, regional cooperation is viewed as key to the 
                                                                                                                                               
100  Charter of Paris for a New Europe, section on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of 
Law, para. 1, 21 ILM (1982) at 58. 
101  Ibid., paras. 3 and 4. 
102  As SAAs are mixed agreements, this conclusion is also applicable to the EU Member States. 
For thoughts on what would happen when democracy derails in one of the Member States, see my 
articles ‘Oostenrijk in quarantaine – de voorwaarden voor het beëindigen van het lidmaatschap van 
een internationale organisatie’ [Austria in quarantine – conditions for terminating membership of an 
international organisation], 9 Ars Aequi (2000) pp. 629-637; and ‘Van Wenen naar Nice: nieuwe 
voorwaarden voor het instellen van sancties door de EU tegen een lidstaat die de grondrechten 
schendt’ [From Vienna to Nice: New conditions for imposing EU sanctions against a Member State 
that violates fundamental rights], 5 Ars Aequi (2001) pp. 331-338. 
103  See Pippan, loc. cit. n. 17, at pp. 237-238. 
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stabilisation of the Western Balkans and has been made an explicit condition 
before the countries of the region can join the European Union (Art. 3). However 
difficult it is to enforce this additional conditionality, the importance attached to it 
has been underlined by the Commission, which noted in its first annual report on 
the SAP: ‘[i]ntegration with the EU is only possible if future members can 
demonstrate that they are willing and able to interact with their neighbours as EU 
Member States do.’104 In Article 4, SAA signatories commit themselves to 
‘continue and foster cooperation and good neighbourly relations with the other 
countries of the region.’ The SAAs explicitly refer to such relations covering the 
movement of persons, goods, capital and services, as well as the development of 
projects of common interest. In the SAA Croatia, specific examples are given: 
‘refugee return and combating organised crime, corruption, money laundering, 
illegal migration and trafficking’. To achieve regional cooperation on these 
issues, the SAA countries are expected to conclude conventions between each 
other. SAA signatories are also obliged to engage in regional cooperation with the 
other countries covered by the SAP (Art. 13). The political dialogue, held within 
a multilateral framework (Arts. 7 and 8), is also meant to contribute to the 
development of regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. In fact, 
these provisions codify a proliferation process that was already underway in 
south-eastern Europe. Apart from a matrix of bilateral free trade agreements,105 a 
whole range of regional initiatives for political dialogue has been developed. 
Notable examples are the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA),106 the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Southeast 
European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII).107 
The biggest achievement of these initiatives is without doubt the sustainable 
political dialogue between the countries involved in these frameworks. But with 
partly overlapping memberships and agendas indicating lack of complementari-
ties, competitiveness is growing among them. Many regional initiatives have been 
criticised because of the modesty of their objectives and the limited concrete 
results they have yielded.108 Moreover, most of them are only addressing the 
                                                                                                                                               
104  See COM (2002) 163 final, Brussels, 4 April 2002, at p. 11. 
105  A matrix of the free trade agreements in south-eastern Europe is available at: <http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Stability_Pact_for_South_Eastern_Europe#FTA_Progress>. See also European 
Commission, ‘Trade in South Eastern Europe’, MEMO/06/155, Brussels, 5 April 2006. 
106  See chapter 6, section 2.1.1.3. 
107  For an overview and analysis of these and other initiatives, see D. Lopandić, Regional Initia-
tives in South Eastern Europe (Belgrade, European Movement in Serbia 2001). See also E. Busek, 
ed., 10 Years Southeast European Cooperative Initiative: From Dayton to Brussels (Vienna, 
Springer 2006). 
108  See O. Anastasakis and V. Bojičić-Dželilović, Balkan Regional Cooperation and European 
Integration (London, Hellinic Observatory LSE 2002); and A. Petričušić, ‘Regional Cooperation in 
the Western Balkans – A Key to Integration into the European Union’, 1 Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy (2005) pp. 213-233. 
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immediate post-conflict situation, and all but the SEECP have been created as a 
consequence of external incentives by resuscitating and broadening existing 
initiatives. It seems that, in the search for the most appropriate regional initiative, 
valuable resources are being wasted.109 
 
3.3.3 Approximation of legislation 
 
The approximation of the associate’s legislation to that of the European Union is 
another important aspect of the SAAs as far as the perspective of future integra-
tion is concerned. The existing SAAs define the rules of the internal market as 
priorities for legislative approximation by Macedonia and Croatia.110 The focus 
on internal market law bears a risk of an unbalanced situation in the approxima-
tion process, leaving behind other essential areas such as social or environmental 
policy. Yet, it is a critical component within the SAA, essentially extending to the 
Western Balkans the European Union’s own philosophy that the adoption of the 
hard core of economic standards based on a free market economy is a route to 
national as well as regional peace, stability and growth and that such integration 
serves the mutual interests of all countries concerned. 
The SAA Croatia declares that this legislative approximation process will be 
fully implemented within six years of the entry into force of the agreement (Arts. 
5 and 69), that is to say, before 1 February 2011. In the case of Macedonia, the 
approximation will take place in a timeframe of ten years divided into two 
successive stages (Arts. 5 and 68). In the first phase of the implementation of the 
SAA FYROM (until 9 April 2009), the approximation will cover fundamental 
elements of the internal market acquis and other trade-related areas. This includes 
competition law, intellectual property law, standards and certification law, public 
procurement law and data protection law. During the second phase (until 9 April 
2014), the remaining elements of the acquis will be covered. The reasoning 
behind the shorter timeframe and the absence of stages in the SAA Croatia reflect 
the belief among the Member States of the European Union that Croatia is in a 
better position, both economically and politically, to meet its obligations under 
the SAA. Full implementation of the SAAs will help the countries of the Western 
Balkans in their preparations for EU membership. They are assisted in this task 
by the Commission with technical advice and financial assistance. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
109  See J. Minić, ‘Summary and Recommendations of the Conference’, in Lopandić, op. cit. n. 
35, at pp. 9-17. For suggestions for restructuring regional cooperation, see chapter 6, section 2.1.1.3. 
110  This is clearly an advance compared to the one-size-fits-all approach prescribed in the EAs. 
See A. Łazowski, ‘Approximation of Laws’, in Ott and Inglis, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 631-639. 
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3.4 Financial and technical assistance 
 
As an overarching, multi-country strategy, the SAP commits the European Union 
to providing not only political but also financial and technical support to the six 
countries of the Western Balkans. From 2000 to 2006, the CARDS (Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme was 
the Community’s main funding instrument dedicated to the region of the Western 
Balkans and supported the actions undertaken within the SAP and under the 
SAAs.111 It replaced the OBNOVA.112 and PHARE.113 programmes and established 
a single legal framework for EU assistance to the countries of the region.114 In 
addition, a special European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) was entrusted 
with the local administration of EC assistance to Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro.115 
                                                                                                                                               
111  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96 and amending Regulations (EEC) 
No. 3906/89 and (EEC) No. 1360/90 and Decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC, OJ 2000 L 306/1 
(as amended). In addition, funding was provided through other budget lines as well. 
112  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1628/96 of 25 July 1996 relating to aid for Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, OJ 1996 L 204/1. See supra section 2.1. 
113  The PHARE programme was one of the pre-accession instruments financed by the European 
Union to assist the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations to join 
the Union. PHARE was created in 1989 to assist Poland and Hungary in their rapprochement to the 
Community. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the 
Republic of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic, OJ 1989 L 375/11. In 1990, the PHARE 
programme was enlarged with, inter alia, Yugoslavia. See Council Regulation (EEC) 2690/90 of 17 
September 1990, OJ 1990 L 257/1. This decision reflected the upbeat attitude of the EC towards 
increased cooperation, potentially even association, with the SFRY. See M. Maresceau, ‘Zuidoost-
Europa en de Europese Unie’, in R. Detrez, ed., Ontmoeting met de Balkan (Brussels, KVAB 2005) 
pp. 9-43 at pp. 11-14. Until 2000, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia were also 
recipients of PHARE assistance. See, respectively, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3800/91 of 23 
December 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 in order to extend economic aid to include 
other countries in central and eastern Europe, OJ 1991 L 357/10; Council Regulation (EC) No. 
753/96 of 22 April 1996 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 with a view to extending 
economic aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ 1996 L 103/5; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1366/95 of 
12 June 1995 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 in order to extend economic aid to Croatia, 
OJ 1995 L 133/1; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 463/96 of 11 March 1996 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No. 3906/89 with a view to extending economic assistance to the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, OJ 1996 L 65/3. 
114  For a breakdown of the grand total of €5.55 billion in Community support to the SAP region 
during the 1991-2000 period, see Annex 4 to European Commission, CARDS Assistance Programme 
to the Western Balkans: Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Brussels, 22 October 2001, available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/publications_en.htm>. 
115  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2667/2000 of 5 December 2000 on the European Agency for 
Reconstruction, OJ 2000 L 306/7. The EAR has its headquarters in Thessaloniki and runs operational 
centres in Belgrade, Priština, Podgorica and Skopje. It is accountable both to the Council and the 
European Parliament and overseen by a governing board composed of the Commission and 
representatives from EU Member States. The EAR is due to close down by the end of 2008. More 
information is available on the EAR’s website at: <http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm>. 
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Under the unified procedures of CARDS, which became fully operational in 
2002, the Commission drew up multi-annual country strategies as well as a 
regional strategy in collaboration with the Western Balkan countries, EU Member 
States, other donors and, insofar as possible, representatives of civil society. 
These strategy papers formed the basis for annual programmes for each of the 
countries concerned.116 Under the CARDS programme, a budget of €4.65 billion 
was agreed for the 2000-2006 period.117 However, Table 1 below shows that the 
eventual amount of CARDS funding during this period was closer to €5.13 billion 
(or even €5.385 billion when including funding to Croatia during its first pre-
accession period). To achieve its objective of facilitating the SAP, CARDS 
assistance financed investment, institution-building and other programmes in four 
major areas: (i) reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the 
return of refugees; (ii) institutional and legislative development, including 
approximation of domestic legislation with EU norms to underpin democracy and 
the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, as well as the operation 
of a free market economy; (iii) sustainable economic and social development, 
including structural reform; and (iv) the promotion of closer relations and 
regional cooperation between SAP countries and between the SAP countries, the 
EU Member States, the acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and candidate 
country Turkey.118 
In one regional strategy paper and a series of country strategy papers, the 
European Union set out its priorities for the implementation of the SAP and the 
legally binding bilateral agreements between the Union and each associate. The 
Commission has identified the strategy papers as key tools for integrating conflict 
prevention in the programming of its development cooperation.119 As such, they 
                                                                                                                                               
116  The 2002-2006 Strategy Papers and the most recent Annual Programmes can be retrieved 
from: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/publications_en.htm>. 
117  Annex B to the first annual review of the SAP, COM (2002) 163 final, Brussels, 4 April 
2002, at p. 23. 
118  In 2005-2006, CARDS financial assistance covered both the ‘potential’ candidate countries 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo under UN administra-
tion)) and the candidate countries of the Western Balkans (Croatia and Macedonia). The latter remain 
part of the SAP and continue to be eligible for regional funding. Upon receiving candidate status (see 
infra section 5), Croatia was included as a beneficiary of PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD by way of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2257/2004 amending Regulations (EEC) No. 3906/89, (EC) No. 
1267/1999, (EC) No. 1268/1999 and (EC) No. 2666/2000, to take account of Croatia’s candidate 
status, OJ 2004 L 389/1. See also the Framework Agreement between the European Community and 
the Republic of Croatia on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Croatia in 
Community programmes, OJ 2005 L 192/16; and Commission Decision 2006/658/EC of 29 
September 2006 conferring management of aid on implementing agencies for pre-accession measures 
in agriculture and rural development in Croatia in the pre-accession period, OJ 2006 L 271/83. At the 
time of writing, similar decisions concerning Macedonia, which received candidate country status in 
December 2005 (see infra section 5), had not been taken. 
119  COM (1999) 235 final, Brussels, 26 May 1999. 
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complement the political dialogue backed up by the annual reviews of the SAP. 
When drafting the political analysis section of the strategy papers, risk factors are 
systematically checked. For that purpose, the Commission is using the indicators 
developed for the so-called ‘checklist for root causes of conflict’.120 This checklist 
looks at issues such as the balance of political and economic power, the control of 
the security forces, the ethnic composition of the government of ethnically 
divided countries, the human rights situation, the level of organised crime, the 
potential degradation of environmental resources, the level of corruption and so 
forth. On the basis of this conflict analysis, attention is then drawn to activities 
focused on conflict prevention that should be targeted by external aid. 
The CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans: Regional Strat-
egy Paper 2002-2006 was adopted by the Commission on 22 October 2001 and 
provided a strategic framework for programming the regional envelope of the 
CARDS programme during the 2002-2006 period.121 Some 10 per cent of the 
available CARDS budget was to be directed towards raising the levels of regional 
cooperation between the countries of the Western Balkans. The Regional Strategy 
Paper earmarked funds for support in four priority areas: (i) integrated border 
management to help tackle cross-border crime, to facilitate trade across borders 
and to stabilise the border regions themselves; (ii) institutional capacity-building 
to help raise awareness of EU policy and laws that the region should increasingly 
be moving towards; (iii) democratic stabilisation to help cement advances in 
democracy and boost the involvement of civil society in the region’s develop-
ment; and (iv) integration of the region’s transport, energy and environmental 
infrastructure into the wider European networks. These areas were selected 
because of their contribution to regional cooperation or because the support could 
be best delivered at the regional level. The so-called ‘multi-annual indicative 
programme’ attached to the Regional Strategy Paper provided strategic guidance 
for implementing the CARDS regional assistance. The CARDS regional financial 
allocation for 2005-2006 amounted to €85 million.122 
The country strategy papers were adopted to provide the strategic framework 
in which EC assistance would be provided to each country during the 2000-2006 
period. Each country strategy paper set out cooperation objectives, policy 
response and priority fields of cooperation based on a thorough assessment of the 
                                                                                                                                               
120  Available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm>. For background 
and analysis, see J. Niño-Pérez, ‘Conflict Indicators Developed by the Commission: The Check-list 
for Root Causes of Conflict/Early Warning Indicators’, in V. Kronenberger and J. Wouters, eds., The 
European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2004) pp. 3-19. 
121  See supra n. 114. 
122  Priority areas for regional CARDS assistance in 2005-2006 were institution-building (€16-18 
million), justice and home affairs (€5-6 million), cross-border cooperation (€33-39 million), private 
sector development (€2.5-3.5 million) and infrastructure development (€21-26 million). 
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partner country’s policy agenda and political and socio-economic situation. The 
multi-annual indicative programme attached to the each country strategy paper set 
out the EU response in more detail, highlighting programme objectives, expected 
results and conditionality in the priority fields of cooperation. Malfunctioning 
governance, combined with organised crime, corruption and smuggling, consti-
tuted the most serious obstacle to a rapid improvement of the situation in most of 
the Western Balkan countries.123 In this context, and taking into account the 
objectives of the SAP, it is worth noting that the EU response under the CARDS 
programme to the partner countries focused on the sustainable return of refugees 
and displaced persons, the full integration of ethnic minorities into society, 
democratic stabilisation, administrative capacity-building, an effective and 
accountable legal system, economic and social development, the environment and 
natural resources, and justice and home affairs.124 
The main beneficiaries of CARDS assistance were the central governmental 
institutions, but regional and local bodies, social partners, cooperatives, associa-
tions and NGOs were also eligible to apply.125 In the past, the latter has proven to 
be of particular importance, as this creates the possibility of a direct, ‘decentral-
ised’ form of cooperation that can be maintained even if the state’s central 
government falls short of complying with the conditions set out by the European 
Union for official Community assistance.126 
Political conditionality was explicitly included in Article 5 of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No. 2666/2000 on CARDS: 
 
1. Respect for the principles of democracy and the rule of law and for human and 
minority rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element for the appli-
cation of this Regulation and a precondition for Community assistance. If these 
principles are not respected, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a pro-
posal from the Commission, may take the appropriate measures. 
2. Community assistance shall also be subject to the conditions defined by the 
Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997, in particular as regards the recipi-
ents’ undertaking to carry out democratic, economic and institutional reforms. 
                                                                                                                                               
123  Bosnia-Herzegovina faced even greater challenges over the medium term, notably strength-
ening the state and reinforcing the administration. The country strategy papers for Serbia and 
Montenegro and Macedonia set out an approach that was designed to require the least modification 
possible, whatever the outcome of the final status talks on Kosovo. 
124  For ‘facts and figures’ on assistance to each of the Western Balkan countries, see the Re-
gional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, the country strategy papers, the multi-annual indicative 
programmes and a sample of case studies from the hundreds of ongoing projects in all sectors, 
regions and countries, all available at: <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations>. See also 
the joint initiative of the European Commission and the World Bank in economic reconstruction and 
development in south-eastern Europe, available at: <http://www.seerecon.org>. 
125  Art. 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2666/2000. 
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This provision represented one of the most comprehensive conditionality clauses 
ever embodied in a Community legal instrument regulating external assistance.127 
Apart from giving expression, in its first paragraph, to the importance of the 
‘political’ part of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria as a precondition for Community 
assistance, it also explicitly incorporated the entire range of political and eco-
nomic conditions entailed in the April 1997 Council Conclusions on 
conditionality as additional conditions for EU financial support to the countries of 
the Western Balkans. Moreover, the CARDS Regulation did not only rely on 
punitive measures in order to promote the exceptionally broad range of political 
and economic standards applied by the European Union towards the countries 
concerned. It also provided for the application of positive measures, namely, the 
financing of projects and programmes aimed at supporting ‘the creation of an 
institutional and legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law 
and human and minority rights, reconciliation and the consolidation of civil 
society’.128 
In an attempt to harmonise (insofar as possible) the pre-accession financial 
instruments – PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, the Turkish pre-accession instrument 
and CARDS – the Council has recently adopted a regulation creating a single 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for the period covered by the 
financial perspective for 2007-2013.129 This new funding mechanism for the 
Western Balkans (and Turkey) will be discussed in chapter 6 of this book. 
 
3.5 Trade preferences 
 
In addition to the significant amounts of aid that the countries of the Western 
Balkans receive from the European Union, all states benefit from generous trade 
preferences. In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council decided that future 
association agreements with the Western Balkans had to be preceded by a regime 
                                                                                                                                               
127  Ibid., at p. 232. 
128  Art. 2(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2666/2000. Between 1998 and 2002, EC assis-
tance devoted to the field of ‘democratic stabilisation’ (including aid to refugees) represented 20 per 
cent of the total assistance allocated to the Western Balkans. See COM (2003) 139 final, Brussels, 26 
March 2003, at 23. 
129  See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), OJ 2006 L 210/82. IPA is part of a wider reorganisation of the 
European Union’s financial framework for relations with third states, which includes a new European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a new development cooperation instrument, the 
Instrument for Stability and a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights. The IPA Regulation provides a total envelope of €11.5 billion over the next seven years for 
the countries with candidate status (currently Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey) and potential 
candidate status (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (including Kosovo)). As a 
result, all Western Balkan countries will receive less than before. This point is made more poignantly 
in chapter 6, section 2.1.1.2. 
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of asymmetrical trade liberalisation.130 The decision to improve access for 
exporters from the Western Balkans to the single market creates a win-win 
situation, as it meets a paramount interest of the countries of the region (the 
European Union is by far their most important trading partner) and involves as 
good as no economic risks but plenty of benefits for the European Union.131 As 
part of the SAP, the Council of Ministers implemented the decision taken by the 
European Council at Lisbon by adopting Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000, 
which provided for duty and quota free access to the EU market for nearly all 
industrial products and most agricultural products from the Western Balkan 
countries.132 Preferential quotas were retained, however, for baby-beef, fisheries 
and wine products.133 While Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 was initially 
limited to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and certain ‘territories’ linked to 
the SAP (Kosovo and Montenegro),134 its application was soon extended to 
Macedonia and, after the political uproar that led to the fall of the Milošević 
regime, to the whole territory of Serbia and Montenegro.135 Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2563/2000 improved the existing autonomous trade preferences and 
                                                                                                                                               
130  Bull. EU 3-2000, point I.21.47. 
131  The general level of imports from the Western Balkan countries is less than 1 per cent of all 
Community imports, whereas 70 per cent of all Croatian exports, for example, currently go to the 
European market. This means that the EU market can profit from an increased product diversification 
without having to fear that it will be swamped by products from the Western Balkans. Moreover, the 
market of the Western Balkans offers a huge potential for European exporters. See European 
Commission, Trade in South Eastern Europe, MEMO/06/155, 5 April 2006, and the portal of the 
WIIW Balkan Observatory for more statistics and research in relation to economic developments in 
south-eastern Europe, at: <http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan>. 
132  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 of 18 September 2000 introducing exceptional trade 
measures for countries and territories participating in or linked to the European Union’s Stabilisation 
and Association process, amending Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98, and repealing Regulations (EC) 
No. 1763/1999 and (EC) No. 6/2000, OJ 2000 L 240/1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
530/2007 of 8 May 2007, OJ 2007 L 125/1 to take account of the new contractual regime with 
Albania. The period of validity of Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 was prolonged until 31 December 
2010 by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1946/2005 of 14 November 2005, OJ 2005 L 312/1. 
133  See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2008/2006 of 22 December 2006 laying down 
detailed rules for the application in 2006 of the tariff quotas for baby beef products originating in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro, OJ 2006 L 379/105; and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2088/2004 of 7 December 
2004 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2497/2001 and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2597/2001 as 
regards tariff quotas for certain fish and fishery products originating in Croatia and for certain wines 
originating in Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia, OJ 2004 L 361/3. 
134  In the case of Kosovo and Montenegro, limited trade preferences were granted for certain 
products that were not produced in other parts of the FRY, which remained excluded from EC trade 
preferences until November 2000. 
135  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2563/2000 of 20 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) 
No. 2007/2000 by extending to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia the exceptional trade measures for countries and territories participating in or 
linked to the European Union’s stabilisation and association process and amending Regulation (EC) 
No. 2820/98, OJ 2000 L 295/1. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 was also amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1946/2005 to take account of the fact that the Republic of Montenegro, 
the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo each constitute separate customs territories. 
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provided for an autonomous trade liberalisation of 95 per cent for all of the 
Western Balkan countries’ exports to the European Union, meaning that imports 
of such products into the Union were to be admitted without quantitative restric-
tions or measures having equivalent effect. These arrangements were even more 
generous than those enjoyed by the ten new Member States before they joined the 
Union.136 The Enlargement Protocols to the SAAs with Macedonia and Croatia 
did not change this, as they simply adapted the trade provisions of the SAAs to 
increase the volume of tariff quotas in order to take into account traditional trade 
between Macedonia and Croatia, on the one hand, and the ten new Member 
States, on the other. The quotas for fisheries and wine products from Macedonia 
and Croatia have thus been increased, thereby providing new export opportunities 
for these SAA countries. 
The preamble to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 on exceptional trade 
preferences refers to the political conditions enshrined in the Council Conclusions 
of 29 April 1997. The granting of autonomous trade preferences is linked to 
respect for fundamental principles of democracy and human rights, but political 
conditionality is not repeated in the operative part of the regulation. Article 2 
links the granting of improved autonomous trade preferences in favour of 
countries participating in the SAP to their readiness to engage in effective 
economic reforms and regional cooperation, in particular through the establish-
ment of free trade areas in line with Article XXIV of the 1994 GATT and other 
relevant WTO provisions. In addition, the entitlement to benefit from autonomous 
trade preferences is conditional on the beneficiaries’ involvement in effective 
administrative cooperation with the Community in order to prevent any risk of 
fraud. According to the same Article 2, the Council may, in the event of non-
compliance by one of the beneficiary countries, take ‘appropriate measures’ – 
thus including the suspension or withdrawal of exceptional trade preferences – by 
a qualified majority vote, on the basis of a Commission proposal. From a legal 
standpoint, exceptional trade preferences, which by definition go beyond the 
Community’s general obligations stemming from its WTO membership, do not 
reflect a legally binding commitment on the part of the EC vis-à-vis beneficiary 
countries, provided that such preferences are not governed by bilateral agree-
ments.137 Therefore, any subsequent decision to suspend or withdraw these 
preferences in a specific situation remains at the discretion of the competent EU 
institutions. As indicated in the preamble to Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2007/2000, such a decision will be based on all requirements set out by the 
                                                                                                                                               
136  For a comparison, see P. Koutrakos, ‘Free Movement of Goods under the Europe Agree-
ments’, in Ott and Inglis, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 369-390 at pp. 375-381. 
137  See B. Brandtner and A. Rosas, ‘Trade Preferences and Human Rights’, in Alston, op. cit. n. 
14, pp. 699-722 at p. 706. 
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Council in respect of the granting of autonomous trade preferences in its 29 April 
1997 Conclusions, including respect for the fundamental principles of democracy 




4. EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIPS: CONDITIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
At the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, it was determined that the SAP should 
be bolstered by new methods based on the experience of previous enlargements 
of the European Union. The chief of these is the introduction of the so-called 
‘European Partnerships’.139 On 30 March 2004, the Council of Ministers approved 
the first-ever European Partnerships with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Albania and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo as defined by UN Secur-
ity Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999).140 The first European Partnership 
with Croatia was published at the same time as the Commission’s positive avis on 
Croatia’s application for membership.141 Due to the unsettled status of Kosovo, 
the Commission had proposed a separate list of priorities and recommendations, 
based on the ‘Standards for Kosovo’.142 Thus, the European Partnership with 
Serbia and Montenegro strengthened the existing ‘standards before status’ policy 
of the international community, even though this policy had long been declared 
dead in the region. At the same time, however, by treating Kosovo’s priorities 
separately, the European Partnership gave tacit support for a decentralisation 
process, something Serbia vehemently opposed.143 In the wake of the proclama-
tion of independence by Montenegro on 3 June 2006, it was appropriate to 
                                                                                                                                               
138  See Pippan, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 231. 
139  See Bull. EU 6-2003, point 1.6.70. 
140  Council Decisions 2004/515/EC, 2004/518/EC, 2004/519/EC and 2004/520/EC, OJ 2004 L 
221/10, L 222/20, L 223/20 and L 227/21, respectively. These acts were repealed and replaced by 
Council Decisions 2006/55/EC, 2006/57/EC, 2006/54/EC and 2006/56/EC, OJ 2006 L 35/19, 57, 1 
and 32, respectively. 
141  See Council Decision 2004/648/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in 
the European Partnership with Croatia, OJ 2004 L 297/19, repealed and replaced by Council 
Decision 2006/145 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the accession partnership 
with Croatia, OJ 2006 L 55/30 [emphasis added] so as to reflect the new status of Croatia as a 
candidate for EU accession. 
142  See chapter 4, section 3.3.1. 
143  This situation was not remedied in the latest European Partnership with Serbia and Montene-
gro, including Kosovo, even though it was already clear at the moment of its adoption that final 
status talks would commence. This shows the EU Member States’ firm belief that, by gradually 
merging the Standards for Kosovo into the European Partnership, the European Commission was 
creating a framework for credibly monitoring and accompanying Kosovo’s development towards a 
stable and multi-ethnic society in the European mainstream. 
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establish a new European Partnership with Montenegro on the basis of the parts 
relating to it in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, updated in 
view of the 2006 progress report and supplemented with priorities addressing the 
challenges faced by the newly independent state. The first European Partnership 
with Montenegro was adopted on 22 January 2007.144 
Modelled on the Accession Partnerships developed to prepare past aspirants 
for EU membership, the European Partnerships were heralded as a milestone in 
the relations between the European Union and the Western Balkan countries, but 
the difference in the qualifying adjective suggests otherwise: this time around, the 
emphasis is on ‘partnership’ rather than ‘accession’. This impression is reinforced 
when one considers that, while the partnerships for the Western Balkan countries 
were first announced as ‘European Integration Partnerships’ in the Commission’s 
proposal from 2003,145 they were tellingly re-dubbed as ‘European Partnerships’ 
in Council Regulation (EC) No. 533/2004 of 22 March 2004, the basic legal act 
by which they are established.146 
The first Accession Partnerships were endorsed by the European Council of 
Luxembourg in December 1997 as a key element for strengthening the pre-
accession strategy for the candidate countries at the time. They set out the 
priorities for each country as they were preparing themselves to become members 
of the European Union. The first accession strategies were decided in March 1998 
for the ten CEECs, in 2000 for Cyprus and Malta and in 2003 for Turkey. They 
highlighted the main instruments and financial resources available, which had to 
be maximised to target the objectives effectively. Each candidate country was 
supposed to establish a ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’ 
(NPAA), setting out in detail the way in which the priorities would be realised. 
The Commission assessed each country’s progress annually in its regular re-
ports.147 
                                                                                                                                               
144  Council Decision 2007/49/EC of 22 January 2007 on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Montenegro, OJ 2007 L 20/16. The adoption of a new 
constitution, the completion of the establishment of the legal and institutional set-up required for an 
independent country, including the signature and ratification of the international instruments to 
which the state union of Serbia and Montenegro had adhered, and the continuation of efforts to 
implement the reform of the public administration and the judiciary were mentioned as short-term 
key priorities. 
145  European Commission, The Western Balkans and European Integration, COM (2003) 285 
final, Brussels, 21 May 2003. 
146  Council Regulation (EC) No. 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of the Euro-
pean Partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ 2004 L 86/1. The 
Council rephrased the policy instrument as early as 16 June 2003. See Thessaloniki Agenda, in 
Annex A to Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003, Press Release No. 10369/03 (Presse 166). 
147  See K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of Their Pre-accession Reori-
entation’, 37 CML Rev. (2000) pp. 1173-1210 at p. 1184; K. Inglis, ‘The Pre-Accession Strategy and 
the Accession Partnerships’, in Ott and Inglis, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 103-111; and M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-
accession’, in Cremona, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 9-42 at pp. 30-32. 
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While the European Partnerships are very similar to the Accession Partner-
ships, their legal basis is nevertheless different. Council Regulation (EC) No. 
533/2004.148 is based on Article 181a(2) TEC rather than Article 308 TEC (ex Art. 
235 TEC), which was the legal basis for Regulation (EC) No. 622/98 on the 
establishment of Accession Partnerships.149 Since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Nice, Article 181a(2) provides a specific legal basis for the adoption of 
European Partnerships, because it is the only provision that is capable of referring 
both to association agreements and agreements still ‘to be concluded with the 
states which are candidates for accession to the Union’. As such, Article 181a(2) 
could appropriately serve as a legal basis for the adoption of European Partner-
ships with SAP countries that have either already signed an SAA (Macedonia and 
Croatia) or will do so in the future (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and Serbia). But this conclusion hinges on the assumption that the interpretation 
of ‘candidates’ in Article 181a(2) equals ‘potential candidates’. Unfortunately for 
the SAP countries, this liberal interpretation does not constitute a Freudian slip on 
the part of the EU institutions in the sense that, with the adoption of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 533/2004, all Western Balkan states have indirectly been 
promoted to the level of candidate states. European Partnerships do not endow 
their addressees with candidate country status and cannot be thought of as pre-
accession instruments in the same way as the Accession Partnerships, because 
they are used to programme the work of a range of states even prior to the 
existence of contractual relations with the European Union. The Accession 
Partnerships, on the other hand, were proposed to candidate countries that were 
recognised as such and already signatories to a Europe Agreement.150 
On paper, the European Partnerships and the Accession Partnerships seem to 
offer the same framework, the same organisation and the same means of assess-
ment. They are both structurally divided into short and medium-term priorities. 
Based on the Commission’s annual SAP reports, the European Partnerships are 
tailored to each Western Balkan country’s specific needs, setting out priorities for 
the short term (one to two years) and the medium term (three to four years). The 
Partnerships are intended to help governments concentrate reform efforts and 
available resources where they are most needed. The competent authorities are 
expected to respond with a detailed plan for the implementation of their state’s 
European Partnership priorities, setting out the concrete measures to be taken, a 
                                                                                                                                               
148  As amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 269/2006 of 14 February 2006 on the estab-
lishment of the European Partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and association process, 
OJ 2006 L 47/7, to take account of the establishment of an Accession Partnership for Croatia. 
149  Council Regulation (EC) No. 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States 
in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession 
Partnerships, OJ 1998 L 85/1. 
150  In a similar vein, see Inglis, loc. cit. n. 3. 
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timetable and demonstrating what human and financial resources will be devoted 
to the tasks involved – basically a sort of NPAA. The priorities identified in the 
European Partnerships will also influence the allocation of the financial assistance 
from the European Union. Thus, clearly, European Partnerships cannot be 
regarded as agreements. They are EU policy tools to encourage reforms and serve 
as checklists against which to measure progress. Furthermore, they provide 
guidance for Community and Member State financial assistance. They reflect the 
particular stages of development of each country and, to that end, all contain a 
conditionality clause: according to common recital 5 of the preamble to the 
European Partnerships, non-compliance with the 1993 Copenhagen political 
criteria and a lack of progress in meeting the specific priorities of the European 
Partnerships themselves could lead the Council to unilaterally suspend Commu-
nity assistance under the SAP.151 Community assistance is also subject to the 
conditions defined by the Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997 and 21-22 
June 1999, in particular as regards the recipients’ undertaking to carry out 
democratic, economic and institutional reforms. 
In short, the added value of the European Partnerships lies primarily in the fact 
that their adoption represents a new step towards further integration with the 
European Union, as the SAP is increasingly being modelled on the pre-accession 
process of the CEECs. These policy instruments finally provide each of the 
countries with a timetable and a road map towards EU membership. The partner-
ships are necessary to measure progress and build motivation to persist with the 
painful reforms that are necessary to attract private domestic and foreign direct 
investment, help stimulate economic growth and overcome high unemployment. 
The timeframe for their implementation will of course depend on the pace of 
political and economic reform in each country. 
 
 
5. FROM ‘POTENTIAL’ TO FULL MEMBERSHIP PERSPECTIVE 
 
5.1 The meaning of ‘potential’ candidate country status 
 
In contrast to the preambular reference to accession in the Europe Agreements, 
the preambles of the SAAs recall not simply the European Union’s readiness to 
integrate Macedonia and Croatia ‘to the fullest possible extent […] into the 
political and economic mainstream of Europe’ but also the status of the two 
associates as ‘potential’ candidates for EU membership. The membership 
perspective is set out in the final recital of the preamble to the two existing SAAs: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
151  The conditionality clause invokes Article 5 of the CARDS Regulation. 
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[The contracting parties recall] the European Union’s readiness to integrate to the 
fullest possible extent the [associate] into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe and its status as a potential candidate for EU membership on the basis of 
the Treaty on European Union and fulfilment of the criteria defined by the Euro-
pean Council in June 1993, subject to successful implementation of this 
Agreement, notably regarding regional cooperation. 
 
From the wording of the recital, as well as its travaux préparatoires, it becomes 
clear that, for reasons already explained, the inclusion of the membership perspec-
tive came against a background of reticence towards any firm commitment to 
admit the SAP countries into the European Union at a future date.152 This is 
apparent in the Commission’s May 1999 Communication on the SAP, which 
made no explicit mention of the word ‘membership’ at all, but instead referred to 
the SAAs as ‘draw[ing] the region closer to the perspective of full integration into 
EU structures.’153 One month later, the Cologne European Council agreed to a 
similar wording but acknowledged that this would be done ‘with a prospect of EU 
membership on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam and fulfilment of the criteria 
defined at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993.’154 In the course of 
drawing up the SAAs, the European Union watered down the strength of the 
commitment.155 The current wording of the recital follows declarations that were 
made at the June 2000 European Council in Santa Maria da Feira and at the 
Zagreb Summit of November 2000, to the effect that the Western Balkan coun-
tries are ‘potential candidates’ for EU membership.156 Although this notion has no 
official definition and does not confer on the holder a legally enforceable right to 
membership, politically speaking, the term ‘potential candidate’ recognises the 
Union’s willingness to see membership ambitions of the status holder realised in 
the future. In the words of Friis and Murphy: 
 
This promise, however vague and conditional, cannot be withdrawn […]. [I]t will 
force the Union to increase its level of engagement with the region and to advance 
the on-going enlargement process […]. [The] genie is now out of the bottle.157 
 
                                                                                                                                               
152  See supra section 2.1. See also R. Biermann, ‘Die Europäische Perspektive für den wes-
tlichen Balkan’, 51 Osteuropa (2001) pp. 922-937 at pp. 926-927. 
153  COM (1999) 235 final, Brussels, 26 May 1999, at 4. 
154  Bull. EU 6-1999, point I.26.72. 
155  See Biermann, loc. cit. n. 27, at pp. 15-19. 
156  Bull. EU 6-2000, point I.49.67; and Bull. EU 11-2000, point I.6.57. 
157  L. Friis and A. Murphy, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Can-
didates and the “Next Neighbours”’, 14 ECSA Rev. (2001). Looked at from the perspective of 
Ukraine, for example, ‘potential candidate’ status is a rather significant commitment and one that 
was not, after all, offered to the CEECs. 
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However half-hearted the Member States’ commitment to enlarging ‘their’ Union 
with the countries of south-eastern Europe may at first have seemed, the repeated 
confirmation of it.158 has provided the ‘able and willing’ governments of the 
Western Balkan states with a justification for difficult political and economic 
reforms and a means to rally support for tough decisions at home.159 Croatia’s bid 
for membership on 20 February 2003,160 Macedonia’s application for accession on 
22 March 2004,161 the eagerness of political leaders to guide Bosnia-Herzegovina 
into the European Union.162 and the successful efforts of Podgorica on a peaceful 
withdrawal from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro to speed up the 
process of European integration.163 all attest to the fact that the only worthwhile 
‘carrot’ the European Union can offer the Western Balkan countries in exchange 
for concerted efforts to create lasting peace and stability in the region is the 
prospect of full membership.164 The Union should therefore grant candidate 
country status to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (and – if 
independent – Kosovo) if and when these potential candidate countries formally 
apply for membership and meet all the relevant conditions (ex Art. 49 TEU).165 
 
5.2 Revised procedure for accession negotiations 
 
5.2.1 Transitional v. permanent arrangements 
 
The European Council, at its 16-17 December 2004 summit in Brussels, agreed 
on a revised framework for every future round of accession negotiations, to be 
created ‘according to own merits and specific situations and characteristics of 
                                                                                                                                               
158  Most vocally at Zagreb in 2000 and Thessaloniki in 2003, Bull. EU 11-2000, point I.6.57 and 
Bull. EU 6-2003, point I.17, respectively. 
159  Others have criticised the European Union’s unwillingness to make a full commitment to 
integrate the countries concerned and have pointed out that an integration strategy that revolves 
around the promise of the perspective of membership does not necessarily trigger the reforms most 
needed in instable societies. See, e.g., Anastasakis and Bechev, op. cit. n. 39; and D. Triantaphyllou, 
‘The Balkans between Stabilisation and Integration’, in J. Blatt, et al., ‘Partners and Neighbours: A 
CFSP for a Wider Europe’, 64 Chaillot Papers (2003) pp. 60-76. 
160  See Doc. 6991/03 ELARG 19 COWEB 28. 
161  See Council Conclusions of 17 May 2004, Press Release No. 9210/04 (Presse 149). 
162  For a country whose governance is supervised by the international community and where the 
EU will maintain a military force (EUFOR Althea) and a police mission (EUPM) for some time to 
come, even 2014 seems an optimistic target date. 
163  See chapter 4, section 3.2.4. 
164  Increasingly louder calls from Western European political leaders for the European Union to 
grant so-called ‘privileged partnerships’ instead of full membership to countries like Turkey and 
Ukraine have recently been extended to include the Western Balkans. On these related developments, 
see infra section 6.4. 
165  For an elaboration on this point, see chapter 6, section 2.1.1.1. 
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each candidate state.’166 It adopted this new approach to soothe worries in some 
Member States over its decision to open accession talks with Turkey (most 
vocally France, Cyprus and Austria)167 and, to a lesser extent, with Croatia (the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Italy).168 The European Council stressed, 
for instance, that long transition periods, derogations and specific arrangements 
could in the future be imposed in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, 
structural policies or agriculture.169 The proliferation of different sorts of transi-
tional arrangements in previous accession treaties.170 and the safeguard clauses 
included in the Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania are indicative in this 
respect.171 With respect to the latter, the proper use of a membership postpone-
ment clause, that is to say, in the absence of a promised date of entry (which is the 
new norm), an economic safeguard clause and internal market and JHA safeguard 
clauses are temporary measures that could act as a powerful lever for reform. 
More problematic is the fact that the European Council even went so far as to 
suggest that permanent safeguard clauses, defined as ‘clauses which are perma-
nently available as a basis for safeguard measures’, could be imposed.172 Although 
the introduction of permanent safeguard clauses seems reasonable from the 
political point of view of some Member States, it is highly questionable as a 
permanent solution for a ‘constitutional’ legal order like that of the European 
Union, for it would violate one of the most fundamental legal principles upon 
which it is built: the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of nationality.173 
                                                                                                                                               
166  See Bull. EU 12-2004, point I.8.23. 
167  For background and analysis, see E. Lenski, ‘Turkey (including Northern Cyprus)’, in Block-
mans and Łazowski, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 283-313. 
168  See infra section 5.3. 
169  And all matters relating to freedom of movement of persons will allow ‘a maximum role of 
[those] individual Member States’ that are afraid that their labour market will be flooded by Turkish 
workers. The European Council emphasised that transitional arrangements or safeguards should be 
reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market. 
170  See, e.g., K. Inglis, ‘The Union’s Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means to Make Enlargement 
Possible’, 41 CML Rev. (2004) pp. 937-973; and K. Inglis, ‘The Accession Treaty and Its Transi-
tional Arrangements: A Twilight Zone for the New Members of the Union’, in Hillion, op. cit. n. 3, 
pp. 77-109. 
171  See A. Łazowski, ‘And Then They Were Twenty-Seven… A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth 
Accession Treaty’, 44 CML Rev. (2007) pp. 401-430 at pp. 410-419. 
172  See Bull. EU 12-2004, point I.8.23. 
173  See U. Becker, ‘EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the EC Treaty’, 15 Jean 
Monnet Working Paper (2001), available at: <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org>; A. Bodnar, 
‘Transitional Periods for Employment – “Second Class” EU Citizenship?’, in O. Zetterquist, ed., Law 
and Modernity (Kraków, Polpress 2004) pp. 121-138; C. Hillion, ‘The European Union is dead. 
Long live the European Union…’, 29 EL Rev. (2004) pp. 583-612 at p. 593; and C. Hillion, ‘You 
Cannot Have Your Cake and Eat It! The Limits to Member States’ Discretion in EU Enlargement 
Negotiations’, Inaugural lecture, Leiden University, 21 March 2006. For a more optimistic view, see 
D. Thym, Ungleichzeitigkeit im Europäischen Verfassungsrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2002) at p. 
341. 
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5.2.2 Benchmarking 
 
Like in previous pre-accession rounds, all Member States will take part in 
chapter-by-chapter negotiations with each candidate. However, there will be more 
chapters to be negotiated by present and future candidate countries. Instead of the 
thirty-one chapters that Bulgaria and Romania had to negotiate, Croatia and 
Turkey are looking at thirty-five chapters. This is the result of both a technical 
rearrangement – certain chapters were considered too big and were chopped up 
and smaller ones were merged.174 – and the introduction of a new package on 
judiciary and human rights. The latter reflects a normative advancement in 
comparison with previous rounds of accession negotiations, as the political 
Copenhagen criteria on respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
have now been incorporated into a so-called ‘acquis chapter’.175 From now on, 
candidate countries will have to show that they have the administrative capacity 
to effectively apply and implement the acquis on democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and – crucially when dealing with Western Balkan countries – 
minority rights. 
Another novelty in the revised procedure agreed to by the December 2004 
European Council concerns the right of the Council, acting by unanimity on a 
proposal by the Commission, to lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure 
and, where appropriate, (re)opening of each chapter. Depending on the chapter 
concerned, these benchmarks will refer to legislative alignment and a satisfactory 
track record of implementation of the acquis as well as obligations deriving from 
contractual relations with the European Union. Thus, after agreement has been 
reached between the Union and the candidate country on an individual chapter of 
the negotiations, and once the set benchmarks have been met, the respective 
chapter is considered temporarily closed. The formal decision is made by the 
Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level. If, before the Accession Treaty 
has been concluded, new acquis falling within the scope of a specific chapter is 
developed or if the candidate country does not meet the set benchmarks or 
obligations assumed under the chapter concerned, negotiations on that chapter can 
be reopened. The revised procedure thus provides for an extra ‘stick behind the 
door’ to make sure that candidate countries deliver on each of the chapters, 
                                                                                                                                               
174  For example, the chapter on free movement of persons was divided into a chapter on free 
movement of workers and one dealing with the right of establishment and the free movement of 
services; the chapter on agriculture was separated into a chapter on agriculture and rural development 
and one on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. On the other hand, the chapters on 
industrial policy and small and medium-sized enterprises were merged into one chapter on enterprise 
and industrial policy. 
175  For a critical legal appraisal of the European Union’s application of pre-accession condition-
ality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law in the run-up to the two previous rounds of 
enlargements, see D. Kochenov, The Failure of Conditionality (Groningen, Ph.D thesis 2007). 
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something about which the Commission had become distrustful since the fifth 
round of enlargement negotiations. In fact, the December 2004 European Council 
stated that the new frameworks for negotiations would be established by the 
Council on a proposal by the Commission, ‘taking account of the experience of 
the fifth enlargement process and of the evolving acquis’. Under the terms of the 
frameworks, ‘the shared objective of the negotiations is accession’, but ‘the 
outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.’  
In one way, the European Council merely stated the obvious, namely that 
accession negotiations have – and have always had – an open-ended character, 
but the political signal towards new candidate countries cannot be underesti-
mated. They have to comply with the conditions and stick to the rules or see their 
pre-accession path (.partially) blocked by the European Union. In cases where a 
candidate seriously and persistently breaches the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, negotiations 
can be suspended altogether. In such cases, the Commission will, on its own 
initiative or at the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the 
suspension of negotiations and propose conditions for their eventual resumption. 
On receiving such a recommendation, the Council will decide by qualified 
majority, after having heard the candidate state, whether to suspend the negotia-
tions and what the conditions for their resumption should be. The procedure 
further prescribes that Member States will act in the IGC in accordance with the 
Council decision, without prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in 
the IGC, and that the European Parliament will be informed. However, if a 
candidate is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership – 
diplomatic language for a failure in negotiating accession – the European Union 
will nevertheless ensure ‘that the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in 
the European structures through the strongest possible bond’. Supposedly, the 




On 17-18 June 2004, the European Council finally crossed the Rubicon when it 
decided to follow up on the Commission’s positive avis on Croatia’s application 
for membership and grant candidate status to the country, thereby opening it up to 
increased financial and technical assistance.177 At its Brussels summit in Decem-
ber 2004, the European Council requested the Council of Ministers to agree on a 
negotiating framework with a view to opening accession negotiations with 
                                                                                                                                               
176  See S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski, ‘Conclusions: Squaring the Circle of Friends’, in Block-
mans and Łazowski, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 613-639. 
177  For the avis, see COM (2004) 257 final, Brussels, 20 April 2004; for the decision by the 
European Council, see Bull. EU 6-2004, point I.7.31. See further supra n. 118. 
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Croatia on 17 March 2005, thereby rewarding Croatia’s ongoing preparations for 
membership with a firm date for starting accession talks.178 The opportunity, 
however, was subject to an equally firm condition: full and unequivocal coopera-
tion with the ICTY. Croatia was given exactly three months to ‘smoke Ante 
Gotovina out of his hole’ and hand him over to the ICTY in The Hague.179 
Despite strong eleventh-hour lobbying by Croatia to prevent the consequences of 
its failure to arrest and extradite Gotovina, ‘the absence of a common agreement’ 
among the twenty-five EU Member States on the issue of full cooperation with 
the ICTY led the Council to take the unprecedented decision to postpone the start 
of membership talks.180 The Council was careful, however, to underline that 
accession negotiations with Croatia could open as soon as there was proof that 
Croatia was fully cooperating with the Tribunal. To prove its point, but without 
offering an early resolution of the standoff, the Council adopted the negotiating 
mandate for the Commission.181 and created a special task force to monitor 
Zagreb’s cooperation with the ICTY.182 Just hours ahead of the crucial ‘enlarge-
ment’ meeting of the Council of Ministers on 3 October 2005 in Luxembourg, the 
task force gave its positive opinion after it was informed by the Chief Prosecutor 
of the ICTY that, despite the fact that Gotovina remained at large, Croatia was 
‘cooperating fully’ with the Tribunal.183 Noting the clear commitment by the 
                                                                                                                                               
178  See Bull. EU 12-2004, point I.6.16. For a description and analysis of the road travelled by 
Croatia to get to that point, and a little further, see D. Jović, ‘Croatia and the European Union: A 
Long Delayed Journey’, 8 Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans (2006) pp. 85-103. 
179  See supra n. 55. 
180  Council Conclusions of 16 March 2005, Press Release No. 6969/05 (Presse 44); reproduced 
in Bull. EU 3-2005, point 1.5.1. 
181  Ibid. 
182  See L. Kubosova, ‘EU to send monitoring team to Croatia’, EUObserver.com, 23 March 
2005. Chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, the task force brought together 
representatives of the Commission, the SG/HR and the next two EU Presidencies (the United 
Kingdom and Austria). These two countries held diametrically opposed views during the Council 
debate of 16 March 2005. The United Kingdom was against the opening of negotiations because it 
was convinced that Croatia was not fully cooperating with the ICTY. Austria, on the other hand, 
wanted to open membership talks with Croatia on 17 March 2005, because such a decision would 
enhance Austria’s economic and political position in the region. 
183  Carla del Ponte was heavily criticised by her own staff for the sudden U-turn in the approach 
taken towards Croatia. She was reported as having said at a press conference in Luxembourg, that 
‘[f]or a few weeks now, Croatia has been cooperating fully with us and is doing everything it can to 
locate and arrest Ante Gotovina.’ This statement stood in sharp contrast to what the Chief Prosecutor 
said after a one-and-a-half-hour meeting with Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and President Stipe Mesić 
in Zagreb on 30 September 2005: ‘You cannot imagine how disappointed I am. [The] prime minister 
has promised me full cooperation but we still have the same problem. Gotovina is still at large.’ It is 
thought that del Ponte succumbed to heavy political pressure. The Chief Prosecutor herself denied 
such allegations. See ‘Carla del Ponte bescheinigt Zagreb überraschend “uneingeschränkte 
Zusammenarbeit” bei der Kriegsverbrecher-Suche’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 October 2005. Whatever 
the case may be, del Ponte’s announcement on 3 October greatly facilitated agreement by Austria – a 
strong ally of Croatia – on the opening of accession talks with Turkey, which Vienna had blocked 
until the last minute. Incidentally or otherwise, Gotovina was arrested on 7 December 2005. See 
supra n. 55. 
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Croatian Prime Minister that full cooperation would be maintained until the last 
remaining indictee was in The Hague and as long as required by the ICTY, the 
Council of Ministers concluded that Croatia had fulfilled the outstanding condi-
tion for the start of accession negotiations.184 The accession negotiations were 
officially launched immediately after the Council meeting, that is to say, in the 
early hours of 4 October 2005.185 
The formal start of the accession negotiations was followed by the opening of 
the so-called ‘screening process’ by the Commission on 20 October 2005. In the 
course of this process, the degree of harmonisation of national legislation with the 
acquis is subjected to an analytical examination. This examination is conducted 
individually for each chapter. Following the screening process in respect of 
Croatia, which was completed on 23 October 2006, the decision on opening the 
negotiations on individual chapters, depending on the evaluated readiness of 
Croatia, is made by the Member States within the Council.186 During this phase, 
the subject of the negotiations is the conditions under which Croatia will have to 
adopt and implement the acquis in the respective chapter, including the transi-
tional periods that Croatia may have requested during the screening phase. 
Chapters that might raise difficulties in Croatia’s accession negotiations include: 
‘free movement of capital’ (in view of the currently very tolerant Croatian laws 
that allow EU citizens to purchase real estate), ‘competition policy’ (in view of 
the fact that Croatia spends a greater percentage of its national wealth on state aid 
to companies than any EU Member State) and ‘judiciary and human rights’ 
(rights of minorities, refugee return, impartial prosecution of war crimes trials, 
judicial and public administration reform and fighting corruption).187 It was in a 
                                                                                                                                               
184  See Council Conclusions of 3 October 2005, Press Release No. 12514/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 
241). The Council confirmed that sustaining full cooperation with the ICTY would remain a 
requirement for progress throughout the accession process. It invited the Commission to continue to 
monitor this closely, on the basis of regular reports from the ICTY, and report back to the Council if 
full cooperation was not maintained. The Council noted that an assessment of cooperation with the 
ICTY would form part of the Commission’s reports to the Council on Croatia’s fulfilment of the 
political criteria. The Council agreed that less than full cooperation with the ICTY at any stage would 
affect the overall progress of the negotiations and could be grounds for triggering the mechanism in 
para. 12 of the negotiating framework. 
185  The UK Presidency insisted that negotiations had been opened on 3 October 2005, that is to 
say, before 24:00 hrs GMT. 
186  According to the European Council, the difficult policy dossiers, such as those on administra-
tive and judicial reforms and the fight against corruption, will be opened early. See European Council 
Conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, Press Release No. 16879/06 CONCL 3, Brussels, 15 
December 2006, para. 7. In this way, the European Union avoids giving the impression that the 
negotiations will be easy. 
187  These items were highlighted by the President of the Commission in his speech to the Croa-
tian Sabor. See J. Barroso, ‘Leading by example: Croatia’s road to EU membership’, Zagreb, 16 
February 2006, SPEECH/06/96. More generally, see T. Ćapeta, D. Mihelin and S. Rodin, ‘Croatia’, 
in A.E. Kellermann, J. Czuczai, S. Blockmans, A. Albi and W.Th. Douma, The Impact of EU 
Accession on the Legal Orders of New EU Member States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) pp. 69-112; and S. Rodin and I. Goldner, ‘National Report for 
Croatia’, presented at FIDE 2006 (<http://www.fide2006.org>). 
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different dossier, however, that Croatia has the dubious honour of being the first 
candidate country ever to experience the discomfort of the revised accession 
negotiation procedure.188 In an unprecedented move, Slovenia briefly blocked the 
opening of EU-Croatia negotiations on the next chapter of EU legislation by not 
giving its approval to a European Commission screening report on the extent to 
which Croatia’s fisheries legislation conformed to the acquis. Slovenia argued 
that Croatia had failed to implement a bilateral border agreement on the basis of 
which Slovenian fishermen (operating from the Bay of Piran, Slovenia’s sole 
outlet to sea and the object of a dispute between the two countries since their 
secession from the SFRY in 1991) should be able to enjoy a right of passage 
through Croatian waters.189 The blockage by Slovenia served as a brief beating of 
the drums to raise awareness among EU members of the country’s outstanding 
land and sea border disputes with Croatia and to warn the latter to solve the 
matter or risk a real interruption of the accession negotiations process.190 
From here onwards, until the conclusion of the Accession Treaty, the revised 
procedure as described above will be applied.191 Croatia is hoping to conclude its 
EU membership talks by 2008, so that it can take part in the European Parliament 
elections of 2009.192 
                                                                                                                                               
188  In a much more widely publicised incident, Turkey was the first candidate country to see the 
opening of eight of its accession negotiation chapters suspended by the European Union until it 
opens its air and seaports to planes and ships from EU Member State Cyprus. See European Council 
Conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, Press Release No. 16879/06 CONCL 3, Brussels, 15 
December 2006, para. 10, with reference to the conclusions of the Council of Ministers (GAERC), 
Press Release No. 16289/06 (Presse 352), 11 December 2006, at 8-9. See S. Blockmans, ‘Reconcil-
ing “Widening” and “Deepening” of the European Union: Consolidating the Enlargement Agenda for 
South Eastern Europe’, in S. Blockmans, S. Prechal and W.Th. Douma, eds., Reconciling ‘Deepen-
ing’ and ‘Widening’ of the European Union (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2007), forthcoming. 
189  See H. Mahony, ‘Slovenia blocks EU-Croatia talks over fishing dispute’, EUObserver.com, 
19 October 2006; and N. MacDonald, ‘Rocky Road from Independence to EU Accession’, Financial 
Times, 30 October 2006. See also the warning in the conclusions of the Council of Ministers 
(GAERC), Press Release No. 16289/06 (Presse 352), 11 December 2006, at 10. 
190  A call from MEPs on Croatia and Slovenia to resolve this issue in arbitration if negotiations 
would be unsuccessful was kept out of the European Parliament’s report on Croatia’s progress 
towards accession in 2006. See EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Croatia’s 2006 progress 
report (2006/2288 (INI)), No. A6-0092/2007 final, 29 March 2007, prepared by rapporteur Hannes 
Swoboda; and ‘EP President urges Croatia, Slovenia to resolve border dispute without international 
arbitration’, Southeast European Times, 15 March 2007. 
191  For more details on the negotiations on the accession of Croatia to the European Union, see 
the website specifically designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration for the 
Negotiating Team for the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, at: <http:// 
www.eu-pregovori.hr/default.asp?ru=447&sid=&akcija=&jezik=2>. 
192  See K. Grabar-Kitarović, ‘Guest Editorial. The Stabilization and Association Process: The 
EU’s Soft Power at Its Best’, 12 EFA Rev. (2007) pp. 121-125. In a speech for the French Parliament 
on 6 June 2006, Olli Rehn had shut the European Union’s doors until 2010, or at least until new rules 
on the internal functioning of the Union had entered into force. See O. Rehn, ‘Elaborer un nouveau 
consensus sur l’élargissement’, Paris, 6 June 2006, SPEECH/06/345. 
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5.4 Macedonia 
 
When the Council requested the Commission to give its opinion on Macedonia’s 
application for accession on 1 October 2004, the Commission submitted to the 
Macedonian authorities a questionnaire with over 2,500 questions on the political, 
economic and administrative situation in the country. The answers, which were 
transferred to the Commission on 14 February 2005, formed the basis for the avis 
on the start of accession negotiations. In the preparation of its opinion, the 
Commission also used feedback from its delegation in Skopje and from the 
international organisations active in the country, as well as statistical and eco-
nomic information from sources such as the OECD and the IMF. On 9 November 
2005, the Commission published its avis.193 Despite the Commission’s positive 
stance towards the opening of accession negotiations with Macedonia, the 
granting of candidate country status was thrown into doubt when France threat-
ened the other Member States that they would have to put all enlargement issues 
aside if the Council could not agree on its financial perspective for 2007-2013, 
the first budget to include the ten new Member States.194 After two days of 
nervous negotiations, the European Council of December 2005 reached an 
agreement on the financial perspective,195 thereby averting the threat of deep 
political rifts within the Union as well as delays over further enlargement. 
Macedonia was granted EU candidate country status in the early morning hours 
of 17 December 2005.196 The European Council spoke highly of Macedonia’s 
‘significant progress’ in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement, securing 
minority rights, implementing the SAA and fulfilling the political criteria for EU 
membership, but made it clear that Skopje’s new status did not automatically 
mean the opening of accession negotiations. For that, Macedonia would first have 
to show ‘further significant progress’ in each of the above-mentioned domains.197 
Crucially, the European Council also referred to the debate on the 2005 Enlarge-
ment Strategy Paper,198 as first provided for by the Council on 12 December 
2005,199 and the Union’s own ‘absorption capacity’ as two of the ‘specific 
                                                                                                                                               
193  COM (2005) 562, Brussels, 9 November 2005. 
194  See A. Rettman, ‘Macedonia should not be held hostage, Denmark says’, EUObserver.com, 
15 December 2005. 
195  Bull. EU 12-2005, point I.4.6. 
196  Bull. EU 12-2005, point I.12.24. 
197  Bull. EU 12-2005, point I.12.25. 
198  COM (2005) 561 final, SEC (2005) 1421-1424, 1426, 1428 and 1433, Brussels, 9 November 
2005. 
199  Bull. EU 12-2005, point 1.5.4. The Council concluded that the 2005 Enlargement Strategy 
Paper prepared by the Commission was a good basis for discussion on enlargement in 2006, but it 
also noted that ‘care should be taken to anchor and develop support for the enlargement process 
across the EU, to ensure effective conditionality at all stages of the process in a fair and rigorous 
way, and to reiterate encouragement to reform and stability to all candidate countries, particularly the 
western Balkans.’ 
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benchmarks’ for taking ‘further steps’.200 Thus, the start of Macedonia’s entry 
talks has been tied to the much broader debate among the EU Member States on 
the Union’s future and its ability to absorb more newcomers. Bilateral issues may 
also feature. The Greek government, for example, has announced that it will veto 
Macedonia’s accession to the European Union if the country seeks to accede as 
‘Macedonia’, as opposed to its internationally recognised name, currently the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.201 Accordingly, it may take months, 
possibly years, before Skopje actually opens membership talks. This casts a 
gloomy spell over the rest of the region’s membership prospects. 
 
 
6. INTEGRATION CAPACITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
6.1 Shortcomings of the Treaty of Nice 
 
EU enlargement conditionality does not only include conditions, incentives and 
disincentives that apply to candidate countries but also focuses on the European 
Union. The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 made the Union 
responsible for ensuring its own ‘capacity to absorb new members, while main-
taining the momentum of European integration’.202 Institutional reform has been a 
constant in the EC/EU’s history and each enlargement since 1973 has emphasised 
the dilemma of the strain that ‘widening’ puts on the ‘deepening’ of the European 
integration process. However, the need to reform the institutional architecture of 
the Union to keep the motor of the integration process running became increas-
ingly pressing with the prospect of the accession of ten new Member States in 
2004. Although the pre-Nice IGC did not effectively deal with the so-called 
‘Amsterdam left-overs’ (e.g., the size of the Commission, voting weights in the 
Council and further moves towards qualified majority voting),203 enlargement 
went ahead as scheduled. It has stretched the operational capacity of the EU 
institutions to the maximum. Further enlargements will accentuate – almost 
certainly aggravate – the problems facing the Union in terms of its decision-
making capacity and the continued evolution, implementation and enforcement of 
the acquis. Moreover, the current legal framework, as provided for by the Treaty 
of Nice, does not cater for the integration of any other states than those with 
                                                                                                                                               
200  Bull. EU 12-2005, point I.12.25. 
201  See ‘Greece to say “No” to FYROM’, Euractiv.com, 2 September 2005. On the name issue, 
see chapter 1, section 5.1 and chapter 3, section 2.6.4. 
202  Bull. EU 6-1993, point 13. See, e.g., Olli Rehn, ‘The European Community and the Chal-
lenge of a Wider Europe’, Sussex Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, No. 6, July 
1994. 
203  See G. Edwards, ‘Reforming the Union’s Institutional Framework: A New EU Obligation?’, 
in Hillion, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 23-43. 
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which accession negotiations had already started prior to the Nice summit 
(Bulgaria and Romania).204 Therefore, the institutional arrangements for taking in 
today’s candidate countries – Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey – are still to be 
made. 
 
6.2 Constitutional impasse 
 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), which was signed on 29 
October 2004 in Rome by the Heads of State and Heads of Government of the 
twenty-five Member States and Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey in their capacity 
as candidate countries and observers to the IGC, was intended to improve the 
democracy, transparency and efficiency of the European Union’s decision-
making processes in light of, inter alia, the ongoing enlargement process.205 After 
its signing, the Constitutional Treaty was ratified by more than half of the 
Member States, representing more than half of the Union’s population.206 Accord-
ing to Article IV-447 TCE, the Constitutional Treaty could only enter into force 
when ratified by each of the high contracting parties in accordance with their own 
constitutional procedures and the ratification was officially notified by all the 
signatory states (excluding Turkey). The entry into force of the Constitutional 
Treaty was thrown into doubt after voters in France and the Netherlands rejected 
the text of the Treaty in referenda held on 29 May 2005 and 1 June 2005, respec-
tively.207 In the light of these results and facing a clear risk of a similar outcome in 
referenda that had been scheduled in Denmark and Ireland, as well as the decision 
of the British government to suspend the parliamentary ratification process, the 
European Council, meeting on 16 and 17 June 2005, considered that the date 
initially planned for a report on ratification of the Treaty (1 November 2006 
according to Art. IV-447 TCE), was no longer tenable, since those countries 
which had not yet ratified the Treaty would be unable to furnish a clear reply 
before mid-2007.208 A period of reflection, explanation and discussion was 
announced by the Commission for all countries, whether or not they had ratified 
                                                                                                                                               
204  OJ 2001 C 80/1, Declaration No. 20 on the enlargement of the European Union. 
205  OJ 2004 C 310/1. For background and analysis on the Constitutional Treaty, see, inter alia, 
D. Curtin, A.E. Kellermann and S. Blockmans, eds., The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? 
(The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2005). 
206  An up-to-date overview is presented at: <http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm>. 
207  By 54.68 per cent and 61.6 per cent of the voters, respectively (turnout was 69.3 per cent and 
62.8 per cent). For background and analysis, see J. Ziller, ‘France: Revision of the Constitution and 
Popular Rejection’, in A. Albi and J. Ziller, eds., The European Constitution and National Constitu-
tions: Ratification and Beyond (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2007) pp. 103-112; and L. 
Besselink, ‘The Netherlands: Ratification Referendum and Impact on the Constitution’, ibid., pp. 
113-123. 
208  Bull. EU 6-2005, point I-30. 
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the EU Constitution.209 The state of discussions on the ratification of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the future of the Union was again examined by the European 
Council at its summit of December 2006,210 on the basis of the Commission’s 
communication on the enlargement strategy and – in Annex I thereof – its special 
report on the European Union’s capacity to integrate new members.211 The 
European Council agreed with the Commission that after the completion of the 
sixth wave of enlargement, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, an 
institutional settlement should precede any further enlargement of the Union. This 
way, the efficient and harmonious functioning of the Union would be ensured. To 
this end, the European Council set a timetable for continuing the institutional 
reform, starting with a political declaration adopted in Berlin on 25 March 2007, 
the day that the Member States celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties 
of Rome.212 The necessary steps to achieve a new institutional settlement (i.e., a 
new IGC and ratification of a reform treaty) should have been taken by mid-2009, 
so that the newly-appointed Commission and newly-elected European Parliament 
can start working under the new rules. Therefore, the Constitutional Treaty as we 
know it in the form of the document published in the Official Journal in October 
2004 is dead.213 
 
6.3 Enlargement as a casualty? 
 
The resounding ‘No’ votes in France and the Netherlands have been said to 
reflect a variety of factors. The French ‘No’ is widely thought to have been due to 
the voters’ stubborn dislike of being ordered around by their own politicians and 
                                                                                                                                               
209  EC Press Release IP/05/995, ‘Listen, Communicate, Go Local – New Commission approach 
to dialogue and communication with European citizens’, Brussels, 20 June 2005. 
210  More or less in line with Declaration No. 30 on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, annexed to the Final Act of the IGC: ‘The Conference notes that if, two 
years after the signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, four fifths of the 
Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered difficulties in 
proceeding with ratification, the matter will be referred to the European Council.’ 
211  See European Council Conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, Press Release No. 16879/06 
CONCL 3, Brussels, 15 December 2006; and Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007 Including 
annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, COM (2006) 649 final, 
Brussels, 8 November 2006. For a critical analysis of the concept of integration capacity, see M. 
Emerson, et al., Just what is this ‘Absorption Capacity’ of the European Union (Brussels, CEPS 
2006); and F. Amtenbrink, ‘On the European Union’s Institutional Capacity to Cope with Further 
Enlargement’, in S. Blockmans, S. Prechal and W.Th. Douma, eds., Reconciling ‘Deepening’ and 
‘Widening’ of the European Union (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), forthcoming. 
212  The Berlin Declaration is available on the website of the German EU Presidency, at: <http:// 
www.eu2007.de>. 
213  In this respect, see already Paul Magnette at the symposium on the future of the constitu-
tional process of the European Union, organised by the Constitutional Affairs’ Committee of the 
European Parliament, Brussels, 13-14 October 2005, as reported in NRC Handelsblad, 14 October 
2005, but not in the European Parliament’s press release on the event, Ref. No. 20051010IPR01195, 
‘EU Constitution: seeking a way forward’. 
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bureaucrats; worries that the Constitutional Treaty would move the European 
Union in an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ direction economically; general concerns about the 
development of the Union, especially a perceived reduction of France’s influence 
in the enlarged Union, combined with a perceived threat posed by the proverbial 
Polish plumber to the French labour force; and last, but certainly not least, 
opposition to the possible future EU membership of Turkey.214 The referendum in 
the Netherlands embraced all the insecurities that have led to the disenchantment 
of voters: from unemployment and strained welfare systems, to immigration and 
cultural cohesion.215 
It is striking to note that the negative outcome of both referenda was to a con-
siderable extent due to hostility to enlargement. One year after the ‘big bang’ 
enlargement of the European Union, French and Dutch voters seemed to suffer 
from both ‘enlargement blues’ (the impact of the 2004 enlargement) and 
‘enlargement fears’ (the prospect of further expansion of the Union). As far as the 
latter is concerned, France’s CSA polling institute found in an exit-poll on the day 
of the referendum that, for 79 per cent of all French ‘No’ voters, Turkey’s 
possible entry into the European Union was a reason for their opposition.216 In its 
exit poll on the day of the referendum, the renowned Maurice de Hond institute in 
the Netherlands found that 41 per cent of the Dutch ‘No’ voters were motivated 
by opposition to enlargement.217 The same proportion of Dutch opponents to the 
Constitutional Treaty saw the prospect of Turkey’s entry into the European Union 
as a threat to cherished liberal and secular values.218 
Whereas early indicators pointed out that enlargement was one of the main, if 
not the most important reason for the astounding ‘No’ votes in France and the 
Netherlands, this reading of the outcome of the referenda was heavily played 
down in the following weeks, especially by the European Commission. In-depth 
voter analyses conducted by the Commission’s Directorate General for Press and 
Communication showed that further enlargement of the European Union featured 
very far down on the list of reasons why the French and the Dutch voted against 
the EU Constitution. Eurobarometer studies on the referenda in France and the 
Netherlands had 3 per cent of French and 8 per cent of the Dutch ‘No’ voters 
saying that enlargement was the reason for their negative vote.219 And only 6 per 
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cent and 3 per cent of them, respectively, allegedly said specifically that further 
expansion to include Turkey was the reason.220 European Commissioner for 
Enlargement Olli Rehn added to the spinning of the referenda results by saying 
that ‘it would be a misinterpretation to highlight [the] issue [of enlargement] as 
the decisive cause of the No vote, when the sense of insecurity and social 
discontent stemming from high unemployment played a much bigger role.’221 
While the latter may be true, it does seem slightly odd that no explanations were 
giving for the Commission’s dramatically different insights into the motives of 
French and Dutch voters to reject the Constitutional Treaty. But the rationale 
behind the Commission’s totally different take on the disastrous referenda is 
obvious. It feared that the Union’s enlargement plans could get snarled up in a 
much bigger argument between rival groups of Member States that disagree about 
the long-term objectives of the Union, its shape and final borders and that this 
could lead certain Member States suffering from enlargement fatigue to retreat 
from the Union’s commitments under the consolidated enlargement agenda 
towards south-eastern Europe.222 
 
6.4 ‘Privileged partnerships’ 
 
On several occasions since the ‘big bang’ enlargement, half a score of primarily 
French and German political leaders have insisted that the European Union 
should pause for breath, consolidate and grant a ‘privileged partnership’ instead 
of full EU membership to big neighbouring countries such as Turkey and 
Ukraine.223 From those statements, it is not clear what exactly is to be understood 
by the concept of ‘privileged partnership’, other than the creation of ‘arrange-
ments that would bring maximum benefits to all sides without endangering the 
EU itself.’224 While one’s first thoughts immediately go in the direction of the 
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partnership and ‘privileges’ offered by the European Union in the framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),225 this is apparently not what the 
likes of Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President Nicolas 
Sarkozy have in mind. Turkey and Ukraine are too big and strategically important 
for the Union, in (geo)political as well as economic terms, to be put in the same 
category with countries like Azerbaijan and Lebanon. The Union cannot suffice 
by granting these countries enhanced trade relations and increased financial and 
technical assistance. Some sort of ‘third way’ is implied, whereby Turkey and 
Ukraine would be granted a special status in relation to the Union that would go 
beyond a customs union but would not envisage any Turkish or Ukrainian 
participation in the Union’s common policies (e.g., structural funds and agricul-
ture), except – for obvious reasons – in the fields of security and defence. The 
free movement of goods, services and even capital would be guaranteed, but the 
Union’s labour market would remain closed.226 This situation could be created 
either by granting full membership to the countries in question, albeit with the 
permanent safeguard clauses proposed under the revised procedure for accession 
negotiations,227 or by concluding an international agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the countries concerned that is based on a customs union and 
otherwise comes as close to the acquis as politically acceptable. Setting aside the 
legal obstacles, both options represent a position that, politically speaking, is 
unwise to adopt when one is concerned with the positioning of the European 
Union on the international scene. By abandoning the commitments made towards 
Turkey, the Union would create an image of itself as an unreliable negotiating 
partner and potentially destabilise domestic politics in Turkey, with all imagin-
able consequences. 
More troubling, especially in the context studied here, is the fact that German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel was the first Head of Government to publicly suggest 
a loose partnership option for the Western Balkans.228 Merkel’s statement came 
just days after EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs struggled to find common 
wording for their aims towards the region after their (ultimately not so) informal 
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meeting with leaders from the Western Balkans in Salzburg on 10-11 March 
2006. A draft statement had avoided the term ‘membership’ while confirming the 
EU accession goal in more general terms. After strong overnight pressure from 
the Balkan states, the final statement read: 
 
[T]he EU confirms that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European 
Union. […] All [Western Balkans states] have in the last year made significant 
steps along their road towards the EU, with EU membership as ultimate goal in 
conformity with the Thessaloniki Declaration.229 
 
But diplomats from the Western Balkans lost the battle to remove the notion 
‘absorption capacity’ from the final text. ‘The EU also notes that its absorption 
capacity has to be taken into account,’ the statement reads.230 France and the 
Netherlands strongly insisted on keeping the absorption capacity paragraph, as 
they saw perceptions of uncontrolled enlargement as a key reason why their 
citizens voted down the Constitutional Treaty in the national referenda. The 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy was reported as having 
said: ‘We cannot act as if the people do not exist. […]. We must not rush head-
long into enlargement.’231 His Dutch counterpart Bernard Bot indicated: ‘We 
should not go too fast, we should pay attention to our public opinion,’ adding that 
a ‘very long process’ lies ahead.232 
In spite of the more or less clear message on the future membership of Turkey 
sent by the French and Dutch voters, it would be unwise, dangerous even, to 
renege on the commitments made vis-à-vis the countries of the Western Balkans, 
as this could disrupt a valuable process that is helping to build stable states in the 
region. In the words of Olli Rehn in a speech before the European Parliament: ‘If 
[the European Union] were to go wobbly about the Western Balkans’ European 
perspective, [its] beneficial influence would be seriously eroded, just when the 
region enters a difficult period of talks on Kosovo’s status.’233 The debate on how 
to increase the absorption capacity of the European Union or the final borders of 
Europe should not be used to question the existing commitments under the 
consolidated enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans. Seen in this light, the 
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opposition to the EU Constitution, as expressed in the disruptive referenda in 
France and the Netherlands, has to give way to the responsibilities of the Euro-
pean Union in ensuring security and stability on the continent by continuing the 
process of enlargement. After all, the perspective of full membership is the most 
powerful incentive that the European Union can offer to the (.potential) candidate 
countries in return for reform. Of course, further enlargements cannot be self-
defeating, in the sense that they would weaken the fabric of the Union to such an 
extent that they would threaten the very aims of peace, prosperity, stability and 
security on the European continent that they seek to achieve.234 The best way 
forward for the European Union is to reconcile its ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ 
agendas without creating second-class members. 
 
6.5 Reconciling ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’: can ‘widening’ save 
‘deepening’? 
 
While the membership provisions of the Nice Treaty, as applied through the 
Copenhagen conditionality, are still perfectly suitable for the purposes of future 
EU enlargements, the institutional architecture is not. If the potential for institu-
tional reform, inter alia, through the adoption of secondary legislation has been 
exhausted and the political stalemate over the current constitutional impasse 
lingers on beyond the Union’s self-imposed new ‘deadline’ of mid-2009,235 
‘deepening’ of the Union might in fact be saved by ‘widening’. Theoretically, the 
conclusion of the seventh accession treaty could serve as a vehicle to introduce 
institutional reform via the backdoor. After all, accession treaties, acts of acces-
sion and the annexes thereto constitute primary law, as they are intended to 
amend provisions of the constituent treaties of the European Union.236 However, 
the argument hinges on a liberal interpretation of Article 49(2) TEU: 
 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agree-
ment between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be 
submitted for ratification by all contracting States in accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional requirements. 
 
The words ‘adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded’, a phrase 
which so far has only been used for the introduction of the acceding country’s 
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number of weighted votes in the Council, seats in the European Parliament and so 
forth could be interpreted so as to apply to the reform of the entire institutional 
apparatus of the Union, from the composition of the Commission and decision-
making procedures in the Council to revisiting the distribution of powers. This 
functional interpretation of Article 49(2) TEU could be regarded as supporting the 
achievement of one of the goals for which the Union was set up, namely ensuring 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions (Art. 2 TEU). However, as 
noted earlier, there are obvious limits to the introduction of institutional reforms 
through accession treaties: they may not have the intent or effect of undermining the 
foundations of the European integration process. For example, they may not violate 
the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality.237 
The argument is also based on the assumption that the ratification process of 
the accession treaty with Croatia will proceed unhindered.238 This is not a fore-
gone conclusion when one considers the lukewarm response that the Accession 
Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania received in the national parliaments of some 
enlargement-wary Member States.239 But Croatia seems to hold a better hand. If it 
jumps through all the hoops that the Commission is holding out for it, which it 
seems able and willing to do, then it is difficult to see for what reasons a majority 
of voters in Ireland or the national parliaments of the other twenty-six Member 
States could oppose the entry of a small and increasingly prosperous country that 
currently holds the No. 1 position of European holiday destinations. 
 
 
7. THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL NATURE OF EU CONDITIONALITY 
AS APPLIED IN THE CASE OF THE WESTERN BALKANS: 
SYNOPSIS 
 
EU membership conditionality is primarily defined by the requirements of 
Articles 49 and 6(1) TEU. According to Article 49 TEU, ‘any European state’ 
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that respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU (liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law) may 
apply to become a member of the Union. The application of these articles (in their 
previous forms and numbers: Art. 237 EEC, Art. 98 ECSC, Art. 205 EAEC and 
Art. O TEU) proved sufficient to allow the EC/EU to expand to fifteen members 
without undermining its functioning.240 But the prospect of the ‘reunification of 
Europe’ after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the entry of twelve or more mostly 
poor post-Communist members triggered the June 1993 European Council 
Summit in Copenhagen to develop more stringent criteria to measure the level of 
preparedness of both the candidates and the European Union itself. Since 1993, 
EU membership requires: 
 
(a) that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; 
(b) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; 
(c) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adhering to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union; 
(d) the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momen-
tum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries. 
 
To reflect the special need to stabilise the region, EU conditionality towards 
south-eastern Europe was defined by the interpretation given to the Copenhagen 
criteria in the specific guidelines adopted by the Council on 29 April 1997.241 
Multi-dimensional in nature, the instrument was subsequently geared towards 
reform and integration of the countries of the region into the structures of the 
Union. Economic, political, social and security-related, the nature of EU condi-
tionality towards south-eastern Europe is positive as well as negative and 
develops in parallel with the European Union’s acquis. Special requirements 
reflect the distinct historical trajectory and peculiar problems of the Western 
Balkans. In addition to the membership conditions of Articles 49 and 6(1) TEU 
and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, pre-accession conditionality for the Western 
Balkans is established by: 
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(a) the conditions flowing from the 1999 Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process, which reiterate the 
Copenhagen criteria and add the condition of regional cooperation through 
political dialogue and the conclusion of (free trade) agreements with coun-
tries in South Eastern Europe; and 
(b) the country-specific conditions for the opening and conclusion of SAA talks, 
that is to say, the conditions that arise out of the peace agreements and po-
litical deals (e.g., the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements, UN Security Council 
resolution 1244 and future arrangements). 
 
In its annual reports, the European Commission closely monitors progress in 
fulfilling the seemingly ever-increasing body of membership conditions. Through 
the screening process and the accession negotiations, the Commission identifies 
the main weaknesses and technical adaptations needed by the (.potential) candi-
date countries and accordingly sets out priorities and benchmarks and directs EU 
funds towards relevant projects. Similarly, the SAP is monitored and reviewed 
annually in order to highlight the key priorities and channel funds to the Western 
Balkans. On top of all this, the Union is, for the first time in its history, applying 
the fourth Copenhagen criterion, namely, the Union’s capacity to absorb new 
members while maintaining the momentum of European integration. 
 
 
8. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
8.1 Flawed assumptions? 
 
While the European Union has established one single framework to govern 
relations with all SAP countries, it is developing bilateral ties at different speeds. 
This reflects the pace at which reforms are being introduced by the governments 
concerned. As such, frontrunners are distinguished from laggards. As Othon 
Anastasakis and Dimitar Benchev have explained, the European Union, in 
applying conditionality, relies upon three implicit assumptions: 
 
(1) that differentiation among the countries generates a positive climate of 
competition on the way towards accession; 
(2) that the reform process enjoys consensus and support from the local elites 
and populations; and 
(3) that the guidelines and templates developed by the European Union are 
equally beneficial for all of the countries.242 
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While the application of the conditionality principle has worked well in the 
CEECs, its ability to generate EU-proof reform in the Western Balkans has been 
less conclusive, especially in Albania and the international protectorates of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.243 This may reflect flaws in the implicit 
assumptions underpinning the application of EU conditionality in the Western 
Balkans as well as its effectiveness. Each of the three above-mentioned points 
will briefly be touched upon below. 
 
8.2 Regional approach 
 
As noted before, differences are huge in the Western Balkans. This fragmentation 
is a consequence of centuries of recompositioning in the region. This a priori 
differentiation is at the root of the varying progress in bilateral relations with the 
European Union, which in turn exacerbates local disparities. Croatia is undoubt-
edly the frontrunner in light of its economic performance and the pace of its 
administrative reforms. Although Croatia’s progress has long been inhibited by 
political problems such as an aversion to cooperating with the ICTY and to Serb 
refugee return, technically it has been moving closer to EU standards. Full 
cooperation with the ICTY was rewarded by the European Union with the 
opening of accession negotiations. Macedonia is keen to follow the Croatian 
example, but its ability to meet conditions is clearly more limited. Its spectacular 
progress in barely five years time has earned it EU candidate country status, but 
further progress, such as the cultivation of a democratic decision-making process 
based on the principle of political compromise, is needed before it will be able to 
open membership talks. A weak state and a gangster economy make Albania, the 
third SAA signatory, one of the laggards in the process. Serbia possesses the 
know-how and capacity to meet the conditions set by the European Union, but its 
cooperation with the ICTY will have to be improved before further progress can 
be made. After its withdrawal from the state union with Serbia, Montenegro will 
have to focus on constitutional and judicial reform and administrative capacity-
building before real steps towards the European Union can be made. Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo have the longest way to go, as both are still under 
international administration. A sustainable solution for the latter’s status will also 
have to be found. 
This heterogeneity contradicts those elements of Stability Pact and SAP condi-
tionality that promote a greater degree of regional cooperation. In fact, the 
contribution of the Stability Pact to the process of European integration is often 
contested, for it creates unnecessary coordination problems and sometimes hinders 
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a more effective application of the conditionality principle by the European 
Union.244 For their part, most Western Balkan states tend to regard regional 
schemes with suspicion, sceptical of the benefits they can generate or concerned 
that they might impede closer bilateral relations with the Union.245 In such a 
context, it is difficult to see how the differentiating effect of conditionality can 
generate healthy competition among Western Balkan states when the stronger feel 
that they are delayed by the weaker and the weaker do not benefit from the 
progress of the stronger.246 
 
8.3 Local support 
 
EU conditionality can have an important catalytic role in prompting reforms. For 
instance, good progress reports tend to raise (foreign) investors’ confidence, 
which is essential for growth and further reforms. However, a sustainable reform 
process also requires certain domestic conditions, such as the presence of reform-
ist parties that alternate in power and a broad societal consensus as to the 
necessity of EU-guided reforms. The experience of a number of Western Balkan 
countries suggests that EU conditionality does not generate popular consensus, 
even if it is understood to be necessary in principle.247 Thus, the European Union 
does not help political parties to win elections.248 
One must take into account that many people in the Western Balkans still 
perceive the European Union in a rather ambivalent way. Although, overall, the 
polls show a considerable rate of approval for the Union,249 this seems to be offset 
by a lack of confidence in what it actually does or has done in the region. In a 
way, there are two clashing conceptions of the Union cohabiting in local percep-
tions. One is related to the image of ‘EUtopia’, representing prosperity, 
democratic values and peace. The other raises the not-so-distant memories of EU 
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blunders in dealing with the Yugoslav wars. This feeling is strongest in Kosovo, 
where a widespread perception exists that European powers did not do enough to 
protect the Albanian population in Kosovo against Serb aggression, and in Serbia, 
where memories of EU Member States’ fighter jets participating in the air 
campaign waged by NATO in 1999 over the crisis in Kosovo are still fresh. Such 
contradictory attitudes erode the efficiency and legitimacy of EU conditionality, 
especially when the European Union is perceived to lack a real commitment 
towards the Western Balkans. Opening accession negotiations with Croatia has 
given the Union a boost in popular perception in the region, but this advantage 
risks being lost if Macedonia is kept in limbo. 
In essence, EU conditionality is considered as a necessary but also unwelcome 
imposition from outside. These perceptions are of immense political importance 
because they reinvigorate the image of the European Union as a necessary evil, a 
picture that is further boosted by its one-way approach to priorities-setting. 
 
8.4 One-way approach 
 
EU conditionality has hitherto been a one-way process: conditions are defined 
exclusively by the European Union and its Member States and must be accepted 
unconditionally by the (.potential) candidates.250 This unequal relationship has 
been aimed at the transposition of policy templates that reflect EU preferences 
and past practices.251 The templates used for the post-Communist CEECs, which 
followed the ‘classic’ transition path, are not the most conducive to effecting EU-
proof change in all corners of a war-torn region, especially in those corners where 
a state-building process is still underway. The European Union seems to assume 
that its prescriptions have universal applicability and should therefore be adopted 
and implemented irrespective of the particularities of countries or regions. As 
Laza Kekić has pointed out, there are some indicative areas in which harmonisa-
tion with the EU’s acquis and policies can be detrimental to the hoped-for 
economic growth in the Western Balkans, for example capital account liberalisa-
tion and competition policies.252 This paradox reflects the shortcomings of the 
one-way approach in setting policy targets. Moreover, local priorities often prove 
to be out of sync with those of the European Union. Especially in the international 
protectorates, to people who see their country dominated, for better or worse, by 
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foreign masters, the European Union’s demands ring hollow. An extreme 
example is provided by the reactions in the region to the Union’s support for the 
United Nations’ ‘standards before status’ policy for Kosovo. 
There is little point in the European Union constantly blowing against the 
wind, especially when that wind is coming from the Western Balkans. By doing 
so in the past couple of years, the international community, including the Euro-
pean Union, has bred an unsustainable status quo that might drive parts of the 
region towards a new period of highly dangerous instability.253 Regional input in 
the Union’s policies towards the Western Balkans is a conditio sine qua non for 
effectively stabilising the region. There is one big problem, however. Regional 
input not only requires a perceptive and understanding donor that can demonstrate 
vision and flexibility but also presupposes sovereign governments that are 
capable of articulating their needs and demands. The reality is that sovereignty is 
still a scarce resource in some parts of the Western Balkans. When one considers 
the extensive powers of the High Representative/European Union Special 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General in Kosovo, one may question the domestic ability to address 
needs and priorities. The result is the definition of a form of EU conditionality 
that does not involve regional input, does not necessarily generate broad domestic 
consensus for reform and poisons relations between the populations and the 




9. IMPROVING EU CONDITIONALITY FOR THE WESTERN 
BALKANS 
 
While conditionality is inherently asymmetric and the European Union must not 
step down from its role of as a promoter of reform, there is much to be done in 
terms of establishing a viable partnership with the Western Balkans. Beyond any 
doubt, EU conditionality has to be based on a process of ‘adaptive learning’ by 
paying closer attention to the signals coming from the region.255 There is general 
agreement across the region, verified by opinion polls, that social and economic 
                                                                                                                                               
253  This observation is supported by the results of the survey conducted by the ICB, op. cit. n. 
243, at p. 10. 
254  See I. Krastev, ‘The Balkans: Democracy without Choices’, 13 Journal of Democracy 
(2002). One move in the right direction has so far been the greater consideration of the recipients’ 
interests in the timing, for example, of the approximation of legislation. See the rationale behind the 
shorter timeframe and the absence of stages for the approximation of legislation in the SAA Croatia 
as compared to the SAA FYROM, as discussed supra section 3.3.3. 
255  See Chandler, loc. cit. n. 251. 
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matters – as opposed to the old ethno-political repertoire – are the real concern.256 
High unemployment, poverty and corruption typically score high on the list of 
problems that preoccupy people in the Balkans. It is only when its commitment is 
better linked to addressing those issues that matter to citizens that the European 
Union will be able to sell its conditionality approach.257 
Although EU membership conditionality leads, by definition, to bilateralism 
and competition, the Western Balkans also require a region-wide strategy. While 
packaging the countries into a single region is not viable, the institutionalisation 
of the dialogue between Brussels and the Western Balkans has been a step in the 
right direction. It is imperative that the countries in the region are involved in 
setting the regional cooperation agenda. The European Union should also take a 
clear stand on the Stability Pact. As far as the Western Balkans are concerned, the 
Pact has been overtaken by the more preferred and comprehensive Stabilisation 
and Association Process. Moreover, after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
to the Union, the Pact’s ‘theatre’ is almost limited to the Western Balkans. There 
is little point in maintaining the ‘working tables’ as a forum for relations with 
Turkey and Moldova. Turkey has a customs union with the European Union and 
is covered by the pre-accession process, while Moldova is covered by the ENP. 
At long last, the European Union has accepted that it must let go of the Stability 
Pact and prioritise relations with the Western Balkans through a reorganised SAP. 
For those countries, regionalism would thus be more closely linked to the EU 
integration project than it is at present. In view of the need for the countries of the 
region to take ownership of the regional cooperation process, the plan to trans-
form the Stability Pact into a Regional Cooperation Council, with a Secretariat 
and a Secretary General, should be welcomed.258 This Regional Cooperation 
Council would not be a substitute for EU membership but only a way to speed up 
integration with the European Union. 
 
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process replaced and updated the 
European Union’s Regional Approach. While the Stability Pact focuses on 
regional cooperation in the fields of politics, economics and security, the SAP is 
intended to act primarily as a mechanism for upgrading bilateral relations 
                                                                                                                                               
256  Based on an extensive survey of public attitudes conducted by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance during January and February 2002, available at: <http://www. 
idea.int>. 
257  See Anastasakis and Bechev, op. cit. n. 39. 
258  See more elaborately in chapter 6, section 2.1.1.3. 
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between the European Union and the individual countries. The two elements are 
interrelated in that the conditionality instituted by the SAP urges the Western 
Balkan states to engage in regional cooperation activities, partly in the framework 
of the Stability Pact. It places a particular emphasis on projects like the estab-
lishment of free trade in south-eastern Europe. The SAP countries are also 
required to demonstrate commitment to democratic and market reforms and 
respect for human rights, to work for the return of refugees, to cooperate with the 
ICTY and to build up their capacity in the domain of justice and home affairs. 
Rightly, it has been noted that the structural tension between a regional approach 
and bilateral conditionality may endanger the coherence of international action 
towards a region still known to many as a powder keg. This is because the best 
pupils of the class will ‘leave’ the region by acquiring a different contractual 
status in their relations with the Union, thereby increasing rather than reducing 
the disparities within the region.259 While official EU documents have always 
shunned a prioritisation between the Stability Pact and the SAP, it is clear that, in 
practice, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (as part of the SAP) are 
seen, both by the countries in the region and the European Union, as the most 
important instruments to achieve lasting peace and stability in the Western 
Balkans, because they offer the prospect of EU membership. For these countries, 
there is no need to pursue the Stability Pact. 
With the principle of conditionality firmly and explicitly built into all phases 
of the SAP, the countries of the Western Balkans have a clearly marked path and 
timetable to follow and are aware of the consequences of not abiding by the 
conditions imposed upon them by the European Union: postponement or cancel-
lation of political negotiations and/or suspension or termination of contractual 
relations. At the same time, the European Union has recently confirmed the 
tangible prospect of EU membership, the most powerful instrument for transfor-
mation of the Western Balkans, as the SAP’s finalité. This gives the governments 
that were still in doubt as to whether or not to take the Union’s ‘perspective of 
membership’ offer seriously a strong incentive and clear message to convince 
their electorates of the advantages of ethnic reconciliation and the tightening of 
belts to reform their countries’ administrative, legislative and economic struc-
tures. 
In many ways, Croatia stands out as a model for the rest of the region.260 For the 
Croatian case to serve as a positive example, the rest of the SAP countries should be 
persuaded that the European Union is serious about settling the legacy of the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and does not apply a double standard. Consistency is 
                                                                                                                                               
259  Van Meurs, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 41. 
260  Of course, so does Slovenia. But for reasons explained in chapter 1, section 5.1, comparisons 
with Slovenia are harder to make. 
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crucial. Seen in this light, the Union was right to play hard-ball with Croatia and 
enforce its conditionality principle by not opening accession talks when Croatia 
failed to show full cooperation with the ICTY before 17 March 2005. An equally 
strong signal was certainly received in Belgrade over its failure to transfer Ratko 
Mladić to the ICTY. Now that membership negotiations have opened with Croatia, 
the European Union will have to continue to apply pressure to make sure that 
Croatia holds up its end of the deal. As noted, the revised framework for accession 
negotiations offers new possibilities in this respect. 
The decision to open accession negotiations with Croatia, the granting of can-
didate country status to Macedonia and the progress made on the SAAs with the 
other countries of the Western Balkans do not allow for the conclusion that any of 
these countries is likely to join the European Union as a full member any time 
soon. But these developments do provide the European Union’s overall approach 
towards the Western Balkans with a radically new strategic objective: the further 
expansion of the European Union south-eastwards. This strategic reorientation 
should prompt the Union to vigorously reinforce a guiding principle that has 
characterised its relations with third countries in general: the principle of condi-
tionality. But it is important that the Union does not give the impression that 
membership is too distant, as this might lead to rapid domestic deterioration. A 
balanced application of the conditionality principle is central to closer relations 





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REINFORCING THE EUROPEAN 




1. IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS 
 
Over the past two decades, most parts of the Western Balkans have been touched 
by forms of autocratic governance, armed conflict, ethnic cleansing and seces-
sion. Ever since the fighting ended, it has been recognised that systemic political, 
economic and social reforms are needed to build legitimacy, transparency and the 
rule of law. Set in motion by the international community, this transition process 
is far from over. The problem is that, until recently, the Western Balkans were 
regarded primarily as a post-war region. This approach has led to a raft of 
provisional solutions to constitutional problems and policies based on what might 
be termed ‘constructive ambiguity’, which have been imposed on their recipients 
and embodied in documents like the Dayton Agreement (1995), UN Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) and the 
Belgrade Agreement (2002). At the same time, the international community has 
been working on the assumption that economic development would reduce the 
pressing need to solve the remaining status issues. Unfortunately, this assumption 
has turned out to be false. Economic stagnation has generated massive unem-
ployment. On top of that, thousands of refugees and displaced persons still await 
return or resettlement; prominent accused war criminals remain at large; key 
institutions have resisted reform; and political and legal reforms are impeded by 
corruption and by entrenched obstructionist forces that advance narrow, personal 
or ethnically driven interests. In those circumstances, unresolved status issues are 
potentially a very harmful source of instability. Neglecting these challenges by 
pursuing policies that either maintain the status quo or amount to international 
dicta that find very little support on the ground could have severe and destabilis-
ing consequences for parts of the Western Balkans, including a greater likelihood 
of political extremism, armed conflict and further human displacement. A renewal 
of armed conflict, however limited, would be devastating for the region and 
beyond, especially for the European Union and its Member States. It would 
amount to a policy failure with damaging implications for the European security 
architecture. In short, it is high time for the international community to change its 
current approach to problem-solving in the Western Balkans, reverse the vicious 
circles and turn them into virtuous ones. Failure to do so could result in a costlier 
and more dangerous intervention down the line and act as an unnecessary irritant 
in international relations. 
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While a continued international presence in some parts of the Western Balkans 
is imperative, the current structure of the international involvement in the region 
is poorly organised, sometimes even counterproductive. Throughout the Western 
Balkans, ad hoc structures (e.g., the OHR, UNMIK and Stability Pact), regional 
missions (e.g., of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO) and the European 
Union work independently, with coordination that ranges from close to non-
existent. Although this jungle of largely uncoordinated agencies was perhaps 
inevitable – given that the international presence in each country was created at 
different times, by different actors and under different circumstances – it has 
prevented the international community from mounting a concerted campaign 
against the core elements that inhibit progress. It is increasingly obvious that the 
ad hoc nature of the international presence is an impediment to effective action on 
the most pressing issues. The makeshift structure puts an extra layer between the 
states of the Western Balkans and the Euro-Atlantic institutions to which they 
aspire. This arrangement inhibits the effectiveness of the international agencies on 
the ground, confuses local actors when the signals coming from the various 
international institutions are competing or unclear and may become a source of 
resentment for governments anxious to demonstrate to their citizens that, after 
several years of hard choices, they are full partners in the main pillars of the 
European security architecture. If this confusion and resentment continue to grow, 
the international presence will become less effective over time, just when the 
states of the region will have to tackle some of the most difficult issues, impeding 
their integration with the rest of Europe. Thus, it is time to reduce the number of 
international officials and organisations that are able to set priorities and make 
decisions. 
In the previous chapters, this study has identified both the measures taken by 
the key international stakeholders in stabilising the Western Balkans and – along 
those lines – the progress made by the different parts of the region in getting back 
on track. It now turns towards crafting general recommendations targeted at those 
international organisations that make up the European security architecture. In 
doing so, it takes a ‘tough love’ approach to long-term peacebuilding, paying 
particular attention to measures to strengthen those who promote moderation and 
growth while weakening those who oppose progress. Accordingly, this chapter 
tries to devise a realistic agenda for general actions that make wiser use of the 
remaining resources in support of regional and Euro-Atlantic interests: achieving 
a sustainable (‘positive’) peace by preventing the region from becoming a 
vacuum in which organised crime and corruption predominate and poverty and 
insecurity fuel migration to the European Union and beyond. 
The overall vision for the countries of the Western Balkans centres on their 
full integration into the European Union and NATO – both in terms of shared 
structures and institutions and in terms of shared norms and ideals. A coordinated 
international effort with these objectives and clear lines of responsibility can, in 
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cooperation with reform-oriented local leaders, put all Western Balkan states on 
the path to full integration with the European Union and NATO. Such an effort 
will encourage and assist a wide-ranging transformation of the political, eco-
nomic, legal and administrative systems in the region that will make it possible, 
over the next years, for the European security architecture to reduce its presence 
in an orderly fashion and transfer full sovereignty and responsibilities to capable 
domestic actors and institutions. Achieving the goal of putting the Western 
Balkans on the path of integration with the European Union and NATO will 
therefore require sustained assistance, organised around three guiding principles: 
 
(i) the rationalisation of the international presence in the Western Balkans, led 
by the European Union and supported by NATO (section 2); 
(ii) the adoption of policies that seek to resolve the remaining constitutional and 
status questions and focus on political, social, economic and legal reform 
(section 3); and 
(iii) the assumption by the citizens of the Western Balkan countries and their 
political leaders of responsibility for their own future (section 4).1 
 
 
2. RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE 
 
2.1 More European Union and NATO 
 
The vision formulated above for the Western Balkans requires a continued, albeit 
reconfigured and rebalanced engagement by the international community. In any 
rational reconfiguration of the international presence in the Western Balkans, the 
European Union and NATO will take the lead. The aim of the countries in the 
region is to establish closer ties with the main pillars of the European security 
architecture, because these provide the best rationale, leverage and political cover 
for promoting tough political, economic and social changes. For reasons already 
mentioned, it is in the interest of these international organisations, the European 
Union in particular, to provide the ‘carrots and sticks’ that will keep the states of 
the Western Balkans on the path of progress and reform. Therefore, the interna-
tional presence can be reorganised most effectively around the Union’s 
Stabilisation and Association Process and NATO’s Membership Action Plan and 
Partnership for Peace programme. However, the SAP and the MAP/Pf.P will 
require streamlining and systematising to meet today’s challenges in the region. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1 The same could be said of EU citizens and their political leaders. See chapter 5, section 6. 
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2.1.1 Strengthening the Stabilisation and Association Process 
 
The current Stabilisation and Association Process is not strong enough a frame-
work to build Member States out of the weak states and international 
protectorates of the Western Balkans. More and better quality technical and 
financial assistance is needed before the laggards in the process – Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo – will be able to close the gap with the frontrunner – 
Croatia – and face up to the challenges posed by EU membership. In this context, 
it has been rightly suggested that, in their drive towards EU accession, the 
Western Balkans are in need of a ‘Member State-building’ strategy.2 It is argued 
here that the implementation of this new strategy should be facilitated by three 
important improvements to the SAP: (i) overcoming the ‘potential’ candidate 
country status; (ii) mitigating the effects of a tough love approach towards 
granting financial and technical assistance; and (iii) enhancing cooperation in the 
region. 
 
2.1.1.1 Choosing a ‘Helsinki moment’ 
 
Firstly, a so-called ‘Helsinki moment’ should be created for the Western Balkans. 
This is a reference to the historic decision of the European Council gathered at 
Helsinki in December 1999 to grant candidate country status to Turkey.3 In a 
similar historic spirit, the European Council should use one of its forthcoming 
summits to review the achievements of the Western Balkans in satisfying the pre-
accession criteria and grant candidate country status to Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (if independent). These countries 
(including Macedonia in case accession negotiations have still not been opened) 
should then be presented with their accession road maps. The experience of the 
CEECs illustrates best how the institutionalisation of the EU integration perspec-
tive is the most efficient way to foster and accelerate the overall political, 
economic, administrative and legal reforms in aspirant countries. This does not 
mean that all Western Balkan countries should join the European Union at the 
same time. On the contrary, each country should only join when all conditions 
have been fulfilled. But giving the ‘potential’ candidate countries a real member-
ship perspective would mean an end to the growing fears in some of these 
countries that they might be left out of the accession process altogether. The 
enlargement summit should be held soon after the last SAA has entered into force 
                                                                                                                                               
2 See International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future (Sofia, Centre 
for Liberal Strategies 2005) at p. 14. 
3 Bull. EU 12-1999, point I.3.2. The phrase was first coined by the European Stability Initiative, 
The Helsinki Moment – European Member State Building in the Balkans (Berlin, ESI 2005). 
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and all applications for EU membership have been received (.pursuant to Art. 49 
TEU). Working on the assumption that the European Commission will meet its 
ambition to conclude the remaining SAAs in 2007, a new ‘Helsinki moment’ 
could come as early as the second half of 2008.4 To that end, popular anxiety over 
any further EU enlargements, now very apparent in the internal politics of some 
Member States,5 should be countered, as the European Union definitely ‘cannot 
take a sabbatical’ from enlargement while it sorts out its internal rules.6 Convinc-
ing the Union’s enlargement-wary citizens will not be an easy task, but it is 
necessary if the Union wants to keep a firm grip on its most effective tool for 
stabilising the troubled region of the Western Balkans. 
 
2.1.1.2 Embedding financial and technical assistance 
 
The second improvement of the SAP should concern the flanking policies of the 
financial and technical assistance given to the candidate – and especially the 
potential candidate – countries of the Western Balkans. Over the years, the 
European Union has developed a system of different aid programmes addressed, 
inter alia, to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE, 
SAPARD and ISPA and the Turkish pre-accession instrument), the (.potential) 
candidate countries of the Western Balkans (CARDS), the neighbouring countries 
on the Mediterranean Sea (MEDA) and those built on the ashes of the Soviet 
Union (TACIS). In September 2004, the European Commission presented plans 
to harmonise (insofar as possible) the existing aid programmes for the period 
covered by the financial perspective for 2007-2013.7 With regard to the candidate 
and potential candidate countries, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 
1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assis-
tance (IPA), thereby replacing the five existing instruments by a single one.8 
                                                                                                                                               
4 At the beginning of 2005, the ICB suggested to first organise a ‘Helsinki’-type summit in the 
second half of 2006 and then to conclude Europe Agreements with those countries that would not 
start accession negotiations directly. In view of the aim to conclude all the SAAs in 2007, there 
seems little point to negotiate and conclude a type of agreement that is so similar to the SAAs. See 
chapter 5, section 3. The third pointer in the ICB’s strategy was to start accession negotiations around 
2009/2010.This would make accession of all Western Balkan countries possible on or before 28 June 
2014. ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 6 and 14. 
5 See chapter 5, section 6. 
6 Dixit Olli Rehn, quoted in G. Parker and C. Condon, ‘Some Balkan states may find EU’s door 
closed’, Financial Times, 7 April 2006. Of course, it would be best if institutional reform were to 
precede the next wave of enlargement. 
7 See, inter alia, European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing an Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), COM (2004) 627 final, Brussels, 29 September 2004. 
8 OJ 2006 L 210/82. IPA is part of a wider reorganisation of the European Union’s financial 
framework for relations with third states, which includes a new European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a new development cooperation instrument, the Instrument for 
Stability and a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide. 
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The IPA Regulation is problematic on two levels. Firstly, following its adop-
tion, there are no more ways of mobilising additional EU pre-accession funds 
within the new budget cycle. The envelope that the Regulation foresees for the 
pre-accession process will force the European Union to reduce its assistance to 
the Western Balkans in the coming years. As can be seen from Table 1 below, the 
region is due to receive around €2.7 billion over the next four years. 
 
Table 1: IPA funds allocation for 2007-2010 (in € millions) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007-2010 
Croatia 141.2 146.0 151.2 154.2 592.6 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 58.5 70.2 81.8 92.3 302.8 
Serbia 186.7 190.9 194.8 198.7 771.1 
Kosovo.* 68.4 64.7 66.1 67.3 266.5 
Montenegro 31.4 32.6 33.3 34.0 131.3 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 62.1 74.8 89.1 106.0 332.0 
Albania 61.0 70.7 81.2 93.2 306.1 
Total Western Balkans 609.3 649.9 697.5 745.7 2702.4 
* under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) 
Source: European Commission.9 
 
The IPA Regulation provides a total envelope of €11.5 billion over the next seven 
years for the countries with candidate status (currently Croatia, Macedonia and 
Turkey) and potential candidate status (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montene-
gro and Serbia (including Kosovo)). This amount is less than the €14.65 billion 
proposed by the Commission in its heavily criticised proposal of 2004.10 As a 
                                                                                                                                               
9 European Commission, MEMO/07/169, 8 May 2007. In addition, the Western Balkans will 
benefit, together with Turkey, through horizontal and regional programmes, from almost €560 
million in additional funding over the same period. 
10  Section 2.1 of Annex 2 to the Draft Regulation of 2004 set out the total envelope of funds 
available for assistance to both candidate and potential candidate countries, but not the allocation for 
each country. However, section 5.1.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Regulation stated 
the principles according to which funds would be allocated to the official candidates: Croatia, Turkey 
and, in due course, Macedonia. The Draft Regulation stated: ‘The intention is that future candidate 
countries should be treated broadly the same as past candidate countries. As the countries of the 
Western Balkans become candidate countries it is proposed that they will receive per capita per year 
about the level of assistance established in the financial perspective 2000-2006 […] for the 10 
candidate countries in central and eastern Europe.’ The European Stability Initiative, a non-profit 
research and policy institute with bases in Berlin, Brussels and Istanbul calculated that, according to 
this formula, each of the candidates would receive around €27 per capita per year. For Croatia, this 
would boil down to €120 million per year and for Macedonia around €54 million per year. See ESI, 
Breaking Out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA Should Be Changed (Berlin, ESI 2005). 
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result, most Western Balkan countries (with the exception of Croatia and 
FYROM, which have received candidate country status) will receive virtually the 
same funding as they receive now, but it should be noted that CARDS funding 
has already fallen to a lower level since 2000.11 In Kosovo, the decline in EU 
assistance will be particularly steep, even in view of the exceptional Community 
financial assistance given in 2007 under the previous budget cycle.12 Conse-
quently, signing an SAA will not be ‘rewarded’ with the increase in EU financial 
assistance that the potential candidates hope for. At a time when some of the most 
delicate steps in the region are expected to be taken, namely the implementation 
of the decisions concerning Kosovo’s final status and ending the international 
governance of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union’s financial engagement 
in the region will be almost at its lowest level since the war over Kosovo. 
Following the difficult compromise on the financial perspective for 2007-2013 
reached at the European Council of 17 December 2005,13 hope should only be 
vested in the willingness of individual Member States that are genuinely commit-
ted to the eventual integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union to 
provide extra funds on a bilateral basis. 
The second reason why the IPA Regulation is problematic is that the negative 
consequences of the instrument’s ‘tough love’ approach are currently insuffi-
ciently mitigated. Under the rules of the IPA Regulation, pre-accession assistance 
will not be made automatically and fully available to the potential candidate 
countries.14 Official candidates will and potential candidate countries may receive 
support under three headings: regional development, rural development and 
human resources development. Likewise, the regional development component, 
the human resources development component and the rural development compo-
nents will only be accessible to candidate countries accredited to manage funds in 
a decentralised manner. This qualitative differentiation between the two catego-
ries of countries is significant and will exacerbate the differences in the Western 
                                                                                                                                               
11  See Table 1 in chapter 5, section 3.4. 
12  See Council Decision of 30 November 2006 providing exceptional Community financial 
assistance to Kosovo, OJ 2006 L 339/36. 
13  Bull. EU 12-2005, points I.1 and I.4.6. 
14  Section 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Regulation already described that the 
potential candidates were to be offered a continuation of the same kinds of assistance provided in 
recent years under the CARDS programme: ‘Potential Candidate Countries will continue to receive 
assistance along the lines currently laid down in the CARDS Regulation: Institution Building and 
Democratisation, Economic and Social Development, Regional and Cross-Border Co-operation and 
some alignment with the acquis communautaire, in particular where this is in the mutual interest of 
the EU and the beneficiary country.’ The official candidates, however, were to receive the full 
package of pre-accession assistance, in order to prepare them more intensively for EU membership: 
‘Candidate Countries will receive the same kind of assistance [as the potential candidates], and will 
additionally receive assistance in the preparation for the implementation of Structural and Rural 
Development Funds after Accession, as well as concerning the full implementation of the acquis 
communautaire.’ 
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Balkans if it is not compensated for in other domains. Its implementation will 
mean that all those living in rural areas and declining industrial towns in Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, who are already suffering 
from inadequate education systems and a seriously deficient infrastructure, will 
see the development gap separating them from the rest of Europe – and from their 
immediate neighbours in candidate countries – grow wider. To prevent the 
emergence of a new ‘Balkan ghetto’15 – comprising most of the region’s difficult 
to reconcile Albanians and Serbs, brought together behind a wall of trade and visa 
restrictions – in the heart of an integrating subcontinent, IPA needs to be sup-
ported by attractive flanking policies. In this respect, visa facilitation will be an 
important improvement for ordinary citizens in the region, enabling them to travel 
to, study in and make business cheaper with the European Union. Easier access to 
visas will make the European perspective more concrete to all citizens of the 
region, in particular those from the potential candidate countries.16 The conclusion 
of negotiations between the EC and the countries of the region on agreements to 
facilitate procedures for issuing short-stay visas and on the readmission of people 
who are residing in the Union illegally represents a step in the right direction.17 
Such new agreements will promote people-to-people contacts between the 
European Union and the Western Balkan countries and will increase the opportu-
nities for travel, especially for the younger generation. The inclusion of the 
potential candidate countries in the Tempus and Erasmus Mundus programmes is 
another symbolic example of an IPA flanking policy, but it is obvious that more 
scholarships should be made available for this to have a real impact.18 
 
2.1.1.3 Enhancing regional cooperation 
 
For the European Union, the third policy challenge in the improvement of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process emerges as a conundrum: how to effectively 
reconcile the regional approach that is essential for the stabilisation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
15  The term is from ESI, op. cit. n. 10. 
16  See A. Pulaj, ‘Visa or no visa? That’s still the question in the Balkans’, Southeast European 
Times, 26 February 2007. 
17  The draft agreements with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were 
initialled on 12 April 2007; the one with Serbia on 16 May 2007. Albania only negotiated a visa 
facilitation agreement as a readmission agreement had been in force since 1 May 2006. See 
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation, OJ 2005 L 124/22. In this context, see F. Trauner, ‘EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Strategy in the Western Balkans’, CEPS Working Document No. 259, 
February 2007. 
18  See ‘The European Commission launches new scholarship scheme outside the EU’, Press 
Release IP/06/1721, Brussels, 11 December 2006. The plan allows for up to 100 (in the future 500) 
students from the region to undertake postgraduate studies in EU master’s courses. In the 2006-2007 
academic year, only four students from Albania, one from Bosnia-Herzegovina, four from Mace-
donia, three from Serbia and Montenegro and three from Kosovo participated in the programme. 
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Western Balkans with the requirement of evaluating countries on the basis of 
their individual performances, a concept that lies at the heart of the EU accession 
process? The SAP tried to answer this question by emphasising the central need 
for regional cooperation as part of the SAAs. The past five years, however, have 
demonstrated that this works only to a limited extent. The laggards in the pre-
accession process – Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (including Kosovo) – no 
longer perceive the SAP as a fast integration track. The lesson from this is that 
only real incentives can bring real reforms. 
The creation of a free trade area in south-eastern Europe would provide the 
missing incentive for regional cooperation. After all, the economic interdepend-
ence of the countries of the Western Balkans is vital for the future of the region.19 
The economic sustainability of their small and unattractive markets depends on 
the creation of a common economic area that will attract foreign direct invest-
ment. Thus, in an economic sense, a regional approach is a necessary 
precondition for development. In this respect, the Energy Community Treaty, 
which creates an Energy Community between the European Community, on the 
one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(.pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on behalf of the entity), 
on the other, is a development that should be welcomed.20 The Treaty entered into 
force on 1 July 2006 for a period of ten years. The Energy Community Treaty is 
not a mixed agreement, as the scope of the treaty is fully covered by Community 
competence (Arts. 43(2), 55, 83, 89, 95, 133 and 175 TEC). However, the 
(geographically most concerned) EU Member States may become participants 
without voting rights in the institutions of the Energy Community pursuant to 
Article 95 of the Treaty. While this form of ‘enhanced multilateralism’21 is limited 
                                                                                                                                               
19  On the high levels of intra-regional trade, see European Commission, ‘Trade in South Eastern 
Europe’, MEMO/06/155, Brussels, 5 April 2006. For up to date data, see the portal of the WIIW 
Balkan Observatory, at: <http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan>. For an overview of recent macroeconomic 
and structural developments in the countries of the Western Balkans, as well as contributions on 
various topics that represent a common challenge for all the economies in the region, see European 
Commission (DG ECFIN), ‘Western Balkans in Transition’, 30 Enlargement Papers (2006). 
20  See Council Decision of 29 May 2006 on the conclusion by the European Community of the 
Energy Community Treaty, OJ 2006 L 198/16. The text of the Treaty itself follows on page 18. For 
an analysis of these and other peculiarities of the Energy Community Treaty, see F. Hoffmeister, 
‘Die Beziehungen der Europäischen Union zu den Staaten des Westbalkans’, in S. Kadelbach, ed., 
Die Auβenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2006) pp. 125-150 at pp. 
132-138. 
21  See S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski, ‘Conclusions: Squaring the Ring of Friends’, in S. 
Blockmans and A. Łazowski, eds., The European Union and its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of 
the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2006) pp. 613-639; and A. Łazowski, ‘Box of Chocolates Integration: The European Economic Area 
and Swiss Model Revisited’, in S. Blockmans, S. Prechal and W. Douma, eds., Reconciling 
‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’ of the European Union (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2007, 
forthcoming). 
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to the creation of an integrated market in natural gas and electricity,22 the Energy 
Community Treaty does provide a legal framework (i.e., a new international 
organisation equipped with autonomous decision-making powers and legal 
instruments) for exporting and extending the EC’s acquis on energy, the envi-
ronment, competition and renewables to the Western Balkans.23 As such, the 
Treaty aims to create a stable regulatory and market framework capable of 
attracting investment so that all parties have access to the continuous supply of 
gas and electricity that is essential for economic development and social stability. 
The Energy Community Treaty provides a model for the integration of the 
relatively small markets of south-eastern Europe in other segments of the Euro-
pean Union’s single market. An example of the latter is the creation of a 
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) by 2010.24 Just like the integration 
efforts of the six founding states of the ECSC in the field of coal and steel were a 
precursor to the decision to expand their cooperation to other domains of their 
economies with the creation of the EEC, the Energy Community Treaty heralds 
the resuscitation of a much broader platform for realising their economic ambi-
tions, namely the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
CEFTA will provide the countries of the Western Balkans with a broader plat-
form to realise their economic ambitions and meet two important requirements of 
EU pre-accession conditionality: regional cooperation and readiness for the 
competitive impact of participating in the Union’s single market. Since its 
enactment in 1992, the agreement’s aim has been to ensure the free commercial 
                                                                                                                                               
22  At a later stage, the integrated market may involve other energy products and carriers, such as 
liquefied natural gas, petrol, hydrogen or other essential network infrastructures. 
23  See Title II of the Treaty. Article 94 of the Treaty provides that the institutions of the Energy 
Community shall interpret any term or concept used in the Treaty that is derived from EC law in 
conformity with the case law of the ECJ or the CFI. Where no interpretation from those courts is 
available, the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community will give guidance in interpreting the 
Treaty, not prejudging any interpretation of the acquis by the ECJ or the CFI at a later stage. 
24  See, e.g., European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the 
Multilateral Agreement between the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the European Community, the Republic of Iceland, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Kingdom of Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania and 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on the Establishment of a European 
Common Aviation Area (ECAA), COM (2006) 113 final, Brussels, 14 March 2006. See also the 
study prepared by the European Commission – World Bank Office for South East Europe, The 
European Common Aviation Area and the Western Balkans: Domestic Reforms and Regional 
Integration in Air Transport, February 2007. The EC and the countries of the region have already 
concluded bilateral agreements in this field. See, e.g., Agreement between the European Community 
and Serbia and Montenegro on certain aspects of air services, OJ 2006 L 169/37; Agreement between 
the European Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina on certain aspects of air services, OJ 2006 L 
169/48; Agreement between the European Community and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia on certain aspects of air services, OJ 2006 L 217/17; and Agreement between the Council 
of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the European Community on certain aspects of air 
services, OJ 2006 L 294/52. 
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flow of products and services between countries sharing a common EU perspec-
tive and political stability in Central and Eastern Europe.25 As such, CEFTA has 
made a valuable contribution in preparing the CEECs for the competitive forces 
within the single market and – ultimately – accession to the European Union. The 
founding members of CEFTA (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia) left CEFTA when they acceded to the European Union in 2004. So did 
Slovenia. In view of the departure of Bulgaria (.party since 1998) and Romania 
(.party since 1997) following their accession to the Union on 1 January 2007, 
CEFTA was preserved by extending its membership to cover the Western Balkan 
states, thereby replacing the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of bilateral free trade agreements 
between them.26 On 6 April 2006, nine Heads of Government and one Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from the Balkans, and the Special Representative of UNMIK on 
behalf of Kosovo, adopted a joint declaration underpinning their political com-
mitment to start negotiations on the enlargement and amendment of CEFTA in 
May.27 Eight months later, on 19 December 2006, the political leaders of the 
countries and territories involved signed a new Central European Free Trade 
Agreement.28 Included in the enlarged CEFTA are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia (since 2002), Macedonia (since 2006), Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. The agreement 
focuses on the promotion of simpler and less bureaucratic procedures and the 
introduction of modern trade provisions in areas such as harmonisation, competi-
tion, state aid, services and the protection of intellectual property rights. As such, 
the agreement assists Montenegro and Serbia (including Kosovo) in their prepara-
tion for WTO membership, because the two processes are rooted in the same 
goals and rules of progressive trade liberalisation. The European Union, which is 
not a party to the agreement, had strongly supported an agreement on the 
enlargement of CEFTA because of the complementary nature of the regional 
cooperation stemming from CEFTA’s principles within the EU integration 
process.29 
                                                                                                                                               
25  The original 1992 Agreement is reproduced entirely in 34 ILM (1995) pp. 8-42, with an ac-
companying note from P. Kornfeld, ‘CEFTA’, 34 ILM (1995) pp. 3-7. See also D. Lopandić, 
Regional Initiatives in South Eastern Europe (Belgrade, European Movement in Serbia 2001) at pp. 
93-102. 
26  A matrix of the free trade agreements in the region is available at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Stability_Pact_for_South_Eastern_Europe#FTA_Progress>. The quote is from European Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s ‘Remarks at the launch of CEFTA expansion negotiations’, 
SPEECH/06/228, Bucharest on 6 April 2006. 
27  Joint Declaration by Prime Ministers, South Eastern Europe Summit, Bucharest, 6 April 2006, 
available at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/documents/tradeFINAL-joint%20declaration.pdf>. 
28  See ‘A New Regional Agreement to Develop Trade in South Eastern Europe’, 
MEMO/06/502, Brussels, 19 December 2006. 
29  See Council Conclusions of 20 March 2006, in Press Release No. 7035/06 (Presse 69). Others 
have made the argument that extending the matrix of bilateral trade agreements into a pan-regional 
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Based on the foregoing, we should witness substantial progress in regional 
economic cooperation in the coming years. As a result of the greater ownership of 
the countries of the Western Balkans in these forms of regional cooperation, a 
review of the ad hoc structures and methods of regional cooperation has become 
necessary. It has been acknowledged by at least one of those structures, the 
Stability Pact, that the time has come to pass the buck to the countries of the 
region. In May 2006, the Regional Table of the Stability Pact adopted a roadmap 
for a regionally-owned cooperation framework in south-eastern Europe.30 The 
roadmap foresees in the creation of a Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) to 
take over the responsibilities of the Stability Pact in early 2008. A Secretariat will 
be established in Sarajevo and a Secretary General has recently been elected.31 
The RCC and its Secretariat will provide the SEECP, for a long time the only 
regionally-owned initiative,32 with operational capabilities as well as a framework 
for the continued involvement of the international donor community in the region. 
Priority areas for cooperation in the framework of the RCC are economic and 
social development, infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, 
building human capital and parliamentary cooperation. Social cohesion and 
gender mainstreaming will also be given due attention. As such, these activities 
will complement and build on achievements within CEFTA, the ECAA and the 
Energy Community and should be welcomed. 
 
2.1.2 Focus on the Membership Action Plan and the Partnership for Peace 
 
Until it develops a forceful military arm of its own, NATO remains a crucial 
partner for the European Union in the Western Balkans, and its continued 
engagement is imperative. The Western Balkans is the region where the ‘Berlin 
Plus’ arrangements have finally paid off. EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is a case in point.33 In the short to medium term, NATO’s support for the EU-led 
security forces is crucial. The formulation by NATO of a long-term strategy for 
the Western Balkans, beyond the situation-specific deployments in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo, will enhance the security context in the entire region. 
                                                                                                                                               
trade association is likely to be inadequate. See D. Kernohan, ‘Reverse Balkanisation? Trade 
Integration in South-East Europe’, CEPS Working Document No. 249, August 2006. Kernohan 
argues that it would be better to extend the present customs union with Turkey to include trade with 
the entire south-east European zone of countries linked to the European Union. 
30  See Chairman’s Conclusions, Regional Table of the Stability Pact, 30 May 2006, Belgrade; 
available at: <http:// www.stabilitypact.org>. 
31  The Croatian deputy Foreign Minister Hido Biscević was elected during a SEECP meeting in 
Zagreb on 10-11 May 2007. See N. Radić, ‘Croatian diplomat to lead new Regional Co-operation 
Council’, Southeast European Times, 25 May 2007. 
32  See chapter 5, section 3.3.2. 
33  See chapter 4, section 4.1.2. 
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The underlying goal for this strategy is the development in each Western Balkan 
state of a security capacity under civilian democratic control, as well as the 
eventual transition of the role played by NATO units from security forces to 
security development forces. To put it in the words of the International Commis-
sion on the Balkans: ‘[p]aradoxically, membership in NATO is the only effective 
instrument for demilitarising this most militarised part of Europe.’34 
The Membership Action Plan, the Partnership for Peace programme and joint 
military exercises are the basis for this strategy. NATO played the role of a fast 
integration track for the CEECs, and it should do the same for the Western 
Balkans. On the basis of the progress achieved on their Membership Action 
Plans, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia should receive invitations to join NATO 
at the Alliance’s summit in the spring of 2008. And in order for NATO enlarge-
ment to fulfil its regional role, the Alliance should offer membership in the 
Membership Action Plan to Pf.P programme partners Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Serbia as soon as possible. In this way, ever closer and deeper 
relations with the Alliance would be forged with a view to all Western Balkan 
states becoming full members. In the process, the countries of the region would 
have to undergo comprehensive and demanding reforms covering a wide variety 
of areas, extending well beyond defence and security issues and military struc-
tures. In this respect, NATO enlargement can be a complementary tool to the 
European Union’s efforts to take away some of the root causes of conflicts in 
south-eastern Europe and contribute to the extension of the zone of lasting peace 
and stability in Europe. 
 
2.2 Fewer ad hoc arrangements 
 
2.2.1 The role of the United Nations 
 
The establishment of an enhanced Stabilisation and Association Process and the 
orientation on NATO’s Membership Action Plan and Partnership for Peace 
programme as the basic road maps for the region’s evolution and the subsequent 
transfer of responsibilities to EU officials, or preferably capable local leaders, 
implies that ad hoc arrangements such as the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo can be phased out. The 
international community seems set to restructure its presence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 2008.35 The United Nations has started its ‘wind-down’ operation 
and a change of guard with the European Union is being prepared pending 
consideration of status issues in Kosovo.36 
                                                                                                                                               
34  ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 15. 
35  See, more extensively, infra section 3.3.2. 
36  See, more extensively, infra section 3.3.1. 
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As has been indicated by a dozen or more NGO’s and think tanks active in the 
region, the international organisations and operations ought to prepare and 
publicise their transition plans to ease the process. These plans must identify the 
local government offices or ministries that will assume responsibility for specific 
issues and tasks, detail how the transition will occur and within what timeframe 
and identify a follow-up plan, specifying which offices or agencies within EU and 
NATO structures will retain responsibility for coordination with local actors on 
the major tasks required by the SAP and the MAP/Pf.P after the transition period 
is completed. 
 
2.2.2 The role of the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
 
The involvement of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
the Council of Europe should be limited to those fields of action in which the 
European Union can benefit from their specialised expertise. For the OSCE this 
means election monitoring through ODIHR and conflict prevention through the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Council of Europe could 
continue to assist its members (and the European Union) with human rights 
monitoring and advice on constitutional issues (Venice Commission).37 
 
2.2.3 The role of the United States and Russia 
 
Experience over the last seventeen years has shown that the military presence of 
the United States is still indispensable to ensure security and maintain stability in 
the Western Balkans and that EU efforts are most effective when closely coordi-
nated with and supported by the United States, whether exercised unilaterally or 
through NATO. Notwithstanding the leading role of the European Union in 
shaping the future of the Western Balkans and the diversion of US attention from 
the region after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 
2001, there is a strong case for continued engagement by the United States.38 It is 
based partly on the US interest in the ongoing project of building a free and 
undivided Europe and partly on the need for the hard political and military power 
of the United States to confront security threats posed by a vacuum of authority in 
the Western Balkans. The main question for the United States is whether, in view 
of its difficulties in reconciling its ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ agendas, the 
European Union has the staying power and political will to see its stabilisation 
strategy for the Western Balkans through. It is strongly in the interests of the 
United States to help the Union stay the course and ensure that it remains politi-
cally accountable for its end of the deal. The exact nature of US involvement will 
                                                                                                                                               
37  See, more extensively, chapter 2, sections 8 and 9. 
38  This is acknowledged by the ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 38. 
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change with the situation, but an active presence in the region will remain 
necessary, as the United States possesses a unique combination of authority and 
capabilities that are still needed in parts of the Western Balkans. The European 
Union’s nascent efforts to build up a rapid reaction force may help in limited 
circumstances, but for the foreseeable future this will not replace the capacity of 
NATO (as a longa manus of the United States) to assure basic security in the 
most fragile parts of the region. 
Any discussion of the international community’s role in the Western Balkans 
would be incomplete without considering the interests of Russia, which for 
centuries has seen itself as an important player in the region, a defender of the 
region’s Orthodox populations. But Russia’s influence in the region has waned 
after most of the Western Balkan countries started looking westward towards a 
European future. So far, Russia has acquiesced in NATO’s expansion plans in the 
region and has even played a constructive role by participating in NATO-led 
missions. As such, the region has become a laboratory for cooperation between 
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic partners. But a reassertion of Russia’s role on the 
international political scene, through energy politics and other questionable 
means, could again cause problems for the Euro-Atlantic players, especially over 
the final status of Kosovo.39 
 
 
3. FACING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUS ISSUES 
 
3.1 The current constitutional environment 
 
Between 1994 and 2002, international negotiators and local parties designed (i) 
several constitutional frameworks for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1994), which was to become one of the entities within the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina; (ii) a Constitution for that Republic, as part of the Dayton Accord 
(1995); (iii) changes to the Constitution of the Republika Srpska (1996); (iv) a 
constitutional framework for Kosovo as requested by the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General (2001); (v) Macedonia’s new constitutional frame-
work, known as the Ohrid Agreement (2001); and (vi) the Constitutional Charter 
for the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, underpinned by the Belgrade 
Agreement (2002). These constitutional frameworks have several features in 
common. First, they were shaped by elites associated with armed conflicts. The 
processes that led to the Constitutions were not informed by popular mandates but 
by cold-blooded trade-offs to stop the fighting or avoid other destabilising acts. A 
second similarity is that each of the constitutional frameworks allocated power on 
                                                                                                                                               
39  See infra section 3.3.1. 
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the basis of ethnicity. For example, in the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Ohrid Agreement and the constitutional framework for Kosovo, 
members of various ethnic groups were assured specified quotas in the central 
institutions. While it is probably true that without these allocations of jobs and 
decision-making powers the peace agreements would have failed, the question is 
how long these undemocratic provisions should be tolerated. Third, the constitu-
tional frameworks created weak states. Each state must compete with strongly 
decentralised powers, especially in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and (.previ-
ously) in Serbia and Montenegro. State weakness is perpetuated in those states 
where there are influential international actors on the scene. The posts of the High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General in Kosovo were established during crises. Years later, both 
continue to exercise extraordinary powers, including the authority to override 
local decisions. Neither the reach of these powers nor the occasions for their use 
are clearly defined or well understood. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
there has been an irresistible temptation for both international representatives and 
local governments to shift political accountability onto one another. Citizens are 
left guessing who is responsible for what. 
A consequence of the patchwork regulatory environment is that state actors 
have become cumulatively weaker while powerful private actors, oligarchs and 
criminal syndicates generated by the wars of the 1990s have remained influential 
and have largely escaped scrutiny. This means that, in some areas, non-state 
institutions provide basic public services that traditionally fall under the responsi-
bility of the state. It also means that some individuals receive pensions, health 
care and education from neighbouring states. The best example is provided by the 
Serbs of Mitrovica (Northern Kosovo), who are subsidised by Belgrade. The 
emphasis on decentralisation in Kosovo may accelerate the trend.40 
 
3.2 The perceptions map: ICB survey 
 
International stakeholders have frequently argued that postponing the resolution of 
key status issues is the lesser of two evils. While they concede that the status quo is 
not ideal, they maintain that it is nonetheless essential to maintain regional peace 
and stability. The results of the survey conducted by the International Commission 
on the Balkans (ICB) in 2005 show a more complex reality.41 The key findings 
demonstrate that Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer a highly contested state. Most 
Serbs in Serbia and almost half of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina view the 
separation of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia-Herzegovina as both undesirable 
                                                                                                                                               
40  See ICG, ‘Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide’, Europe Report No. 165, 13 September 2005. 
41  See ICB, op. cit. n. 2, Annex. 
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and unlikely.42 It is important to note that the ICB’s survey indicates that there is no 
ethnic group intent on threatening the existence of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and that the international community’s nightmare that Kosovo’s independence 
would automatically provoke the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina has no 
foundation in reality. Still, it would be premature to conclude from this that nation-
building among Serb communities across the region has been settled. Such a 
conclusion hinges on the implementation of the results of the final status talks for 
Kosovo. An indication of what can be expected was given when, in the wake of the 
pro-independence referendum results in Montenegro of 21 May 2006, even the 
Prime Minister of the Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina renewed calls for the 
independence of the Republika Srpska.43 
As noted before, determining Kosovo’s status is a contested process which, if 
mismanaged, could have a ruinous effect on the settlement of Serb-Albanian 
interests.44 According to the survey conducted by the ICB, the establishment of a 
‘Greater Albania’ is a development that could destabilise the region. The results of 
the survey show a relatively high acceptance of the idea of a Greater Albania 
among the Albanian populations of both Kosovo and Albania.45 As a whole, they 
differ from other groups in the region in their view that a future unification of 
Kosovo and Albania is both desirable and possible.46 This suggests that the process 
of nation-building among Albanian communities in the Western Balkans is still in 
progress. If the European Union fails to offer a convincing membership perspective 
to Albania and – if independent – Kosovo, it might bolster support for a Greater 
Albania among Albanians. This would almost certainly provoke a Serb reaction. 
In contrast, when it comes to the territorial integrity of Macedonia, the survey 
shows that a great majority of Albanians in Macedonia reject the idea of dividing 
the country: 77.5 per cent of ethnic Albanians (and 85 per cent of ethnic Macedo-
nians) support the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state.47 
 
3.3 Balkan endgame.48 
 
Unresolved status issues and provisional constitutional frameworks are major 
obstacles for the process of European integration of parts of the Western Balkans. 
                                                                                                                                               
42  Ibid., figure 5. 
43  See T. Loza, ‘Balkan Eye: Watch Out, Milorad’, Transitions Online, 8 January 2007, refer-
ring to Milorad Dodik. 
44  See chapter 4, section 3.3. 
45  Even if this has been rejected by Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha on numerous occasions. 
46  See ICB, op. cit. n. 2, Annex, figure 6. 
47  Ibid., figure 7. 
48  The term is taken from, inter alia, R. Bassett, ‘Balkan Endgame?’, JDW (1999); S. Biserko, 
‘Comment: Balkan Endgame’, 23 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report (1999); and E. Pond, Endgame in the 
Balkans: Regime Change, European Style (Washington, Brookings Institution Press 2006). 
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While all states aspire to EU membership it is unclear how many will actually 
emerge from the current constitutional chaos. The integration of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia (including Kosovo) into the European Union is unimag-
inable in the current circumstances of constitutional uncertainty. 
 
3.3.1 Kosovo’s final status 
 
Time is running out in Kosovo. The international community has clearly failed in 
its attempts to stabilise and develop the province. The social and economic 
situation in the protectorate is depressing. Power cuts are regular. The province 
never boasted a self-sustaining economy, and chances are small that it will 
develop one now. In 2006, the official unemployment rate was more than 40 per 
cent.49 A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist. The events of March 2004, July 
2005 and February 2007 amount to the strongest signals yet that the situation 
could explode. UNMIK has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the courage to 
reverse this trend.50 Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned in their enclaves with 
no freedom of movement, no jobs and with neither hope nor opportunity of 
meaningful integration into Kosovo’s society.51 The position of the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo is the greatest challenge to the European Union’s willingness 
and ability to defend and export its proclaimed values.52 
By endorsing final status talks, the UN Security Council on 24 October 2005 
implicitly accepted that the ‘standards before status’ approach needed to be 
replaced by a ‘status and standards’ strategy. While the result of the negotiations 
will not solve all the territory’s problems, postponement of the final status talks 
would no doubt have led to a further deterioration in the situation in the province. 
It is argued here that the European Union should play a much more prominent 
role in guiding this process.53 The rationale behind this is simple. The determina-
tion of the final status of Kosovo should concentrate on offering real incentives to 
Belgrade, Priština and Tirana, so that all may find the prospect of an independent 
                                                                                                                                               
49  See European Commission (DG ECFIN), ‘Western Balkans in Transition’, 30 Enlargement 
Papers (2006) at p. 86. 
50  Indirectly, this has been acknowledged by the United Nations’ outgoing Special Representa-
tive for Kosovo, Søren Jessen-Petersen. See ‘UN mission head says Kosovo status-quo 
unsustainable’, DTT-NET.COM, 26 August 2005. 
51  See ICG, loc. cit. n. 40. 
52  In the judgement of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Kai Aide, the protectorate has 
made insufficient progress towards meeting internationally agreed standards with regard to human 
rights, respect for minorities and law and order. See UN Doc. S/PRST/2005/51. 
53  Compare with the current situation, as described in chapter 4, section 3.3.1. See further, ICG, 
‘Kosovo: Challenge of Transition’, Europe Report No. 170, 17 February 2006. On the limits of the 
European Union’s role as a state-builder in Kosovo, see D. Papadimitriou, P. Petrov and L. 
Greiçevci, ‘To Build a State: Europeanization, EU Actorness and State-Building in Kosovo’, 12 EFA 
Rev. (2007) pp. 219-238. 
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Kosovo as a future member of the European Union acceptable. The enhanced EU 
pre-accession process can provide such incentives. Thus, the implementation of 
the decision on the final status of Kosovo should be an integral part of the overall 
process of European integration of the Western Balkans. Of course, the European 
Union should be backed up by its international partners. The active engagement 
of the United States is of particular importance for a successful outcome of the 
negotiating process, as Kosovo Albanians still view the United States as the best 
guarantor of their independence.54 
In this context, the ICB has recommended a helpful and realistic agenda for 
achieving Kosovo’s independence and EU accession in four stages.55 The first 
stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia. This stage is 
implicit in UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), which transformed 
Kosovo into a UN protectorate, even if the ‘weaving fault’ has been repaired and 
the text of the resolution now fully applies to Serbia.56 The second stage (inde-
pendence without full sovereignty) would see Kosovo as an independent entity 
but one where the international community reserves its powers in the fields of 
human rights and the protection of minorities – the areas that are essential for 
meeting the Copenhagen ‘Plus’ criteria. Legally, Kosovo would remain a protec-
torate, but the United Nations’ authority, as defined by chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, would be transferred from UNMIK to the European Union. NATO’s 
KFOR would preserve both its mandate and its size. Kosovo would be treated as 
an independent state but not as a sovereign one at this stage, allowing it to further 
develop a capacity for self-government. It would be assisted in this task by an EU 
administration for Kosovo and a civilian ESDP mission. The provisions in the 
final status agreement on the decentralisation of power (guaranteeing, inter alia, 
self-government and development for the Kosovo Serbs), the return of refugees 
and the clarification of property rights would be the key provisions to be imple-
mented at this stage. The special arrangements for the areas around Mitrovica and 
the Serbian monasteries would have to be enforced by the transitional EU 
administration for Kosovo, backed up by KFOR. The third stage (guided sover-
eignty) would coincide with Kosovo’s recognition as a candidate for EU 
membership. As the European Union cannot open accession negotiations with 
itself, that is to say, with a protectorate it controls, it would at this stage hand over 
its powers to the government of Kosovo. The Union would further exercise 
influence through the negotiation process alone. The fourth stage (sovereignty) 
would mark the accession of Kosovo to the European Union and its adoption of 
the shared sovereignty to which all EU Member States are subject. Martti 
                                                                                                                                               
54  See ICB, op. cit. n. 2, Annex, figure 20. 
55  Ibid., at pp. 18-23. 
56  Chapter 4, section 3.3.3. 
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Ahtisaari’s blueprint for the status settlement is a good and crucial first step in 
this process and should therefore be supported.57 
 
3.3.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina: from Bonn to Brussels 
 
Since the world celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, 
attention is increasingly being focused on how Bosnia-Herzegovina can move 
from the tutelage of the international community to a full-fledged, decentralised, 
modern, sovereign, democratic state. The need for constitutional change is high 
on the political agenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For Bosnians who have grown 
accustomed to the awkward political system established under the Dayton 
Agreement of 1995, this is revolutionary. There are few greater frustrations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina than the country’s multi-tiered political system with its 
rotating leadership positions shared by members of the three main ethnic groups, 
its many levels of administration and overlapping jurisdictions – all set up under 
Dayton and overseen by the international community’s High Representative. 
While all involved agree that the present constitutional architecture is dysfunc-
tional, deeper agreement about what Bosnia-Herzegovina’s new Constitution 
should look like has long eluded the parties to the process. On 18 March 2006, the 
leaders of the main political parties reached a deal on constitutional changes.58 
They agreed to increase the number of ministries in central government and 
change the powers of the current three-member presidency into a single rotating 
one with two vice-presidents, each of them representing one of the country’s main 
ethnic groups. The last stumbling block concerned the election of the members of 
the presidency and was only cleared after the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe gave its opinion on the issue.59 Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats 
finally agreed that the members of the presidency would be elected by the 
national Parliament (in accordance with the wishes of the Bosnian Croats, who 
represent the smallest ethnic community) and not by direct vote. Like Dayton, 
this agreement on a new Constitution was the fruit of painful compromise. It was 
hailed by the Council of the European Union as representing a significant step 
towards strengthening Bosnia-Herzegovina’s state institutions and boosting the 
country’s ability to meet European standards.60 
Along with the need for constitutional change, the main problem that Bosnia-
Herzegovina faces today is the transition from its current status as a protectorate 
that is defined by the Bonn powers to a sustainable self-governed state guided by 
                                                                                                                                               
57  See chapter 4, section 3.3.4. 
58  As reported in ‘BiH parties agree to constitutional reforms’, Southeast European Times, 19 
March 2006. 
59  See Opinion No. 374/2006, CDL-AD(2006)004, Strasbourg, 20 March 2006. 
60  Council Conclusions of 20 March, in Press Release No. 7035/06 (Presse 69). 
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the process of EU accession. The coercive authority of the High Representative 
was originally developed for an unstable environment in the wake of armed 
conflict. When its intrusive powers to intervene in and overrule domestic institu-
tions were developed in mid-1997, these were intended to head off threats to 
public order and attempts by the former warring parties to challenge the integrity 
of the state. However, as the agenda of politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shifted 
to very different issues like democratic consolidation and development, the 
powers and activities of the High Representative continue to dominate Bosnian 
politics. This has blocked the development of self-government, which is a 
precondition to becoming an EU candidate state.61 After the success of the first 
elections to be run and managed entirely by domestic institutions rather than the 
international community, the challenge for the next political leaders of Bosnia-
Herzegovina will be to complete the stalled police and constitutional reforms. 
With their joint report on the European Union’s future presence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the SG/HR and the European Commissioner for Enlargement 
expressed their conviction that these reforms could be implemented before 30 
June 2007, the date on which the Office of the High Representative was provi-
sionally scheduled for closure and the Bonn powers of the High Representative 
could be transferred back to the domestic authorities.62 The report noted that 
progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina justified the transfer of full responsibility to its 
elected leaders by end-June 2007 and stated that ‘only threats to the country’s 
peace and stability ought to change that timeline.’63  
Unfortunately, these plans were pushed back by one year when the Steering 
Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which reviews the stabilisation of 
the country, decided on 27 February 2007 to extend the mandate of the OHR by 
one year (until 30 June 2008) due to the still volatile situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.64 With a continued visible military and police presence on the 
ground, the plan is now that a reinforced office for the EU Special Representative 
should guarantee the smooth transition from the international community’s 
caretaker role to the European Union’s role as a strong supporter for further 
reforms under domestic governance.65 The EUSR for Bosnia-Herzegovina would 
                                                                                                                                               
61  In a similar vein, see S. Recchia, ‘Beyond International Trusteeship: EU Peacebuilding in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Occasional Paper No. 66, February 2007, EUISS, Paris. 
62  See joint report by the EU SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement on a reinforced 
EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of the envisaged closure of the Office of the 
High Representative, 17 October 2006. 
63  Ibid. 
64  See Council Conclusions of 5 March 2007, in Press Release No. 6756/07 (Presse 39) at 10. 
The PIC Steering Board will again review the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 2007 and 
February 2008. 
65  See also the recommendations by the ICG, ‘Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International 
Engagement Strategy’, Europe Report No. 180, 15 February 2007. It should be noted that the joint 
report by the EU SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement also recommended maintaining 
the coalition of the international community as an important coordination forum. 
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remain as the overall coordinator of the activities of the EU family in the country 
(EUFOR Althea, EUPM and others) and would work alongside the European 
Commission’s delegation in Sarajevo.66 The office of the EUSR would concen-
trate on political and security-related issues, offer political advice, facilitate 
political and legal processes, especially in relation to further constitutional 
reform, and promote the rule of law. It could also offer advice on rationalising 
structures. As noted before, the enhanced Stabilisation and Association Process 
could provide the framework that provides the requisite incentives for strengthen-
ing the state’s federal structures and developing policy-making capacity. 
 
 
4. BUILDING MEMBER STATES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 
The success of EU enlargement is one of the few unambiguously positive achieve-
ments of the post-Cold War world, nothing short of a revolution, as European 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn is fond of saying. In little over a decade, the 
prospect of EU membership succeeded in consolidating democratic and market 
reforms and transforming societies throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The 
European Union likes to repeat that it can do the same for the Western Balkans. 
There are, however, three critical differences compared to previous pre-accession 
rounds: the problem of weak states; the Union’s lack of experience in integrating 
them; and the presence of other – powerful – international actors on the ground. 
Enlargement of the Union with most of the countries of the Western Balkans is 
therefore not a matter of business as usual. Functioning state administrations have 
to be developed – in one case even in the absence of a state (Kosovo) – the quality 
of political representation has to be improved and the economy has to be reformed. 
This section will only focus on institution-building and constituency-building. For 
suggestions on how to realise economic revitalisation and ‘Europeanisation’, suffice 
it to refer to what has already been said about the creation of a regional markets and 




The Member-State-building strategy that is advocated by the International 
Commission on the Balkans and think tanks like the European Stability Initiative 
and the International Crisis Group holds the middle ground between the ‘authori-
tarian’ model of international tutelage, as applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
                                                                                                                                               
66  Over time, a similar construction as in Macedonia could perhaps be opted for by combining 
the posts of head of the delegation of the Commission and the EUSR. This double-hatting could 
increase the coherence and consistency of the European Union’s role in the country. 
67  See supra section 2.1.1.3. 
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Kosovo, and the EU accession process as typified by the enlargements of 2004 
and 2007. The objective is not ‘simply’ to build stable, legitimate states whose 
own citizens will seek to strengthen and not destroy them. Rather, it is the 
establishment of states that the European Union can accept as full members. The 
trouble is that there is not a single model EU Member State. In the absence 
thereof, and in view of the wide variety of Member States’ practices and constitu-
tional arrangements in fields such as justice or tax administration, the European 
Commission is wary to recommend specific institutional solutions to candidate 
countries. The International Commission on the Balkans has regarded this as a 
‘serious obstacle’ and has called upon the European Commission to ‘assume the 
responsibility for some of the institutional choices that the applicants are forced to 
make’.68 Disregarding the fact that, in this respect, the European Commission 
could only make recommendations to and execute such responsibility for the 
Council, imposing institutional choices on Kosovo would in the long run be 
counter-productive. For Member-State-building to be truly effective over time, 
homebred choices would have to be carried by democratic majorities. The extent 
to which the European Union can win local hearts and minds by mobilising the 
carrot of Kosovo’s future entry to the club remains a key challenge, particularly in 
a context where the pro-Europeanism of local elites cannot be taken for granted.69 
In this respect, the instrument of benchmarking in the SAP should be cautiously 
applied when facing the most challenging reform issues: administrative capacity-
building and reform of the judiciary. These issues, which in previous accession 
rounds were tackled last, should be included as the principal objectives of the 
future negotiating frameworks for Macedonia and the other countries of the 
Western Balkans.70 The progress of the candidates in the field of institutional 
capacity-building could then be monitored by measuring the level of implementa-
tion of the acquis – not just its adoption – in the light of annual progress reports 
and accession partnerships.71 
                                                                                                                                               
68  ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 30. 
69  Much of the scepticism towards ‘Europe’ has its roots in the European Union’s early debacles 
over the handling of the disintegration of the SFRY and, more importantly, a widespread perception 
that European powers did not do enough to protect the Albanian population in Kosovo against Serb 
aggression. 
70  The ICB has rightly suggested that instead of starting with the White Book on the Single 
Market, the countries of the Western Balkans would be much better served by a White Book on 
Freedom, Security and Justice. In practical terms, this would mean that assisting the countries from 
the region in the field of justice and home affairs would be the overriding priority for the accession 
process and that the state of the rule of law would be the major criterion in evaluating the progress of 
Western Balkan countries on their journey to the European Union. See ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 30. 
71  See S. Blockmans, ‘Impact of EU Accession on the Role of (Potential) Candidate Countries’ 
Executives’, in A. Kellermann, J. Czuczai, S. Blockmans, A. Albi and W. Douma, eds., Impact of EU 
Accession on the Legal Orders of New Member States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries: Hopes and 
Fears (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) pp. 291-300. 
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4.2 Constituency-building 
 
A state is not only a legal and administrative entity, it is also a social phenome-
non. The growing gap between a state’s public administration and its citizens is a 
critical risk to the success of the European Union’s transformative policies.72 
Political mobilisation and participation is essential. In the Western Balkans, the 
modernisation of the political culture and discourse is also necessary. The 
emphasis should be on the future, while progress is made by dealing with the 
past. Three challenges stick out: (i) assuring minority rights protection in decen-
tralised systems of governance; (ii) achieving justice and reconciliation on war 
crimes; and (iii) the fight against organised crime. These will be discussed in turn. 
 
4.2.1 Assuring minority rights protection 
 
As observed at the outset of this study, war and ethnic cleansing on the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia have resulted in significant demographic shifts. While 
all countries of the Western Balkans still contain multi-ethnic areas, most 
countries are now nation-states with majorities amounting to 80 per cent or more 
of the population. Albania, Croatia, Serbia (excluding Kosovo) and Kosovo (as a 
separate entity) have strong majorities, and most minorities live in a relatively 
compact part of the country and account for 10 to 20 per cent of the population. 
Only Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are multi-ethnic, with 
little or no dominance by one community.73 Decentralisation policies aggravate 
the ethnic separation in certain parts of the Western Balkans. Albanian areas 
around Tetovo in Northern Macedonia and the predominantly Serb area around 
Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo are cases in point. While the argument for decen-
tralisation (with more competences exercised at local level minorities are able to 
govern themselves to a larger degree, which in turn should increase their loyalty 
to the state) is perfectly acceptable, its reality in the Western Balkans is not. 
Human rights violations by regional authorities against minority elements (e.g., 
Roma and residents or returnees of a different ethnicity) largely escape interna-
tional monitoring.74 Hence, what is needed is the recognition of minorities at 
municipal level and the international monitoring of their fundamental rights.75 
 
                                                                                                                                               
72  Again, the same might be said of the transformation process of the European Union itself. 
73  See F. Bieber, ‘Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe’, Discussion Paper, King 
Baudouin Foundation, 30 September 2004. 
74  Ibid. 
75  See ICB, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 32-33. 
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4.2.2 Reinterpreting ICTY conditionality 
 
The second challenge to constituency-building in the Western Balkan societies 
concerns justice and reconciliation on war crimes. Since 1993, the ICTY has 
played a decisive role in bringing war criminals to justice. However, it has failed 
to take away the distrust of local people regarding its mission to achieve justice 
and reconciliation in the Western Balkans.76 The European Union has defined full 
cooperation with the ICTY as a threshold conditionality when it comes to the 
process of integration.77 The challenge facing the Union at present is how to 
translate the post-war conditionality of the ICTY, which is charged with examin-
ing concrete crimes in the cases of Gotovina, Mladić and Karadžić, into one that 
looks towards the future and concentrates on the strengthening of European 
values across the region. While the unprecedented decision by the Council to 
postpone the start of membership talks with Croatia was – incidentally or not – 
followed by the arrest of General Gotovina and his transfer to The Hague, a 
similar decision to suspend negotiations on an SAA with Serbia failed to cajole 
Belgrade into compliance with ICTY conditionality. Of course, full cooperation 
with the ICTY should remain mandatory for the opening of accession negotia-
tions with the European Union. However, failure to transfer a single high-profile 
fugitive to the Tribunal should not hold back the development of entire countries 
when it comes to negotiating and signing SAAs. In partial recognition of this, and 
despite the opposition of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the strict 
requirement of handing over Mladić to the ICTY seems to have been dropped by 
the Council in an attempt to lessen the blow of an internationally imposed 
decision to let Kosovo secede from Serbia.78 As was to be expected, the European 
Union won the scorn of Carla del Ponte, the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor.79 But what 
should be learned from these experiences is that ICTY conditionality, at least in 
the phase of negotiating and signing SAAs, should be understood more broadly 
than just the need to transfer one or two suspected war criminals to The Hague.80 
Instead, it should concentrate on the willingness of Western Balkan societies as a 
                                                                                                                                               
76  See, P. Hazan, Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Texas, A&M University Press 2004). 
77  In addition, the European Union regards the success of the ICTY as critical in its struggle to 
confer legitimacy on the International Criminal Court. 
78  In February 2007, the Council confirmed the European Union’s readiness to resume SAA 
negotiations with a new government in Belgrade ‘provided it shows clear commitment and takes 
concrete and effective action for full co-operation with the ICTY.’ See Council Conclusions of 12 
February 2007, in Press Release No. 6037/07 (Presse 18) at 13 [emphasis added]. 
79  See ‘Del Ponte again urges EU not to resume SAA talks with Serbia’, Southeast European 
Times, 16 February 2007. 
80  For the counterarguments, see G. Evans and J. Lyons, ‘No Mladic, no talks’, International 
Herald Tribune, 21 March 2007; and S. Freizer and A. Stroehlein, ‘The EU’s inexcusable pardon for 
Serbia’, European Voice, 29 March 2007. 
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whole to examine the causes and consequences of their troubled past. Hence, the 
European Union should attach more importance than it does now to the readiness 
and ability of the domestic judicial, religious and educational authorities to deal 
with the war-related crimes of the past and to promote tolerance and reconcilia-
tion. In this respect, recent judgments by Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian courts 
convicting war criminals to long prison sentences should be taken as a positive 
sign.81 The European Union was therefore right to look at the broader picture and 
no longer outsource the decision-making on compliance with ICTY conditionality 
to the single-minded Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal. 
 
4.2.3 Fighting organised crime 
 
A third challenge in the movement towards moderation and modernisation in the 
Western Balkans is posed by so-called ‘politico-criminal syndicates’. In every 
country of the region, there are people in high places with the motivation and 
resources to undermine local reformers’ efforts to modernise and clean up their 
governments and economies.82 Strengthened by the profits from pirate privatisa-
tion and bolstered by cross-border illegal connections, the revenue and survival of 
these syndicates depend on their ability to suppress efforts to introduce transpar-
ency and accountability into the political and economic systems of the states in 
which they operate. Their combination of influence, access, resources and 
superficially appealing ideology makes it difficult for new and weak governments 
to mount sustained campaigns against them. Until the Western Balkan govern-
ments have the capacity and will to fight these politico-criminal groups, the 
Office of the High Commissioner, the European Union and UNMIK have 
launched such campaigns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, that is 
to say, where the extent and authority of these international institutions are 
greatest. Arrests of ethnic extremists, seizure of weapons, control of border 
crossings, the enforcement of travel and financial restrictions on key leaders and 
improved law enforcement and intelligence cooperation have played important 
roles in reducing ethnic violence in these parts of the Western Balkans.83 While 
                                                                                                                                               
81  See, e.g., ‘Croatian Court Charges Glavas, Six Others with 1991 Crimes Against Ethnic 
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murders’, International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2007; and N. Wood, ‘Serbia praised over trials of 
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83  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, progress in moving the country toward European stan-
dards of governance was only made when the OHR confronted the syndicates’ power over industry, 
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these efforts have been limited, the underlying lesson is clear: decisive actions 
aimed at the levers of power controlled by the politico-criminal groupings 
produce results and help reformers’ efforts to modernise the state. The interna-
tional community should therefore continue the seizing of criminal institutions 
and the pursuit, prosecution and removal from office of individuals associated 
with illegal intersections of government and financial power until local institu-
tions acquire the ability and the will to take it upon themselves. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The European Union has come a long way in the Western Balkans in just a few 
years. During the 1990s, while it stood by and watched the Balkans burn, it was 
the United States, in the framework of NATO, that acted decisively to stop the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the crisis in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the 
Kosovo crisis, the European Union finally found its voice to say no to new armed 
conflict in the heart of Europe. It adopted sanctions, brokered political agree-
ments, launched its first-ever police and military missions and directed economic, 
legal and administrative reforms. Yet, despite the comprehensive nature of the 
Union’s actions, its strategy towards the Western Balkans has been marked by 
confusion. While the European Union actively courted the countries of the region 
to form a closer relationship, it scaled down the level of financial support to 
tackle complicated issues that form the root causes of radical discontent and 
instability. Thus, the Union’s Stabilisation and Association Process has made a 
critical contribution to progress achieved throughout the region, but the returns on 
its investment are dwindling. In contrast to the CEECs, the Western Balkans still 
contain the possibility of a genuine security threat. Therefore, there is currently a 
real imperative to move the region as a whole from the stage of international 
protectorates and weak states to the stage of accession to the European Union and 
NATO. This scenario not only presupposes a reinvigorated drive for reform by 
the countries concerned but also presumes a continued, albeit reconfigured 
engagement by the Euro-Atlantic security organisations under the leadership of 
the European Union. Such a strategy would be significant not just practically but 
                                                                                                                                               
government finances, borders and the media. Examples include the 1997 removal of media from 
nationalist control in the Republika Srpska; the seizure in 2001 of a bank controlled by hard-line 
Croats who had stolen from their own people; the March 2002 decision by the OHR to remove 
constitutional provisions that helped nationalist parties retain control of public institutions and 
resources; and the December 2004 sackings of senior Bosnian Serb security officials accused of 
harbouring war crimes suspects, including Ratko Mladić. See the six-monthly reports of the High 
Representative for implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement to the UN Secretary-General, 
available on the OHR’s website at: <http://www.ohr.int>. 
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symbolically as well: if the Western Balkans were to be successfully integrated 
into the European Union, it would finally banish the possibility of a revival of the 
type of armed conflict that so plagued the continent’s nineteenths and twentieth 
century history. Incidentally, defusing the ‘powder keg’ would also be a landmark 
achievement for the European Union in its quest for a more prominent role 
internationally. 
By opening accession negotiations with Croatia and granting candidate coun-
try status to Macedonia, the European Union has finally shown its commitment to 
the countries of this troubled region. One can only hope that, despite the constitu-
tional impasse and the enlargement fatigue from which it is currently suffering, 
the Union will not shy away from offering a real membership perspective to the 
other Western Balkan countries as well. By transcending the ‘potential members’ 
mindset and showing its commitment to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montene-
gro, Serbia and Kosovo, the Union will render the Stabilisation and Association 
Process a much more credible framework. But it will have to do more than that to 
prevent these least stable parts of the Western Balkans from turning into a new 
ghetto. The Union will have to address the remaining constitutional and status 
issues and put its money where its mouth is. While nation-building in the Western 
Balkans has entered its final stages with the functional separation of Serbia and 
Montenegro, the search for the end of international governance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and a final status for Kosovo, the EU Member States seem unwilling 
to release the necessary funds to see these defining processes through. Only a 
bigger effort based on a fair but firm application of the conditionality principle 
will lead to the integration of the Western Balkans into the European mainstream. 
This means that countries should gain substantial rewards if they meet tough 
political, economic and legal conditions and that rewards will be denied or 
withdrawn if they lapse back into bad habits. Today, probably more than ever, 
tough love is required. 
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1389 – On 28 June, a coalition of Serbs, Hungarians, Bosnians, Bulgarians and 
Albanians under the leadership of the Serbian Prince Lazar meets the Ottoman 
army for a battle on the Field of Blackbirds (Kosovo Polje, in Serbian). The 
coalition suffers a crushing defeat. Much of the region falls under the influence of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 
1878 – In the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Europe’s Great 
Powers and the Ottoman Empire decide on the reorganisation of the Balkans at 
the Congress of Berlin. Ceding to Russian pressure, Serbia and Montenegro are 
declared independent principalities. Bosnia and Herzegovina are placed under the 
administration of Austria-Hungary. The establishment of a border between 
Greece and Turkey is not accomplished. The Congress sows the seeds of further 
conflicts, including two Balkan Wars and World War I. 
 
1908 – Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
1912 – First Balkan War. The Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and 
Serbia) conquer Ottoman-held Macedonia and northern Greece and subsequently 
fall out over the division of the spoils. 
 
1913 – Second Balkan War (Serbia, Greece and Romania v. Bulgaria over 
Macedonia). Serbia wrests control of Kosovo from Albania. 
 
1914 – On 28 June, Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinates Archduke 
Franz Josef, the heir to the Austrian Empire, in Sarajevo. One month after the 
assassination, Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. Serbia’s ally Russia 
declares war on Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary’s ally Germany declares war 
on Russia and World War I begins. 
 
1918 – Following the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles establishes the 
principle of self-determination and the League of Nations. In the resulting break-
ups of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes is created. Serbia dominates the kingdom. 
 
1919 – The Communist Party is founded in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. 
 
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 338 
1920 – The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes joins the so-called ‘Little 
Entente’ (with France, Czechoslovakia and Romania) against what remains of the 
Austria-Hungary. 
 
1929 – The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is renamed Yugoslavia. 
The parliamentary system is abolished in favour of a royal dictatorship. Macedo-
nians are forbidden from having political parties and from speaking Macedonian 
in public. 
 
1939 – Croatia earns a certain degree of autonomy within Yugoslavia with the 
creation of the Banovina (Duchy) of Croatia. 
 
1940 – Nazi Germany occupies Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. It 
establishes the puppet Vichy government in much of France. Italy invades Greece. 
 
1941 – Nazi Germany invades Yugoslavia from Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Germany and Italy divide Slovenia. Italy also takes parts of Dalmatia and 
Montenegro, as well as Kosovo and Western Macedonia on behalf of Albania. 
Bulgaria gets the rest of Macedonia. Hungary gets part of Vojvodina. Bosnia is 
officially ‘independent’. Serbia comes under German military occupation. Croatia 
becomes a fascist puppet regime of the Nazis under the Ustaše. Ethnic cleansing 
of Serbs begins. Serbs respond with Chetnik guerrilla forces of their own. Josip 
Broz (Tito) leads the Communist partisan movement (.primarily Serbs) against the 
Ustaše and the Nazis, as well as the Chetniks. 
 
1943 – The Western alliance discontinues aiding the Chetniks under Draz Mihajlo-
vić and starts aiding Tito’s partisans. Proclamation of Communist Yugoslavia. 
 
1944 – Tito’s partisans, aided by the Soviets and the British, push the Nazis out of 
Yugoslavia. The pre-war borders between Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia are 
restored. 
 
1945 – World War II ends. Tito comes to power. The Communists abolish the 
monarchy and establish the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
1946 – A new constitution is adopted, whereby six constituent republics (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) are estab-
lished. 
 
1948 – Tito breaks with Stalin. 
 
1950s – Yugoslavia is at the forefront of the international non-aligned movement. 
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 339 
1963 – The new constitution proclaims Yugoslavia to be a socialist republic 
(Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRY) and Tito is named president-for-life. 
 
1967 – The national movement in Croatia enjoys a resurgence as Croatian intellec-
tuals protest against the suppression of the Croatian language in Yugoslavia. 
 
1968 – Kosovo becomes an autonomous province of the SFRY. Hungarian is 
recognised as an official language in Vojvodina. 
 
1971 – Officials in Zagreb circulate proposals for Croatia to secede from Yugo-
slavia. Tito responds by suppressing organisations and sending several officials to 
jail (including future Croatian President Franjo Tudjman). 
 
1973 – The European Economic Community (EEC) concludes a trade agreement 
with the SFRY. 
 
1974 – The new constitution of the SFRY strengthens the powers of the autono-
mous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina within the Serbian republic. 
 
1980 – The EEC signs a cooperation agreement with the SFRY. Tito dies. A 
collective presidency rules until 1991. 
 
1984 – On 8 February, the XIVth Winter Olympic Games open in Sarajevo, 
introducing the world to a city of cosmopolitan flair in the heart of the Balkans. 
 
1985 – The Serbian Academy of Sciences condemns Tito for leaving Serbia 
poorer than Croatia and Slovenia and proposes an independent Serbian state. 
 
1986 – Slobodan Milošević becomes head of the Serbian Communist Party. 
 
1988 – Ethnic Albanians protest against Serb domination in Kosovo. 
 
1989 – On 28 June, one million Serbs gather at the site of the Battle of Kosovo to 
commemorate its 600th anniversary. Milošević, newly elected president of 




January – The Yugoslav Communist Party splits along ethnic lines. Deadly riots 
in Kosovo result in an intervention by the Yugoslav Army (JNA). 
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February – A multi-party system is adopted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
April – A pro-independence coalition wins in Slovenia. 
 
May – HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union Party) wins the parliamentary elections 
in Croatia. HDZ’s leader Franjo Tudjman advocates a Yugoslav confederation of 
sovereign states. 
 
June – In Serbia, a referendum is organised in opposition to ethnic autonomy for 
Kosovo and Vojvodina and in favour of retaining a one-party state. In Croatia, 
HDZ proposes that the constitution be amended to allow for a confederated 
system of sovereign states. 
 
July – The League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the 
Working People of Serbia merge to become the Socialist Party of Serbia. Slobo-
dan Milošević is elected president by the delegates. Albanian delegates of the 
Parliament of Kosovo declare independence from Yugoslavia. Belgrade responds 
by banning the Kosovo shadow government led by Ibrahim Rugova and shutting 
down or taking over the local media. The Slovenian legislature declares Slovenia 
a sovereign state. Croatia adopts the proposed amendments to the constitution 
which replace the flag and declares that it is no longer a socialist republic. The 
Bosnian legislature adopts constitutional amendments declaring that Bosnia-
Herzegovina is a democratic state with equality for all its ethnic groups. 
 
August – As Croatia’s move towards independence seems likely, ethnic Serbs in 
Krajina argue for greater autonomy by way of their newly established Serbian 
National Council (i.e., the Parliament of the Knin-based Serbian Autonomous 
Oblast (SAO) Krajina). 
 
November – A Macedonian party advocating a confederation of sovereign states 
comes to power in the republic’s first multi-party elections. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
also holds its first multi-party elections. Nationalistic parties win. 
 
December – Milošević wins the presidency of Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians 
boycott the elections. The new Croatian constitution recognises ethnic Serbs as a 
minority but does not grant rights to minority groups. In a plebiscite in Slovenia, 
nearly 90 per cent of voters favour sovereignty. 
 
1991 
January – Macedonia elects a new president and adopts pro-sovereignty legisla-
tion. Slovenia announces it will start legislative procedures towards independence. 
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February – Tensions mount in the Croatian but largely Serbian-populated 
regions of Slavonia and Baranja. 
 
March – Milošević orders a crackdown on opposition protests in Serbia. The 
Serbian National Council, with Milošević’s approval, declares Krajina’s inde-
pendence from Croatia. Violence between ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs in 
Croatia intensifies. Serbia assumes authority over the dissolved Kosovo legisla-
ture. In response to the increased tensions in Yugoslavia, the European 
Communities declare their support for diplomacy and political dialogue over 
force and promote unity and democracy in Yugoslavia. 
 
April – At a meeting of the six presidents of the Yugoslav republics, it is agreed 
that each republic should hold a referendum on a future confederation or federa-
tion. 
 
May – Serbs resist the election of Stipe Mesić to the rotating presidency of the 
SFRY. In a referendum in Croatia, over 90 per cent votes for sovereignty and 
independence. The Krajina Serbs boycott the referendum. 
 
June – Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina unsuccessfully propose a Yugoslav 
commonwealth of sovereign republics. On 25 June, Croatia and Slovenia pro-
claim their independence from Yugoslavia. JNA army tanks and helicopters 
attack Slovenia. After the Slovenian militia captures 2,000 JNA soldiers, it trades 
their release for the right to control its own borders. The war in Slovenia lasts for 
a total of ten days. Fighting between Serbian and Croatian militias, which starts 
on 27 June, is more severe, especially in regions of Krajina, Baranja and Sla-
vonia. The United States states its support for the unity and democracy of 
Yugoslavia and for sovereignty determined through mutual agreement rather than 
unilateral secession. The EC sends a troika to Belgrade and Zagreb to leverage a 
ceasefire accord by threatening to block trade and withdraw economic aid. 
Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s prime minister, declares that ‘the hour of Europe 
has dawned’. 
 
July – The Zagreb ceasefire accord brokered by the EC is broken. On 5 July, the 
Council of Ministers decides to impose an arms embargo on all Yugoslav 
republics and suspends some aid and trade concessions. Under the political 
sponsorship of the EC, the Brioni ceasefire agreement of 7 July is signed and 
hailed as a triumph of European diplomacy. In accordance with this document, 
the SFRY stops all hostilities on Slovenian territory, thus ending the Slovenian 
war, while Slovenia and Croatia freeze independence activities for a period of 
three months. 
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August – JNA tanks and aircraft drive refugees from Vukovar and Dubrovnik. 
The fighting escalates. The EC threatens to impose economic sanctions on Serbia 
and recognise the other republics seeking independence. 
 
September – In a referendum in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians vote for independ-
ence. The UN Security Council enacts an arms embargo against all former 
Yugoslav republics and an economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. 
Resolution 713 states that a continuation of the situation in Yugoslavia would 
constitute ‘a threat to international peace and security’. The EC hosts a Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague. A ceasefire is signed between Serbia 
and Croatia. An EC Monitoring Mission is deployed to supervise the ceasefire. In 
spite of this, fighting continues. ECMM is maintained until it is restructured and 
renamed in 2000. 
 
October – Croat and Muslim parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina unite against 
Bosnian Serbs and plan for a referendum on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
President Tudjman of Croatia and President Milošević of Serbia agree to a 
ceasefire. But the JNA remains in Croatia. With the navy, it starts its siege of the 
UNESCO-protected town of Dubrovnik. The EC’s Peace Conference on Yugo-
slavia reconvenes in The Hague. Co-chairman Lord Carrington submits a 
proposal that supports independence and recognition of former Yugoslav repub-
lics and protection of the rights of ethnic minorities. Serbia refuses to agree to the 
proposal even after changes are made, on the grounds that it does not support the 
unity of Yugoslavia. Albania’s Parliament recognises Kosovo as an independent 
republic. The Bosnian Muslim government declares itself a sovereign state. 
 
November – The Council of Ministers decides to unilaterally suspend all 
coordinated assistance to Yugoslavia. For the first time in the history of the 
European Communities, a cooperation agreement with a third country is de-
nounced. 90 per cent of Bosnian Serbs vote to remain within Yugoslavia. The 
Macedonian legislature proposes a new constitution declaring Macedonia sover-
eign and independent. 
 
December – The EEC restores trade links, the Generalised System of Preferences 
and economic and financial aid terms with all Yugoslav republics, except Serbia 
and Montenegro. Under German pressure, the European Communities invite 
republics seeking diplomatic recognition to submit applications by 24 December. 
To this end, special ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union’ are adopted. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Mace-
donia and Slovenia rise to the occasion. Germany does not wait for the end of the 
‘arbitration’ process and recognises Croatia and Slovenia. UN Special Envoy 
Vance’s peace plan provides UN peacekeepers to Eastern Slavonia, Western 
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Slavonia and Krajina, following a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops and the 
disbanding of irregulars, but offers no specific solutions to the ethnic conflict. 
The Bosnian Serbs adopt a resolution to form the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Republika Srpska). Leaders of the SAO Krajina, the SAO Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem announce that the areas are being joined to 
form a single Serbian ‘state’ in Croatia: the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Repub-
lika Srpska Krajina). Dubrovnik sustains its worst shelling on 6 December. 
 
1992 
January – On 3 January, the fourteenth cease-fire takes effect. The UN Security 
Council sends monitors. On 11 January, the Badinter Arbitration Commission 
opines that only Macedonia and Slovenia meet all the criteria to be recognised as 
new states. Nevertheless, the EEC and its Member States on 15 January choose to 
recognise Croatia and Slovenia. Macedonia is not, as its recognition is vetoed by 
Greece on account of the republic’s name. 
 
February – On 7 February, the Treaty of Maastricht is signed. On 21 February, 
the Security Council establishes the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). On 29 
February, Bosnia-Herzegovina declares its independence and the Bosnian Serbs 
declare their own separate state. 
 
March – The fighting in Croatia spreads to Bosnia. 
 
April – The United States recognises Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
independent sovereign states. Bosnian Serb forces start to drive Muslims out of 
small villages; many of these refugees flee to the larger Bosnian cities of Žepa, 
Srebrenica, Tuzla and Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs, holding the high ground on the 
perimeter of the city, begin their siege of Sarajevo. On 28 April, Serbia and 
Montenegro, the two remaining republics of the SFRY, establish the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
 
May – The Croatian army liberates Dubrovnik and its surroundings from the 
suffocating Serbo-Montenegrin grip. Croatia is accepted as a full member in the 
United Nations. International sanctions are adopted against the FRY, the two 
remaining republics of the SFRY. Ethnic Albanian writer Ibrahim Rugova is 
elected president of Kosovo in an election unsanctioned by the ‘Yugoslav’ 
government. 
 
June – Croatia joins the war in Bosnia on the side of the Muslims. 
 
August – UNPROFOR is authorised to use force to deliver humanitarian supplies 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, two-thirds of which is now under Serbian domination.  
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First international media reports of ‘ethnic cleansing’, rapes, Bosnian Serb 
concentration camps, and mass executions in Bosnia. The United Nations 
convenes an International Conference on Yugoslavia in London. 
 
September – The FRY is expelled from the United Nations. 
 
October – Serb and ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo hold peace talks. The 
United Nations imposes a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
November – The EEC concludes a Trade, Commercial and Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement with Albania. 
 
1993 
January – Croatia launches an offensive in Krajina. The Geneva peace talks get 
underway. Under discussion is the Vance-Owen Plan, which would partition 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and provide for a rotating presidency but require no Serb 
troop withdrawals. 
 
March – Bosnian Croats and Muslims begin fighting over the 30 per cent of 
Bosnia not yet seized by the Bosnian Serbs. 
 
April - May – In resolutions 819 and 824, the Security Council declares six ‘safe 
areas’ for Bosnian Muslims: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Srebrenica, Žepa and 
Goražde. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
is established by UN Security Council resolution 827. Bosnian Serb leaders reject 
the Vance-Owen Plan. 
 
June – Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić proposes several partition deals 
that would leave Serbs about half of Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslim government 
rejects this plan. The Copenhagen criteria, the defining component of the EC’s 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are adopted. They are 
named after the European Council summit meeting in the Danish capital on 21 
and 22 June. WEU naval forces start participating in operations in the Adriatic 
and on the Danube to monitor the implementation of UN sanctions imposed on 
the former Yugoslavia. 
 
July – Krajina Serbs vote to join the Bosnian Serbs in ‘Greater Serbia’. 
 
September – Bosnian Muslims reject the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan to 
separate Bosnia into Muslim, Croat and Serb sections. 
 
November – On 1 November, the Treaty of Maastricht enters into force, thereby 
creating the European Union. On 9 November, Bosnian Croatian artillery units 
destroy the Stari Most (Old Bridge) in the Bosnian town of Mostar. 
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1994 
January – Yasushi Akashi is appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative. NATO offers all states participating in the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (including Albania) the opportunity to join the Partnership 
for Peace programme. 
 
February – A Bosnian Serb mortar shell kills sixty-eight people in Sarajevo’s 
central Markale market. The attack increases international attention for Bosnia 
and western nations threaten air strikes if the Bosnian Serbs do not stop shelling 
Sarajevo and withdraw their heavy weapons outside a perimeter established by 
NATO. On 28 February, NATO jets shoot down four Serb aircraft over central 
Bosnia. This is the Alliance’s first use of force since it was founded in 1949. 
 
March – A US-brokered peace accord on the constitution of the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is signed in Washington by Bosnian Muslims and Croats. 
The Krajina Serbs sign a ceasefire and agree to zones of separation between Serbs 
and Croats. At the end of the month, Bosnian Serb forces launch a big offensive 
against the safe area of Goražde. 
 
April – After UN military observers in Goražde are endangered by Serb shelling, 
UNPROFOR’s command requests NATO to use its air support for the defence of 
UN personnel. On 10 and 11 April, aircraft belonging to NATO states bomb 
Bosnian Serb positions. NATO threatens more air strikes if the Bosnian Serbs do 
not pull back from Goražde, Tuzla, Žepa, Bihać and Srebrenica. 
 
May – NATO starts air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions but halts them as 
UN peacekeepers are taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb army and used as 
‘human shields’. 
 
July – The European Union takes over the civilian administration in Mostar. 
 
August - September – Twice more, UNPROFOR calls in NATO warplanes to hit 
Serbian heavy weapons violating the exclusion zone around Sarajevo. 
 
October - December – The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues unabated. 
 
1995 
January – On New Year’s Day, former US President Jimmy Carter brokers a truce 
between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. It holds reasonably well for four months. 
 
March – Negotiations on a Europe Agreement with Slovenia start. 
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May – When Serbs ignore a UN order to remove heavy weapons from the 
Sarajevo area, NATO aircraft attack a Serb ammunition depot. In retaliation, 
Serbs begin shelling UN-protected ‘safe areas’. Krajina Serbs shell Zagreb. 
Croatia seizes Western Slavonia. 
 
July – Bosnian Serb forces enter the ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica (11 July) and Žepa 
(25 July) in Eastern Bosnia. In what is considered the first genocide in Europe 
since World War II, as many as 8,000 Bosnian Muslims are killed by Bosnian 
Serb forces under the command of General Ratko Mladić. Croatia expels ethnic 
Serbs from the Krajina region. Nearly seventy ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are 
sentenced to jail for setting up a parallel police force. Radovan Karadžić and 
Ratko Mladić are indicted for war crimes by the ICTY. 
 
August – On 4 August, General Ante Gotovina launches Croatia’s Operation 
Storm, an offensive against Serb-held territory in Eastern Croatia, killing hund-
reds and sending 150,000 Serb citizens fleeing. On 19 August, three diplomats 
from US Envoy Richard Holbrooke’s peace mission are killed when their 
armoured personnel carrier plunges off a road on Mount Igman, near Sarajevo. 
On 30 August, NATO warplanes begin a fierce air campaign against Serb 
positions around Sarajevo. 
 
September – The Serbs around Sarajevo hold their ground until 20 September. 
The foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY agree to the 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serb and Muslim-Croat entities. 
 
October – A ceasefire is declared in Bosnia. 
 
November – On 1 November, peace talks between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia 
and the FRY begin at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. On 
21 November, the leaders of the three countries agree to a settlement. Despite UN 
Security Council resolution 1021 on the lifting of the arms embargo against the 
states of the former Yugoslavia, the European Union continues its own embargo 
of 5 July 1991 against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY (until long after 
the start of the Kosovo crisis in 1998). 
 
December – The Dayton Peace Agreement is signed in Paris on 14 December 
and puts an end to a war that engulfed the Balkans for nearly four years, claimed 
more than 200,000 lives and displaced six million people. The accord gives 51 
per cent of Bosnian territory to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 per cent to 
the Bosnian Serbs. It also authorises a right for refugees to return to their pre-war 
homes and a NATO-led international force (IFOR) to implement the peace plan. 
With regard to Croatia, the Dayton Agreement recognises the country’s pre-war 
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borders (including Eastern Slavonia). On 20 December, NATO launches its 
largest military mission to date: Operation Joint Endeavour. 
 
1996 
February – In its Conclusions and Declaration on former Yugoslavia, the 
Council of the European Union calls for a broad regional approach and the 
negotiation and conclusion of association agreements, taking account of each 
country’s individual situation. 
 
March – The United Nations ends its embargo on small arms for the region. 
 
April – Bosnian Muslim and Croat officials sign a federation accord to jointly 
collect customs duties and have a common flag. The FRY and Macedonia 
establish diplomatic relations. The international community pledges to raise $1.2 
billion for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
May – The ICTY opens in The Hague. This is the first war crimes tribunal since 
the Nuremberg Trials after World War II. Radovan Karadžić is succeeded by 
Biljana Plavsić as leader of the Bosnian Serbs. 
 
June – The Europe Agreement with Slovenia is signed on 10 June. 
 
July – Leaders of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina sign an agreement to 
reduce their arsenals of heavy weapons. The Bosnian Federation approves the 
merger of the Muslim and Croat armies. Mass graves are discovered at Sre-
brenica. The EU Administration in Mostar is replaced by the Office of the High 
Representative of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by 
Carl Bildt. The Council of the European Union adopts Regulation (EC) No. 
1628/96 on reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the 
FRY (the so-called ‘OBNOVA’ Regulation). 
 
August – Serbia and Croatia agree to establish diplomatic relations. 
 
September – Bosnia-Herzegovina holds the first national (‘entity’) elections 
since the end of the war. Bosnian Muslim Alija Izetbegović becomes the first 
chairman of the new, rotating presidency to be shared with Serbian Momcilo 
Krajisnik and Croat Kresimir Zubak. 
 
December – Following UN Security Council resolution 1074, the European 
Union terminates all restrictions on economic and financial relations with the 
FRY. After Milošević annuls local election results, Serbs take to the streets in 
protests. 
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1997 
January – In Albania, the first of a series of pyramid savings schemes collapses, 
triggering riots. IFOR is renamed Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), a banned ethnic Albanian militia group, is suspected of 
having had a hand in the car bomb targeting the Serb rector of Priština University. 
A KLA leader is killed by the police. 
 
March – Albania is in chaos. The government loses control over the south of the 
country. Many in the army and police force defect and a million weapons are 
looted from depots. Evacuation of foreign nationals and mass emigration of 
Albanians begins. The government is forced to resign. The country descends into 
anarchy and a near civil war in which some 2,000 people are killed. President 
Berisha is deposed. Four people are injured when a bomb explodes in the centre 
of Priština, Kosovo. 
 
April – Authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1101, an Italian-led 
coalition of willing states under the flag of the OSCE deploys a military and 
humanitarian mission (Operazione Alba). Adoption by the Council of the 
European Union of its ‘Conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing 
the development of the European Union’s relations with certain countries of 
South-East Europe’, combining the Union’s regional and bilateral approach 
towards the countries of the Western Balkans. 
 
May – The WEU Council decides to send a Multinational Advisory Police 
Element to Albania (MAPE), as part of the efforts undertaken by the OSCE. 
 
July – The ICTY convicts Serbian police officer Dusan Tadić to twenty years in 
prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He is the first person to be 
found guilty by the Tribunal after a full trial. He appeals against the conviction. 
 
August - December – Operazione Alba draws to a close on 12 August. The first 
municipal elections since the end of the war take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
13 and 14 September. The Treaty of Amsterdam is signed on 2 October. The pro-
Western Milo Djukanović wins the November presidential elections in Montene-
gro. The December European Council of Luxembourg decides to convene 
bilateral IGCs in the spring of 1998 to begin accession negotiations with Slovenia 
and five other candidate countries. 
 
1998 
January – Milo Djukanović is inaugurated as president of Montenegro. 
 
February – Fighting erupts between the KLA and a Serbian police patrol in 
Likosane. 
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March – Between twenty and fifty ethnic Albanians are killed during battles in 
the Kosovar village of Prekaz. Ethnic Albanians vote in presidential and parlia-
mentary elections, but the elections are declared illegal by Belgrade. The 
European Union publishes its first sanctions list to impose travelling restrictions 
on senior FRY and Serbian representatives deemed to be responsible for repres-
sive action in Kosovo. 
 
April – A Serbian referendum opposes Western intervention in Kosovo. The 
United States sets new sanctions against Serbia, including the freezing of its 
leaders’ assets abroad. 
 
May – Peace talks between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are conducted as fighting 
continues. 
 
June – The Council of the European Union decides that all funds held outside the 
territory of the FRY and belonging to the governments of the FRY and/or Serbia 
are to be frozen. The Council also adopts the EU Code of Conduct on arms 
exports. 
 
July – Kosovo Albanians inaugurate their outlawed Parliament. Serbian police 
order legislators to disperse. 
 
August – Serbian forces capture the KLA stronghold of Junik. The United 
Nations calls for a ceasefire in Kosovo. 
 
September – NATO issues an ultimatum to Serbia to stop violence in Kosovo or 
face air strikes. The European Union imposes a flight ban against the FRY. 
 
October – The United Nations condemns massacres of Kosovo Albanians by 
Serbian troops. NATO threatens air strikes in spite of Russian protests. Holbrooke 
and Milošević engage in talks. Serbian forces appear to pull back, and the 
negotiations lead to the Kosovo Verification Agreement of 12 October: OSCE 
monitors will check whether violence has ended. 
 
December – The peace negotiations on Kosovo fail in Rambouillet, near Paris. 
 
1999 
January – Violence escalates in Kosovo. OSCE monitors discover the bodies of 
at least forty-five ethnic Albanians in Racak in southern Kosovo. ICTY’s Chief 
Prosecutor Louise Arbour is refused entry to Kosovo to probe the killings. NATO 
once again threatens air strikes. 
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February – Peace talks between Serbs and Albanians are again held in Ram-
bouillet. Kosovo Albanians conditionally accept a ceasefire and a draft accord in 
exchange for broad autonomy for Kosovo. The Serbs accept conditional auton-
omy. Serb forces expand in Kosovo. 
 
March – Peace talks resume in Paris. The Kosovo Albanians sign the accord, but 
Serbia rejects international peacekeepers on its territory and boycotts the event. 
OSCE monitors withdraw from Kosovo. In spite of last-minute diplomatic efforts 
to seek a peaceful solution, Serbia continues to reject any talk of NATO peace-
keepers in Kosovo. NATO launches air strikes against military targets of the 
FRY. Russia suspends cooperation with NATO. The FRY breaks off diplomatic 
relations with the United States, France, Germany and Britain. Hundreds of thou-
sands of ethnic Albanian refugees flee to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
 
April – The refugee crisis in Albania and Macedonia continues with the influx of 
as many as 20,000 people per day. The FRY closes refugee exit points. Mace-
donia refuses to let NATO and the United Nations set up more camps. NATO 
bombs hit a passenger train south of Belgrade and a convoy of ethnic Albanian 
refugees. The FRY rules out a foreign military force in Kosovo but says it is 
willing to discuss a civilian presence. The FRY breaks off diplomatic relations 
with Albania. Yugoslav and Kosovo Albanian troops exchange fire at the border. 
NATO missiles hit the headquarters of Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party, his 
private residence, Serbian State Television and the Defence Ministry in Belgrade. 
The European Union imposes an oil embargo on the FRY. 
 
May – On 1 May, the Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force. President Milošević 
is listed by the European Union under the visa ban adopted in March 1998. 
NATO missiles mistakenly hit a civilian bus north of Priština, the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade and a crowded bridge in central Serbia. NATO begins 
intensive bombing of the FRY’s electricity and water grids, disrupting supplies. 
The ICTY indicts President Milošević for crimes against humanity. On 17 May, 
EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs launch the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, stating their willingness to draw the countries of the region closer to the 
perspective of full integration into EU structures through a new kind of contrac-
tual relationship, ‘with a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam once the Copenhagen criteria have been met’. To this end, the 
European Commission initiates the European Union’s Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process (SAP) on 26 May. 
 
June – The FRY seemingly accepts a peace plan from the European Union and 
Russia but refuses to agree to NATO’s terms. NATO’s bombing campaign 
intensifies. Serb forces start their withdrawal from Kosovo. Redeployments in the 
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Preševo Valley cause thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee to Macedonia. On 10 
June, Serbian forces withdraw from Kosovo and NATO halts its seventy-eight-
day bombing campaign against the FRY. Russian peacekeepers from Bosnia enter 
Kosovo and take control of Priština airport. Ethnic Albanian refugees start to 
return home. The KLA promises to disarm. The Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe is endorsed at an international meeting held on the fringes of the Euro-
pean Council summit in Cologne, also on 10 June 1999. The Pact’s further 
development and implementation is vested in the OSCE. 
 
November – Boris Trajkovski’s win in the presidential elections is attributed by 
the opposition to mass electoral fraud among Albanian voters. The Montenegrin 
government introduces the German Mark as a parallel currency. 
 
December – Croatian President Tudjman dies of cancer. 
 
2000 
January – Serbian business man, paramilitary leader and indicted war criminal 
Arkan is assassinated in a Belgrade hotel. The Milošević government denies 
involvement, although rumours spread that Arkan was ready to provide evidence 
at the ICTY against Milošević. The first case tried in the ICTY ends. Following 
the appeals procedure, Bosnian Serb Dusan Tadić is sentenced to twenty years for 
crimes against humanity. 
 
February – Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo spar with UN troops over their protec-
tion of Kosovo Serbs. The new Croatian government promises to support internal 
democratic reforms and the independence of Bosnia rather than stimulate a separa-
tist movement among the Bosnian Croats. The Serbian Minister of Defence is 
assassinated. 
 
March – Serbia’s independent media are shut down by the government, and 
Serbia seals its border with Montenegro. Several Bosnian Serbs are arrested by 
NATO troops and charged with committing war crimes between 1992 and 1994 
in Bosnia. Meanwhile, the new Croatian government hands over to the ICTY a 
Bosnian Croat who had commanded irregular forces against Bosnian Muslims 
from 1993 to 1994. Street battles in Mitrovica in northern Kosovo result in the 
deaths of civilians and French peacekeepers. 
 
April – In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Social Democrats win the 
elections. The Serbian Democratic Party narrowly wins in the Republika Srpska. 
An ally of Milošević, the head of the Yugoslav airline company JAT, is shot 
death in Serbia. 
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May – The head of the Vojvodina regional government is shot dead. President 
Milošević blames the political opposition for the murder. The opposition holds 
rallies in favour of free elections. Milošević continues his crackdown on the 
independent media. Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovenia are among nine 
countries petitioning for NATO membership by 2002. A Serbian court convicts 
nearly 150 ethnic Albanians on terrorism charges stemming from the 1999 NATO 
bombings. President Milošević closes universities early. The security advisor to 
the Montenegrin president is shot dead. 
 
June – Elections in Montenegro are split. Although the pro-Western government 
of Milo Djukanović wins, pro-Milošević representatives win in predominantly 
Serbian areas. The Serb opposition figure Vuk Drasković survives an assassina-
tion attempt in Montenegro. Montenegro informs the United Nations that it does 
not wish to be represented by the FRY. The European Council at its summit in 
Santa Maria da Feira endorses its offer of future EU membership for the five 
countries of the Western Balkans by dubbing them ‘potential’ candidate coun-
tries. 
 
July – President Milošević adjusts the constitution of the FRY to reduce Monte-
negro’s power in the legislature and allow himself to run for re-election. 
 
September – Elections take place in the FRY. In spite of widespread fraud and 
the refusal by most Montenegrins and Kosovo Albanians to participate, opposi-
tion leader Vojislav Koštunica is elected. The Milošević government insists that 
the opposition’s ‘victory’ represents less than 50 per cent of the votes and 
declares that a second round of voting will take place in October. The opposition 
refuses to accept a second round and leads nationwide protests and strikes. 
 
October – Serb protesters storm the parliament building and official state media 
outlets in Belgrade. Milošević concedes power to Koštunica, who is sworn in as 
the new president. Alija Izetbegović, citing poor health, steps down from the 
Bosnian joint presidency. As the last of the wartime leaders, his decision marks a 
new era in Balkan leadership. The European Union lifts its flight ban and oil 
embargo completely. 
 
November – On 21 November 2000, the Zagreb Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of EU Member States and Western Balkan countries set the seal on 
the Stabilisation and Association Process by gaining the region’s agreement on 
the applicable set of objectives and conditions. The European Union lifts its 
financial sanctions against companies in the FRY. The assets freeze against listed 
individuals is continued. Montenegro adopts the German Mark as its exclusive 
currency. 
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December – The Montenegrin negotiation position on the future of the FRY is 
presented by Prime Minister Djukanović. The Community Assistance for Recon-
struction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme replaces 
OBNOVA as the Community’s funding instrument to support actions undertaken 




January – Federal President Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Djindjić 
present a reply to the Montenegrin position on the future of the FRY. Albanian 
guerrillas claim responsibility for a deadly rocket attack on a Macedonian police 
station. 
 
February – In Macedonia, construction begins of the disputed SEE University in 
Tetovo. A border demarcation agreement between the FRY and Macedonia is 
signed in Skopje. The Macedonian National Liberation Army (NLA) clashes with 
a military patrol. Both the European Union and NATO issue sharp warnings to 
Albanian leaders and call on all involved to isolate the extremists. The Parliament 
of the FRY passes an amnesty law for 650 ethnic Albanians held in jails since the 
1999 Kosovo war. On 21 February, the Treaty of Nice is signed. 
 
March – The Macedonian army calls for a general mobilisation and launches an 
offensive against the NLA’s stronghold of Tanuševci, near the border with 
Kosovo. The conflict spreads. 
 
April – On 9 April, the EC and their Member States sign the first SAA with 
Macedonia. The European Union uses the SAA to leverage the Macedonian 
authorities into negotiations with the NLA to solve the conflict by peaceful 
means. The European Union also concludes agreements with Macedonia and the 
FRY on the activities of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in 
these countries. Slobodan Milošević is arrested in Belgrade. The Serbian govern-
ment vows to try him at home rather than send him to The Hague. Survivors of 
Srebrenica storm UN headquarters in Sarajevo following reports that a Bosnian 
Muslim commander who defended the town would be charged with war crimes 
against Bosnian Serbs. 
 
June – At the end of June, Robert Badinter, François Léotard – the freshly 
appointed EU Special Representative in Macedonia – and US Special Envoy 
James Pardew are sent to Skopje to mediate in the negotiations on a ceasefire and 
a political agreement between the parties to the conflict. On the anniversary of his 
‘Field of Blackbirds’ speech in Kosovo, Slobodan Milošević is extradited to The 
Hague. Milošević refuses to cooperate and the ICTY issues a not guilty plea on 
his behalf. 
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July – A ceasefire agreement is breached by Albanian extremists. This causes the 
peace talks on Macedonia to stall. The European Union adopts punitive sanctions 
against the ethnic extremists. Fighting continues as government forces battle with 
Albanian rebels in the northern town of Tetovo. On 25 July, NATO secures a 
limited ceasefire agreement in and around Tetovo. The following day, the EU 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, 
and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, accompanied by the Chairman-in-
Office of the OSCE, Mircea Geoana, travel to Skopje to blow new life into the 
negotiations. 
 
August – On 13 August, the Macedonian government signs the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement with the Albanian rebels. A British-led NATO force enters the 
country to disarm the guerrillas (Operation Essential Harvest.). Bosnian Serb 
General Radislav Krstić is found guilty of genocide for his role in the July 1995 
Srebrenica execution of 7,000 Muslim men and boys. 
 
October – On 29 October, the EC and its Member States sign a second SAA, 
now with Croatia. 
 
November – The last EU sanctions against the FRY for its role in the Kosovo 
crisis are suspended, pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1367. 
 
December – Slobodan Milošević is charged with genocide by the ICTY. 
 
2002 
February – The trial of Slobodan Milošević opens, with the defendant repre-
senting himself. 
 
March – After more than one year of difficult trilateral negotiations among the 
governments of Montenegro, Serbia and the Federation, with Javier Solana as 
mediator, the ‘Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations between 
Serbia and Montenegro’ are agreed to and signed in Belgrade on 14 March. 
 
April – The Dutch Government resigns amidst a scandal over Dutch UN troops 
not preventing the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. 
 
May – Paddy Ashdown succeeds Wolfgang Petritsch as High Representative of 
the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
July – The presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY meet for the 
first time since the war. The countries pledge to cooperate on the repatriation of 
refugees and the fight against organised crime and assist each other in economic 
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development. The United States extends its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina amidst negotiations over Americans being granted immunity from 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court. 
 
October – Former Bosnian-Serb President Biljana Plavsić confesses to commit-
ting crimes against humanity during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war against Croats 
and Muslims. 
 
November – NATO invites Slovenia to join the alliance, along with other Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
 
December – NATO’s mandate for Operation Amber Fox comes to an end. 
Operation Allied Harmony secures the follow-up. 
 
2003 
January – As a follow-on mission to the United Nations’ International Police 
Task Force, the European Union launches its first-ever civilian ESDP operation, 
the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Negotiations on an SAA 
with Albania are opened by the Commission. 
 
February – On 4 February, the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
votes to rename the country Serbia and Montenegro and thereby adopts the new 
Constitutional Charter. The new federation includes a joint administration of 
defence and foreign affairs. The Constitutional Charter prescribes a three-year 
time period before any of the composite republics can hold a referendum on 
independence. Croatia applies for EU membership on 20 February. Plavsić is 
sentenced to eleven years in jail by the ICTY. 
 
March – The Treaty of Nice enters into force on 1 March. Serbian Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjić is assassinated in Belgrade on 12 March. Likely suspects 
are organised criminals with ties to Milošević. On 31 March, the European Union 
launches its inaugural military Operation Concordia in Macedonia as a follow-on 
to NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony. 
 
April – Slovenia and nine other countries meet in Athens to sign the fifth EU 
Accession Treaty. Mirko Sarović, the Bosnian Serb member of the tripartite 
presidency, is forced to resign following a scandal over military exports to Iraq. 
 
June – The EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki on 21 June acknowl-
edges that the SAP will remain the framework for the European course of the 
Western Balkan countries, ‘all the way to their future accession’. ‘The Thessalo-
niki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration’ is 
adopted to further strengthen and enhance the political visibility of the SAP. 
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July – After twenty months of work, the president of the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, presents the draft text of the EU 
Constitution to the EU Presidency. 
 
November - December – Political parties associated with nationalism in the 
1990s gain power in Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. HDZ, the party of the 
late Franjo Tudjman, wins more than 40 per cent of the seats in parliamentary 
elections in Croatia. In Serbia and Montenegro, the Serbian Radical Party of 
Vojislav Seselj walks away with the most votes. Seselj and Milošević both win 
seats in spite of being held by the ICTY on war crimes charges. Bosnian Serb 
commanders are convicted of war crimes for their part in commanding the siege 
of Sarajevo (1992-1994) and the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica. The European 
Union’s military Operation Concordia is replaced by the EUPOL Proxima police 
mission, in line with the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. 
 
2004 
March – Macedonia applies for EU membership on 22 March. In Kosovo, 
NATO is unable to prevent the eruption of riots between ethnic Albanians and 
Serbs, which last for four days and leave nineteen dead and at least ten Orthodox 
churches and 100 Serbian homes destroyed. The Council of the European Union 
adopts the first-ever European Partnerships with each of the Western Balkan 
states to guide them in their reform efforts towards accession. 
 
April – The SAA with Macedonia enters into force on 1 April. 
 
May – On 1 May, the European Union expands with ten new Member States, 
including Slovenia. 
 
June – The European Council grants candidate country status to Croatia. At its 
summit in Istanbul, NATO announces that SFOR will be replaced by an EU-led 
peacekeeping force by the end of 2004. 
 
October – Political leaders of both Serbia and Montenegro endorse the so-called 
‘twin-track’ approach whereby the European Union will deal with the two 
republics on policies that they conduct separately, while it will continue to work 
with the state union where the latter is the competent authority. The Commission 
relaunches the feasibility study on an SAA. After an IGC of more than a year, the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is signed in Rome on 29 October. 
 
December – As a follow-on from NATO’s SFOR, the European Union launches its 
second-ever military operation – EUFOR Althea – in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Paddy 
Ashdown sacks senior Bosnian Serb security officials accused of harbouring war 
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crimes suspects, including Ratko Mladić. The European Council agrees on a 
revised framework for every future round of accession negotiations. It requests 
the Council of Ministers to agree on a negotiating framework with a view to 
opening accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005, provided the 
country fully cooperates with the ICTY. 
 
2005 
January – In a wave of extraditions, half a dozen Bosnian Serb and Serb indict-
ees are transferred to the ICTY. 
 
February – The SAA with Croatia enters into force on 1 February. 
 
March – In an unprecedented move, the Council of the European Union decides 
on 16 March to postpone the granting of EU candidate country status to Croatia 
until the country fully cooperates with the ICTY. After having been indicted, 
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigns and surrenders to the ICTY. 
 
May - June – The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is rejected in 
French and Dutch referenda. The negative outcome plunges the European Union 
into a political crisis. During their summit on 16-17 June, political leaders steer 
clear of discussing further enlargement of the European Union. 
 
July – Sali Berisha returns to power as Prime Minister of Albania after winning 
the 3 July general elections. Despite the OSCE’s statement that the elections 
complied ‘only partially’ with democratic norms, the Commission is in favour of 
reviving the stalled SAA talks. Macedonia completes the legislative agenda set 
out in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 
 
August – Car bombs explode and two Serbs are killed in Priština, ahead of UN 
Special Envoy Kai Eide’s visit to Kosovo to evaluate the province’s progress in 
the last year and the chances of success of possible final status talks. 
 
October – On 3 October, the Council of the European Union decides to open 
accession negotiations with Croatia after being informed by the Chief Prosecutor 
of the ICTY that Croatia is cooperating fully with the Tribunal. The accession 
negotiations are officially launched in the early hours of 4 October. Four months 
into its ‘constitutional crisis’, the European Union reasserts its commitment to the 
Western Balkans. The opening of SAA negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro 
on 10 October marks the fifth anniversary of the democratic uprising that ousted 
Slobodan Milošević from the presidential seat. On 25 October, the Energy 
Community Treaty, the first-ever multilateral treaty in south-eastern Europe, is 
signed between the European Union and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, 
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Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and UNMIK on behalf of 
Kosovo. The UN Security Council endorses final status talks for Kosovo. 
 
November – On 10 November, the UN Security Council endorses the Secretary-
General’s intention to appoint Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy to lead the 
negotiations on the final status for Kosovo and establishes the guiding principles 
for the process as agreed to by the Contact Group. The Council of the European 
Union endorses the appointment of Stefan Lehne as EU Representative to support 
the UN Status Envoy in the implementation of his mandate. Ahtisaari kicks off 
the final status process with a fact-finding mission to Priština on 21 November. 
SAA negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina are officially opened on 25 Novem-
ber, in the same week that the world celebrates the tenth anniversary of the Day-
ton/ aris Peace Accords. 
 
December – Following the compromise reached on the financial perspective for 
2007-2013, the European Council grants candidate country status to Macedonia, 
but no date is set for the opening of accession negotiations. A decision on the 
country’s entry is linked to a future debate among the EU-25 on the Union’s 
future and its ability to absorb more newcomers. The European Union launches 
an EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia after the termination of the mandate 
of EUPOL Proxima. Former Croatian General Ante Gotovina is arrested in 
Tenerife and transferred to the ICTY. 
 
2006 
January – In the gun battle that ensues after the storming of a house in Bosnia, 
EUFOR troops apprehend Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Dragomir Abazović 
but kill his wife. On 21 January, Kosovo’s President Ibrahim Rugova dies. 
 
February – Christian Schwarz-Schilling succeeds Paddy Ashdown as High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 4 February, the three-year period 
mentioned in the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro as barring the 
composite republics from holding a referendum on independence lapses. The 
Montenegrin Parliament schedules a referendum for 21 May. On 10 February 
Fatmir Sejdiu is elected as the new president of Kosovo. On 20-21 February, the 
first round of direct negotiations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians on the 
final status of Kosovo takes place in Vienna under the auspices of UN Special 
Envoy Ahtisaari. The talks focus on decentralisation and are perceived to be 
largely constructive. After the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor tells the BBC that Mladić 
is within ‘immediate reach’ of the Belgrade authorities, the Council of the 
European Union gives Serbia and Montenegro a one-month deadline to send the 
war crimes suspect to the ICTY or else face ‘disruption’ of SAA negotiations. 
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March – On 11 March, Slobodan Milošević dies in his prison cell in The Hague, 
where he was on trial before the ICTY on sixty-six charges of crimes against 
humanity (including two counts of genocide). His death and burial spark contro-
versy in Serbia. EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs, assembled in Salzburg at a 
Gymnich meeting with political leaders from the Western Balkans, greet 
Milošević’s death by reaffirming their support for the Thessaloniki Agenda and 
the SAP, thereby renewing their promise that the countries of the region will join 
the European Union. In Kosovo, Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi steps down over 
accusations by members of his coalition of being ineffective. He is replaced by 
former KLA commander Agim Çeku, against whom Serbia has issued an arrest 
warrant. Solana rebuffs Serbian opposition to the move and welcomes the 
replacement. On 17 March, technical talks on the future status of Kosovo resume 
in Vienna. They focus on cultural and religious heritage, minority rights and the 
economy, local financing and relations between municipalities. Although no 
agreement is reached, all participants describe the talks as constructive. On 18 
March, the main political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina reach agreement on 
constitutional reform for the country. 
 
April – The European Union recognises that controversies over the death and 
burial of Milošević have complicated Belgrade’s efforts to transfer Mladić to The 
Hague and gives Belgrade one extra month to transfer the war-time general. Thus, 
the political round of SAA negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro goes ahead 
as planned on 5 April. On 26 April, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliament fails to 
adopt the proposed constitutional amendments. Swan song for Serbia and 
Montenegro as the country withdraws from the Eurovision song contest after a 
row over its competition to find a song for this year’s event. 
 
May – As Belgrade is unable to meet the deadline over the transfer of Mladić, the 
European Union cancels the political round of SAA talks with Serbia and 
Montenegro. The US suspends $7 million in assistance to Serbia over Mladić. On 
21 May, 55.5 per cent of the Montenegrin voters choose for independence in a 
nation-wide referendum that is considered to be free and fair. Elements in the 
Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina renew calls for the independence of the 
Republika Srpska. 
 
June – In a special session on 3 June, the Parliament of Montenegro passes a 
declaration on the independence of the Republic of Montenegro. On 5 June, the 
Parliament in Belgrade declares the Republic of Serbia the legal successor to the 
state union and gives all state institutions forty-five days to complete the separa-
tion. On 12 June, the Council of the European Union recognises that the 
parliamentary acts were taken in conformity with the arrangements and the 
procedures foreseen in the Belgrade Agreement and with Article 60 of the 
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Constitutional Charter. The SAA Albania is signed in the margins of the Council 
meeting. An interim agreement is also signed, allowing for the trade part of the 
SAA to take effect immediately. On 15 June, Serbia recognises Montenegro as an 
independent state. On 21 June, Montenegro joins the OSCE. 
 
July – The Energy Community Treaty enters into force on 1 July. Despite violent 
incidents within the Albanian community during the election campaign, the 
OSCE considers the general elections in Macedonia to have been conducted in a 
generally peaceful and orderly manner. Serbia presents the European Union with 
a new action plan for achieving full cooperation with the ICTY, including ways 
and means to arrest and extradite Mladić. European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso states that the European Union might endorse the SAA with 
Serbia by the end of 2006 if the action plan is fully implemented. Taking note of 
the fact that all Member States have recognised the Republic of Montenegro as a 
sovereign and independent state, the Council of the European Union decides to 
extend bilateral political dialogue under the SAP at ministerial level. On 24 July, 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council authorises the Commission to negotiate an 
SAA with Montenegro. At the same time, the Council amends the negotiating 
directives for the SAA with Serbia, in order to take account of Montenegro’s 
independence. After seven unsuccessful rounds of technical negotiations, the final 
status talks in Vienna convene at the highest political level under the chairman-
ship of Martti Ahtisaari. The positions of the Serbs (everything but independence) 
and the Kosovo Albanians (nothing but independence) remain far apart. 
 
August – Serbia’s Prime Minister Koštunica insists that Kosovo will remain part 
of Serbia, even if that means delaying EU membership. On 7 August, talks on the 
future of Kosovo resume at a technical level, with the Kosovo Serb delegation 
boycotting the negotiations. Following comments by Martti Ahtisaari that, with 
regard to Kosovo, Serbs as a nation would have to pay the price for their past and 
the policies of ex-President Milošević, Koštunica declares that his government 
will start a diplomatic campaign against the serious preconceptions of the UN 
envoy. At the ICTY in The Hague, one of the biggest joint trials tackling the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre kicks off. 
 
September – The European Union expresses concern over looming instability in 
Macedonia amid strong dissatisfaction on the part of ethnic Albanians, whose 
preferred party has been excluded from the new government. General elections in 
Montenegro are largely conducted in line with international standards. During a 
week of heightened tensions in Kosovo, Contact Group ministers meeting in New 
York reaffirm their commitment that all possible efforts will be made to achieve a 
negotiated settlement in the course of 2006 and make it clear that they would 
permit neither Belgrade nor Priština to ‘unilaterally’ block negotiations to decide 
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the disputed territory’s future status. But attempts to reach a negotiated solution in 
Vienna remain deadlocked. On 26 September, Bulgaria and Romania receive the 
go-ahead from the European Commission to enter the European Union as planned 
on 1 January 2007. Commission President Barroso tells the European Parliament 
an institutional settlement for the European Union should precede any further 
enlargement. European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn adds that it 
should be possible to reach such an institutional settlement in 2008, that is to say, 
before the next likely enlargement of the European Union with candidate country 
Croatia. Also on 26 September, SAA negotiations with Montenegro are resumed. 
The talks continue from the point at which they were interrupted by the European 
Union in May under the twin-track approach for the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. During a special session, Serbia’s Parliament unanimously approves 
a new constitution that claims sovereignty over the UN administered province of 
Kosovo. 
 
October – For the first time since 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina holds general 
elections on 1 October that are managed entirely by its own institutions. The 
elections are largely in accordance with international standards. In Montenegro, 
outgoing Prime Minister Djukanović, whose coalition won the September 
elections, retires from government. In an unprecedented move, Slovenia blocks 
the opening of EU-Croatia negotiations on the next chapter of EU legislation by 
not giving its approval to a European Commission screening report on the extent 
to which Croatia’s fisheries legislation conforms to the acquis. Slovenia argues 
that Croatia has failed to implement a bilateral border agreement on the basis of 
which Slovenian fishermen should be able to enjoy a right of passage through 
Croatian waters. Meanwhile, Ahtisaari says he doubts a negotiated settlement for 
Kosovo is possible as the two parties remain diametrically opposed on the final 
status issue. At its 16-17 October meeting, the Council of the European Union 
again chides Serbia for not doing enough to transfer Mladić to the ICTY. Solana 
and Rehn present a joint report on a reinforced EU presence in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina after the envisaged closure of the Office of the High Representative on 30 
June 2007. In the weekend of 28-29 October, voters in Serbia and Kosovo are 
asked whether or not they support the adoption of a new constitution which states, 
inter alia, that Kosovo is a ‘constituent’ part of Serbia. Other innovations include 
the abolition of the death penalty, a ban on human cloning and the safeguard of 
minority rights. The one million ethnic Kosovo Albanians boycott the referen-
dum. Despite international warnings not to prejudge status talks and amid 
allegations of electoral fraud, Prime Minister Koštunica declares that 51.6 per 
cent of the total population has voted in favour of the new constitution. Solana 
congratulates Serbia for the orderly conduct of the referendum, but recalls that 
Kosovo’s status will be determined by the ongoing status process. 
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November – Political leaders in Serbia issue calls for UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari to step down, accusing him of writing biased proposals on the future 
status of Kosovo. EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs welcome Ahtisaari’s decision, 
after consulting with the Contact Group, to delay the presentation of his recom-
mendations on the future of Kosovo in order to avoid inflaming tension ahead of 
Serbia’s elections on 21 January 2007. Kosovo’s Prime Minister Agim Çeku 
warns that if the United Nations does not proclaim independence soon, then local 
institutions will do it themselves. In turn, Bosnian Serb officials warn that a 
unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s independence by the ethnic-Albanian 
leadership could provoke a similar move in the Republika Srpska. Representa-
tives of several international organisations caution political leaders in the region 
against unilateral moves. On 8 November, in its annual enlargement package, the 
European Commission recommends holding off on EU enlargement with the 
Western Balkans until the ‘medium to long term’, urging all six states in the 
region to do more on political and economic reform before the accession process 
can move forward. On 28 November, UNMIK police and local security forces use 
teargas to disperse thousands of ethnic Albanian protesters in Priština. At its Riga 
summit on 29 November, NATO Heads of State and Government declare that the 
Alliance intends to extend further invitations to Albania, Croatia and Macedonia 
to join NATO at the next summit (in the spring of 2008) if these countries meet 
NATO standards. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are invited to join 
the Partnership for Peace programme. On 30 November, the Commission 
launches negotiations on readmission and relaxing the visa regime for the citizens 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia and relaxing the visa 
regime for the citizens of Albania. 
 
December – The SAA Interim Agreement between the EC and Albania enters 
into force on 1 December. Montenegro wraps up technical negotiations on its 
SAA with the European Union. The fifth and final round of technical talks on an 
SAA between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EC are held in Sarajevo. EU Commis-
sioner Olli Rehn says that Bosnia-Herzegovina must implement key reforms 
(especially restructuring of the police sector) before SAA negotiations can be 
formally concluded. Russia hints at its intention to use its veto power in the UN 
Security Council to block a plan for the future status of Kosovo if it does not 
satisfy both the ethnic Albanian majority and Serbia. The Joint Committee of 
SFRY Successor States convenes in Zagreb to divide assets of sixty-seven 
diplomatic and consular offices. Survivors and relatives of the victims of the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre criticise the Dutch government for giving medals to UN 
peacekeepers who served in the city. Most of the 300 Dutch military staff of 
EUFOR will leave Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 2007. On 14 December, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia join NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme. After seven months of intense negotiations, the prime ministers of 
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south-eastern European countries and territories sign a new Central European 
Free Trade Agreement on 19 December. At its ‘enlargement’ summit, the 
European Council agrees that the Commission’s ‘enlargement strategy based on 
consolidation, conditionality and communication, combined with the European 
Union’s capacity to integrate new members, forms the basis for a renewed 
consensus on enlargement’. While deciding to delay the opening of eight of the 
thirty-five chapters in the accession negotiations with Turkey, due to the coun-
try’s continued failure to open up its ports and airports to ships and planes from 
Cyprus, the European Union ‘keeps its commitments towards the countries that 
are in the enlargement process’, according to the summit conclusions. The 




January – On 1 January, Bulgaria and Romania accede to the European Union. 
Thirteen ‘old’ Member States and one of the ten that joined in 2004 invoke their 
right to impose transitional arrangements in the field of the free movement of 
workers. After a stalemate of more than a year, the twelve political parties that 
make up the governing coalition in Albania reach a deal on electoral reforms, 
clearing the way for local elections in February. On 21 January, Serbia holds 
general elections that are declared to have been conducted in a free and fair 
manner. With 28.5 per cent of the vote, the ultranationalist Radical Party emerges 
as the biggest party, but pro-EU parties gather enough votes to establish a 
coalition government. On 28 January, a bomb explodes in the Kosovar town of 
Gnjilane, damaging a building but causing no injuries. On 29 January, Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling announces that he will step down as High Representative for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina when his mandate expires on 30 June. On 31 January, the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina strips the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina of their symbols (flag, anthem and coat of 
arms) because the entities failed to harmonise them with the constitution. 
 
February – On 2 February, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presents his 
proposals on a settlement for Kosovo’s final status. During a press conference, he 
states that his draft proposal is a reflection of the fifteen rounds of direct negotia-
tions and twenty-six missions to Belgrade and Priština over the previous year. 
NATO, the European Union and the United States welcome Ahtisaari’s plan and 
firmly support the his intension of holding intensive talks with and between the two 
sides on the basis of the proposals. Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica rejects the 
plan. The government of Kosovo supports it. Russian Minister of Defence Ivanov 
warns that Russia might veto a Security Council resolution granting independence 
to Kosovo. Two persons die and seventy are injured when UNMIK police officers 
use excessive force in their efforts to disperse a violent demonstration on 10 
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February. On 12 February, the Council of the European Union voices strong 
support for Ahtisaari’s plan and welcomes the Commission’s readiness to resume 
SAA negotiations with a new Serbian government, provided it shows a clear 
commitment to and takes concrete and effective action for full cooperation with the 
ICTY. On 16 February, Serbia’s new Parliament rejects the Ahtisaari plan. In a 
series of bomb explosions, a blast in Priština on 20 February damages three 
UNMIK vehicles. A group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army claims 
responsibility for the attack. On 21 February, Ahtisaari starts a two-week consul-
tative process with delegations from Belgrade and Priština on all aspects of his draft 
comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status settlement. On 26 February, a new 
blast damages seven vehicles of the OSCE in Peja. On 27 February, 20,000 people 
gather in front of the US embassy in Belgrade to protest against Ahtisaari’s 
settlement proposal for Kosovo. On the same day, the International Court of Justice 
clears Serbia of direct responsibility for the 1995 ‘genocide’ in Srebrenica but rules 
that it breached international law by failing to stop the killings and punish those 
responsible. The ICJ criticises Serbia for failing to cooperate fully with the ICTY 
and hand over war crimes fugitives, including Ratko Mladić. Also on 27 February, 
the Council of the European Union decides on a transition plan for the Union’s 
EUFOR Althea military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. EUFOR will scale down 
its troops to 2,500. Tensions during the local elections in Albania on 18 February 
prompt a response from the European Union, with both Olli Rehn and Javier Solana 
saying that the shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of the elections reflect 
the need for improved cross-party cooperation to fulfil Albania’s international 
commitments. 
 
March – On 1 March, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, 
which reviews Bosnia-Herzegovina’s stabilisation, extends the mandate of the 
Office of the High Representative until the end of June 2008, due to the still 
potentially volatile situation in the country. Stating that the ICJ’s ruling demon-
strated that blame lies with individuals who must be brought to justice, Serbian 
President Tadić calls on all war crimes fugitives to surrender to the ICTY. The 
government of the Republika Srpska officially expresses its deep regret for the 
crimes committed against non-Serbs during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and condemns all persons who took part in these crimes. Former 
Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj returns to The Hague to stand trial before the 
ICTY. On 2 March, talks between Belgrade and Priština in Vienna end without 
success. About 4,000 activists of the Self-Determination Movement march past 
UNMIK’s headquarters in a peaceful demonstration on 5 March. Following a 
final meeting between the two parties in Vienna on 9 and 10 March, Ahtisaari 
says that the one-year long negotiations have been exhausted, leaving no ‘com-
mon ground’ between Belgrade and Priština. The talks shift to the UN Security 
Council. On his tour through the Western Balkans in mid-March, Olli Rehn issues 
an usually stark warning to Macedonia, criticising all political parties for ‘ob-
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struction [of] and lack of faith’ in the democratic decision-making process. In 
Tirana, the Enlargement Commissioner calls upon political parties to develop a 
democratic culture of compromise. In Sarajevo he issues a tough warning to 
political leaders to push forward with the required (.police) reforms or see the 
SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina put on ice. On 16 March, Rehn and the Montene-
grin Prime Minister Sturanović initial the SAA between the European Union and 
Montenegro. Ahead of his visit to Podgorica, Rehn says that the Union expects 
Montenegro to draft a constitution in line with European standards and strengthen 
its institutions and judicial and administrative capacities. After two months of 
bickering over who will fill the post of prime minister, negotiations on a coalition 
start in Serbia. On 25 March, the European Union celebrates the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Treaties of Rome. On 26 March, the High Representative in Bosnia-
Herzegovina annuls Parliament’s approval of the new government of the Federa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 30 March, the ICTY transfers its first war crimes 
case to Serbia. In a five-day span, three bomb attacks against Serb-owned houses 
take place in Mitrovica. An informal meeting of EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
in Bremen sees Slovakia, Romania and Greece raise serious objections to the 
European Union’s endorsement of Ahtisaari’s proposals for supervised independ-
ence for Kosovo, with Spain, Italy and Cyprus also voicing reservations on the 
blueprint. 
 
April – On 3 April, the UN Security Council holds its first meeting on the status 
plan for Kosovo. It later decides to send a fact-finding mission to the region. On 
10 April, the Serbian war crimes court sentences four Serb paramilitaries filmed 
killing Bosnian Muslims during the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Six months of 
negotiations are concluded with the initialling of agreements between the EC and 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro on visa facilitation 
and the readmission of persons. On 17 April, the former Minister of the Interior 
of Macedonia goes on trial before the ICTY. The Osjiek County Court indicts 
Croatian MP Glavas and six others for war crimes committed against Serb 
civilians in 1991. Ongoing EU disunity over Kosovo’s future knocks the topic off 
the agenda of the General Affairs Council on 23 April. Russia threatens to use its 
veto on an EU and US-backed draft UN resolution to give independence to 
Kosovo, denting hopes that it might abstain from the vote. Deputy Prime Minister 
Titov explicitly states that a decision based on Ahtisaari’s draft proposals will 
‘not get through’ the Security Council without the support of both Belgrade and 
Priština. A delegation of the Security Council completes a five-day fact-finding 
mission to Brussels, Vienna, Belgrade and Kosovo on 28 April saying that the 
Security Council will need more time to make a decision on the province’s future. 
 
May – Hard-line nationalists pledge allegiance to a new paramilitary force (the 
Guard of Tzar Lazar) willing to fight and die to save Kosovo as part of Serbia. 
Twenty-seven volunteers are arrested by the Serbian police. The international 
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community expresses concern about the election of the leader of the Serbian 
Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolić, as speaker of the Serbian Parliament. Nikolić 
calls on Russia to devise a way to unite countries that are against US hegemony 
and the European Union, saying that Serbia should not become a member of the 
European Union. On 11 May, the United States and the European Union circulate 
a draft resolution endorsing independence for Kosovo under international 
supervision. Russia circulates elements for a rival resolution calling for additional 
talks between Belgrade and Priština and increased efforts to meet the UN-
endorsed ‘Standards for Kosovo’. Montenegro joins the Council of Europe as its 
forty-seventh member. Serbia takes over the two-month chairmanship of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Decisions on transforming the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe into a regionally-owned Regional 
Cooperation Council are taken at the meeting of the Pact’s Regional Table and 
the SEECP in Zagreb. The Belgrade regional court finds twelve men guilty of the 
2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjić. Agreements on visa facilitation and 
readmission between the EC and Serbia are initialled. After one week in the post, 
Nikolić resigns as speaker of the Parliament in a deal between opposition parties 
to form Serbia’s next government. Twenty-eight minutes before the expiration of 
the deadline, the Serbian Parliament approves a new government led by Vojislav 
Kostunica. Olli Rehn confirms that the European Union is ready to resume SAA 
talks with Serbia as soon as the new government’s programme on cooperation 
with the ICTY is ‘rigorously being implemented’. On 31 May, General Zradvko 
Tolimir, a close aid to Ratko Mladić accused of helping to plan and carry out the 
Srebrenica massacre, is arrested in Bosnia, apparently after close cooperation 
between Serbian and Bosnian Serb authorities. With his arrest, only five of the 
161 people indicted by the ICTY remain at large. Russia dismisses the slight 
changes in a new draft UN resolution tabled by the United Kingdom, saying it 
wants more negotiations to see if the ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo can 
reach an agreement. 
 
The question of Kosovo’s future status, relations with Serbia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina’s assumption of greater ownership of its governance will continue to top 
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STRENGE LIEFDE: DE BETREKKINGEN VAN DE EUROPESE 




Het uiteenvallen van het voormalige Joegoslavië aan het begin van de jaren 
negentig was één van de meest tragische gebeurtenissen in Europa sinds het einde 
van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Na bijna een halve eeuw vrede barste het geweld in 
Zuidoost Europa in alle hevigheid los, net op het moment waarop twaalf staten in 
West Europa hun georganiseerde samenwerking hernieuwden met de oprichting 
van de Europese Unie, gekenmerkt door welvaart, democratie en nauwere 
integratie. Vanaf het begin van de oorlog in Joegoslavië stonden de Europese 
Gemeenschappen – en later de Europese Unie – op de bres om een escalatie van 
het gewapende conflict te voorkomen. En hoewel sommigen verklaarden dat 
Europa’s gloren eindelijk was aangebroken, kwam de crisis in Joegoslavië op het 
verkeerde moment voor de Unie. Haar handelspolitieke gewicht ten spijt, bleken 
ook de nieuwe bevoegdheden voor de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschappelijk 
buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid bleken onvoldoende om het bloedige tij te keren. 
Tot op heden is geen enkele staat, mondiale of regionale organisatie erin geslaagd 
om een conflict in de Westelijke Balkan alleen op te lossen. Alleen de samen-
werking tussen verscheidene gespecialiseerde internationale organisaties – VN, 
NAVO, OVSE, Raad van Europa en EU voorop – heeft bijgedragen tot een 
stabieler en veiliger klimaat in de regio. 
Helaas kampen de post-communistische samenlevingen van de Westelijke 
Balkan nog steeds met socio-economische problemen die een bedreiging vormen 
voor de stabiliteit van Zuidoost Europa: wijdverbreide georganiseerde misdaad, 
hoge werkloosheid en duizenden ontheemden. Bosnië-Herzegovina en Kosovo 
vormen de epicentra van de geteisterde regio. Hun gangstereconomieën zijn in 
concentrische cirkels uitgedeind via netwerken van vluchtelingen, wapen-, drugs- 
en mensensmokkelaars en handelaren op de zwarte markt. Aangewakkerd door 
deze problemen zijn terugkerend geweld in Kosovo en herhaaldelijke oproepen 
tot onafhankelijkheid door politieke leiders in de Republika Srpska het bewijs dat 
verdere veranderingen in de samenstelling van de regio niet uitgesloten mogen 
worden. Duurzame vrede in de Westelijke Balkan is niet mogelijk zolang niet alle 
etnisch-territoriale conflicten zijn opgelost. 
In een poging om een akkoord te bereiken tussen Belgrado en Priština over de 
uiteindelijke status van Kosovo heeft de internationale gemeenschap de potentieel 
meest explosieve van Pandora’s spreekwoordelijke dozen geopend. Daarmee 
werd bevestigd wat al lang gemeengoed was in Zuidoost Europa: de etnisch-
territoriale status quo is onhoudbaar in delen van de Westelijke Balkan. Echter, 
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een internationale ‘oplossing’ voor de Kosovo-kwestie die niet wordt gesteund 
door beide partijen in het conflict kan een domino-effect in andere delen van de 
regio tot gevolg hebben, met alle desastreuze gevolgen van dien. Een terugkeer 
naar geweld kan worden voorkomen door duurzame oplossingen te vinden voor 
de resterende status- en constitutionele kwesties (Kosovo én Bosnië-Herzegovina) 
en door de regio als geheel te bewegen van het stadium van internationale protec-
toraten en zwakke staten tot integratie met NAVO en de EU. Dit scenario 
veronderstelt niet alleen een continuering van het hervormingsstreven van de 
betrokken landen, maar ook een hernieuwd engagement van de euro-atlantische 
veiligheidsorganisaties.  
Een continuering van de internationale aanwezigheid in sommige delen van de 
Westelijke Balkan is dus noodzakelijk. Echter, de internationale gemeenschap is 
momenteel slecht georganiseerd, waardoor ze inboet aan slagkracht. Ad hoc 
instanties zoals de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger in Bosnië-Herzegovina, UNMIK in 
Kosovo, het Stabiliteitspact, regionale missies van NAVO, OVSE, Raad van 
Europa en de EU werken onafhankelijk van elkaar en zijn soms contraproductief. 
Hoewel deze jungle van grotendeels ongecoördineerde missies wellicht onvermij-
delijk was – gezien de verschillende tijdstippen waarop ze in meerdere landen 
door verscheidene actoren onder verschillende omstandigheden werden 
gecreëerd, dit kluwen heeft de internationale gemeenschap verhinderd om een 
effectieve strijd te voeren tegen de elementen die de vooruitgang van landen 
tegenhouden. De tijdelijke internationale instanties vormen een extra laag tussen 
de staten van de Westelijke Balkan en de euro-atlantische organisaties waartoe ze 
willen behoren. De huidige structuur van de internationale aanwezigheid remt de 
effectiviteit van haar acties, verwart locale actoren wanneer verschillende 
signalen worden uitgestuurd door verscheidene internationale organisaties met 
overlappende of concurrerende mandaten, en dreigt een bron van ergernis te 
worden voor nationale en regionale overheden die hun burgers willen aantonen 
dat ze, na jaren van moeilijke keuzes, eindelijk volwaardige partners zijn 
geworden in de pijlers van de Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur. Als deze 
verwarring en ergernis blijven bestaan of toenemen, dan zal de impact van de 
internationale steun afnemen, net op het moment waarop de landen in de regio 
een reeks van harde noten moeten kraken. Het tijdstip is dus aangebroken om de 
institutionele architectuur van de internationale aanwezigheid in de Westelijke 
Balkan te wijzigen. 
Het doel van dit boek is het opstellen van een realistische agenda gericht op 
een efficiënter en effectiever gebruik van internationale middelen om de 
Westelijke Balkan te stabiliseren. Als zodanig tracht deze studie een praktische 
bijdrage te leveren aan de verbetering van het beleid en de acties van de inter-
nationale gemeenschap in de regio in plaats van nieuwe theorieën of concepten te 
ontwikkelen voor een beter begrip van dergelijk beleid of dergelijke acties. In de 
zoektocht naar de juiste mix van beleid en instrumentarium ter stabilisering van 
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de Westelijke Balkan, en in een poging om een evenwicht te vinden tussen een 
globale benadering van de regio en microanalyses, gaat deze studie niet erg diep 
in op specifieke juridische vraagstukken betreffende het karakter van de Europese 
en de internationale rechtsorde. Het doel is te bepalen met welke beleids- en 
rechtsinstrumenten de internationale gemeenschap, en de EU in het bijzonder, 
dient te zijn uitgerust om de Westelijke Balkan te bewegen van het post-conflict 
stadium tot toetreding tot de NAVO en de EU. Het resultaat van deze benadering 
is dat de specifiek juridische dimensie van deze studie eerder versnipperd is. 
Dit boek verdedigt de stelling dat, van alle internationale actoren die actief 
zijn in de regio, alleen de Europese Unie over alle benodigde instrumenten en 
politieke vaardigheden beschikt om een alomvattende veiligheidsstrategie te 
ontwikkelen voor de stabilisering van de Westelijke Balkan. Met het oog op het 
creëren van een zone van veiligheid, stabiliteit en welvaart, van Ierland in het 
westen tot Griekenland in het zuidoosten, legt de EU zich al enige jaren toe op de 
uitvoering van een strategie die gericht is op de socio-economische stabilisatie en 
associatie van Albanië, Bosnië-Herzegovina, Kroatië, Macedonië, Montenegro en 
Servië (inclusief Kosovo). Het optuigen van een geloofwaardig gemeenschap-
pelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid en het ontplooien van de allereerste EU-
vredesmissies hebben de ‘tool-kit’ van de EU recentelijk vervolledigd. Afgezien 
van een unieke combinatie van bevoegdheden op de terreinen van economie, 
veiligheid en recht heeft de EU ook het geld, het belang en de politieke wil om de 
ruigste van haar naburige regio’s te stabiliseren. Bovendien heeft de EU een 
enorme aantrekkingskracht op de regio. Alle landen van de Westelijke Balkan 
willen immers lid worden van de EU. Het perspectief van EU-lidmaatschap is de 
krachtigste motor voor economische, juridische en administratieve hervormingen 
in deze landen. Omwille van haar bijzondere positie heeft de Unie ook de grootste 
morele verplichting om de Westelijke Balkan te stabiliseren. De EU draagt de 
zware verantwoordelijkheid om ervoor te zorgen dat het stabilisatie- en 
associatieproces tot een goed einde wordt gebracht. Als de Unie faalt in haar 
pogingen om de Balkan te ‘brusseliseren’, dan riskeert Brussel te worden gebal-
kaniseerd. 
Het voorgaande betekent niet dat de Europese Unie zou moeten proberen de 
Westelijke Balkan op eigen houtje te stabiliseren. De Unie heeft niet dezelfde 
expertise en ervaring op die terreinen waarop andere internationale organisaties 
zich hebben gespecialiseerd. Bovendien kan de EU het zich niet veroorloven om 
al haar aandacht en middelen in te zetten voor het stabiliseren van de Westelijke 
Balkan. De regio is meer gebaat met een door de EU geleide en gecoördineerde 
internationale actie, gemandateerd door de VN Veiligheidsraad en gericht op EU-
lidmaatschap van de betrokken landen. 
Ter ondersteuning van de stelling dat de EU een leidende rol zou moeten 
spelen in een meer coherente en effectievere internationale actie gericht op het 
creëren van duurzame vrede en stabiliteit in de Westelijke Balkan, en ter 
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beantwoording van de hoofdvraag hoe de strategieën en specifieke acties van de 
Unie in die zin versterkt zouden kunnen worden, geeft het boek een beschrijving 
en evaluatie van de rol en impact van de – voor de regio – belangrijkste 
universele en regionale organisaties (VN, NAVO, OVSE en Raad van Europa) 
(hoofdstuk 2). In de drie daarop volgende hoofdstukken wordt de rol en impact 
van de EU geanalyseerd. Dit gebeurt allereerst door een beschouwing van de 
externe (economische en financiële) betrekkingen van de EU (het sanctiebeleid in 
het bijzonder) vis-à-vis het voormalige Joegoslavië en (de politieke leiders van) 
de opvolgerstaten in de periode van 1991 tot 2001 (hoofdstuk 3); vervolgens door 
middel van een analyse van de ontwikkeling van het gemeenschappelijk 
buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid van de EU voor de regio, ruwweg vanaf 2001 
(hoofdstuk 4); en tenslotte door middel van een evaluatie van de toepassing van 
het conditionaliteitsbeginsel door de EU in het stabilisatie- en associatieproces, 
het (.pre-)toetredingsproces voor de Westelijke Balkan (hoofdstuk 5). 
Op grond van deze analyses concludeert het boek dat de internationale 
aanwezigheid in de Westelijke Balkan het best kan worden georganiseerd rondom 
het stabilisatie- en associatieproces van de EU, geflankeerd door de input van 
gespecialiseerde internationale organisaties: NAVO voor wat betreft het bieden 
van militaire veiligheid; de OVSE in de sfeer van conflictpreventie tussen natio-
nale minderheden (middels de Hoge Commissaris voor Nationale Minderheden) 
en als toezichthouder bij verkiezingen (ODIHR); de Raad van Europa als 
toezichthouder op het respect voor mensenrechten en als adviesorgaan voor 
constitutionele kwesties (door middel van de zgn. Venice Commission); en de 
VN voor, onder andere, de hulp bij terugkeer van vluchtelingen (hoofdstuk 6). Bij 
gebrek aan een panacee voor de stabilisatie van de Westelijke Balkan, pleit deze 
studie voor een beleid van ‘strenge liefde’ (tough love): de EU dient streng doch 
rechtvaardig te zijn in het aanhalen van de banden met de Westelijke Balkan. Een 
consequente houding in conflictpreventie, crisismanagement en de begeleiding 
van het transformatieproces van de betrokken landen is cruciaal voor de 
vooruitgang van de hele regio. De Unie moet de landen duidelijk maken dat ze 
zullen worden beloond als ze voldoen aan strikte voorwaarden en dat beloningen 
zullen worden ingehouden of verworvenheden zullen worden ingetrokken als ze 
hervallen in slechte gewoonten. 
In die context is het duidelijk dat het stabilisatie- en associatieproces versterkt 
moet worden om de uitdagingen die de regio stelt aan te gaan. Momenteel is het 
proces te zwak om falende staten onder internationale administraties om te 
vormen tot sterke kandidaten voor EU-lidmaatschap. Deze studie stelt dat de 
implementatie van bovengenoemde strategie van ‘strenge liefde’ zal worden 
vergemakkelijkt door drie belangrijke verbeteringen in het stabilisatie- en 
associatieproces: 
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(i) de status van ‘potentiële’ kandidaatlanden dient te worden omgezet in een 
reëel perspectief op EU-lidmaatschap voor alle landen van de Westelijke 
Balkan. Daartoe dient te worden besloten kort nadat de laatste stabilisatie- en 
associatieovereenkomst in werking zal zijn getreden en alle aanvragen voor 
EU-lidmaatschap zijn ontvangen. Een nieuw ‘Helsinki moment’ (cfr. de 
historische beslissing van de Europese Raad in 1999 in Helsinki om Turkije 
kandidaatstatus toe te kennen) zou reeds in de tweede helft van 2008 kunnen 
plaatsvinden; 
(ii) de negatieve bijwerkingen van een benadering van ‘strenge liefde’ moeten 
worden opgevangen door flankerend beleid. Een mooi voorbeeld daarvan is 
de recente versoepeling van de visa-voorschriften voor onderdanen van 
landen uit de regio, waardoor het voor hen makkelijker is te reizen, te 
studeren en zaken te doen in de EU. Een dergelijke maatregel voorkomt dat 
de voorlopig erg beperkte financiële en technische bijstand voor potentiële 
kandidaatlanden (Albanië, Bosnië-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Servië (incl. 
Kosovo)) onder het nieuwe instrument voor pretoetredingssteun van de Unie 
ertoe leidt dat de onderdanen uit die landen verder worden benadeeld ten 
opzichte van de onderdanen van de naburige kandidaatlanden (Kroatië en 
Macedonië); 
(iii) de regionale samenwerking dient te worden versterkt door economische 
samenwerking. Met hun kleine en onaantrekkelijke economieën zijn de 
landen van de Westelijke Balkan op elkaar aangewezen om grote buiten-
landse investeringen aan te trekken. De uitbreiding van de Centraaleuropese 
vrijhandelszone, de inwerkingtreding van het Verdrag ter oprichting van een 
Energiegemeenschap voor natuurlijk gas en elektriciteit, en het streven naar 
een Europese Gemeenschappelijke Zone voor de Luchtvaart doen wat dat 
betreft denken aan de integratiepogingen van de zes oorspronkelijke lidstaten 
van de Europese Gemeenschappen in de jaren vijftig. Op politiek vlak zal de 
overname van het Stabiliteitspact door de Regionale Samenwerkingsraad aan 
het begin van 2008 een belangrijke ontwikkeling zijn ter versterking van de 
greep die de landen van de regio hebben op hun eigen sociaal-economische 
ontplooiing en de ontwikkeling van een regionale infrastructuur, samen-
werking op het vlak van justitie en politie, veiligheid en dergelijke. 
 
Daarnaast is ook een modernisering van het politieke proces in de Westelijke 
Balkan noodzakelijk. De nadruk moet meer gaan liggen op de toekomst, terwijl 
op constructieve wijze dient te worden omgegaan met het woelige verleden. In 
het boek worden drie uitdagingen besproken: de bescherming van de rechten van 
minderheden in vormen van gedecentraliseerde overheden; het nastreven van 
rechtvaardigheid en verzoening met betrekking tot oorlogsmisdaden; en de strijd 
tegen de georganiseerde misdaad. Ten aanzien van het tweede punt staat de EU 
momenteel voor de vraag hoe de voorwaarde van samenwerking met het 
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Tribunaal voor het voormalige Joegoslavië te vertalen in een proces te versterking 
van Europese waarden in de hele regio. Hoewel het besluit van de Raad van de 
EU om de opening van toetredingsonderhandelingen met Kroatië uit te stellen 
(toeval of niet) werd gevolgd door de arrestatie en transfer van oud-generaal 
Gotovina naar Den Haag, bleek een vergelijkbaar besluit om onderhandelingen 
over een stabilisatie- en associatieakkoord met Servië te bevriezen tot 
overlevering van oud-generaal Mladić allerminst effectief. Het falen om één 
enkele verdachte te arresteren en over te brengen naar Den Haag kan niet langer 
als argument worden gebruikt om de verdere ontwikkeling van een heel land in 
het stabilisatie- en associatieproces te blokkeren, althans niet voor wat betreft het 
sluiten van een stabilisatie- en associatieakkoord. In de fase die voorafgaat aan de 
toetredingsonderhandelingen zou de EU meer belang moeten hechten aan de 
bereidheid en pogingen van de nationale, lokale, rechterlijke, religieuze en 
pedagogische autoriteiten om de oorzaken en gevolgen van het verleden te 
onderzoeken en te bespreken. Recente berechtingen van oorlogsmisdadigers door 
Bosnische, Kroatische en Servische rechtbanken stemmen in deze context tot enig 
optimisme. De EU mag zich niet alleen laten leiden door de tunnelvisie van de 
Hoofdaanklager van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. 
De Europese Unie heeft op korte tijd heel wat bereikt. Terwijl het in de jaren 
negentig nog toekeek hoe de Balkan brandde, was het de VS, door middel van de 
NAVO, die het vuur bluste. Pas na afloop van de Kosovo-oorlog vond de EU haar 
stem om verder geweld in Zuidoost Europa een halt toe te roepen. De Unie nam 
economische en financiële sancties aan, bemiddelde vredesakoorden, stuurde haar 
allereerste civiele en militaire operaties uit en overzag economische, juridische en 
administratieve hervormingen in de landen van de Westelijke Balkan. Maar 
ondanks het alomvattende karakter van haar acties wordt de strategie van de Unie 
jegens de Westelijke Balkan gekenmerkt door verwarring. Terwijl de EU de 
betrokken landen uitvoerig het hof maken in een poging om nauwere banden aan 
te gaan, schroefde ze tegelijkertijd haar financiële steun aan de regio terug. De 
EU riskeert de opbrengsten uit haar investeringen in de regio te verliezen. 
Ondanks de huidige malaise in het integratieproces en de moeilijkheden om 
overeenstemming te bereiken over institutionele hervormingen om de uitgebreide 
Unie beheersbaar te houden, mogen de EU-lidstaten er niet voor terugdeinzen om 
de landen van de Westelijke Balkan een realistisch toetredingsperspectief te 
bieden. In tegenstelling tot de nieuwe lidstaten van Centraal- en Oost-Europa 
vormt de Westelijke Balkan immers nog steeds een bedreiging voor de veiligheid 
in (Zuidoost) Europa. Nu met het zoeken naar een finale status voor Kosovo het 
vormingsproces van (natie-)staten in de Westelijke Balkan in een eindfase is 
aanbeland is het zaak om de regio als geheel voort te bewegen van het stadium 
van falende staten naar dat van kandidaatlidstaten voor de euro-atlantische 
organisaties. Alleen een intensieve poging gebaseerd op een strenge doch recht-
vaardige toepassing van het conditionaliteitsbeginsel zal leiden tot de integratie 
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van de Westelijke Balkan in de Europese mainstream. Dit betekent dat de betrok-
ken landen substantiële beloningen zullen krijgen bij het vervullen van strikte 
politieke, economische en juridische voorwaarden, maar dat zulke beloningen 
zullen worden ingehouden of verworvenheden zullen worden ingetrokken als zij 
in slecht gedrag vervallen. Een dergelijke strategie van ‘strenge liefde’ heeft niet 
alleen een praktische, maar ook een symbolische betekenis: als de landen van de 
Westelijke Balkan met succes worden geïntegreerd in de EU, dan zou daarmee 
een einde worden gemaakt aan de mogelijkheid van een heropflakkering van de 
gewapende conflicten die zo typerend waren voor de recente geschiedenis van het 
Europese continent. Bovendien zou het ‘ontmijnen’ van de Balkan een uniek 
succes betekenen voor de Europese Unie in haar pogingen om een meer promi-
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